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ABSTRACT 
This thesis exanunes two critical issues in the law of carriage of goods by sea. First, does English 
law giye adequate means of recovery against sea carriers to all parties whose goods may be lost or 
danlaged during sea carriage? More, specifically, how do third parties claiming under combined 
tr~ulsport bills of lading or under bills of lading issued by a non- vihicale owning carrier (NVOC) 
fall within the provisions of COGSA 1992? These issues will be analysed in the first two chapters 
of the thesis with the related issue of cargo owner's liability to the carrier being addressed in the 
third chapter. If the answer is negative, what are the obstacles such claimants might face in 
proceeding non- contractually in bailment or negligence or by way of implied contract? This issue 
is addressed in chapter five. Electronic documentation raises difficult and novel issues relating to 
title to sue of a different order to the issues relating to paper documents, which are addressed in the 
first three chapters. These will be addressed in the forth chapter. Secondly, does English law have 
3dequate mechanisms for enabling sub- contractors of the sea carrier to rely on the exceptions and 
limitations ayailable to the head carrier under the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules? This question is 
addressed in the sixth chapter where I shall analyse the doctrines of bailment and sub- bailment on 
tenns, the Himalaya clause and circular indemnity clauses, as well as the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999. 
This thesis is focused on doctrinal rather than empirical issues. The main sources will therefore be 
decided cases and commentary in academic journals, textbooks and monographs. Throughout, 
English law will be compare with two other systems that address the two questions under 
consideration in the thesis. First, there is US law. I have chosen this because I wanted to compare 
English law with solutions adopted by another law jurisdictions. I chose the US law because there 
is a greater difference between its solutions and those adopted by common wealth jurisdictions 
such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong. Not only does the US law on privity 
of contract, with its doctrine of third party beneficiary differ significantly form its English law 
equivalent, so, too, does the statutory solution adopted in the US. The Pomerene Act has many 
points of differences from COGSA 1992 (and Bills of Lading Act 1855 that preceded it) in the way 
it grants third parties rights of suit under bills of lading. It also has no provisions regulating the 
liability of third parties to the carrier. This issue is left to the common law and the doctrine of 
implied contract. The differences lllake US law a potentially fruitful point of comparison to the 
solutions adopted by English law to the issue of title to sue. The other point of reference is the 
Draft Outline Instrument on Carriage of Goods by Sea, which is currently being developed under 
auspices of UNCITRAL which is continuing the work started by the CM!. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The first problem addressed in this thesis is the relationship between the carrier and third 
party owners of the cargo being carried. Those who suffer loss are generally not the parties 
who have made the initial contract of carriage with shipowner. Recovery from the 
shipowner is more attractive than recovery from other possible parties due to ability to get 
security for the claim by the arrest process. The basic privity problem has been solved by 
COGSA 1992 but there are still lacunae, especially as regards electronic bills, bills issued 
by nvocc' s, combined transport bills. Claimants may also have problems when a 
charterer's bill is issued or when damage occurs after transhipment and the head bill 
contains a clause providing for carrier's responsibility to cease on discharge of goods from 
its vessel. If claimants fall outside COGSA 1992 how can they obtain rights of suit? Non-
contractual actions, implied contract, 1999 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act all offer, 
at best, a partial solution to this question .. Even if a claim falls within the 1992 Act, the 
way the Act operates may not always be satisfactory. For example, there is uncertainty as 
to the operation of s. 2 (4), whether Leduc v Ward still applies, and whether physical 
possession of the bill is essential to show that you are a 'lawful holder'. Also, there remain 
problems with the operation of s. 3 as regards transfer of liabilities. Did The Berge Sisar 
reach the right conclusion as regards the position of intermediate holders? Should liability 
as regards dangerous cargo ever be imposed on third parties? What exactly is the legal 
effect of 'freight pre- paid' clausing? 
The second problem is the need to prevent non- contractual claims going outside 
the scope of COGS A 1971 or its equivalents, i.e. the Hague Rules. US COGSA 1936. The 
policy justification for this was put as follows by Lord Steyn in The Nicholas H 
"The dealings between shipowners and cargo owners are based on a 
contractual structure, the Hague Rules, and tonnage limitation, on which 
the insurance of international trade depends ...... The result of a 
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recognition of a duty of care in this case will enable cargo owners, or 
rather their insurers, to disturb the balance created by the Hague Rules 
and Hague- Visby Rules as well as by tonnage limitation provisions, by 
enabling cargo owners to recover in tort against a peripheral party to the 
prejudice of the protection of shipowners under the existing system". 
How successful is doctrine of bailment and sub- bailment on terms on achieving this goal? 
Both problems will be examined from the following perspectives. Existing English 
law. US law, by way of comparison. Modifications made by COGSA 1971. Modifications 
made by way of the Hamburg Rules. Modifications made by way of the UNCITRAL 
Outline Draft Instrunlent on Transport Law (the 'Draft Instrument'). The purpose of the 
Draft Instrument is to consider areas of transport law, not at present governed by 
international liability regimes and thereafter to draft provisions to be incorporated in the 
proposed instrument including those relating to liability. Because of the multipurpose of 
the instrument, further work is now going on under the auspices of UNCITRAL. 
Chapter one will study the significance of the bill of lading as between the original 
parties the carriage contract. Firstly, the bills' function as evidence of the carriage contract 
will be examined under both bills of lading and charter- parties. Secondly, the 
identification of the contractual carrier under the bill of lading will also be discussed by 
way of comparison with US law the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument. Thirdly, the 
bills' function as documents of title will be examined to determine whether other 
documents, such as 'received for shipment' bills, could be considered as documents of 
title. Lastly, the different types of bills of lading will, briefly, be studied, as some of these 
types will, latter, be considered in more detail, to see whether these documents are 
included in any of the statutory modifications to the privity of contract doctrine. 
In chapter two, transferring of contractual rights under COGSA 1992 will be 
discussed in relation to bills of lading, sea waybills and ship's delivery orders. The 
shipper's rights, as an original party to the carriage contract, are extinguished, which will 
2 
reveal some situations whereby the shipper would be denied a remedy against the 
wrongdoer carrier. I will also consider whether the title to sue problem created by Grant. v. 
Norway has been solved by virtue of s. 4 of the 1992 Act. The inclusion of other 
documents within the provisions of COGSA 1992 will also be considered, particularly in 
the light of the uncertainty as to whether these documents qualify as documents of title. All 
these issues will be considered by way of comparison with US law and the Draft 
Instrument. 
The operation of s. 3 of the 1992 Act as regards transfer of liabilities to the holder 
of a bill of lading will be discussed in chapter three. The position of an intermediate holder 
will also be examined under both s. 3 (1) and s. 2 (5). Both the question of whether such a 
holder would be liable for the shipment of dangerous cargo and the effect of 'freight pre-
paid' clausing will be discussed in more detail. These issues will be considered by way of 
comparison with the US law and the Draft Instrument. 
The lacunae of electronic bills of lading will be discussed in chapter four since, to 
the date, the Secretary of State has not used his powers under s. 1 (5) of the 1992 Act to 
regulate electronic bills. The status of an electronic bill of lading must, therefore, be 
ascertained by reference to the common law. The Bolero bills of lading will be examined 
under the Bolero system in comparison its equivalent under the Draft Instrument. I shall 
also examine the UNCITRAL Modal Law on Electronic Bills of Lading as well as the CMI 
Rules on Electronic Bills of Lading. 
Notwithstanding the substantial improvements made by COGSA 1992, there will 
still remain some claimants who fall outside its ambit. Such claimants will need to find 
alternative means of making recovery from the carrier. Therefore, the implied contract 
doctrine, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, liability in negligence and the 
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doctrine of bailment on terms will all be examined in chapter five. The discussion will 
conclude with a comparison between with the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument. 
The need to prevent non- contractual claims from being the means of 
circumventing the carrier's exceptions and limitation of liability under COGSA 1971 will 
be discussed in chapter six. The doctrine of bailment and sub- bailment on terms, the 
Himalaya clause and Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 will therefore be 
examined as judicial and statutory attempts to resolve this problem. The thesis will 
examine the various problems that still remain in confining non- contractual claims within 
the framework of the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules. For example, why do jurisdiction 
clauses within a sub- bailment on terms but not a bailment on terms? Can a 'Himalaya' 
clause be redrafted so as to extend the protection of such clauses to sub- contractors? Can a 
claimant take free of the terms of any sub- bailment by basing its claim exclusively on the 
general duty of care in negligence? The discussion will initially be by way of comparison 
with US law, and will then conclude with a comparison with the Hamburg Rules and the 
Draft Instrument. 
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CHAPTER ONE: CONTRACTS FOR THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA 
Before examining how third parties may obtain contractual rights of suit under a bill of 
lading, one first needs to consider the contractual significance of the bill of lading as 
between the original parties to the contract of carriage. 
1. 1. BILL OF LADING AS EVIDENCE OF THE CARRIAGE CONTRACT 
The contract of carriage can be an express contract made between the shipper and the 
carrier before the loading starts, but it can, also, be an implied contract arising out of the 
acts of the shipper in tendering the goods for loading and the acts of the carrier in receiving 
the goods for shipment on board of the vessel. 1 It was held in Union Industrielle et 
AJaritime . v. Petrosul International Ltd., (The Roseline),2 that there was no contractual 
relationship at all between the seller and the carrier if, in such case, the bill is not made out 
to the order of the seller, but names the buyer's bank as consignee. However, the decision, 
with respect, is to be doubted because the bill of lading in such case is prima facie evidence 
of the contract between the person named as shipper and the carrier for delivery of the 
goods to the consignee to whose order the bill is made out, or to such other person as the 
seller may direct. In Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex ltd, Lord Goff said that "There is 
doubt whether a similar conclusion [The Roseline] would be reached in English Law". 3 
Moreover, where the ship is chartered by the owner to a charterer, and then sub- chartered, 
by the charterer to the shipper, the relationship between the shipowner and the shipper, to 
whom the bill of lading may be issued, will be governed by the terms of the bill of lading. 
Therefore, it was held in Heinrich Hanna & Co. BV. v. Fairlight Shipping Co. Ltd., that 
"Bills of lading were taken which named a specific port and, furthermore, they were taken 
1 See Cooke, J., (et al), Voyage Charter, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., 1993, p. at 375, and Devlin 
J., in Pyrene .v. Overseas Containers Ltd., [1954] 2 Q.B. 402 at pp. 426- 427. The implied contract was 
Devlin's alternative basis for his finding of a contract between fob seller and shipowner; his preferred basis 
was that of agency. 
2 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 18 at 22- 23. 
3 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 at 5. 
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In terms which created a new contractual nexus directly between Andre and the 
shipowners. This is not the situation where the bills of lading, when issued, were mere 
receipts as between the parties to the charter- party. The bill of lading does create a fresh 
nexus which did not previously exist. Therefore, they can not be treated as documents 
having no contractual significance; nor can the exercise of asking for and taking bills of 
lading in this form be regarded as insignificant". 4 
The contract of carriage comes into the existence before the issuing of the bill of 
lading, but the carrier and the shipper are aware that the goods will be carried according to 
the terms of the bill of lading customary in the trade. Subsequently, the terms of the bill of 
lading will be the terms of the carriage contract between the consignee and the carrier, 
where the bill of lading has been transferred to the consignee or endorsee. While it is 
admissible, as between the carrier and the shipper, to show that there are differences 
between the terms of the bill and the terms of the contract of carriage,5 this is not the case 
as regards the endorsee or the consignee.6 In these circumstances the bill of lading is the 
carriage contract and not merely evidence of its terms.7 
1. 1. 1. CARRIAGE OF GOODS CONTRACT EMBODIED IN BILLS OF LADING 
Every standard liner bill of lading contains the terms on which the goods are to be carried 
and delivered to their destination. However, the relationship between the shipper and the 
carrier is not regulated solely by the terms in the bill of lading, which is only evidence of 
the terms of their contract. Therefore, one of the parties can prove that the terms are partly 
4 [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 231 at 235- 236. 
5 The Ardennes, [1951] 1 K.B. 55. 
6 Leduc .v. Ward, [1888] 2 Q.B.D. 475. 
7 For general details see Ivamy, H. E. R., Payne and Ivamy's Carriage of Goods by Sea, 13th Edition, 
London and Edinburgh: Butterworths 1989, at p. 81. 
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contained elsewhere, as in oral promises by the carrier. Thus, in Crooks. v. Allan,8 Lush J. 
expressed the view that, 
A bill of lading is not the contract but only the evidence of the contract, and 
it does not follow that a person who accepts the bill of lading which the 
shipowner hands him, necessarily, and without regard to circumstances, 
binds himself to abide by all its stipulations. If a shipper is not aware when 
he ships them, or is not informed in the course of the shipment, that the bill 
of lading which will be tendered to him will contain such a clause, he has a 
right to suppose that his goods are received on the usual terms, and to 
require a bill of lading which express before those terms.9 
Thus, where the goods are lost or damaged before the bill of lading is issued, the 
shipper has a remedy against the carrier for breach of the carriage contract which was 
concluded before the issuing of the bill of lading. Moreover, the shipper can prove that the 
terms of the bill of lading do not comply with the terms of the initial carriage contract, 
between himself and the carrier, by submitting oral evidence to establish the precise terms 
of the contract. In The Ardennes, 10 the plaintiff was anxious to receive the consignment of 
mandarins from Carte gena to London, before 1 Dec., in order to avoid a threatened rise in 
import duty. The plaintiff explained that to the shipping agents who gave an oral 
commitment that the vessel would sail direct to London on the ground that the loading 
process finished on 22 Nov. But, at the same time, the vessel had a cargo for Antwerp and 
the bill of lading which was issued contained a liberty clause which entitled the vessel to 
call at any intermediate ports on the voyage to London. The vessel reached London on 4 
Dec., as a result of calling at Antwerp, and the import was duty raised and there was a 
considerable fall in the market price of oranges due to an influx of other cargoes. 
Therefore, the plaintiff sought to recover these losses by way of damages for breach of the 
carriage contract, and the defendants sought to rely on the terms of the bill of lading which 
contained a liberty clause to call at any intermediate port. The court held that the oral 
8 [1879] 5 Q.B.D. 38. 
9 Ibid. at 40- 41. 
10 See supra th. 5. 
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evidence was admissible to establish the original terms of the carriage contract. Lord 
Goddard C J., added, 
It is, I think, well settled that a bill of lading is not, in itself, the contract 
between the sh~powner a~d the shipper of goods, tho~rh it has been said to 
be excellent eVIdence of Its terms: Sewell. v. Burdick ,per Lord Bramwell 
and Crooks. v. Allan}~. The contract has come into existence before the bill 
of lading is signed; the latter is signed by one party only and handed by him 
to the shipper, usually after the goods have been put on board. No doubt if 
the shipper finds that it contains terms with which he is not content, or does 
not contain some terms for which he has stipulated, he might, if there were 
time, demand his goods back; but he is not, in my opinion, thereby 
prevented from giving evidence that there was in fact a contract entered into 
before the bill of lading was signed different from that which is found in the 
bill of lading or contained some additional term. He is not a party to the 
preparation of the bill of lading, nor does he sign it. 13 
However, the shipper is responsible for filling in the copy of the bill of lading, and so he 
will have the opportunity to check its terms. Also, it is not easy for the shipper to discharge 
the burden of proof, where he is challenging the accuracy of the terms of the bill of 
I d· 14 a lng. 
But when the bill of lading is issued and indorsed for value to a bona fide third 
party, the terms of the carriage contract will be solely the terms of the bill of lading. The 
carrier, thus, cannot allege and prove that the terms of the carriage contract are different 
from those in the bill of lading. Thus, in Leduc. v. Ward, 15 the plaintiff sought to recover 
damages for a consignment which had been lost off the mouth of the Clyde. It argued that 
the unjustified deviation to Glasgow prevented the defendants from relying on perils of the 
sea exception in the bill of lading. In reply, the defendants argued that the shippers were 
aware at the time of shipment that the vessel was going to call at Glasgow. The Court of 
Appeal held that the plaintiff could recover damages on the ground that the deviation was 
11 [1884] A.C. 74 at 105. 
12 [1879] 5 Q.B.D. 38. 
13 See supra fn. 5 at 59- 60. 
14 See Wilson, J. F., Carriage a/Goods by Sea, 4th Edition, Longman/ Pearson Education 2001, at p 135. 
15 See supra fn. 6. 
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not pernlitted by a teffi1 of the bill of lading contract, and that the teffi1S of the carriage 
contract were solely those set out in the bill of lading. 
1. 1. 2. CARRIAGE OF GOODS CONTRACT EMBODIED IN 
CHARTERPARTIES 
Under nOffi1al practice, the bill of lading will be issued and signed by the master or any 
other agent of the shipowner. What is the precise status and the effect of the bill of lading 
where the carriage contract is embodied in a charterparty, specially when the charterer of 
the vessel, at the same time, is also the shipper of the goods? The relationship between the 
charterer, the shipowner and the cargo owner needs more explanation. 
If the bill of lading is issued to a charterer who is the shipper of the goods, it 
operates only as a receipt and the relationship between the shipowner and the charterer is 
governed only by the teffi1S of the charterparty, unless a teffi1 of charterparty provides that 
the teffi1S of the charterparty may be modified or superseded by the teffi1S of the bill of 
lading. Furtheffi1ore, the relationship between the charterer and the shipowner will be 
governed by the teffi1S of the charterparty, even where the bill of lading has been indorsed 
to the charterer by the shipper of the goods. In President of India . v. Metcalfe,16 the 
charterer was bound by an arbitration clause in the charterparty, despite the fact that the 
bill of lading which was indorsed to him by the shipper did not contain such clause. In the 
hands of the charterer the bill was a mere receipt and for this reason the Hague- Visby 
Rules will not apply to a bill of lading in the hands of the charterer. Article I (b) states that 
the Rules apply only where the bill of lading regulates the relationship between the carrier 
and the holder of the bill of lading. But the parties to a charterparty, by agreement. between 
themselves, can incorporate the Hague- Visby Rules in their charterparty. Sometimes, the 
incorporation of the Hague- Visby Rules in the charterparty leads to conflict between the 
16 [1970] 1 Q.B.D. 289 at 290. 
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existing tenus of the charterparty and the provisions of the Hague- Visby Rules. Thus, the 
coulis have tried to resolve this problem by giving effect to the real intention of the parties 
to the contract. As the Rules will not have the 'force of law' in this situation, art. III (8) 
will not operate. I? It is therefore possible for an express clause to prevail over a provision 
in the Rules. Thus, in Metalfer Corporation. v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd.,18 an express 
30 days- time limit, arbitration clause, prevailed over the one-year time limit in art. III (6) 
of the incorporated Rules, paramount clause. 
However, where the buyer is the charterer of the vessel, for the purpose of taking 
delivery of the goods, and the seller takes the bill of lading in his own name and for his 
own order, the relationship between the seller and the shipowner will be governed by the 
tenus of the bill of lading. Where the bill of lading is indorsed to the buyer (charterer), the 
tenus of the charterparty will govern the relationship between the buyer and the shipowner, 
by way of exception to the general principle. 19 
Where the goods have been shipped by a third party in a chartered vessel, there are 
two problems facing the shipper where the goods are lost or damaged in transit. First, the 
identity of the carrier, in particular whether the shipowner or the charterer is the carrier 
under the contract. Secondly, the precise tenus of the contract of carriage. 
1. 1. 2. 1 Who is the Carrier? 
In respect to the identity of the carrier, the cargo owner will be confused where the bill of 
lading is issued under a charterparty. It is vitally important to know who the carrier is 
17 COGSA 1971, by virtue of s. 1 (6), provides that "Without prejudice to Article X (c) of the Rules, the 
Rules shall have the force of law in relation to-
(a) any bill of lading if the contract contained in or evidenced by it expressly provides that the Rules shall 
govern the contract, and 
(b) any receipt which is a non- negotiable document marked as such if the contract contained in or evidenced 
by it is a contract for the carriage of goods by sea which expressly provides that the Rules are to govern the 
contract as if the receipt were a bill oflading, ... ". 
18 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 632. 
19 Usually the relationship between the shipowner and the endorsee is governed by the terms of the bill of 
lading. 
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because the cargo owner must sue the carrier within the one-year limit under art. III (6) of 
the Hague- Visby Rules and under English law only one party is liable as a carrier under 
one carriage contract.20 However, the bill of lading is often issued by the charterer, but is 
signed by or for the master. The question is whether the owner or the charterer is the party 
to the bill of lading contract. The shipowner will be regarded as the carrier, despite the 
existence of the charterparty contract, because he is still responsible for the management of 
the ship and the master signs any bill of lading as agent for him. This remains the position 
where the terms of the charterparty states that the master is authorised to sign the bill of 
lading on behalf of the charterer.21 Under a demise charterparty the master will sign the bill 
of lading on behalf of the charterer not the shipowner. In Baumwoll Manufactur von Carl 
Scheibler . v. Furness,22where the ship was under a demise charter and the charterers 
appointed their own crew including the master. The House of Lords held that the bills of 
lading were not signed on behalf of the shipowner and the charterparty was by demise, 
despite the fact that, there was use of the word "demise" on the face of the bills of lading. 
If the charterer contracts with the shipper as principal and issues his own bill of lading, he 
will also be regarded as the carrier. The charterer may be treated as the carrier, if he signs 
the bill of lading without any indication that he is acting either as agent to the master, or 
the owner of the vessel. Everything will depend on the terms of the bill of lading and the 
construction of documents as a whole. 
In general a bill of lading signed by the master would be considered as a 
shipowner's bill of lading on the basis of the prima facie rules that the master is the 
shipowner's servant or agent and so he has, if not actual, an apparent authority to bind the 
shipowner by his signature. It was concluded in The Manchester Trust, Ltd . v. Furness, 
20 See The Antares, See supra fu. 5 at 429, where it was held that art. III (6) is given the force of law by 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 and it is applied to unauthorised carriage of goods on deck. 
21 The Manchester Trust, Ltd .v. Furness, Withy & Co, Ltd., [1895] 2 Q.B. 539. 
22 [1893] A.C. 8. 
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TVithy & Co, Ltd., that the a clause in the charterparty relating to the master signing bills of 
lading as an agent for the charterers would not be effective against the holder of the bill of 
lading. The effect of the reference to the charterparty, in the bill of lading, "is to 
incorporate so much of the charterparty as relates to the payment of freight and other 
conditions to be performed on the delivery of the cargo". 23 The position might have been 
different had the incorporating words in the bill been wide enough to incorporate that 
clause. Thus, Carver suggests that "if the bill of lading had been so drafted as to have 
incorporated the charterparty agency clause, either by express reference or by general 
words of sufficient width to bring about this result". 24 
A bill of lading signed by the charterer or his agent 'on behalf of the master or the 
owner' would also prima facie be a shipowner's bill of lading unless the signature 
indicates that it was intended to take effect as a charterer's bill. The Court of Appeal in The 
Rewia,25 held that the bill of lading signed for the master could not be a charterer's bill of 
lading unless the carriage contract was made with the charterers alone and the person who 
signed the bill had authority to sign and did that on behalf of the charterers and not the 
owners. The authority of the signer, which was actual, was derived from clause 53 of the 
head charter which provided that "It is understood that the master will authorise Charterers, 
or their agents, to sign Bills of Lading on his behalf provided the Bills are made up in 
accordance with Mate's and Tally Clerk's receipts".26 The Court of Appeal in W. & R. 
Fletcher (New Zealand) Ltd. and Others . v. Sigurd Haavik Aksjeselskap and Others (The 
Vikjrost),27 held that the charterer had an actual authority to sign the bills of lading on 
behalf of the master, by virtue of clause 13 of the head charter. Also, the charterer was 
23 [1895] 2 Q.B. 539 at 545. 
24 See Sir Guenter Treitel and Reynolds, F.M.B., Carver on Bills of Lading, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2001, at para. 4- 032 and, also, see para. 4- 038. 
25 [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 325 at 333. 
26 Ibid. at 329. The Court of Appeal distinguished The Elder Dempster, [1923] 1 K.B. 420, on the grounds 
that the charterers there not only used their own form of bill of lading but were shipowners in their own right 
and had chartered in additional tonnage. 
27 [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 560. 
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expressly authorised to sub- let the vessel to a sub- charterer, by virtue of clause 19 of the 
head charter, without any restrictions as to the terms of the sub- letting, and so "by 
necessary implication the head charter authorised the charterer in case of such a sub-
letting to put the sub- charterer in the same position as to signature of bills of lading as the 
charterer was under the head charter".28 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the 
sub- charterer had an implied authority to sign bills of lading and so to bind the 
shipowners. 
However, Sheen J., held in The Nea Tyhi,29 that a distinction must be made 
between the master issuing a bill of lading in respect of goods which have in fact not been 
shipped, as in Grant. v. Norway, and the master issuing a bill of lading which states that 
the goods are under deck when in truth they are on deck. In the former case the master has 
no authority to sign such bill, while in the latter case he has ostensible authority on the 
basis that the shipper would not be able to know that the statement is erroneous. By 
analogy, he held that the charterers' agents had an ostensible authority to sign the bills of 
lading on the master's behalf and so to bind the shipowners to the contract contained or 
evidenced by the bills. Sheen 1., justified his view, as follows, "if I had to choose whether 
the shipowner or the endorsee of a bill of lading should be the loser, I would have no 
hesitation in saying that there is more reason that he who contracts with the charterer and 
puts trust and confidence in him to the extent of authorising the charterers' agent to issue 
and sign bill of lading should be a loser, than a stranger".30 
As a matter of construction, the indications received from the manner in which the 
bill of lading is signed may be displaced by a clause identifying the carrier; the 'demise' or 
'identity of carrier' clause. Brandon J., in The Berkshire3! held that the demise clause 
28 Ibid. at 567. 
29 [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606. 
30 Ibid. at 611. For the opposite point of view see Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 25 at para. 4- 033. 
31 [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 185 at 188. 
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elubodied into the bill of lading would have the effect of creating a contractual relationship 
between the shipowners and the shipper, made on behalf of the shipowners by the sub-
agents of the charterers, as agents only.32 Brandon J., gave effect to the demise clause, in 
accordance with its terms, on the ground that "The company or line by whom the bill of 
lading was issued, within the meaning of that clause, is clearly in this case Ocean Wide 
[the charterers' agent]. It is not in dispute that the ship was not owned or chartered by 
demise to that company, but was on the contrary owned by the shipowners. It follows that 
the bill of lading is, by its express terms, intended to take effect as a contract between the 
shippers and the shipowners made on behalf of the shipowners by Ocean Wide as agents 
only. The circumstance that Ayers signed the bill of lading as sub- agents for Ocean Wide 
does not affect the position, which is the same as if Ocean Wide had signed it 
themselves".33 Therefore, Brandon's 1., conclusion in The Berkshire provides clear 
authority for the recognition of the validity of such clauses under the English common law 
rules. 
Such clauses may also operate to tum what appears to be a shipowner's bill into a 
charterer's bill. In The "Venezuela ,,34 the sub- charterers issued bills of lading on their own 
standard form which were signed by their agents. The plaintiffs sued the sub- charterers for 
damages, but the latter alleged that the carriage contract was with the shipowners. The 
Court of Appeal had to decide the parties to the bill of lading contract upon the correct 
construction of the bill of lading. It held that the bill of lading which is presented and 
signed by the master will be a shipowner's bill of lading, but not all the bills of lading 
which are issued and signed on behalf of the master by the sub- charterers' agents will be 
32 However, Brandon 1., in The Berkshire, ibid. at 188, held that the charterers had the authority to sign the 
bills of lading on the shipowners' behalf under cl. 8 of the charter- party. He also held that this authority 
which was based on cl. 8 of the charter- party was reinforced by the letter that was written by the master to 
the charterers' sub- agents. 
33 Ibid. 
34 [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 393. 
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shipowner's bills of lading and the sub- charterers can issue a bill of lading on their own 
~ -
behalf. -~ As to whether the shipowner or the sub- charterer was liable as a carrier toward 
the shipper under the carriage contract, the Court of Appeal held that, according to an 
'identity of the carrier' clause in the bill of lading, the carrier under the bill of lading was 
to be the sub- charterer and the terms of the bill of lading would be the same even where 
the goods were shipped by a ship owned by the sub- charterer. Thus, if the sub- charterer 
did not wish to contract as a carrier he should have clarified that the contracting party with 
the shipper is another company. 
Clarke J., in The l1les36 agreed with Brandon's J., conclusion in The Berkshire that 
in order to ascertain the true contracting parties to the carriage contract, it is necessary to 
examine the document itself and to consider the circumstances in which it came into 
existence. Accordingly, he held that the shipowners were the carriers under the carriage 
contract contained in or evidenced by the bills of lading, notwithstanding the existence of 
the following factors that pointed towards the bills of lading as time charterers' bills.37 
First, the words "Maras Linja" appeared in large capital letters on both sides of all bills of 
lading (Maras Linja were the time charterer). Secondly, the appearance of the following 
typed words "pp EIMSKIP- Rotterdam" underneath the signature box which contained the 
printed words "signed for the carrier Maras Linja" and underneath them the following 
further typed words "as agents only". Clarke J's., conclusion that the bill of lading was, 
nonetheless, a shipowner's document was based upon three factors. First, despite the 
ambiguity of the signature box, the charterers' agents, Eimskip, signed the bills of lading 
on behalf of the shipowners. Secondly, the charterers had an authority to sign the bills of 
lading on behalf of the shipowners, since clause 9 of the charter- party inter alia provided 
35 See The Rewia, supra fn. 25 at 333, where it was held that the bill of lading signed for the master could not 
be a charterer's bill of lading unless the carriage contract was made with the charterers alone and the person 
who signed the bill had authority to sign and did that on behalf of the charterers and not the owners. 
36 [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 144 at 149. 
37 Ibid. at 150. 
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that "The charterers to indemnify the Owners against all consequences or liabilities arising 
fronl the Master, Officers or agents signing Bills of Lading or other documents or 
otherwise complying with such orders".38 Finally, clause 19 of the charter- party, titled as 
"RESPONSIBILITY WHEN JOINT SERVICE", provided inter alia that "The contract 
evidence by this Bill of Lading is between the Shipper and the owner of the Ocean vessel 
named herein", and would have the same effect as a demise clause, despite the fact it was 
in different form and under a different title. This is because the meaning of joint service is 
no more than a service where the charterer is using a chartered vessel to provide its 
seryice.39 It is arguable, however, that the findings of Clarke J., in The Ines can only be 
accepted on the ground of its unusual circumstance as to the ambiguity of the signature box 
which required the examination of other clauses of the bill of lading such as the carrier's 
identity and the demise clauses.4o 
Rix J., in The Hector41 was not certain whether the question of whether a bill of 
lading is a charterer's bill or shipowner's bill should purely be answered according to the 
construction of the bill or whether the circumstances of case should also be taken into 
account. However, he adopted Clarke's ]'s., approach in The Ines of considering the 
construction of the document and then determining whether the circumstances of the case 
supported or detracted from that conclusion.42 The source of the dispute in The Hector was 
the signature as 'For and on behalf of the master- as agents' and the USEL stipulation-
'CARRIER: U.S. EXPRESS LINES' on the face of the bill of lading. In addition, cl. 17 on 
the back of the bill of lading identified the shipowner as the carrier. As to the USEL 
stipulation Rix J., held that the term 'carrier' in the USEL stipulation- 'CARRIER: U.S. 
38 Ibid. at 149. 
39 Ibid. However, Clarke 1., in The Ines, supra fu. 36 at 150, supported his conclusion by the surrounding 
circumstance of the issuance of the draft bill oflading in which the plaintiffs' agents and the charterers' agent 
initially intended the carriage contract to be between the shipowners and the plaintiffs. 
40 For similar finding see the decision of Hirst 1., in The Jalamohan, [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 443. 
41 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 287. 
42 Ibid. at 293- 294. 
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EXPRESS LINES' on the face of the bill of lading was critical, as it indicated that USEL 
[who were the time- charterer] was the party who undertook to carry out the obligations of 
the bill of lading contract. He then proceeded to hold that there was no conflict between the 
identity of carrier clause, cl. 17, and the USEL stipulation, as USEL was the only party 
which was expressly identified by name in the bill as the carrier, stating "For all that 
anyone reading the bill of lading knows USEL are owners, and there is no conflict between 
the stipulation that USEL are the carrier on the one hand and the signature for the master 
and cl. 17 on the other".43 However, he held that in the case of conflict between the identity 
of carrier clause, cl. 17, and the USEL stipulation, the latter must be regarded as 
superseding the printed provisions of cl. 17. As to the signature 'For and on behalf of the 
master- as agents' Rix J., held that "The rule is only that in the ordinary way a bill signed 
by or for the master will be an owner's bill, not that it must be".44 He agreed with the 
dictum of Sheen J., in The Venezuela 45who held that if a sub- charterer did not wish to 
contract as a carrier he should have clarified that the contracting party with the shipper is 
another company, and he continued that "In this case, there is nothing on the face of the 
bill to say who the owners (and therefore the carrier) are, save for the clause stipulating 
that USEL are the carrier".46 Finally, as to the circumstances of the case Rix J., supported 
his conclusion by the fact that the time charter did not authorise USEL to sign the bill of 
lading in conformity with the mate's receipt on behalf of the master, so as to bind the 
shipowners. 
A variant on these facts occurred in The Flecha where the conflict was between the 
words of the attestation clause and the identity of carrier and demise clauses on the back of 
the standard form of bill of lading used by the charterer, CPC. Moore- Bick J., held that the 
43 Ibid. at 394. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See supra fn. 34 at 397. 
46 Supra fn. 41 at 395. 
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terms of the bills of lading; in particular the words of the attestation and both the identity 
of carrier clause and the demise clause, indicated that the shipowners undertook the 
responsibility for the carriage contract and so the bills were shipowners' bills rather than 
charterers' bills:l7 He also took the view that very clear wording was needed to make the 
charterers, not the shipowners, as the contracting party with the shipper. Describing the 
charterers 'loosely' as carriers in the signature box 'is not unusual or surprising,48 and was 
not enough to demonstrate an intention to displace the effect of both the identity of carrier 
clause and the demise clause, even though the words raise the question as to the purpose of 
describing the charterers as carriers in the signature box.49 
The courts' decisions in both The Ines and The Flecha appear to give conclusive 
effect to the printed terms such as the demise and the identity of carrier clauses, even 
though the typed words in the signature box pointed to a totally different outcome. 
However, recently, this issue was considered by the House of Lords in The StarsinSo where 
the decisions in the above cases and in both The HectorS 1 and The Flecha52 were reviewed. 
The House of Lords has now overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal on this point 
and reinstated the initial finding of Colman J., that the bill was a charterer's bill. 
Lord Bingham in The StarsinS3 justified his finding that the bill of lading was a 
charterer's bill on the ground that a shipper or transferee of a bill of lading cannot be 
expected to read detailed provisions on the back of the bill to find out whom he was 
contracting with, in particular, "when the bill of lading contains, on its face, an apparently 
clear and unambiguous statement of who the carrier is". He supported his view by the 
47 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 612 at 618. 
48 Jbid. at 619. 
49 Ibid. at 618. 
50 [2003] 2 W.L.R. 711, ([2003] UKHL 12). However, the decision of Colman J., of the first court, [2000] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 85, was reversed by the Court of Appeal, [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437, by Sir Morritt V-C and 
Lord Chadwick J (Lord Rix J dissenting). 
51 See supra fn. 41. 
52 See supra fn. 47. 
53 See supra fn. 50 at para. 15. 
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market practice of banks, as reflected in art. 23 (a) of the ICC Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credit 1994, which does not require the examination of the small 
print on the back of the bill. 54 Lord Steyn agreed with Lord Bingham and added that a 
reasonable person, versed in the shipping trade, "would give greater weight to words 
specially chosen, such as the words which appear above the signature, rather than standard 
foml printed conditions".55 He reinforced his conclusion by art. 23 (a) of the ICC Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credit 1994.56 
Lord Hoffmann agreed with their Lordships that the bill was a charterer's bill and 
added that "if the carrier is plainly identified by the language on the front of the document, 
one never gets to the demise clause on the back. The language on the front simply takes 
priority and no attempt at reconciliation is required".57 Lord Hobhouse agreed with this 
view, reasoning that "Where (the original) parties, by issuing and accepting these bills of 
lading with these signatures, have expressly agreed that Container Pacific Shipping (sic) 
[the charterer] shall be the contracting party, they have implicitly agreed that inconsistent 
clauses will be overridden".58 Finally, Lord Millett held that it was not appropriate to 
attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. Charterers simply used the wrong form and the 
provisions on the back which are inconsistent with the use of the form as charterers' bills 
are modified accordingly or treated as not applicable. 59 He, also, held that in the case of 
inconsistency between standard printed terms and those which the parties have agreed 
themselves written into the document, the latter prevail and, then, added that "This 
principle is applicable even where the inconsistent provisions are of equal importance and 
the printed form is appropriate to the particular case as well as to the general. How much 
54 Ibid. at para. 16. 
55 Ibid. at para. 45. 
56 Ibid. at para. 47. 
57 Ibid. at para. 85. 
58 Ibid. at para. 128. 
59 Ibid. at para. 182. 
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more must primacy be given to the written words where they describe the main intent and 
object of the particular contract".60 The market practice was also a relevant consideration 
in finding that the bill was a charterer's bill of lading rather than a shipowner's bill.61 
The decision of the House of Lords in The Starsin have now dissolved the 
uncertainty concerning the carrier's identity caused by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in The Starsin and by the decision of Moore- Bick J., in The Flecha. As a result, the cargo 
o\vner's need to make a claim against both the shipowner and the charterer in order to 
avoid any uncertainty of the carrier's identity, in particular he has only one year time limit 
to sue the carrier responsible for the loss of or the damage to his cargo, is now reduced, if 
not demolished. This is because priority is now given to the front of the bill of lading rather 
than to the back. Moreover, the decision could be justified on the ground that the typed 
attestation clause should prevail over the identity of the carrier clause and the demise 
clause. Given the reasoning of the maj ority of their Lordships, the result would probably 
have been the same had the attestation clause also be printed. However, the identity of the 
carrier clause and the demise clause are probably to be relevant only in cases, such as The 
Hector, where both clauses appear on the front of the bill of lading. Such conflict would be 
determined by giving primacy to the typed material on the front of the bill of lading. 
However, if both the demise clause and the attestation clause were printed or typed it is 
unclear how the courts would determine the conflict. 
Sir Guenter Treitel,62 has suggested that this problem might be solved if more than 
one person answers the description of "the carrier" as to refer to either to contractual 
carrier or the actual carrier. Such an analysis is at odds with the general assumption that 
English law allows only one of the charterer or shipowner, but not both, to be considered 
60 Ibid. at pars. 183- 184. 
61 Ibid. at para. 188. 
62 In Benjamin's Sale a/Goods, Guest, A. G., (el al) 6th Edition., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2002, at para. 
18-103. 
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as 'the carrier' under art. I (a) of the Hague or the Hague- Visby Rules. However, after The 
Starsin it seems that this assumption may need to be rethought some what.63 Lord Steyn in 
The Starsill 64 rejected the argument of the cargo owners that the words like "The Carrier", 
"For the Carrier", and "As Carrier" can be treated as adding the personal liability of the 
charterers rather than excluding the liability of the shipowners on the ground that "the 
completed signature box, as well as the definition clause, points to a single carrier". Lord 
Hoffmann, also, rejected the argument, submitted by Mr Milligan, that the charterers may 
have contracted for themselves and for the shipowners as undisclosed principals on the 
ground that "but I do not think that any reasonable merchant or banker who might be 
assumed to be the notional reader of this bill of lading would imagine that there was more 
than one carrier or that the carrier was anyone other than CPS [the charterers]". 65 These 
comments indicate that it might be possible to have joint carriers under a bill of lading, 
providing the document was appropriately worded. In addition, the charterers would also 
have authority to issue a document that made the shipowners joint carriers. 
1. 1. 2. 2. The Precise Terms of the Carriage Contract 
As regards a third party, the bill of lading terms will be the terms of the carriage contract. 
The holder of the bill of lading will not be affected by any conflict between the terms of 
the charterparty and the terms of bill of lading, even if the shipper is aware of the existence 
of the charterparty. As we have noted above, the shipowner will be the first target of the 
holder of the bill. Therefore, the shipowner may insist on incorporating some or all of the 
provisions of the charterparty in the bill of lading. Under English Law, the inclusion of the 
terms of the charterparty in the bill of lading will be effective since the shipper has a 
63 Nevertheless, this line of argument might succeed under the Hamburg Rules on the ground that the actual 
carrier may be considered as a carrier under arts. 1 (2), 10 and 11. As a result, the problem of the carrier's 
identity would not arguably exist under the Hamburg Rules since the liability of both the carrier and the 
actual carrier is governed by the provisions of the Rules under arts. 7, 10 and 11. 
64 See supra fn. 50 at para. 49. 
65 Ibid. at pars. 84 and 85. 
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reasonable opportunity to notice the incorporation before or at the time he enters into the 
contract of carriage. But the courts still apply a strict interpretation to such an 
incorporation clause, since the shipper is unlikely to have seen the terms of the 
charterparty. Thus, in Paros Shipping Corpn . v. Nafta (GB) Ltd.,66 it was held that the bill 
of lading neither incorporated the charter- party, nor gave the ship the protection of the 
terms of the charter- party because the references to a charter- party were left blank and the 
d f " 67 wor s 0 IncorporatIOn were of the narrowest kind. In contrast, in Denny, Mott and 
Dickson Ltd. v. Lynn Shipping Co Ltd,68 it was held that an arbitration clause in a 
charterparty had been effectively incorporated into the bill of lading, but that the clause did 
not apply in the events, which happened. The court held, regarding the under deck cargo, 
that the shipowners were protected by art. III (6) of The Hague Rules. In respect to the on 
deck cargo the shipowners were unprotected by the arbitration clause according to their 
natural and ordinary meaning, because cl. 32 applied in the case of final discharge. 
Therefore, where there is no final discharge, for any reason, "then the provisions as to the 
appointment of an arbitrator within 12 months, and the consequential words 'otherwise the 
claim shall be deemed waived and absolutely barred' do not apply". 
Where the bill of lading is indorsed to a third party by a charterer, the terms of the 
carriage contract will be those contained in the bill of lading. Before the endorsement, the 
bill of lading operates as a receipt in the hands of the charterer. Under the Bill of Lading 
Act 1855, the rights which were being transferred to the endorsee or consignee were 
contained in the bill of lading. The bill of lading before endorsement in the hands of the 
66 [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 269. The shipowners sought to rely on the terms of the charter- party including the 
arbitration clause. However, the references to the charter- party were left blank into the bill of lading and 
only the words of incorporation were "unto order or to his assigns on payment of freight and all other 
conditions as per charter- party. 
67 Ibid. at 271. The court, however, regarding to the owners' appeal held, according to III (v) of the Hague 
Rules that "Therefore in the context of this case it is, and has to be, accepted that the charterers guaranteed to , 
the shipowners that the tonnage 27,521,746 tonnes was accurate and that the charterers are under obligation 
to indemnify the shipowners against all loss, damages and expenses arising or resulting from (on the present 
assumption) the inaccuracy in the figure." 
68 [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 339. 
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charterer only operated as a receipt, and thus, the charterer had no contractual rights under 
bill of lading and there were no rights to be transferred. Also, under the Carriage of Goods 
Act 1992, the holder of the bill of lading vests "all rights of suit under the contract of 
carriage as if he had been a party to that contract". Therefore, the rights which will be 
transferred to the holder of the bill might be thought to be the charterer's in the 
charterparty not in the bill of lading. In Hain S.s Co .v. Tate & Lyle,69 Lord Atkin 
suggested a means of resolving the conflict, as following 
The consignee has not assigned to him the obligations under the 
charterparty, nor, in fact, any obligation of the charterer under the bill of 
lading, for ex hypothesi there is none. A new contract appears to spring up 
between the ship and the consignee on the terms of the bill oflading.7o 
Sometimes the shipper, also, is the charterer of the vessel, and the relationship 
between the charterer and the shipowner is governed by the terms of the charterparty. The 
bill of lading in the above case, only operates as a receipt, unless the charterer has indorsed 
the bill to a bona fide third party for value. Subsequently, the endorsement of the bill of 
lading to third party converts the bill into the carriage contract exclusively on the terms of 
the bill of lading. Moreover, where the ship is chartered by the owner to a charterer, and 
then sub- chartered, by the charterer to the shipper/1 the relationship between the 
shipowner and the shipper, to whom the bill of lading may be issued, will be governed by 
the terms of the bill of lading. 72 
1.2. US LAW AS REGARDS CHARTERER'S AND SHIPOWNERS' BILLS OF 
LADING 
The question relating to the carriage contract is whether the contract is with the charterer or 
the shipowner where the bill of lading is issued under a charter- party. This is because, the 
69 [1936] 41 Com. Cas. 350. 
70 Ibid. at 356. 
71 See Heinrich Hanna & Co. BV .v. Fairlight Shipping Co. Ltd., [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 231 at 235- 236. 
72 Since nor the shipper, nor the endorsee, nor the consignee will be party to the charter. Also, the shipowner 
will not be party to the sub- charter. 
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liability for damage or loss of the goods under COGSA 1936 can only be assessed against 
a person who is found to be the carrier under that Act. Under American law, the courts 
answer this question by the principle of agency and also, in some cases, by conferring the 
status of carrier on both charterer and shipowner who participate in the carriage contract. 
However, the type of charter is an important factor to decide who is the carrier for COGSA 
1936. Therefore, a demise charterer will, normally, be considered as the carrier since he 
has complete possession, command and navigation of the vessel. In contrast, the time or 
voyage charterer will not be considered as the carrier since he has no possession and 
control of the vessel. However, a time or a voyage charterer might be considered as the 
carrier for the 1936 Act where the bill of lading was issued and signed for the charterer.73 
Generally a bill of lading which is issued under charter- party and signed by the charterer 
"for the master" will, normally, be considered as a shipowner's bill of 1ading.74 This is 
because the carriage contract with the shipowner may be entered either directly or 
indirectly by the charterer signing the bill of lading for the master. The court has to 
examine the charterer's authority to sign the bill for the master and the master's authority 
to sign the bill on behalf of the shipowner and therefore, the charterer will be considered as 
the carrier where he has no authority to sign the bill of lading for the master on behalf of 
h h· 75 t e s Ipowner. 
However, there is a new trend called the 'practical approach' which is useful where 
the agency approach provides no solution, as where the tangle of relationships between the 
parties is unclear and the bill of lading was issued without significant negotiations between 
73 See Yeramex International.v. s.s. Tendo, 595 F. 2d 943 at 947- 948 (4th Cir. 1979), where the charterer by 
the terms of the charter- party assumed complete responsibility for handling the cargo and the issuance of the 
bill of lading. See also, Bunge Edible Oil Co. v. MIV's Torm Rask Fort Steele, 949 F. 3d 786, [1992] AMC 
2227 (5th Cir. 1992). 
74 See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. MIV Gloria, 767 F. 2d 229 (5th Cir. 1985). 
75 See Associated Metals and Minerals Corp. v. s.s. Portoria, 484 F. 2d 460(5th Cir. 1973). See also Union 
Steel America Co. v. MIV Sanko Spruce, 14 F. Supp. 2d 682 at 685, 1999 AMC (D.N.J. 1998), where the 
court refused to give effect to the identity of carrier clause, because the bill was signed by the time charterer 
as 'carrier' on its form and the charterer also collected the freight. 
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the shipper and either the shipowner or the charterer. The 'practical approach' provides 
that all the parties involved in the carriage of the goods are carriers for COGSA 1936 as in 
Joo Seng Hong Kong Co., Ltd. v. s.s. Unibullifir.76 Conflict between the approaches can be 
avoided by arguing that the agency approach will provide a solution to cases where the 
identity of the person who issued the bill of lading can be ascertained and so to be the 
carrier for the 1936 Act. In contrast, the 'practical approach' will make a non- party to the 
bill of lading as a carrier for the 1936 Act if he was involved in some way in the issuance 
of the bill of lading or the loading of the cargo and the shipper shows that his actions 
contributed to the loss of or damage to the cargo.77 However, it is arguable that the 
'practical approach' will not be accepted under English law, since only one party is 
generally thought to be liable as a carrier under one carriage contract. 78 Also, the party 
liable as a carrier would be able to claim damages from the other party on the terms of the 
charter- party. 
However, COGSA 1936 is under reVIew by what is called the Proposed 
Amendments to COGSA 1936.79 The aim of the Proposed Bill is to update the American 
law concerning the carrier's liabilities in order to be into line with the modem regulation 
governing the carrier's liabilities and also to be brought into line with the law of other 
76 483 F. Sup. 43 at 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). However, the court, in Agroexport & B.Uo. Assurance 
International, Ltd. v. s.s. Gordanka Nikolova, [1983] AMC 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), disagreed to hold the 
charterer who had nothing to do with a defective hatch cover to be liable on the ground of the purpose of 
COGSA which prevents suing parties with no involvement in either the bill of lading or the conduct alleged 
to have caused the cargo loss. See also Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. MIV OOCL Inspiration, 
1998 AMC 1327 (2 Cir. 1998), where the court held that the shipowner as well as the time charterer were 
carriers, despite the inclusion of an identity of carrier clause naming the time charterer as the carrier. The 
court, however, did not explicitly rule against the validity of the identity of carrier clause but it merely denied 
its purported effect in the particular case. However, the Fifth Circuit in Thyssen Steel Co. v. MIV Kavo 
Yerakas, 50 F. 3d 1349,1995 AMC 2317 (5th Cir. 1995), has considered the demise clause as invalid under 
s. 1303 (8) of COGSA, as an attempt to avoid or lessen liability. See also Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Spring Wave, 2000 AMC 1717 at 1719 (E.D. La. 2000), where the court considered such a clause as 
'unlawful' under s. 1303 (8). 
77 See Schoenbaum, T., Admiralty and Maritime Law, 2nd Edition, Hornbook Series- West Group, fn. 16 and 
the corresponding text at 648 in chap. 9. 
78 This argument is supported by The Antares, [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 424. For more detail see supra fn. 21 
and the corresponding text. 
79 The Proposed Amendment to COGSA 1936 [Hereafter The Proposed Bill], Staff Working Draft, 
September 24, 1999, 106th CONGRESS- 1st Session, the text is available on the net at 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/cogsa99.htm. 
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shipping countries, which would lead to certainty and uniformity. However, the Proposed 
Bill is still waiting to be enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled. The Proposed Bill, by virtue of s. 3, defines the 
performing carrier as 
"a person (i) that performs, undertakes to perform, or procures to be 
performed any of a contracting carrier's responsibilities under a contract 
of carriage; but (ii) only to the extent that the person described in clause 
(i) acts, either directly or indirectly, at the request of, or under the 
supervision or control of, a contracting carrier, regardless of whether that 
person is a party to, identified in, or has legal responsibility under the 
contract of carriage". 
Also, the Proposed Bill, by virtue of s. 4, defines the ocean carrier as "a performing carrier 
that owns, operates, or charters a ship used in the carriage of goods by Sea". Accordingly, 
under the Proposed Bill, the cargo owner would not have the problem relating to the 
identity of the carrier, since he would be able to sue the shipowner under the charterer's 
bill of lading as the performing carrier and to arrest the vessel to secure this claim. 
1. 3. SHIPOWNERS' AND CHARTERERS' BILLS OF LADING UNDER THE 
HAMBURG RULES 
The provisions of the Hamburg Rules provide a comprehensive solution to the dilemma of 
the cargo owner as to the identity of the carrier who would be sued for the loss of or the 
damage to the goods. Article 1 (1) of the Hamburg Rules defines the carrier as "any person 
by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with 
a shipper". Also art. 1 (2) of the Hamburg Rules defines the actual carrier as "any person to 
whom the performance of the carriage of goods, or of part of the carriage, has been 
entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such performance has been 
entrusted". The combined effect of art. 1 (1 & 2) of the Hamburg Rules is that the shipper 
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and the cargo owner would be entitled to proceed against both the charterer and the 
shipowner under the charterer's bill of lading. This is because the shipowner under the 
charterer' s bill will be considered as the actual carrier and so the cargo owner's need to 
identify the carrier, as the contracting carrier, is a less pressing matter. Under art. 10 (1) of 
the Hamburg Rules, the contracting carrier remains responsible for the entire carriage 
according to the provisions of the Rules, even though the performance of the carriage or 
part thereof has been entrusted to an actual carrier. Moreover, by virtue of art. 10 (2) of the 
Rules, the actual carrier's responsibility is governed by all the provisions governing the 
carrier's responsibility and so the shipper or the cargo owner will not be better off suing 
the actual carrier in tort. These provisions would reduce, if not obliterate, the need for the 
doctrine of bailment and sub- bailment on terms as means of suing a shipowner when a 
charterer's bill has been issued or where goods have been transhipped under a cesser of 
liability clause. 
However, by virtue of art. 11 (1), the rules contain a departure from the rules that 
the contracting carrier is responsible for the whole carriage performed by the actual carrier, 
and so the contractual carrier can avoid the responsibility for the part of carriage performed 
by the actual carrier where the requirements of art. 11 (1) are satisfied. The contractual 
carrier will have the benefit of this departure if the carriage contract provides "explicitly 
that a specific part of the carriage covered by the said contract is to be performed by a 
named person other than the carrier". The tranship clause and the cesser of liability clause, 
by virtue of art. 11 (1) of the Rules, are accepted as long as "judicial proceedings can be 
instituted against the actual carrier in a court competent under paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 
21" and also, "the burden of proving that any loss, damage or delay in delivery has been 
caused by such an occurrence rests upon the carrier". Therefore, the effect of these 
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provisions is that the cargo claimant would always be entitled to proceed against one of the 
two carriers according to the provisions of the Hamburg Rules. 
1. 4. SHIPOWNERS' AND CHARTERERS' BILLS OF LADING UNDER THE 
DRAFT INSTRUMENT8D 
Ideally, the provisions of the Draft Instrument should provide a comprehensive solution to 
the dilen1ma of the cargo owner as to the identity of the carrier who should be sued for the 
loss of or damage to the goods. On the contrary, the Draft Instrument provides 
contradictory provisions dealing with this issue. The Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. I 
(1),81 defines the carrier as "a person that enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper". 
Accordingly, shipowners as well as charterers can be qualified as carriers, for the purpose 
of the Rules, as long as they are the contractual parties. Also, the Draft Instrument, by 
virtue of art. 1 (5), defines the carriage contract as "a contract under which a carrier, 
against payment of freight, undertakes to carry goods wholly or partly by sea from one 
place to another". The combined effect of art. 1 (1 & 5) is that in order to qualify a person 
as a carrier that person should agree contractually with the shipper to carry the goods from 
one place to another against the payment of freight. By virtue of art. 8 (2) (1) (e), the 
contract particulars in the document or electronic record must include "the name and 
80 There is a recent report of UNCITRAL's working group on the Draft Instrument, dated 6 Sept. 2002, 
which covers the chapters from 1- 9. 3. Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its 
ninth session (New York, 25- 26 April 2002), United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
Thirty- fifth session U.N. Doc. Alcn. 9/510, (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. Alcn.9/510). The full text of the 
document is available on the net; htlp:llwww.uncitral.orglen-index.htm. 
81 The current draft of the Draft Instrument refers to 'chapters' rather than 'articles', UNCITRAL Transport 
Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Ninth session U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9IWG.IIIIWP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.21). The full text of 
the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitral.orglen-index.htm. However, the terminology used 
in this work would be similar to that of the comments on text of the Draft Instrument UNCITRAL Transport 
Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Ninth session U.N. Doc. 
AlCN.9IWG.IIIIWP.2l1Add.l, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9IWG.IIIIWP.2l1Add.1). 
The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitral.orglen-index.htm. 
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address of the carrier". Accordingly, the identity of the carner should not cause any 
problem under the Draft Instrument. 
However, the shipping practice is not as straightforward as it seems, in particular, 
where the bill of lading is issued and signed under a charter- party. Therefore, art. 8 (4) (2), 
provides that 
"If the contract particulars fail to identify the carrier but indicate that the 
goods have been loaded on board a named vessel, then the registered 
owner of the vessel is presumed to be the carrier. The registered owner 
can defeat this presumption if it proves that the ship was under a bareboat 
charter at the time of the carriage which transfers contractual 
responsibility for the carriage of the goods to an identified bareboat 
charterer. [If the registered owner defeats the presumption that it is the 
carrier under this article, then the bareboat charterer at the time of the 
carriage is presumed to be the carrier in the same manner as that in which 
the registered owner was presumed to be the carrier]". 
The first sentence of art. 8 (4) (2) establishes the presumption which enables the cargo 
owner to identify the carrier and so to commence a claim in the correct jurisdiction and 
within the short period of time for suit under art. 14 (1) of the Draft Instrument. This 
presumption has an important effect, in particular, where the vessel is under a charter-
party and the charterer signs the transport document or the electronic record, without 
specifying the name and the address of the carrier, and adds words which make the identity 
of the carrier altogether vague. 
However, this presumption can be defeated by the registered owner of the vessel 
who should prove that the vessel was under a bareboat charter, demise charter- party, at the 
time of the carriage which transferred the contractual responsibility for the carriage of the 
goods to an identified bareboat charterer. However, it is arguable that the effect of art. 8 (4) 
(2) is to do no more than to prove the validity and the effectiveness of both the identity of 
carrier clause and the demise clause, which are not in question under English law. 
Moreover, it is arguable that the identity of the carrier should not be an issue under the 
Draft Instrument. This is because the shipowners under charterers' bills of lading would be 
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considered as the performing parties of the carriage contract and so the cargo owners' need 
to identify the carrier is a less pressing matter. 
Article 1 (17), defines the 'performing carrier' as 
"'a person other than the carrier that physically performs [or fails to 
perform in whole or in part] any of the carrier's responsibilities under a 
contract of carriage, handling, custody, or storage of the goods, to the 
extent that person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carrier's 
request or under the carrier's supervision or control, regardless of 
whether that person is a party to, identified in, or has legal responsibility 
under the contract of carriage. The term "performing party" does not 
include any person who is retained by a shipper or consignee, is an 
employee, agent, contractor, or subcontractor of a person (other than the 
carrier) who is retained by a shipper or consignee". 
Therefore, the liability of both the carrier and the performing party is governed by the 
provisions of the Draft Instrument. The Draft Instrument would have been clearer had it 
adopted the wording used in art. 1 (1 & 2), art. 7, art. 10 and art. 11 of the Hamburg Rules, 
which define and regulate the responsibilities and rights of the carrier and actual carrier. 
Article 1 (2) of the Hamburg Rules, unlike art. 1 (17) of the Draft Instrument, provides no 
distinction between sub- contractors who actually perform and those who undertake to 
procure performance of any of the sub- contracted obligations. This means under a 
shipowner's bill of lading a time charterer will not be a performing party, but under a time 
charterer's bill of lading, the shipowner will be a performing party. The narrow definition 
of the 'performing party' under the Draft Instrument prevents the shipowner from incurring 
liability when it demise charters its vessel. However, if the negotiable transport document 
fails to contain the name and the address of the carrier as required under art. 8 (4) (2), there 
is only a presumption that the registered shipowner is the carrier. This can be rebutted in 
which case the claimant might still have difficulty in tracking down the right person to sue 
within the one-year time limit. Moreover, the so- called parties outside the definition of the 
'performing party' in art. 1 (17) of the Draft Instrument are entitled to the benefits of the 
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defences and limitations of liability available to the carner, without bearing any 
responsibilities under art. 6 (3) (3). 
1. 5. TYPES OF BILLS OF LADING 
Neither the Bills of lading Act 1855, nor the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 defined the 
term 'bill of lading', although, art. 1 of the Hamburg Rules defines a 'bill of lading' as 
........ a document which evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the 
taking over or loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier 
undertakes to deliver the goods against surrender of the document. A 
provision in the document that the goods are to be delivered to the order of 
a named person, or to order, or to bearer, constitutes such an undertaking. 
It is important to analyse the different kinds of bill of lading, because of the very vital role 
the bill of lading plays in the carriage of goods by sea as well as in sale contract. After 
examining the basic types of bill of lading, I shall then consider the function of the bill of 
lading as a document of title. This function will give the clearest indication of what 
constitutes a bill of lading at common law. 
1. 5. 1. 'SHIPPED' AND 'RECEIVED FOR SHIPMENT' BILLS OF LADING 
Under a shipped bill of lading the carrier confirms that the goods are loaded on board of the 
vessel in the condition stated in the bill. In a received bill of lading the carrier just confirms 
that the goods are delivered to him and they are in his custody. In Ishag. v. Allied Bank,82 in 
respect of the argument which was put forward on behalf of Mr. Fuhs, that the "January bill 
of lading is not even a received for shipment bill as ordinarily understood". Lloyd J., held 
that 
I would not take so narrow a view of the January bill of lading. It is true that 
it does not use the traditional language "received for shipment". But the 
language which it does use comes to the same thing. Nobody suggests that 
the goods have to be received by the shipowners themselves. It is enough 
that they received by their agents. For myself, I can see no practical or 
commercial difference between goods being received by agents on behalf of 
82 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 92. 
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t~e shipowners and held in their own warehouse and goods being held at the 
dIsposal of the agents in the warehouse of another. 83 
Thus, Lloyd J., held that the January bill of lading was precisely the same as any other 
received for shipment bill of lading in respect of its legal effect. 
Where the paynlent of the price is arranged under a documentary credit, the bank 
may refuse to accept a 'received for shipment' bill of lading as part of the shipping 
documents, unless the parties have agreed to the contrary in the sale contract, or there is a 
custom to that effect in a particular trade. In Yelo . v. S.M. Machado & Co. Ltd., 84 the buyer 
instructed the bank, as a term in the letter of credit, to accept only a 'shipped' bill of lading. 
Sellers J. held that, the tender of a 'received for shipment' bill of lading was insufficient. 
Under art. III (3) of the Hague- Visby Rules, the shipowner is obliged to issue a bill of 
lading which provides that the goods have been received into his custody. But, where the 
goods were loaded on board the vessel, the carrier is obliged to issue a 'shipped' bill of 
lading on the demand of the shipper. Thus, the carrier can notate, at the port of shipment, 
that the goods are now on the board the vessel, and the document shall have the same 
functions as a 'shipped' bill of lading. By virtue of art. 23 (a) (ii) of UCP 500, banks will 
only accept shipped bills of lading, unless otherwise stipulated in the credit. Thus, a received 
for shipment bill can be accepted by specific stipulation into the credit. Also, art. 26 (a) (ii) 
which relates to multimodal transport document accepts this document which indicates that 
the goods have been dispatched, taken in charge or loaded on board. So, art. 26 can be used 
to support the acceptance of a received for shipment bill by banks under the UCP 500. 
1.5.2. 'BEARER' AND 'ORDER' BILLS OF LADING 
A bearer bill is a bill which does not provide the name of the person to whom the goods are 
to be delivered. Thus the goods will be delivered to the person who has the possession of 
83 Ibid. at 97. 
84 [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 183. 
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the bill of lading. A bill of lading will be considered as an order bill where it provides that 
the goods to be delivered to the order of a named person. 85 The shipper is entitled to direct 
the carrier to deliver the goods to some one other than the named consignee.86 In The 
Lycaoll,87 the seller diverted the goods from the buyer, who was the named consignee, by 
indorsing the bill by way of pledge to a bank. The court held that the seller was entitled to 
do that since the property in the goods had not been passed to the buyer.88 
1.5.3. 'STRAIGHT' BILLS OF LADING AND SEA WAYBILLS 
Sea waybills are important documents where the business is conducted on an open account 
basis. Therefore, s. 2 (1 ) (b) of the 1992 Act gives the named consignee under a sea 
waybill "all rights of suit under the contract of carriage as if he had been party to that 
contract". Section 1 (3) of the 1992 Act defines a sea waybill as a document that is not a 
bill of lading but as a receipt for the goods and as contains or evidences the carriage 
contract by sea. It, also, identifies the person to whom delivery of the goods is to be made 
by the carrier in accordance with the carriage contract. Accordingly, the named consignee 
under a sea waybill need not present the waybill in order to claim delivery of the goods 
from the carrier and, therefore, the carrier's obligation, under such document, is only to 
deliver the goods to the named consignee without being obliged to require presentation of 
that document. Against this background, a sea waybill is not a negotiable document and 
85 According to The Roseline, supra fu. 2 at 22, a bill of lading is an order bill where it makes the goods 
deliverable to a person's order in contrast to the straight bill oflading which makes the goods deliverable to a 
named person without further words of transferability. The bill of lading in The Roseline was an order bill 
because the goods were "consigned to Order" of the buyer's bank. 
86 But not after the shipper indorsed the bill of lading to the named consignee. 
87 [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 548. The seller can not redirect the carrier to deliver the goods to another person 
than the named consignee where the property have passed to him "upon or by reason of such consignment" 
according to s. 1 of Bills of Lading Act 1855, because the rights of the seller have been transferred to the 
consignee, even where the bill or the goods have not yet been delivered to him. The position is the same 
under s. 2 (5) a of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. 
88 It was held in The Stettin, [1889] 14 P.D. 142, that the carrier is obligated not to deliver the goods to an 
endorsee who failed to produce an original bill of lading. Therefore, the carrier is not entitled to deliver the 
goods to a named consignee in a bill of lading which has not been indorsed or to an endorsee of an indorsed 
bill without the production of the bill oflading. 
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any transfer or purported its endorsement will pass neither property nor possession in the 
goods covered by such document. 
But what of a 'straight' bill of lading, a bill which lacks the wording necessary for 
transferability? Tuckey LJ., of the Court of Appeal in Parsons Corporation & Others. v. 
C. V. Scheepvaartonderneming & Others (The Happy Ranger),89 stated that "A 'straight' 
bill has no English law definitions, but the term derives, it appears, from earlier U.S. 
legislation referring to a 'straight' bill as one in which the goods are consigned to a specific 
person as opposed to an 'order' bill where the goods are consigned to the order of anyone 
named in the bill or bearer". Accordingly, it would seem that a straight bill of lading, like a 
sea waybill, is not a negotiable document and cannot be used to transfer the right to 
possession of the goods by endorsement and delivery. This view is supported by the 
decision in The River Ngada,90 that the endorsee of a straight bill of lading obtained no title 
to sue under the Bills of Lading Act 1855 as no property passed to it by reason of the 
endorsement of the bill. 
However, if transferability is not an essential element of a document of title, can 
straight bills of lading be regarded as documents of title? On the one hand, Carver suggests 
that "A 'straight' bill is not a document of title in the common sense, so that its transfer 
does not operate as a transfer of constructive possession of the goods. It is not a symbol of 
the goods because the carrier is not entitled and bound to deliver the goods without 
production of the bill. It follows that a carriage document will not be a document of title in 
the common sense if it is expressed on its face to be 'non- negotiable'. Sea waybills have 
the legal nature of 'straight' or 'non- negotiable' bills: they are similarly not documents of 
title in the common sense, since under such waybills delivery is to be made to the named 
consignee, irrespective of production of the waybill, and not to the holder of the waybill as 
89 [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 357 at 363, ([2002] EWCA Civ. 694). For comment on this case see Martin- Clark, 
D., "Where are you leading us, Ranger", [2002] Shipping & T.L. 1. 
90 [2001] Lloyd's Maritime Law Newsletter. 
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SUCh',.91 On the other hand, the authors of Schmitthoff disagree and state that "Even a bill 
of lading which is not made negotiable operates as a document of title, because the 
consignee named therein can only claim delivery of the goods from the shipowner if able 
to produce the bill of lading". 92 
As regards the status of the straight bill of lading under the Hague- Visby Rules, 
Tuckey LJ., of the Court of Appeal in Parsons Corporation & Others . v. C. v. 
Scheepvaartollderlleming & Others (The Happy Ranger),93 held that it was unnecessary to 
decide the question whether straight bills of lading are documents of title on the ground 
that the document in issue was considered as a bill of lading. However, Tuckey LJ., noted 
that "'it would be unwise to assume that the statements in the text books are correct", 
without pointing out which statements in which books he had in mind. Nonetheless, the 
Court of Appeal in (The Happy Ranger), found no reason why a straight bill of lading 
should not fall within the provisions of the Hague- Visby Rules that apply to "bills of 
lading or other similar documents oftitle".94 
The Court of Appeal in The "Rafaela S",95 has very recently held that a straight bill 
of lading does fall within the meaning of the Hague Rules, notwithstanding that it is not a 
non- negotiable document.96 The Court of Appeal justified their conclusion in part by 
reference to the practice that the consignee must produce the bill to obtain delivery,97 so 
aligning themselves with the decision in Voss Peer .v. APL Co., Pte Ltd.,98 rather than the 
91 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 24 at para. 6- 007. See, also, Sir Guenter Treitel in Benjamin's 
Sale of Goods, 6th Edition., supra fn. 62 at para. 18- 017, expresses the view that "under a straight bill (of 
lading) the carrier is entitled and bound to deliver the goods to the original named consignee without 
production of the bill (oflading)". 
~2 D' Arey, L., Murray, c., Cleave, B., and Others, (et al), SchmitthofJ's Export Trade: Law and Practice of 
International Trade, 10th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2000, at para. 15- 038. 
93 See supra fn. 90 at 363. 
94 For support for the view see Martin- Clark, D., "Straight, but not Straightforward" [2003] 3 Shipping & 
T.L. 1 at 2. 
95 [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 113 at 142, ([2003] EWCA Civ. 556). 
96 For the reasons which are given by Rix LJ., see ibid at pars. 134- 141. 
97 Ibid. at pars. 144- 145. 
98 [2002] 3 SLR 176. 
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courts of other jurisdictions. The High Court of Singapore in Voss Peer .v. APL Co., Pte 
Ltd. ,99 held, under Singapore law, that the carrier, under a straight bill, is only entitled to 
deliver the goods to a person, whether named as consignee or not, upon the production of 
such bill, unlike a sea waybill. The Malaysian High Court in The Taveechai Marine,lOo has, 
also, accepted the principle that it is a breach of contract for a shipowner to deliver cargo 
without the production of the bill of lading, even when delivery is made to the consignee. 
Howeyer, one could argue that the carrier under a straight bill of lading as well as a sea 
waybill undertakes to deliver the goods to the named consignee and, therefore, it seems 
that the production of such documents for delivery is unnecessary, unless the shipper 
instructed the carrier otherwise. This practice would only serve to delay commercial 
transactions as well as one of the purposes of the law which must be to promote 
commercial efficacy rather than hinder it. 101 
US law does not require a straight bill of lading to be presented for delivery of the 
cargo. Therefore, the carrier's obligation is to deliver the goods to the named consignee 
without being obliged to require presentation of such bill. The Hong Kong High Court in 
The "Brij ,,102 held that "the essence of straight bills was that they were not negotiable and 
the contractual mandate was to deliver to named consignee without the production of the 
original documents". 
Notwithstanding these points the Court of Appeal in The "Rafaela S",103 held that 
because the consignee must produce a straight bill of lading to obtain delivery of the cargo, 
such a document amounts to a 'document of title' notwithstanding that only a single 
transfer, to the consignee, is possible thereunder. In the light of this analysis, the consignee 
99 Ibid. 
100 [1995] 1 MLJ 413. . . . . 
101 For the support for this view see Lai, M., "Delivery of Cargo without ProductIOn of the Ongmal BIll of 
Lading" 9 [2003] 3 JIML 284 at 286. 
102 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 431 at 434. 
103 See supra fn. 95 at pars. 143, 144, 151, 152, 158 and 159. 
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would obtain possessory rights once it obtained the bill of lading. The practical importance 
of the decision is that the consignor will be able to sue the carrier for delivering to 
consignee without production of the straight bill. A straight bill therefore gives a greater 
control to the consignor over delivery of the goods than does a sea waybill where no 
document needs to be produced to obtain delivery. It has become critical that sea waybills 
are accurately distinguished from straight bills. The most important indicator is likely to be 
the way in which the document itself is described. 
1. 5. 4. SWITCH BILLS OF LADING 
Switch bills arise when the shipper persuades the carrier to issue a second set of bills of 
lading to replace the bills initially issued. The carrier is under no obligation to accede such 
a request and, indeed, should do so only if all the original bills are surrendered to it. If this 
is not done, it will have put into circulation two competing sets of documents of title in 
respect of the same cargo. If A is the lawful holder of an original bill, and B the lawful 
holder of a switch bill, the delivery of cargo to one of these parties will not extinguish the 
carrier's liability for mis- delivery at the suit of the other. The rule in Glyn Mills Currie & 
Co. v. East and West India Dock Co., 104 applies only when multiple copies of the same set 
of bills of lading end up in the hands of different parties. 
In The Atlas,105 it was held, obiter, that the shipowner was not bound by the terms 
of the switch bills issued by the agents of the sub- sub- charterers. Although the voyage 
charter contained a clause which permitted the voyage charterer to demand switch bills, 
subject to an indemnity, there was no similar clause in the head time charter. The sub- sub-
charterers would have had authority under the chain of charters to issue bills of lading 
binding the shipowner, but there could be no implied or ostensible authority to issue a 
second set of bills. However, there was no evidence on the facts to indicate the shipowner 
104 [1882] 7 App. Cas. 591. 
105 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 642 at 644. 
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had ratified the excess of authority merely by delivering the cargo against an indemnity, 
but without production of a bill of lading, naming the shippers under the switch bills. 
Another problem relating to switch bills is the potential conflict between the receipt 
statements in the two sets of bills. In The Atlas,106 the receipt statements were broadly 
similar in the two sets of bills, the court was not prepared to consider the switch bill as a 
carriage contract but as potential of what had been shipped. However, it was held on the 
facts that neither set of bills provided evidence of receipt. Under Singapore law, in 
Sa71lSllng Corp. \'. Devon Industries 107 the buyer with possession of the original bill 
persuaded the carrier to issue switch bills which were used by the buyer to sell the goods in 
disregard of the seller's rights. It appeared that the carrier did not act fraudulently in 
respect of the seller since the seller appeared to have transferred the original bills lawfully, 
but without securing the payment. Also, in Socteh Sdn Bhn v. Temuka Navigation Co. Pte 
Ltd., 108 it appeared that the carrier was liable for non- delivery to the endorsees of the first 
set of bills of lading where a switch set had been obtained fraudulently from the carrier's 
agent. 
1. 6. BILLS OF LADING AS DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
As will become clear in the next chapter, the statutory transfer of contractual rights to third 
parties will principally depend upon the existence of a bill of lading. To decide whether or 
not a document which appears to be a bill of lading is in fact a bill of lading one first needs 
to examine the defining characteristic of the bill of lading, its function as a document of 
title. 
106 Ibid. 
107 [1996] 1 S.L.R. 469. 
108 (Unreported 1995), cited in Sing, T.K., "Of Straight and Switch Bills of Lading" [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 416 
at 419. 
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In Sanders .l'. Maclean & Co,109 Bowen L 1. summarised the role of the bill of 
lading as document of title as following 
A cargo at sea while in the hands of the carrier is necessarily incapable of 
physical delivery. During this period of transit and voyage, the bill of 
lading, by the law merchant, is universally recognised as its symbol and the 
endorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a symbolic 
delivery of the cargo. Property in the goods passes by such endorsement and 
delivery of the bill of lading whenever it is the intention of the parties that 
the property should pass, just as under similar circumstances the property 
would pass by an actual delivery of the goods ... it is the key which, in the 
hands of the rightful owner, is intended to unlock the door of the 
warehouse, floating or fixed, in which the goods may chance to be. 110 
The bill of lading as a document of title enables the holder to demand delivery of the goods 
covered by the bill at the port of destination since it contains a promise by the carrier with 
the physical possession of the goods to deliver them only to the holder of the bill of lading 
and no- one else. Therefore, possession of the bill of lading will enable the holder to have 
constructi\'e possession of the goods. The constructive possession of the goods will be 
transferred to anyone merely by transferring the bill without any attornment. Thus, it can 
be said, the bill of lading is the only document that can, at common law, transfer 
constructive possession without attornment by the carrier. 111 The possession of the bill of 
lading is equivalent to the possession of the goods, and the transfer of the bill of lading has 
the same effect as delivery of the goods. Therefore, transferring the bill of lading transfers 
the right to demand delivery of the goods at their destination. In Clemens Horst Co . v. 
Biddell Bros, 112 the goods were to be shipped from San Francisco to London and the buyer 
refused to pay the purchase price until the goods were delivered. The Court of Appeal held 
that possession of bill of lading was in law equivalent to possession of the goods. 
109 [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 327. 
110 Ibid. at 341. 
111 Assuming the parties have intention to transfer the constructive possession and the goods are ascertained. 
Therefore, where the goods are unascertained, the holder of the bill will have no constructive possession. 
112 [1912] A.C. 18. 
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Therefore, the seller was entitled to the purchase pnce on shipping the goods, and 
tendering to the buyer the documents of title. 
The bill of lading, as a document of title, in international sales enables the cargo 
owner either to raise credit in order to finance his transaction, or to re- sell the whole or 
part of the consignment in transit. The bill of lading, in order to operate as a document of 
title, must contain an undertaking by the carrier to carry the goods to their destination 
either to a named consignee, or to his order or assigns. Thus, a sea waybill will not be a 
document of title, in the common law sense, and its transfer does not operate as a transfer 
of constructive possession of the goods. Therefore, the holder of a sea waybill cannot raise 
credit or re- sell the goods in transit, because the carrier is bound to deliver the goods to the 
named person and not to the holder of the sea waybill. Thus, the carriage document will 
not be a document of title where it is expressed on its face to be a non- negotiable 
document. 
1. 6. 1. WHETHER "RECEIVED FOR SHIPMENT" BILLS OF LADING ARE 
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE113 
By issuing a document of title, the carner with physical posseSSIOn of the goods 
acknowledges that he is holding the goods on behalf of the holder of that document. 
Therefore, a document of title represents an obligation, which is a promise, by the carrier, 
to deliver the goods only to the holder of that document. Possession of a document of title 
provides the holder with sufficient control over the goods 114 and so, the holder will have 
constructive possession of the goods. The acknowledgement of the carrier, which is the 
essence of the document of title, would be transferred each time with the transfer of the 
113 In general see Procter, c., The Legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal Transport 
Document, Pretoria- Interlegal 1997, chapter. 3. 
114 Control over the goods would provide the holder, who is in possession of the document, with a right to sue 
the carrier in tort of conversion when the goods are delivered to some one else other than the holder on the 
ground of the carrier's break of his obligation embodied in that document of title. 
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docunlent of title without any need for fresh acknowledgement and so constructive 
possession would also be passed to the new transferee. However, the Court of Appeal, in 
Official Assignee Madras. v. Mercantile Bank of India Ltd, 115 held that "The one exception 
was the case of bills of lading, the transfer of which by the law merchant operated as 
transfer of the possession, as well as the property in, the goods". Accordingly, the bill of 
lading is the only document at common law by which constructive possession can be 
transferred without attornment. 
Nonetheless, constructive possession will not pass to the new transferee with the 
transfer of a document of title, unless there is an intention on the part of the transferor and 
the transferee. This is also supported by the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Future 
Express I 16 where it was held that the bank could not sue the carrier in tort of conversion for 
mis- delivery because of the absence of an intention on the part of the parties to transfer 
constructive possession with the bills of lading, since both the seller and the bank knew 
that the goods had been delivered at the time of delivery of the bills. Furthermore, delivery 
of the document of title to the new transferee is important for the passing of constructive 
possession and so, being a named consignee is not enough for the transfer of constructive 
possession. 117 In order for constructive possession to pass with the transfer of the document 
of title, the goods, too, which are the subject matter of the transfer should also be 
identifiable. Constructive possession will not pass to the new transferee until ascertainment 
of the contract goods, despite the fact that the buyer will obtain property in common with 
other buyers of the bulk where they have paid for the goods and the bulk has been 
identified according to s. 20 A of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) 1995. 
A document of title should also be a transferable one which means that the carrier's 
promise to deliver the goods to the holder of that document can be transferred without the 
115 [1935] A.C. 53 at 59. 
116 [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 542 at 547. 
117 See Kum .v. Wah Tat Bank [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep 439. 
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need of a notice to the carner. Delivery of the goods is affected by the transfer of 
possession and so transfer of the document of title with constructive possession represents 
a constructive delivery of the goods so as to satisfy the requirement of s. 27 of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979. In order to satisfy the requirement of transferability, the document of title 
should contain words indicating that the named consignee can substitute an alternative 
deliveree. 118 For this reason a straight bill of lading might not be regarded as a document of 
title. Although the consignee must produce the bill to obtain delivery, such a document 
lacks the essential element of transferability. However, after the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in The "Rafaela S ", 119 it is clear that such a bill of lading does constitute a 
document of title. The document is capable of only a single transfer, to the consignee. But 
it is still transferable and it is clear that multiple transferability is no longer the essence of a 
document of title. 
The only bill of lading which had been recognised as a document of title at 
common law in Lickbarrow . v. Mason 120 is the shipped bill of lading on the ground of the 
custom of merchants 
by the custom of merchants, bills of lading, expressing goods or 
merchandises to have been shipped by any person or persons to be 
delivered to order or assigns, have been, and are, at any time after such 
goods have been shipped, and before the voyage performed, for which 
they have been or are shipped, negotiable and transferable by the shipper 
or shippers of such goods to any other person or persons, by such shipper 
or shippers indorsing such bills of lading with his, her, or their name or 
names and delivering or transmitting the same so indorsed, or causing the 
same to be so delivered or transmitted to such other person or persons; 
and that by such indorsement and delivery, or transmission, the property 
in such goods hath been, and is transferred and passed to such other 
121 person or persons. 
118 Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., (et at) Interests in Goods, 2nd Edition, London and Hong Kong: L.L.P. 
1998, Chapter 22 at pp. 548- 557. 
119 See supra fn. 95 at pars. 143,144,151,152,158 and 159. 
120 [1794] 101 ER. 380. 
121 Ibid. at 382. 
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There are several requirements in order to qualify a document as a bill of lading within the 
custom recognised in Lickbarrow. First, it should be issued by the carrier who accepts 
responsibilities for the goods throughout the entire voyage. Second, it should be a shipped 
bill and the goods must be on board of vessel. Finally, it should be transferable. I22 The 
status of a "received for shipment" bill of lading also bears an question of whether a 
combined transport bill of lading is a true bill of lading(i.e. a document of title) and, 
whether it is covered by the 1992 Act. There is no crystal-clear answer to the question of 
whether a "received for shipment" is a document of title at common law. Surely, a 
"received for shipment" bill is not a document of title according to Lickbarrow . v. Mason 
which only refers to "goods or merchandises to have been shipped by any person or 
persons to be delivered to order or assigns,,?123 
Judicial opinion is divided regarding to the status of a "received for shipment" bill 
of lading as whether it is a true bill and so a document of title. The Privy Council in The 
Marlborough HillI24 held that a "received for shipment" bill is a document of title, despite 
the fact that the actual question before the Privy Council was whether a "received for 
shipment" bill was a bill of lading within s. 6 of the Admiralty Court Act 1861. Lord 
Phillimore refused to differentiate in principle between a 'shipped on board' bill of lading 
and a 'received for shipment' bill of lading on the ground that "The two forms of a bill of 
lading may well stand, as their lordships understand that they stand, together" .125 
Therefore, he concluded that the only difference between the two forms of a bill of lading 
is ".... the practical business- like way of treating parcels of cargo to be placed on a 
general ship ... ".126 The 'practical business- like way' in the case of a 'received for 
shipment' bill is "treating parcels of cargo to be placed on a general ship which will be 
122 See Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., supra fn. 118 at p. 559. 
123 See supra fn. 120 at 382. 
124 [1921] 1 A.C. 444. 
125 Ibid. at 451. 
126 Ibid. 
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lying alongside the wharf taking in cargo for several days, and whose proper stowage will 
require that certain bulkier or heavier parcels shall be placed on board first, while others, 
though they have arrived earlier, wait for the convenient place and time of stowage". 127 As 
regard the objection to carry either by the named ship or by some other vessel, he 
concluded that "The liberty to tranship is ancient and well established, and does not 
derogate from the nature of a bill of lading; and if the contract begin when the goods are 
received on the wharf, substitution of the vessel does not differ in principle from 
transhipmenf'.128 Finally, he concluded that if a 'received for shipment' bill is a bill of 
lading, then, it is a negotiable bill of lading. This is because both parties agreed to call such 
bill a bill of lading and both by its terms have entered into obligations and acquired rights 
such as are proper to bill of lading. 129 
However, there was no reference in The Marlborough Hill either to the issue of a 
"received for shipment" bill as a document of title at common law, or whether it was a bill 
of lading under the Bills of Lading Act 1855. The decision of the Privy Council in The 
.:Vfarlborough Hill was criticised in Diamond Alkali Export Corp. v. Fl. Bourgeois130 where 
a bill of lading provided that "Received in apparent good order and condition from D. A. 
Horan to be transported by the s.s. Anglia, .... , or, failing shipment by said steamer, in 
and upon a following steamer, 280 bags dense soda". It was held that a "received for 
shipment" bill was not a document of title according to the custom which was recognised 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. at 452. 
129 There is a suggestion that the received for shipment bill in The Marlborough Hill was a document of title 
on the ground that it was issued in New York where received for shipment bills are regarded as documents of 
title by the custom. Also, the conclusion of the Privy Council was made regardless to the custom in 
Lickbarrow . v. Mason which is restricted to only a shipped bill of lading. See Debattista, c., Sale of Goods 
Carried by Sea, London: Butterworths 1990, at pp. 219- 228 and Guest, A. G., supra fn. 62 at para. 18- 060. 
130 [1921] 3 K.B. 443. 
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in LickbarroH' . v. Mason. However, the actual point which was decided in Diamond Alkali 
was that a "received for shipment" was not a good tender under c.i.f. contract. 131 
In Ishag . \'. Allied Bank,132 it was argued that the bill of lading which was issued 
was "not received for shipment" because of its words "We herewith confirm that the a.m. 
consignment is at the disposal of Messrs. Karl Geuther & Co. , Bremen, as Agents of the 
Joint Service (NEPH) and that same is intended to be shipped in 1 Lot with MS 
'L YCAON' fronl Bremen to Douala" and so was not a document of title Lloyd J., held that 
It is true that it does not use the traditional language "received for 
shipment". But, the language which it does use comes to the same 
h· H1 t Ing. --
Lloyd J., added 
Nor is there any difference, as was suggested, between "for shipment" in a 
received for shipment bill and' 'intended to be shipped with" in the present 
document. The document acknowledges that the goods are at the carriers' 
disposal. It provides for terms on which the goods are to be carried to their 
destination, namely Douala, and there delivered to the consignee or his 
assigns. It states the name of the ship by which it is intended that the 
carriage should be performed. In my Judgment the legal effect of the bill of 
lading is precisely the same as in any other received for shipment bill of 
lading. 134 
It was held in Ishag . v. Allied Bank International135 that the January bill of lading 
which was exchanged by the sub- agents of the ship with warehouse receipts relating to the 
goods by the seller's forwarding agents was a document of title. The court held that the 
received for shipment was a document of title according to The Marlborough Hill without 
any reference to the criticisms of that decision in Diamond Alkali Export Corp. v. Fl 
Bourgeois 136 where the court held that the received for shipment bill was invalid for a c.i.f. 
131 It was suggested that the only objection against tendering a "received for shipment" bill under c.i.f. 
contract is the lack of the characteristics of a document oftitle. See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 62. 
132 See supra fn. 82. 
133 Ibid. at 97. 
134Ibid. at 97- 98. 
135 Ibid. 
136 See supra fn. 130. The question of whether a "received for shipment" bill oflading is a document of title 
was not, basically, one of the issues which has been discussed in The Marlborough Hill. 
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contract which provides for a specific date of shipment and the Bills of Lading Act 1855 
made reference only to shipped bills of lading. Therefore, Diamond Alkali Export Corp. v 
FI Bourgeois applies only to cases where the buyer asked for a shipped bill of lading and 
the shipment should be within specific period such as under c.i.f. or f.o.b. with additional 
services. However, it was suggested that the January bill of lading was closer to the 
traditional bill of lading than the documents which were considered in The Marlborough 
Hill and Diamond Alkali, as it named the ship, which was the Lycaon, and did not give the 
carrier the right to carry the goods on a substitute ship.137 It is arguable that the only 
objection against the January bill of lading being considered as a "received for shipment" 
bill of lading, and even as a document of title, is that the goods were at warehouses. 
Therefore, physical possession of the goods was not with the carrier but with the 
warehouseman, despite the fact that the warehouse receipts relating to the goods were with 
the carrier which would provide the carrier only with constructive possession of the goods 
and not with physical possession, so preventing the transferee of such a bill from acquiring 
constructive possession of the goods.138 However, a "received for shipment" bill of lading 
is covered by s. 1 (2) (b) of COGSA 1992, although COGSA 1992 does not deal with the 
question whether a "received for shipment" is a document of title. 139 
A bill of lading is still a document of title until the carriage contract is discharged 
by delivery of the goods to the person entitled to them under terms of the bill of lading at 
their destination. The bill of lading is still a document of title, even if the goods have been 
137 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 62. 
138 However, a similar objection might be raised in respect of a shipped bill of lading issued by a time 
charterer but it is clear that such a document is as much a bill oflading as one issued by a shipowner. 
139 It has 'been submitted that a "received for shipment" bill oflading is not a document of title and so, it falls 
outside the custom recognised in Lickbarrow . v. Mason. See the English and Scottish Law Commissions 
Report, Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods By Sea, [1991] 196 Eng. LCR and 130 Scot. LCR at 
para. 5.4. 
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1 t . d l' d 140. 141· OS or nlls- e Ivere. It was held In The Future Express, that delIvery of the goods to 
the person entitled to them, without surrender of the bill to the carrier, will not terminate 
the validity of the bill of lading as a document of title. 142 
Most bills of lading are transferred either by way of security or pursuant to a 
contract of sale. In the case of transfer for security, the endorsee acquires the special 
property of a pledgee. It was held in The Future Express 143 that the bank never became a 
pledgee or acquired any security over the goods because when the bills of lading were 
negotiated to the bank, both the bank and the transferor, were aware that the goods had 
already been delivered to the buyer without the production of the bill of lading. Thus, the 
transfer of the bill of lading to the bank was not intended to transfer constructive 
possession of the goods. The bill of lading which is transferred pursuant to a contract of 
sale will transfer the general property in the goods to the consignee at some time. But the 
time at which the property passes to the consignee depends upon the intention of the 
parties according to the terms of the contract. The bill of lading is a negotiable document, 
but the transferee does not get better title to the goods than the transferor. Thus, where the 
negotiable bill of lading is obtained by fraud and then indorsed to a bona fide endorsee for 
value, the endorsee will not obtain title to the goods represented by that bill of lading. In 
Kum and Another. v. Wah Tat Bank Ltd., 144 Lord Devlin concluded that 
It is well settled that "Negotiable", when used in relation to a bill of lading, 
means simply transferable. A negotiable bill of lading is not negotiable in 
the strict sense; it cannot, as can be done by the negotiation of a bill of 
exchange, give to the transferee a better title than the transferor has got, but 
it can by endorsement and delivery give as good a title. 145 
140 See East West Corporation .v. Dkbs 1912, [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239 at para. 19, ([2003] EWCA Civ. 
83), where the Court of Appeal held that a bil1 of lading is not a 'spent' bill when delivery is made to a party 
who is not entitled to possession of the goods. 
141 At the first instance, [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 79. 
142 It was held in Barclays Bank Ltd .v. Commissioners o/Customs and Excise, [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 81, that 
the bill of lading does not lose its character as a document of title because it is not immediately presented on 
arrival of the ship at the port of destination. 
143 See supra fn. 116 at 547. 
144 See supra fn. 117. 
145 Ibid. at 446. 
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WILLSM.L 
However, the bona fide endorsee may acquire a title even where his indorser has no 
title to the goods, according to s.10 of the Factors 1889 Act and s. 47 (2) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, and will not be affected by the shipper's contractual rights such as 
stoppage in transit. Also, under ss. 8 & 9 of the Factors Act 1889 and under ss. 24 & 25 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the transferee of the bill of lading may get better title to the 
goods than his transferor. In Cahn & Mayer . v. Packett's Bristol Channel Steam Packet 
Co. Ltd,l-+o copper was sold upon c.i.f. terms and resold by the buyer to a sub- buyer. The 
copper was shipped and the bill of lading was indorsed in blank to the buyer with an 
invoice. The buyer failed to pay the purchase price and so the property never passed to him 
according to s. 19 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The buyer sent the bill of lading to 
his buyer who paid in good faith. It was held that, the sub- buyer obtained a good title to 
the goods under s. 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and s. 9 of the Factors Act 1889, even 
though the buyer was not yet in the possession of the bill of lading at the time of sale to the 
sub- buyer. Also, the seller lost his right of stoppage in transit, under s. 10 of the Factors 
Act 1889 and under s. 47 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, because the bill of lading had 
been lawfully transferred to the buyer, even though he had not performed the condition on 
which the transfer was made. 
Lord Devlin in Kum and Another .v. Wah Tat Bank Ltd., 147 also noted that it has 
never been settled whether delivery of a bill of lading which is notated as a non- negotiable 
. 1 . 11 148 H ,. . 11 document transfers tIt e or posseSSIOn at a. owever, mate s receIpts, excepttona y, 
may be treated as a document of title according to local custom. But, mate's receipts will 
146 [1899] 1 Q.B. 643. 
147 See supra fn. 117. 
148 But see The River Ngada, supra fn. 90, where a purported endorsement of such a document was held not 
to transfer property in the goods covered by the straight bill. As such a document lacks the characteristic of 
transferability, it cannot be regarded as a true bill of lading. Therefore, attornment will be needed if 
possession is to transfer to the third party holder of such a document. The decision is unaffected by the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in The "Rafaela S" as it did not involve the consignee named in a straight 
bill but a purported endorsee. 
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not be treated as a document of title where they are notated as non- negotiable documents. 
Thus, the mate's receipt was considered to be a document of title as a result of the local 
custom which was found to exist in the trade between Singapore and Sarawak. But, the 
custom did not apply to the actual mate's receipt in question, because it was marked as 'not 
negotiable' . 
It has been noted above that, a "received for shipment" bill of lading is not a 
document of title according to Lickbarrow . v. Mason and so was outside the scope of the 
Bills of Lading Act 1855, since a "received for shipment" bill of lading was not in use in 
1794 or 1855:49 It has also been suggested that a "received for shipment" bill of lading is 
not a transferable document of title, since art. III (7) of the Hague- Visby Rules obliges the 
carrier to issue only a "shipped" bill of lading, if the shipper so demands. ISO The carrier's 
liability under the Hague- Visby Rules would be on a 'tackle to tackle' basis which allows 
the carrier to exclude liability for pre- shipment period. lSI Therefore, it is arguable that a 
"received for shipment" bill of lading under which the carrier assumes responsibility for 
the goods during the entire period of transportation including the pre- shipment period 
would provide the shipper with a level of control equivalent to that under a "shipped" bill 
of lading. Is2 However, according to the modem practice goods are generally not delivered 
by the shipper to the ship's side, but instead they are delivered the carrier at inland depot 
and so bills of lading in respect of the goods are issued in received for shipment rather than 
shipped forms. IS3 Moreover, a "received for shipment" bill of lading is accepted under art. 
23 (a) (ii) of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits No. 500 and art. 
149 Carver, T. G, "On Some Defects in the Bills of Lading Act 1855" [1890] 6 L.Q.R. 289 and Sanson, N., 
"Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992- The Practice and Legal Implications, Conference Documentation, IBC 
Legal Studies and Services Limited Maritime Law Division 1993, SAS Portman Hotel, London W l. 1 at pp. 
4- 5. 
150 See Sanson, N., ibid. at p. 5. 
151 Under art. 4 of the Hamburg Rules, the carrier should accept responsibility for the goods from the moment 
that the goods are taken into his charge. 
152 In The Marlborough Hill, supra fn. 124 at 451- 452, Lord Phillimore affirmed that the carrier should 
assumes responsibility for the goods during the entire period of transportation. 
153 See Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., supra fn. 118 at p. 562 and Debattista, C., supra fn. 129 at p. 212. 
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26 which provides for the tender of multimodal transport documents which indicate simply 
that the goods have been "dispatched", "taken in charge", or "loaded in board" since a 
nlultimodal transport document would nonnally be a "received for shipment" bill of 
lading.
I54 
In addition, it has been argued that the only difference between a "shipped" or a 
"received for shipment" bill of lading is that a "received for shipment" bill of lading states 
that the goods have been received for shipment and so the bailment of goods has started at 
an earlier stage than in the case of shipped bill of lading which is a distinction of fact, but 
not in law. 155 Therefore, the Law Commissions recommended that "implementing 
legislation should treat "received for shipment" bills of lading on the same footing as 
"shipped" bills of lading".156 Also, it has been submitted that 
that there would now be little difficulty in establishing that all three types 
of documents [through bills of lading, combined transport bills of lading 
and bills of lading in a "received" fonn] are by custom treated as 
transferable documents of title. A "received for shipment" bill of lading 
is undoubtedly within the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and there seems 
no reason to doubt that the other fonns of bill of lading are also within 
the Act157 
It is also arguable that, although art. III (7) of the Hague- Visby Rules imposes an 
obligation on the carrier to issue a shipped bill on the shipper's demand and the shipper is 
under a duty to surrender any document of title which has been taken by him to the carrier. 
Therefore a "received for shipment" bill of lading would seem to be a document of title, 
since it is one of the documents which the Hague- Visby Rules contemplate being issued 
by the carrier in respect of the goodS. I58 Besides, a "received for shipment" bill of lading is 
accepted by mercantile practice as a traditional bill of lading, it is also transferred from one 
party to another by the necessary endorsement and delivery, in additional to the acceptance 
154 See Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., supra fn. 118 at pp. 563, 567 and Sanson, N., supra fn. 149 at p. 6. 
155 See Debattista, c., supra fn. 129 at pp. 223- 224. 
156 See the Commissions Report supra fn. 138 at para. 2. 48. 
157 See Boyd, S. C., (et at) Scrutton on Charter parties and Bills of Lading, 20th Edition, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 1996, at p. 375. Also, it has been submitted that, bankers and traders deal with "received for 
shipment" bills of lading and "shipped" bills of lading in the same way. 
158 See Faber, D., "The problems arising from multimodal transport", [1996] LMCLQ. 503 at 513. 
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of this document in return for a loan to finance the sale transaction by UCP No. 500. 
Therefore, this recognition of the received for shipment bill of lading would probably 
constitute a custom which would help the courts in recognising a "received for shipment" 
bill of lading as a document of title. 159 
1.6.2. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING160 
This is a document where the carrier undertakes to be responsible for carrying the goods 
from the point of reception to the point of final destination. It is used where the contract of 
carriage will be performed by more than one carrier. Therefore, the first carrier will be 
responsible towards the cargo owner for the loss of or damage to the goods during the 
entire period of carriage. However, where the carriage mode is the same during the whole 
contract such as sea carriage the document which issued by the first carrier will be a 
through bill of lading. While the carriage of the goods involving more than one mode of 
carriage as sea and road carriage the document which issued by the carrier will be 
combined transport documents. There are three basic types of through bill of lading. 
1. 6. 2. 1. Pure Through Bills of Lading 
The first carrier undertakes to be responsible for the carriage of the goods from the point of 
receipt to the point of final destination against payment of the freight for the entire voyage. 
The bill must contain a clause to the effect that the principal carrier will be obliged to sub-
contract on- carriage from the port of transhipment with another carrier in his own name 
and at his own expense. 161 Therefore, the cargo owner can sue the initial carrier for the loss 
of or damage to the goods regardless whether or not the loss or damage took place in the 
159 Lord Devlin in Kum . v. Wah Tat Bank, supra fn. 117 at 444, noted that "The function of the commercial 
law is to allow, so far as it can, commercial men to do business in the way in which they want to do it and not 
to require them to stick to forms that they may think to be outmoded". It is arguable therefore, that the 
recognition of this document is a necessity on the ground of its recognition by all the parties related to 
business, in particular, banks and businessmen. For support for this view see Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., 
supra fn. 118 at 567 and Sanson, N., supra fn. 149 at 6. 
160 Through bills oflading will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2 under sub- title 2. 5. l. 
161 A bill oflading which contains a clause to that effect is still a normal bill oflading. 
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initial carrier's hands. The on- carrier will usually issue his own bill of lading for the part 
of carriage which he actually performs, therefore, there will be two bills of lading covering 
the same goods in circulation. The consignee under the individual bill of lading may be the 
initial carrier or the rightful holder of the through bill of lading. But if the individual bill of 
lading falls in the hands of a third party acting in good faith, he can demand delivery from 
the on- carrier without being entitled under the through bill of lading. 162 
A through bill of lading will fulfil the function of the usual bill in respect of being 
receipt of the goods by the carrier as to the quantity and the condition. The question of 
whether or not the through bill of lading is a document of title has never been answered in 
the affirmative. But some authorities have concluded that there is nothing preventing it 
from being considered as a document of title because the initial carrier is responsible for 
the goods during the entire voyage even in the event of transhipment, especially where the 
through bill of lading is shipped bill.163 Therefore, the through bill of lading does not suffer 
from the problem which concerns the "received for shipment" bill of lading and so should 
be accepted as normal bill of lading. Under the common law referring to the through bill of 
lading as a document of title means no more than it is transferable. Therefore, proof to the 
contrary is possible even against the third party acting in good faith. The on- carrier who 
issued the individual bill of lading cannot confer rights to the goods on the third party that 
he himself did not have. Therefore, the delivery of the goods should be against the through 
bill of lading, or else the individual bill of lading should contain a clause that delivery 
against the individual bill should be linked to the presentation of the through bill of lading. 
However, a third party acting in good faith can demand delivery against the individual bill 
of lading from the on- carrier without being the rightful holder under the through bill of 
162 See De Wit, R., Multimodal Transport- Carrier Liability and Documentation, London: Lloyd's of London 
Press Ltd- LLP 1995 at p. 295. 
163 See Todd, P., Modern Bills of Lading, 2nd Edition, London: Blackwell Law 1993, at p. 69. The Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1992 applies to bill of lading and therefore a broad interpretation of its provisions 
would be enough to cover the through bill oflading. 
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lading. Therefore, the rightful holder of the through bill of lading can sue in contract the 
carrier who has issued it, because the undertaking as to the delivery by on carrier in the 
individual bill is given to the initial carrier. 
Do the Hague or Hague- Visby Rules cover the period when the goods are on-
shore during transhipment once the sea carriage in a ship has begun? The Supreme Court 
of British Columbia addressed this question in Captain. v. Far Eastern Steamship Co.,164 
where the cargo of household effects in vans was carried from Madras, India to Vancouver. 
The cargo was damaged as a result of fresh water because the vans were left out in the 
open in Singapore. The question before the court was whether the Hague Rules applied to 
the part of the contract during which the goods were on the dock at Singapore. It was held 
that that part of the contract which related to holding the goods on dock was not within the 
Rules since it did not relate to "the carriage of goods by water".165 The same issue was 
considered in Mayhew Foods .v. Overseas Containers Ltd.,166 where a cargo of frozen 
chicken was shipped from Shoreham to Le Havre for off loading and reshipment upon 
anther vessel to Saudi Arabia. Bingham, J., distinguished Mayhew Foods from Captain in 
two respects. The shipper in the latter case was told that there would be transhipment and 
there were two separate bills of lading for the two legs of the journey. Bingham, 1., agreed 
that the Rules would not apply to carriage or storage before the port of shipment and after 
the port of discharge, since it would be inland carriage but not sea carriage. Bingham 1., 
concluded that the Rules apply from the time of shipment until discharge at the port of 
destination, even if the goods were discharged and stored on land for transhipment, since 
such operations were "in relation to and in connection with the carriage of goods by sea" in 
a ship. Therefore, Bingham, 1., held that the contract between those port was for carriage 
164 [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 595. 
165 Ibid. at 601- 602. 
166 [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 317. For more details see Rose, F., "Transhipment and the Hague- Visby Rules-
Mayhew Foods Ltd., v. Overseas Containers Ltd." [1984] LMCLQ 202. 
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by sea despite the language of cl. 21 and so "the [R Jules, having applied on shipment at 
Shoreham, remained continuously in force until discharge at Jeddah".167 It is arguable that 
Captain is factually different from Mayhew Foods but such difference should not be the 
ground for applying a different result, therefore Captain should have been viewed by 
Bingham as having been wrongly decided, since both vessels were owned by the same 
carrier and under his management and also the carrier had assumed responsibility 
throughout the carriage contract. Moreover, Bingham J's argument could be used in the 
Captain case that the contract was for carriage by sea despite the transhipment and such 
transhipment was related to the carriage contract. Otherwise, the application of the Rules 
could be avoided by carrying the goods by an indirect way to the port of destination. This 
conclusion would be supported by the different treatment of cases where the carrier 
assumes responsibility for carriage of the goods only to the port of transhipment and 
therefore the period of transhipment would not be covered by the Rules since the on-
carriage would have been done by a different carrier under a different bill of lading. 
A variant of this problem came up in The Anders Maersk. 168 Two boilers were 
shipped from the USA pursuant to a through bill of lading which conferred a right on the 
carrier to tranship the cargo. The defendants shipped the boilers from Baltimore to Hong 
Kong and arranged for them to be transhipped from Hong Kong to Shanghai. The boilers 
were damaged and the plaintiffs claimed for the full loss suffered by them. The defendants 
relied upon the incorporation of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 into the bill 
of lading and the package limitation therein. The plaintiffs contended that by reason of the 
transhipment in Hong Kong the final leg of the carriage was subject to the Hague- Visby 
Rules as enacted in Hong Kong. Mayo J., held that COGSA 1936 applied to the whole of 
the carriage in that there was no reference to Hong Kong in the bill of lading. In 
167 Ibid. at 320. 
168 [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 483. 
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transhiping the defendants were simply exercising a right under that bill of lading. He then 
proceeded to hold that 'shipment' under the Hague- Visby Rules did not embrace 
transhipment and therefore, the defendants were entitled to limit their liabilities. 
1. 6. 2. 2. Collective Through Bills of Lading 
The initial carrier here undertakes to perform or in his name to procure performance of the 
carriage. Each carrier will be responsible, according to the terms of his bill of lading, for 
the goods whilst in his possession.1 69 Thus, this kind of bill does not provide the same 
security to the consignee because the issuer of this bill can escape from the liability for the 
periods which falls outside the mandatory tackle to tackle period of liability in the Hague 
Visby Rules. The aim of the collective through bill of lading is that the issuer should 
protect his shipper or consignee by delivering the goods to a competent carrier and he 
should take a clean shipped or receipt from the on-carrier, on the ground that he has 
delivered the goods to on- carrier in the same apparent good condition as he received them 
and the on carrier should do the same towards the consignee. 170 
1. 6. 2. 3. False Through Bills of Lading 
Under this type of bill of lading, the carrier only undertakes to forward the goods to their 
final destination. So the carrier will be responsible for the goods while they are in his 
possession and his responsibility ends at the moment of transhipment. According to Cliffe 
.v. Hull and Netherlands s.s. Co.,171 this document is not considered as a through bill of 
169 Such clause is valid because it does not violate art. III (7) of the Hague- Visby Rules which apply from 
tackle to tackle. The tackle to tackle exemption clause from liability to be effective regarding to the loss or 
damage to the goods on land should be in the collective through bill of lading and it is not enough to be in 
each individual bi11 of lading, since the holder of the collective through bill will have no knowledge of the 
contents of the individual bills. See De Wit, R., supra fn. 162 at pp. 305- 307. 
170 Whether or not the collective through bi11 of lading is a document of title, the same conclusion, which 
applied to the pure through bill of lading, can be applied to this document and so the answer will be 
affirrnati ve. 
171 [1921] 6 L.I.L.R. 136, where the shipowner issued a bill of lading for carriage of the goods from 
Rotterdam to Hull which included a clause "to be forwarded from Hull [ ... ] to Manchester". It was held that 
the document was not a through bill of lading and the carrier just acted as a forwarding agent regarding to 
forward the good from Hull. 
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lading. It is a document of title only regarding the part of the voyage which is actually 
performed by the first carrier to the port of transhipment. This is because the false through 
bill is useless at the port of destination as a document giving a right to deliver the goods 
since it does not represent the goods at that time. Therefore, the consignee's right to take 
delivery of the goods derives from the individual bill which issued by the on- carrier. 
Unless The Hague- Visby Rules apply the on- carrier may prove that he did not receive the 
goods in apparent good order and condition as mentioned in the document. 172 
The question arises as to whether a liberty to tranship clause and a cesser of 
liability clause would offend art. III (8) of the Hague- Visby Rules. These standard clauses 
are commonly used in the liner trade bills of lading and initially it reflects the parties' 
freedom to determine the scope of their agreement. As regard a liberty to tranship clause, it 
was held, in G. H Renton. v. Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama, 173 that the idea of 
art. II of the Hague Rules is to give the parties the right to decide which particular 
functions should be performed by the carrier and so, the performance of any of the 
designated functions, by the carrier, should be governed by the Hague Rules. Therefore, 
the effect of art. III (2) of the Hague Rules is only to prevent the carrier from contracting 
out of liability where he undertakes the performance of one of those functions and not to 
specify those operations. Therefore, under the Hague Rules, the parties are free to allocate 
responsibilities for various tasks in the carriage contract as between themselves and so, it 
would not be void and null by virtue of art. III (8).174 One could argue, accordingly, that a 
liberty to tranship clause and a cesser of liability clause are obligations clauses rather than 
exception clauses and so it will not be void or null under art. III (8) of the Hague- Visby 
Rules. If this line of argument is accepted, the cargo owner might end up without any 
172 See De Wit, R., supra fn. 162 at p. 307. . 
173 [1957] A.C. 149 at 174. In coming to their decision their Lordships endorsed similar comments to thIS 
effect made by Devlin 1., in Pyrene . v. Overseas Containers Ltd., [1954] 2 Q.B. 402 at 418. 
174 Jbid. at 168-173 
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contractual remedy against either the first carrier or the second carrier for the loss of or the 
damage to the goods after transhipment. 175 As a result, sub- bailment on terms might be a 
yiable solution as to give a non- contractual rights to the cargo owner and to define such 
right within the Hague- Visby Rules. Attornment is vital if a third party cargo owner is to 
haye a non- contractual right against the carrier by virtue of the sub- bailment doctrine, 
otherwise the cargo owner will have non- contractual rights of suit in negligence and 
conversion. If the goods are lost prior to delivery, as where the ship sinks, the successor in 
title will have no claim to proceed in bailment and will have to proceed in negligence. 176 
1.6.3. COMBINED TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS 177 
The issuer of the combined bill of lading undertakes for the carriage of the goods from the 
point of reception to the point of final destination. The goods under the combined bill of 
lading involves at least two modes of carriage such as sea and road. Sometimes the 
combined bill of lading will be issued by a person other than the carrier such as the freight 
forwarder. 178 It is unclear whether or not the combined bill of lading is a document of title. 
Carver argues that such document would not be a document of title if it is issued in a non-
negotiable or a straight form, or issued by a freight forwarder agent who is not acting as 
carrier or multimodal transport operator. 179 He first argues that a bill of lading relates to sea 
carriage and that such document would not be a document of title, even though issued by a 
sea carrier, because "It would ( ....... ) scarcely be satisfactory to make the legal nature of the 
document depend on the proportion which the sea carriage bore to the land carriage".180 
Secondly, he argues that such document would be issued in the form of received rather 
than shipped bill of lading. However, this problem can be overcome by making a notation 
175 For supporting this view see Baughen, S., "Article III rule 8. A Killer Provision?" 3 (3) STU 14 [2002]. 
176 The shipper, however, may still sue in bailment as in The Pioneer Container, [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 593. 
177 Combined transport documents will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 under sub- title 2. 5. 3. 
178 Freight forwarder bills oflading will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2 under sub- title 2.5.2. 
179 Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 24 at para. 8- 078. 
180 Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 24 at para. 8- 079. 
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to the effect that the goods were put on board of vessel. 181 There is nothing essentially 
different in this document from a received for shipment bill of lading so if that is a 
document of title so, too, should the combined transport bill. Where the combined bill is 
issued by the freight forwarder it can be regarded as a straight bill of lading and so the 
nlles of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 concerning the waybill may still apply to it 
but the carrier may still have to deliver the goods upon the presentation of the combined 
bill of lading. However, the combined bill of lading can still be considered as a receipt for 
the goods by the carrier and as evidence of the carriage contract. As will be shown in the 
next chapter, the problem with combined transport documents is not so much their 
uncertain status as documents of title but whether or not COGSA 1992 applies to a contract 
\\"here only part of the carriage is by sea. This difficulty also arises in relation of freight 
forwarder bill of lading which would be also discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, these 
documents would be considered under both the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument. 
1. 6. 4. SHIP'S DELIVERY ORDERS 
A ship's delivery order as a document of title is relevant given provisions of COGSA 1992. 
It is relevant because of the issue of title to sue in tort, providing a ship's delivery order 
issued under a combined transport bill of lading which is held to fall outside COGSA 1992. 
Ship's delivery orders are used in bulk cargoes where the whole consignment is covered by 
a single bill of lading. They enable the seller to split out a bulk consignment into smaller 
parcels and to sell them to different buyers while the goods are still at sea. The meaning of 
the expression 'ship's delivery order' at common law, depends upon the context in which it 
is used. In Colin & Shields. v. W. Weddel & Co. Ltd182, a sale contract provided that the 
payment would be on presentation of documents "full set of bills of lading, and/ or ship's 
delivery order (to be countersigned by banker, ship broker, captain, or mate, if so required 
181 Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 24 at para. 8- 079. 
182 [1952] 2 All E.R. 337. 
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by the buyers), and a policy or certificate of insurance. If a bill of lading and/ or insurance 
policy were not supplied, the buyers were to be put in the same position as if they had been 
in possession of such documents". 183 A ship's delivery order was issued and signed by the 
shipowners which was addressed to the Master Porter and authorised him to deliver the 
goods to the named person, who was the buyer, in the order. The Court held that this ship's 
delivery order was not within the meaning of the term of the sale contract and the buyers 
were entitled to refuse payment against it. The buyers were looking for a ship's delivery 
order which would put them in the same position as the bill of lading. But, the ship's 
delivery order which was tendered was issued by the shipowner and addressed to a third 
party. Thus, the buyers would have no cause of action against the shipowners. 184 
However, the ship's delivery order which would satisfy the buyer would be a 
document issued by the shipowner which contained a promise by him to deliver the goods 
to the person named in the order or the holder of it. 185 According to Waren Import 
Gesellschafi Krohn & Co . v. Internationale Graanhandel Thegra N V,186 a ship's delivery 
order will be acceptable where it is issued by or on behalf of the shipowner and contains an 
express or implied undertaking to deliver the goods on board of the ship to the named 
person or the holder of it. 187 The same rules will apply to a ship's delivery order in the case 
of charterparty. Therefore, a ship's delivery order will not be a good tender where it is 
issued by the charterer or sub- charterer on behalf of the shipowner directing the 
183 Ibid. 
184 However, attorment will only give a possessory rights to the attomee, entitling him to claim the cargo and 
to sue in conversion for misdelivery. 
185 There is no difference between ship's delivery order issued by the shipowner and one which is addressed 
to him, unless the shipowner has attomed to the buyer. Roskill J., emphasised the same idea in Margarine 
Union G.m.b.H .v. Cambay Prince s.s. Co. Ltd, [1969] Q.B. 219 at 231, when he said: "They are delivery 
orders addressed by or on behalf of the sub charterers with whom alone the bill of lading holders, who were 
not the plaintiffs, were in contractual relationship, directing the ship to release the quantities of copra 
specified in the respective delivery orders to whomever might come along to the ship or to the ship's agents 
in Hamburg with the delivery orders in order to obtain possession of and, through obtaining possession, 
obtain legal title to those four parcels of 500 tons each.". 
186 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 146 at 155. 
187 It was also held in Waren Import Gesllschaft Krohn & Co .v. Internationale Graanhandel Thegra N V, 
[1975]1 Lloyd's Rep. 147 at 155, that there is no difference whether the s?ip's delivery order issued direct or 
re- issued by the shipowner as long as it is incorporating such an undertaking. 
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charterer's agent to deliver the goods to the order of the sellers. This is because, the 
undertaking embodied in that document would not be in favour of the buyers. 188 
Ship's DeH\'t!ry Orders as Documents of Title? 
As we have noted above a ship's delivery order is not, in the common law sense, a 
document of title, unless a custom to that effect is proved. This is because the transfer of 
the ship's delivery order, which is issued by the seller and addressed to the carrier to 
deliver the goods to the buyer, will not transfer constructive possession of the goods or 
amount to a delivery of the goods to the holder. But where the carrier attorns to the buyer 
and thereby acknowledges that he holds the goods on his behalf, it will transfer 
constructive possession. Also, the transfer of the ship's delivery order from one transferee 
to another will not transfer constructive possession without a new attornment by the person 
in possession of the goods, the carrier. Although s. 1 (4) of the Factors Act 1889, which 
applies to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, refers to the ship's delivery order as a document of 
title, according to s. 29 (4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 constructive possession of the 
goods in the hands of the third party, the carrier, will not be transferable without 
attornment. The words of s. 29 (4) strike a balance between the common law rule and the 
Factors Act 1889. 189 Under s. 1 (4) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, a ship's 
delivery order is considered as a document containing an undertaking "an undertaking by 
the carrier to a person identified in the document to deliver the goods to which the 
document relates to that person". The undertaking should be "under or for the purpose of a 
contract of carriage by sea of the goods to which the document relates, or of goods which 
include those goods". Section 1 (4) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, provides the 
same requirement as the common law and moreover, a ship's delivery order can be issued 
in relation to bulk cargo. Therefore a ship's delivery order must contain an undertaking by 
188 Waren Import Gesllschaft Krohn & Co .v. Internationale Graanhandel Thegra N. v., supra fn. 187 at 155. 
189 See Guest, A. G., supraJn. 62 at pars. 18- 168 and 169. 
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the carrier, and should be given to the person to whom delivery is to be made and any 
ship's delivery order which does not contain these requirement will fall outside the Act190. 
1.6.5. MATE'S RECEIPTS AS DOCUMENTS OF TITLE? 
A mate's receipt is a document issued by the shipowner or on his behalf, to the shipper of 
the goods and it contains statements as to the quantity and condition of the goods. A mate's 
receipt, according to A.R. Brown, McFarlane & Co . v. C. Shaw Lovell & Sons and Walter 
P 191· . 192 otts, IS not a carnage contract. In Naviera Magar S.A . v. Soc. Metallurgique de 
Normandie (The Nagar Marin),193 it was concluded that the mate's receipt is not a 
document under which the contractual rights under the carriage contract, with the carrier 
can be transferred to or created in favour of the third party. Nor is a mate's receipt a 
document of title according to the common law sense. It was held, in Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
,\', Ramjiban Serowgee194 that 
Its transfer does not pass property in the goods, nor is its possession 
equivalent to possession of the goods. It is non conclusive, and its 
statements do not bind the shipowners as do the statements in a bill of 
lading signed within the master's authority. 195 
However, a mate's receipt can be a document of title where a custom to that effect 
can be proved. So in Kum .v. Wah Tat Bank Ltd, 196 there was found to be a custom in the 
trade between Sarawak and Singapore to that effect. The Carriage of Goods Act 1992 
makes no reference to the mate's receipt and thus, the common law rules will apply, unless 
there is a local custom. However, the categorisation of a mate's receipt as a document of 
190 Where the ship's delivery order issued by someone other than the carrier, or is given to the seller, shipper, 
to deliver the goods to the buyer 
191 [1921] 7 LI.L.R. 36 at 37, 
192 In The Hector, supra fn. 41 at 299, the court held that the bill oflading was a charterer's bill oflading, 
Rix. 1., submitted that where the sale contract provides for payment against other documents such as mate's 
receipt, the seller will not be bound to procure a bill of lading and so, a mate's receipt can be the carriage 
contract. But, it is arguable that the above dictum is limited to cases where the bill of lading is a charterer's 
bill and payment against other document apart of the bill of lading is rare. Therefore, the above dictum would 
be limited to cases which would not be supported by international trade practice. 
193 [1988]1 Lloyd's Rep. 412 at 420. 
194 [1938] A.C. 429. 
195 Ibid. at 445. 
196 See supra fn. 117. 
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title in the statutory sense depends upon the words ofs. 1 (4) of the Factors 1889 Act "used 
in the ordinary course of business as proof of the ..... control of goods.". This question has 
never been raised in the English Courts and "the question whether mate's receipt used in 
the ordinary course of business seems to be one of fact". 197 
1. 7. CONCLUSION 
The identification of the contractual carrier has attracted considerable litigation over recent 
years. This is because most of the bills of lading have been issued on the charterers' forms 
as well as they have been signed by or on behalf of the master who is traditionally the 
shipowners' agent. As a result, the cargo owner would face difficult choice in selecting the 
appropriate defendant which might be irretrievable where he has only one year time limit 
to sue the carrier responsible for the loss of or the damage to his cargo. 
One could argue that the issue of the carrier's identity should be determined 
primarily by the words of the carrier's identity and the demise clauses, provided that the 
interpretation of the terms of the bill of lading as a whole, in particular the words of the 
signature box, did not clearly displace or supersede these clauses. However, the 
interpretation and the construction of the bill of lading as a whole, by the English courts, 
has led to conflicting results which provide unpredictable guidance for determining the 
carrier's identity under English law. Nonetheless, the aim and the purpose of both the 
carrier's identity and the demise clause might arguably provide a more satisfactory and 
acceptable result to the cargo owners' dilemma. 
On the one hand, the aim and the purpose of the carrier's identity is to deal with a 
bill of lading which is signed by the charterer or its agent on behalf of the master. 
Therefore, the signatory of such bill is not acting as a principal and assumes no personal 
responsibility. On the other hand, the aim and the purpose of the demise clause is to deal 
197 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 62 at para. 18- 139. 
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with a bill of lading which is issued by the charterer, who is neither the shipowner nor the 
denlise charterer and the bill is signed by or on its behalf and so, its effect is to cover a case 
where the person by whom the bill of lading has been issued appears to be the shipowner 
but, in fact, it can be seen that he is not the shipowner and that person by whom the bill has 
been issued had the authority to issue the bill on the shipowner's behalf. This conclusion 
might arguably be right on the basis that the signature box provided nothing to contradict 
this assumption. However, the written words in the signature box should be capable of 
oyerriding the assumption in the demise clause. It seems, therefore, that if the bill of lading 
has been issued and signed by or on behalf of the liner company' charterer' as an agent, the 
liner company 'charterer' by issuing and signing the bill of lading would have been acting 
solely as an agent on behalf of the shipowner and would have assumed no personal liability 
for the carriage contract. This is because the written words in the signature box provide 
nothing to contradict the assumption contained in the demise clause. In contrast, if the bill 
of lading has been issued and signed by or on behalf of the liner company 'charterer' as 
'carrier', the liner company 'charterer' by issuing and signing the bill of lading would have 
been acting solely as a principal and would have assumed personal liability for the carriage 
contract. 
The decision of the House of Lords in The Starsin have now dissolved the 
uncertainty concerning the carrier's identity caused by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in The Starsin 198 and by the decision of Moore- Bick 1., in The Flecha. As a result, the 
cargo owner's need to make a claim against both the shipowner and the charterer in order 
to avoid any uncertainty of the carrier's identity, in particular he has only one year time 
limit to sue the carrier responsible for the loss of or the damage to his cargo, IS now 
reduced, if not demolished. 
198 For comments on the decision of the Court of Appeal in this respect see Wilson, 1., "The Starsin Spot the 
Contractual Carrier" [2001] STU Lawyer International, 4 at p. 7. 
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However, the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument with their concepts of 
'actual' and 'contracting' carrier and 'carrier' and 'performing party', respectively, make 
the issue of the carrier's identity less critical. This is because the liabilities of both the 
contracting carrier and the actual carrier or the performing party are governed by the same 
rules under these instnm1ents. Therefore, the cargo owner's need of suing the actual carrier 
or the perforn1ing party in a tort action would be reduced, if not dispensed with altogether 
under both the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument. 
A further problem with existing English law is that if a liberty to tranship and a 
cesser of liability clauses are viewed as obligations clauses rather than exception clauses, 
and so will not be void or null under art. III (8) of the Hague- Visby Rules, the cargo 
owner might end up without any contractual remedy against either the first carrier or the 
second carrier for the loss of or the damage to the goods after transhipment. In this 
situation, sub- bailment on terms might be a viable solution as to give a non- contractual 
right to the cargo owner and to define such right within the Hague- Visby Rules. However, 
attornment is vital for a third party cargo owner to maintain an action in bailment against 
the second carrier. In the absence of attornment, the third party cargo owner will have to 
sue in negligence. This will oblige it to prove that at the time of the loss it either owned the 
goods or had the immediate right to the possession. 
By virtue of art. 11 (1) of the Hamburg Rules, transhipment and cesser clauses are 
accepted as long as "judicial proceedings can be instituted against the actual carrier in a 
court competent under paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 21" and "the burden of proving that any 
loss, damage or delay in delivery has been caused by such an occurrence rests upon the 
carrier". Therefore, the effect of these provisions is that the cargo claimant would always 
be entitled to proceed against one of the two carriers on the according to the provisions of 
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the Hamburg RUles. 199 The tranship clause and the cesser of liability clause are also 
accepted under the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 4 (3) (1) relating to mixed contracts 
of carriage and forwarding, provided that these clauses were the subject to discussion 
between the parties and that they were accepted by them. 2oo The head carrier, acting as 
agent, under the Hamburg Rules, would not be able to escape liability, by virtue of art. 11 
(1), if no judicial proceedings "can be instituted against the actual carrier in a court 
conlpetent under paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 21". 
In contrast, the head carrier, acting as agent, under the Draft Instrument, by virtue 
of art. -+ (3), would be able to escape liability altogether if the parties make a special 
agreement for a cesser of liability clause and this will still be valid, even if it is not possible 
to sue the 'performing party'. This is because the head carrier would not qualify as a 
'performing party' under art. 6 (3) (2) (a) (i) by virtue of the words of art. 1 (17), nor as 
'other person, including a performing party's sub- contractors and agent' under art. 6 (3) 
(2) (a) (ii) by virtue of the words "who performs or undertakes to perform any of the 
carrier's responsibilities under the carriage contract" since what the second carrier 
performs or undertakes to perform is not part of the head carrier's responsibilities under the 
head carriage but rather under one of the second carrier's responsibilities under the its sub-
carriage contract. 
Finally, the status of certain types of bills of lading, particularly the 'received for 
shipment' and 'combined transport' bills remains uncertain. This is not in itself critical to 
the application of COGSA 1992 which has dispensed with the property linkage of the Bills 
of Lading Act 1855. However, COGSA 1992 does not define a 'bill of lading' and 
199 Article 11 (1) of the Hamburg Rules contains a departure from the rules that the contracting carrier is 
responsible for the whole carriage performed by the actual carrier, and so the contractual carrier can avoid the 
responsibility for the part of carriage performed by the actual c.arrier where ~he require~ents of art. 11 (1). are 
satisfied. The contractual carrier will have the benefit of thIS departure If the carrIage contract prOVIdes 
"explicitly that a specific part of the carriage covered by the said contract is to be performed by a named 
person other than the carrier". . 
200 For more detail about art. 4 (3) (1) of the Draft Instrument see sub- tItle 5.7 of chapter 5. 
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therefore identifying which documents constitute 'bills of lading' under the Act will 
require reference to the common law. Whether or not these uncertain documents can be 
classified as bills of lading will primarily depend upon an answer to the question of 
whether or not they amount to documents of title. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RIGHTS OF THE CARGO OWNER TO SUE THE 
CARRIER ACCORDING TO CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 1992 
2. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the enactment of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 was to resolve the problems 
imposed by the English legal doctrine of privity of contract. As the cases in the next 
section showed, the 1855 Act no longer adequately dealt with the problems created by 
modem trades and carriage practices, in particular, where goods were lost or damaged in 
transit. As a result of the problems associated with the Bills of Lading Act 1855, there was, 
"a threat that lucrative shipping and insurance business, litigation and arbitration might be 
lost to the City and the national economy". 1 Therefore, new legislation needed to be based 
upon a direct and sensible foundation in order to cure all the problems caused by the 
previous Act and to satisfy the commercial community.2 Also, the new legislation should 
be brought into line with the law of other competitor countries, such as some other 
European states. 
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992,3 which replaced the Bills of Lading Act 
1855, is based upon the recommendations of the English and Scottish Commissions as set 
out in their report.4 COGSA 1992 broke the link between the acquisition of the contractual 
rights and the passing of property, extending the transferring of the contractual rights to 
1 Bradgate, R., & White, F., "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992", [1993] 56 MLR. 188. In general see 
Howard, T., ''The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" 24 lMari.Law & Com. [1993] 18 and Reynolds, 
F.M.B., "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" [1993] LMCLQ 436. 
2 As the Commission pointed out that "reconciling the interests of all parties to a contract of sea carriage, in 
accordance with the dictates of good sense and commercial certainty," The English and Scottish law 
Commissions, Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea, (1991) 196 Eng LCR and 130 Scot 
LCR at para. 1.10. 
3 The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. [Hereafter COGSA 1992 or the 1992 Act]. 
4 See supra fn. 2. 
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others carriage documents and resolved most of the problems created by the decision in 
Grant. v. Nonl'ay. 5 
The discussion in this chapter will be related to bills of lading, ship's delivery 
orders and sea waybills under COGSA 1992, and to whether other documents such as 
combined transport bills of lading are covered by COGSA 1992. The resolution introduced 
by COGSA 1992 to the problem created in Grant. v. Norway will also be considered in the 
context of title to sue. 
2. 2. BILLS OF LADING ACT 1855 
The purpose of the enactment of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 was to abolish the problems 
imposed by the doctrine of privity of contract. This doctrine had two limbs. First, a third 
party could not sue under or rely on the terms of a contract to which it was not a party. 
Secondly, a contracting party could generally recover only nominal damages where a 
breach of contract caused it no loss, but did cause loss to a third party. Nonetheless, the 
shipper as an original party to the carriage contract still can sue the carrier for breach of 
that contract for the benefit of the person who had suffered the loss according to Dunlop. v. 
Lambert, as an exception to the common law rules. However, the statutory assignment of 
contractual rights which was implemented by the Bills of Lading Act 1855 was not without 
problems. This was mainly because of the statutory link between the transfer of the 
contractual rights and the passing of property required by virtue of s. 1 of the 1855 Act. As 
a result, the consignee or the endorsee of a bill of lading could not sue or be sued where the 
property passed a long time before the bill of lading was indorsed, as seen in cases such as 
The Delfini.6 The issue before the Court of Appeal in The Delfini was whether the property 
had passed to the plaintiffs on the endorsement of the bill of lading and so they had a cause 
of action against the defendants by virtue of s. 1 of the 1855 Act. The Court of Appeal held 
5 [1851] 138 E.R. 263. 
6 [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 252. 
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that the property had passed to the plaintiffs a long time before the bill was indorsed to 
them and there was no real connection between the passing of property and the 
endorsement of the bill. 7 However, the Court of Appeal rejected the wide view which 
would cover the facts of The Delfini on the ground that it would "do violence to the words 
of the Act". But it is arguable that the narrow view "would do just as much 'violence to the 
words of the Act' as the wide view: it would deny all force to the words 'or by reason of' 
endorsement. 8 
The same result also followed where the property had been passed a long time after 
the bill of lading had been accomplished as to operate as a document of title in cases such 
as The Aliakmon.9 Furthennore, s. 1 of the 1855 Act would not assist the buyer ofa portion 
of a bulk cargo which had been sold and delivered against a bill of lading in cases such as 
The Aramis,lO as a result of the combined effect of s. 1 of the 1855 Act and s. 16 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. This is because the property would not pass until the goods had 
been ascertained which would only take place, after the consignment or endorsement of the 
bill of lading. 11 
The Bills of Lading Act 1855 failed to cover other shipping documents such as sea 
waybills and ship's delivery orders. The use of these documents had become widespread in 
international trade and the non- application of the 1855 Act undennined the use of these 
documents, in particular in situations where the buyer has no intention to sell or to deal 
7 The narrow view anticipated that the property in the goods has to pass at the same time as the consignment 
or the endorsement of the bill of lading. In contrast, the wide view anticipated that it is not necessary for the 
property in the goods to pass at the same time as the consignment or the endorsement of the bill of lading. 
Therefore it was held in The Delfini, supra fn. 6 at 272, that "although the endorsement of the bill oflading is 
not the immediate occasion of the passing of property, nevertheless it plays an essential causal part in it". 
8 See Treitel, G. H., "Passing of property under c.i.f. contracts and the Bills of Lading Act 1855- The Delfini" 
[1990] LMCLQ 1 at 3. 
9 [1986] 2 W.L.R. 902. 
10 [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213. 
II The problem of the buyer of a portion of a bulk cargo problem is solved by s. 20 (A) of Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995 where the property would pass on payment of the price. However, constructive 
possession would not pass unless and until the goods which are the subject matter of the transfer are 
ascertained, which would only take place after the goods are delivered. For more details about the Bills of 
Lading Act 1855 see Todd, P., "Oil Cargoes and the Bills of Lading Act" [1990] 7 OGLTR 214 and Urbach, 
A., ''The Bill of Lading: Who Owns the Cargo You Just Have Bought?" [1983/84] 12 OGLTR 267. 
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with the goods during transit, or where the seller desired to sell part of his goods to 
different buyers during transit. Therefore, it became clear that the non- application of the 
1855 Act to these documents was prejUdicing the use of English law as the law of the 
contract which in tum would have also affected London as one of the most important cities 
for litigation and arbitration. This failure would have been magnified by doubts as to the 
non- application of the 1855 Act to a "received for shipment" bill of lading, despite the 
modem usage of delivering the goods to inland depot for carrying them by sea rather than 
delivering the goods alongside the ship which is not suitable to modem trade any more. 
Furthermore, the inability of banks to sue the carrier by virtue of s. 1 of the 1855 Act, since 
they could only assert a special property rather than a full property,12 undermined the use 
of the bill of lading as a security document in financial transactions. 
The courts, on the one hand, tried to resolve the problem of the statutory link by 
introducing a wide interpretation of s. 1 of the 1855 Act as in The Elafi.13 But, the wide 
interpretation was not accepted by the courts in cases such as The Delfini, on the ground 
that though property need not have passed at the time of consignment or endorsement, it 
still should not pass a long time after the consignment or endorsement in order for the 
requirements of s. 1 to be satisfied. On the other hand, the courts tried to resolve the 
ineffectiveness of s. 1 of the 1855 Act and the problems caused by the doctrine of privity 
of contract by the implementation of the general principles of the common law such as 
implied contract14 or liability in tort which are dealt with in chapter five. 
12 See Sewell .v. Burdick, [1884] 10 A.c. 74 and Brandt .v. Liverpool Brazil and River Plate Steam 
Navigation Co. Ltd., [1942] 1 K.B. 575. 
13 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213. 
14 The decisions of the Court of Appeal in The Aramis, supra fn. 9, and The Gudermes, [1993] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 311, have placed major limitations on the utility of the doctrine of implied contract. 
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2.3. TO WHICH DOCUMENTS DOES COGSA 1992 APPLY? 
COGSA 1992 covers bills of lading, sea waybills and ship's delivery orders issued on or 
after 16 September 1992. 
2.3.1. BILLS OF LADING 
COGSA 1992 does not contain a definition of 'bill of lading', but this is usually defined by 
reference to its functions. The legislature did not try to define the bill of lading regarding to 
its functions because the bill of lading will in due course cease to be a document of title 
when it ceases to grant constructive possession of the goods. Also, the bill of lading will 
not evidence the terms of the carriage contract where it is issued pursuant to a charter-
party.I5 Section 1 (2 ) (a) of COGSA 1992 provides that references in the 1992 Act to a bill 
of lading do not include references to a document which is incapable of transfer either by 
endorsement or, as a bearer bill, by delivery without endorsement. I6 A bill which is 
indorsed in blank and delivered to the endorsee can be transferred to the next endorsee by 
delivery alone without the need for a new endorsement and so would be a bearer bill of 
lading for the purpose of COGSA 1992. 17 
However, a bill of lading which is consigned to a named consignee without words 
such as "to order" would not be considered as a bill of lading for the purpose of COGSA 
1992, because that bill of lading is a non- negotiable document and falls outside s. 1 (2) (a). 
Therefore, a straight bill of lading will be considered as a sea waybill for the purpose of the 
1992 Act, because it evidences or contains the carriage contract and it is a receipt for the 
goods. IS Thus, the holder of a straight bill of lading succeeds to the rights of suit as if he 
15 Cooper, J., "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" [1992] 3 Current Law Statutes Annotated. 50- 02. 
16 Like transfer of the bill of exchange, Bill of Exchange Act 1882 s. 31 (3). 
17 By virtue of s. 5 (2) (b) of COGSA 1992. 
18 By virtue ofs. 1 (3) (a) of COGS A 1992. However, s. 1 ~3).(b) does cove~ a named. consignee in.a straight 
bill who still has to present the bill to obtain delivery. ThIs IS because delIvery agamst presentatIOn of the 
straight bill will be considered in accordance with that contract embodied into that bill. 
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was the person to whom delivery is to be made under a sea waybill. 19 COGSA 1992 
applies to "received for shipment" bills of lading and thus, resolves an issue which has 
been doubtful for a long time.2o According to the dictum in Ishag . v. Allied Bank,21 a 
document which acknowledged that the goods are at the carrier's disposal is still a 
"received for shipment" bill of lading. But that document should provide an undertaking by 
the carrier to carry the goods to their named destination to the consignee or his assigns, and 
also should state the name of the ship by which is intended that carriage should be 
.,., 
performed. --
Being a Laltful 'Holder' of a Bill of Lading 
In order to acquire rights of suit against the carrier under the bill of lading contract 
a third party should become the 'lawful holder' of that bill as defined in s. 5 (2) of COGS A 
1992. Sub- sections (a) and (b) provide that a person can be a 'holder' of the bill of lading 
in three situations: a consignee who is identified in the bill and has possession of it; an 
endorsee who has possession of the bill as a result of the completion of any endorsement 
and delivery of it; a transferee who has the possession of the bill as a result of the transfer 
to him of a bearer bill of lading. Sub- section (c) provides that a person who would have 
been a holder under these categories but who takes possession of the bill at a time when 
possession of the bill gives no rights against the carrier to possession of the goods to which 
it relates also obtains rights under s. 2 (1). An example of this third situation would be 
when the goods have been delivered to the person who is entitled to them without being yet 
the person who has acquired possession of the bill at the time of delivery as delivery has 
19 For more details see also Bassindale, 1., "Title to Sue- The Penultimate Chapter", [1991] 1 OGLTR. 25 at 
26. 
20 By virtue of s. 1 (2) (b) of COGSA 1992. 
21 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 92. For the citation of Lloyd 1., see fns. 124- 125 in chap. l. 
22 For more detail about a "received for shipment" bill as a document oftitle see sub- title l. 6. l. 
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been made against letter of indemnity?3 It seems that none of the above situations 
specifically covers the position of an order bill which has been previously indorsed in 
blank. That bill can be transferred to a new endorsee by delivery without any new 
endorsement so that the bill can be covered by the provisions relating to a bearer bill of 
lading because that bill has now been converted to a bearer bill of lading. 
COGSA 1992 resolves the problems which have been created by The Aramis and 
The Alialanoll.24 The plaintiffs, in both cases, were the lawful holder of a bill of lading and 
therefore. had COGSA 1992 been in force, they could have sued the carrier in respect of 
their losses or damages according to the bill of lading contract as a result of the divorce of 
the acquisition of the rights to sue from the passing of property required by the Bills of 
Lading Act 1855. But, who is the holder of the bill of lading, for the purpose of COGSA 
1992, where the agent of the buyer has the possession of the bill of lading for collecting the 
goods on behalf of the buyer or as in The Aliakmon where the buyer had the bill of lading 
as agent for the seller? The agent, by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992, acquires the rights 
of suit against the carrier and so he can sue the carrier for the benefit of his principal by 
virtue of s. 2 (4).25 But, the concept of possession is a flexible one to allow the agent to 
h I . d h .. I h . . 26 C 27 ave actua possessIon an t e pnncIpa to ave constructIve possessIOn. arver argues 
that where a bill of lading contains a personal endorsement and is in the possession of the 
agent, by virtue of s. 5 (2) (b) of the 1992 Act, the agent would be considered as the holder 
of the bill and so his principal would not be considered as the holder for the purposes of the 
23 By virtue of s. 2 (2) of COGSA 1992. For the implementation of this section see infra 'Spent' bills. Such a 
bill is known as a 'spent' bill. 
24 In White .v. Jones, [1995] 2 A.C. 207 at 265, Lord Goff of Chieveley suggested that the problem of The 
Aliakmon has been solved by the 1992 Act under which rights of suits are available to all holders of bills of 
lading. The problems in The A ram is and The Aliakmon are discussed in chap 5. 
25 Therefore, the contractual rights, according to the suggestion of Lord Goff of Chieveley in White. v. Jones, 
ibid. at 265, may be transferred by virtue of the transfer of certain documents such as the bill oflading. 
26 Guest, A. G., (et al) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 6th Edition, London. Sweet & Maxwell 2002, at para. 18-
082. However, the problem would be serious where the bill is a bearer bill or a bill which has been indorsed 
in blank. 
27 See Carver on Bills of Lading, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001, at para. 5- 017. 
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1992 Act. In contrast, the same principle will not be applicable to a bearer bill or an 
indorsed bill in blank. However, it should be noted that where a named consignee acts as 
an agent for the shipper, the consignee would obtain rights of suit in its own right under s. 
2 (1). In East West Corporation .v. Dkbs 1912,28 the Court of Appeal held that in such 
circumstances the shipper, having lost its contractual rights under s. 2 (1) could not claim 
the benefit of the consignee's statutory rights because the consignee was acting as its 
agent. 
Being a LaHfid Holder of a Bill of Lading in 'Good Faith' 
The person relying on s. 2 (1) should have become a lawful holder of the bill of lading in 
good faith. COGSA 1992 contains no definition to the "good faith" and therefore, it might 
be contrasted with s. 90 of the Bill of Exchange Act 1882 and s. 61 (3) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 which provide that "A thing is deemed to be done in good faith within the 
meaning of this Act when it in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not". 
So the concept of good faith would be negatived where the possession of the bill of lading 
had been acquired by means of fraud or by stealing; also, where the holder had acquired 
the possession of the bill of lading with knowledge that the previous holder had acquired 
the possession of that bill by means of fraud or theft?9 Thomas J., in The Aegean Sea,30 
held that if a person obtained a bill of lading honestly this is sufficient to make him a 
lawful holder in good faith. He then proceeded that "In my view, it therefore connotes 
honest conduct and not a broader concept of good faith such as 'the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the conclusion and performance of the 
. d",31 transactIon conceme . 
28 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239 at para. 18, ([2003] EWCA Civ. 83). 
29 See infra 'Possession o/the bill' under s. 5 (2) o/COGSA 1992. 
30 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39 at 60. 
31 Ibid. 
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Another problem regarding possession of the bill of lading in good faith is where 
the terms of the initial carriage contract are different from the terms of the bill of lading 
. d 3') 
contract as In Le lie . v. Ward. - The Court of Appeal held that the terms of the carriage 
contract between the carrier and the consignee or the endorsee were solely those set out in 
the bill of lading. The question is whether a holder who actually knew of the terms of the 
carriage contract between the carrier and the shipper had acquired the possession of the bill 
of lading in good faith under the COGSA 1992 or not? It seems to be an injustice to allow 
the holder to enforce the terms of the bill of lading and ignore an oral term related to the 
route of shipment agreed between the shipper and the carrier of which it is aware.33 But it 
is arguable that it is not acceptable to apply the bill of lading contract but to treat the holder 
as having waived the term as to the route of shipment. This is because, the carrier had the 
opportunity to check the terms of the bill of lading and should not profit from his fault and 
be allowed to modify the terms of the bill of lading, even if the holder of the bill of lading 
actually knew that the shipper had assented to such deviation. However, the awareness of 
the differences between the initial contract and the bill of lading contract does not affect 
the good faith of the endorsee. Thus, the endorsee would have the bill in good faith where 
he had no knowledge of any defect in the transferor's title when the bill of lading was 
. d d h' 34 In orse to 1m. 
The last problem which anses out of the issue of good faith is related to 
representations contained in the bill of lading. The question would be whether the holder 
who actually knew that the representations relating to the goods which are contained in bill 
of lading are untrue had acquired the possession of the bill of lading in good faith under 
32 [1888] 20 Q.B.D. 475. For more detail about the facts and the decision see supra fn. 15 in chapter 1. See, 
also, Debattista, C., "The bill of lading as the contract of carriage- A reassessment of Leduc. v. Ward" 45 
[1982] MLR 652. 
33 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 019. 
34 The contrasting situation is in The Ardennes, [1951] 1 K.B. 55, where the terms of the initial contract were 
for the benefit of the shipper. For more details see infra the terms of the contract transferred. 
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COGSA 1992? There is an argument that if the holder had acquired possession of the bill 
of lading in good faith, at the same time he is not entitled to the estoppel rule under s. 4 of 
COGSA 1992 which operates in favour of the holder who does not know the truth. This is 
because the representations of the goods such as the quantity shipped are not terms of 
contract but are only representations. 35 It is arguable that the capability of 'good faith' of 
bearing different shades of meaning for the purpose of different sections of the 1992 Act36 
is supported by art. III (4) of the Hague- Visby Rules which provides that "Such a bill of 
lading shall be prime facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein 
described in accordance with paragraph 3 (a), (b), and (c). However, proof to the contrary 
shall not be admissible when the bill of lading has been transferred to a third part in good 
faith". Therefore, the transferee should have acquired the bill of lading without any 
acknow ledgement that all or some of these representations which are mentioned in art. III 
(3) are untrue, thus good faith is only related to those representations. Also, it is arguable 
that, these representations should be prima facie evidence. So, the carrier has to prove that 
these representations are wrong or that the holder knew that these representations are 
untrue. The carrier, through his master has the opportunity to check these representations 
and should not therefore be allowed to profit from his own negligence. Also, the holder 
should not be entitled to the estoppel rule under s. 4 of COGSA 1992 which makes these 
representations conclusive evidence against the carrier where the holder does not know the 
truth. Nullifying s. 4 in favour of such a person would be on the assumption that the holder 
who knows that the representations relating to the goods are untrue is not a lawful holder 
for the purpose of s. 4, since "such an essentially flexible concept as " good faith" should 
be capable of bearing different shades of meaning for the purpose of different section of 
35 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 at para. 18- 029. 
36 See Carver an Bills a/Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 020. 
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1992 Act',.37 However, such a holder of the bill of lading would still have title to sue under 
s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992, but that title would be restricted to the carrier's breach of the 
carriage contract relating to the goods which are in fact shipped or received for shipment. 
Therefore, the rights under the carriage contract vested in such a holder of the bill of lading 
would be less than those vested in a third party who became the holder of the bill of lading, 
not knowing of the untruth of its representations. 
If no goods are shipped at all the problem is solved because there is no bill of 
lading at common law as what purports to be a bill of lading is in fact a mere 'nullity,.38 
Carver, howeyer, argues that the holder of such a bill of lading, by virtue of s. 4 of the 
1992 Act, would still have a cause of action against the carrier under s. 2 (1) of the Act on 
the following grounds,39 
'"The alternative argument open to C is that the rights under the contract 
between A and B have been transferred to him on his having become 
lawful holder of the bill, under s. 2 of the 1992 Act. This, in tum depends 
on there having been a 'contract of carriage' between A and B, for it is 
rights of suit under this contract which are 'transferred to and vested in 
[C] .... as ifhe had been a party to that contract'. If in consequence of the 
fact of non- shipment, no such contract had come into existence, nothing 
could be transferred to C under section 2. The effect of section 4 is to 
preclude A from denying the fact of shipment and legislative intention 
appears to have been to give C a cause of action against A on the 
hypothetical contract of carriage, which would have come into being, if 
goods had been shipped, even though no such contract may exist in fact. 
This may amount to basing a cause of action on what is in substance an 
1 ,,40 estoppe .... 
Against this, however, there is the fact that a third party would be able to rely on s. 4 of the 
1992 Act only if he could prove that the document which he holds is a bill of lading. The 
carrier under s. 4 is estopped only from denying the fact of shipment but not the existence 
37 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 and also, see Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 020. 
38 This issue was considered in Heskell.v. Continental Express Ltd., [1950] 83 Lloyd's Rep. 438, where the 
sellers sought to recover the sum they had paid to their buyers for breach of the sale contract. The court held 
that the issuance of the bill of lading could not constitute a carriage contract, unless the goods were received 
by the shipowners or his agents for shipments. However, the statutory provisions as to the conclusive effect 
of statements in the bill oflading will not affect this issue. 
39 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at paras. 2- 017- 019. 
40 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 2- 018. 
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of a bill of lading. This is because what appears to be a bill of lading is in fact a mere 
'nullity' under the common law rules. This line of argument can be supported by the 
corresponding section under the US law where the words of that particular section gives 
the holder of a negotiable bill a cause of action against the carrier "the carrier is liable for 
damages caused the non- receipt by the carrier of any part of the goods", while the third 
party under s. 4 of the 1992 Act has to establish the acquirement of the contractual rights of 
suit under s. 2 (1) in order to trigger the application of s. 4. As a result, the third party 
would not be able to rely on the general rule of estoppel which does not provide such 
person with a cause of action since he is not an original party. 
2. 3. 2. SEA WAYBILLS 
The sea waybill is a typical example of a contract for the benefit of a third party. 
Therefore, it suffers from the same problem of privity in that the consignee who has 
suffered loss is unable to sue the carrier because he is a stranger to the carriage contract 
whereas the person who has the right to sue the carrier for that loss has suffered no loss and 
has no reason to sue the carrier. Even the shipper who has suffered no loss and has the 
right to sue the carrier might be unable to recover substantial damages. Section 1 (3) of 
COGSA 1992 resolved the problem of privity by extending the bill of lading legislation to 
sea waybills issued on or after 16th September 1992. 
A sea waybill is not a negotiable document and the transfer of contractual rights 
thereunder will not be effected by the transfer of possession of that document. Thus, the 
consignee who is identified in the waybill does not need to be the holder or the lawful 
holder of that document to acquire the contractual rights. Section 1 (3) of COGSA 1992 
provides that a sea waybill is not a bill of lading. It has been noted above that while there is 
no comprehensive definition of the bill of lading in COGSA 1992, at the same time s. 1 (2) 
(a) of COGSA 1992 provides that a document which is incapable of transfer either by 
78 
endorsement and delivery or as a bearer bill by delivery. Therefore, the phrase "is not a bill 
of lading" nleans that a sea waybill is a document which cannot be used as a means of 
transferring possession in the goods to which it refers, unlike the bill of lading. Moreover, 
the phrase "not a bill of lading" should be read with s. I (3) (b) and s. 5 (3) of COGSA 
1992 which are related to the identification of the person who is entitled to the goods 
which should be delivered by the carrier. A sea waybill which provided for the goods to be 
delivered to the consignee or "his order" would be converted to a bill of lading which is 
capable of transfer by endorsement. A sea waybill which made the goods deliverable to 
. order' would also be a bill of lading because it would not identify the person to whom 
deliyery was to be made at all and thus, it would be out of the definition of the sea waybill. 
In order for the document to qualify as a sea waybill, it should identify the person 
to whom delivery would be made under s. I (3) (b). Under s. 5 (3) it will still be a waybill 
if it gives power to the shipper to vary the identity of that person within the terms of the 
document. The ability of the shipper to vary the identity of the person to whom delivery 
should be made must be done by a notice to the carrier. In short, where the identity of the 
consignee can be varied by endorsement or by delivery of the document, the document is a 
bill of lading. In contrast, when the identity of the consignee can be varied only by a notice 
from the shipper to the carrier, the document is a sea waybill. Therefore, the consignee 
under the sea waybill can acquire contractual rights without acquiring possession of the 
document and without also satisfying the requirement of good faith. 41 Although a straight 
bill requires the consignee to present the bill to obtain delivery, this factor does not 
preclude such a bill from falling under the sea waybill provisions of s. I (3). 
41 It was held in The Chitral, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 529 at 532, that the document before the court, for the 
purpose of s. 2 (5) of COOSA 1992, was a sea waybill rather than a bill oflading, despite the fact that it was 
in the usual form of a bill of lading but with one important difference in that the words "or order or assigns" 
were omitted. 
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For the document to qualify as a sea waybill, it should also be a receipt for the 
goods and evidence or contain a contract for carriage of the goods by sea.42 The words of 
COGSA 1992 do not specify the person by whom the goods must be stated to have been 
receiyed. Thus, the goods could be received by the carrier or by another person on behalf 
of the carrier. Moreover, a sea waybill does not need to indicate that the goods have been 
received for shipment as is the position under the bill of lading. A sea waybill also should 
evidence or contain the terms of the carriage contract. Delivery of the goods under a sea 
\\'aybill would be to the consignee who is identified in the document without presentation 
of that document. Upon which terms can the consignee rely on against the carrier where 
there are differences between the terms of the sea waybill and the original contract between 
the shipper and the carrier? According to s. 5 (1) (a), the terms of the carriage contract 
would be those which are evidenced by or contained in the sea waybill. Therefore, the 
position under a sea waybill would be the same as under a bill of lading. 43 
2. 3. 3. SHIP'S DELIVERY ORDERS 
Ship's delivery orders fell outside the provisions of the Bill of Lading Act 1855. As a 
result of the restrictions imposed on Brandt. v. Liverpool after the decision of The Aramis 
(which is discussed in chapter five), it is doubtful whether a contract could be implied in 
the case of a ship's delivery order since delivery of the goods to holder of the order could 
be explained by reference to the existing obligations of the carrier to the bill of lading 
h . d l' 44 holder, unless the holder paid freight or other charges to t e carner on e Ivery. 
Moreover, as a result of The Aliakmon, no claim in tort would be available where the goods 
42 Section 1 (3) (a) of COGSA 1992 provides that a sea waybill "is such a receipt for goods as contains or 
evidences a contract for the carriage of goods by sea; and. . . .". The reference to carriage by sea does not 
appear in the definition of a contract of carriage in s. 5 (1) of the 1992 Act. 
4 See infra The terms of the contract transferred. . 
44 The implied contract was applied in The Dona Mari, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 341, where the holder of the dehvery 
order presented it to obtain delivery and paid the freight related to those goods. 
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coyered by the ship's delivery order form part of a large bulk.45 Therefore, a statutory right 
of suit needed to be given to the beneficiary of the ship's delivery orders against the 
carrier. This was achieved by virtue of s. 1 (4) of COGSA 1992, which extended the bill of 
lading legislation to ship's delivery orders. 
According to s. 1 (4), a ship's delivery order is "neither a bill of lading nor a sea 
waybill" and so it is neither a receipt for the goods nor does evidence or contain the 
carriage contract, but it is "given under or for the purposes of a contract for carriage". 
Howeyer, a ship's delivery order should contain an undertaking by the carrier to deliver the 
goods to a person identified in the order itself. An order issued by the shipper requesting 
the carrier to deliver the goods to a person named in it, is not a ship's delivery order 
because it contains no undertaking by or to anyone. But, this order can be converted to a 
ship's delivery order by attornment by the carrier. Oral undertakings by the carrier to the 
person named in it in accordance with the shipper's request will not convert that order to a 
ship's one, because the order itself contains no such undertaking. Moreover, an order 
which contains a promise to the shipper to deliver the goods to a named person will not be 
a ship's delivery order, because that promise should be addressed to the person to whom 
delivery is to be made.46 
The undertaking should be given under or for the purposes of a contract of carriage 
by sea. Therefore, it should contain an express reference to the carriage contract which 
would commonly be contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading. It seems that there is 
no reason not to accept a ship's delivery order as a document which refers back to a 
contract which is contained in or evidenced by a sea waybill. Could a ship's delivery order 
45 See Bradgate, 1., & White, F., supra fn. 1 at 196. However, a claim in tort would now be available to cargo 
owner in bulk cargo, as in The Aliakmon, by virtue ofs. 20 A of Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. . 
46 It was held in Colin and Shields .v. Weddel & Co., Ltd., [1952] 2 All ER. 337, that the document whIch 
purported to be a ship's delivery order, was not a ship's delivery. order, since it ordered someone o.ther than 
the carrier or his servants to deliver the goods to the holder, despIte the fact that the document was Issued by 
the carrier. 
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which is issued under charter- party in respect of shipment or part of it, be a ship's delivery 
order for the purposes of COGSA 1992? A contract of carriage, in relation to a ship's 
deliyery order, is defined, under s. 5 (1) (b), without restriction to a contract contained in or 
eyidenced by bill of lading or sea waybill. Thus, any contract can be covered by that 
definition as long as it is related to carriage by sea.47 
The words "goods which include these goods" in s. 1 (4) refer to cases where the 
ship's delivery order relates to goods which are part of other goods as where goods are 
shipped in bulk. Suppose the vessel is under a time charter- party and the bill of lading 
which is issued by the charterer to the shipper and later the shipper sells half of the 
shipment to another person and a ship's delivery order was also issued by the charterer in 
respect of that sold half. Is that document which is issued in respect of the sold half of the 
shipment a ship's delivery order for the purposes of COGSA 1992? The answer depends 
on who is the contracting party with the shipper, the charterer or the shipowner, who would 
be the carrier for the purpose of s. 1 (4) (b) of COGSA 1992. Where the carriage contract is 
between the shipper and the charterer, a charterer's bill, that document would be a ship's 
delivery order, where it is issued by the charterer for the purposes of COGSA 1992, 
because the charterer would be the carrier, as being the party of the carriage contract. 
Where the contract of carriage is between the shipper and the shipowner, a shipowner's 
bill, then the document which was issued in respect of half the goods by the shipowner 
would be a ship's delivery order, but a document which issued by the charterer in respect 
of the other half would not be a ship's delivery order, because the charterer is not the 
47 However, the Law Commissions Report, in respect of the terms of the relationship between the holder and 
the carrier will depend on the facts of each particular case, refer to "the bill of lading will be incorporated by 
reference" see the Commissions Report supra fn. 2 at para. 5. 30. Therefore, it is arguable that, without such 
wording, ~ ship's delivery order could relate back to the charterparty where the charterer is the consignor, 
even where COGSA 1992 does not apply to charter- party contract. 
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contracting party with the shipper,48 unless the charterer has actual, apparent or ostensible 
authority to issue and sign such document for the shipowner. 
The undertaking which should be contained in the ship's delivery order should be 
to a person identified by the document. Moreover, the delivery of the goods should be 
made to the same person, otherwise that document could not qualify as a ship's delivery 
order. Under s. 5 (3) the identity of that person could be varied in accordance with the 
tenns of the docunlent, after its issue. The combined effect of s. 1 (4) and s. 5 (3) would 
lead to difficulty where the document is issued in a way which makes it being capable of 
transfer by endorsement or delivery.49 The problem is that the undertaking which is 
contained in the document would be to a person other than the person to whom delivery is 
actually to be made. However, this unsatisfactory result could, arguably, be avoided by 
providing a tenn in the document that a change in the identity of the person to whom 
delivery is to be made should also have the effect of changing the identity of the person to 
whom the undertaking was given.50 In Cremer .v. General Carriers s.A.,51 the seller 
obtained a delivery order making the goods deliverable to his order which related to a part 
of a larger quantity of goods covered by the bill of lading. The court held that the buyer 
had a cause of action against the carrier according to the implied contract concept. 
However, Kerr. 1., held that the order is "a ship's delivery order" in the common law sense. 
The question is whether or not that document is a ship's delivery order, according to s. 1 
48 In The Rewia, [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 325 at 333, the Court of Appeal held that the bill oflading signed for 
the master could not be a charterers' bill of lading, unless the carriage contract was made with charterers 
alone and the person who signed the bill had authority to sign and did that on behalf of the charterers and not 
the owners. 
49 A ship's delivery order, in principle, is incapable of being a transferable document, since the goods which 
are its subject matter would be unascertained and therefore, no constructive possession would be passed to 
the party to whom the attornment was addressed. So that party would acquire a personal right to sue the 
carrier based on estoppel. . 
50 No distinction was drawn by the Law Commission Report between a party originally named in a shIp's 
delivery order and a transferee of such a party. 
51 [1974] 1 AlLER. 1. 
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(4) of COGSA 1992, and whether it would transfer rights under the carriage contract to the 
buyer by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992. Kerr 1., described that order as 
issued by the shipowner's agents addressed to the master or chief officer 
or other persons authorising delivery to the holder or to the order of a 
'i') 
named person. --
The order, in Cremer .l'. General Carriers S.A., would not be a ship's delivery order for the 
purposes of COGSA 1992, because it was addressed to and given in favour of the seller. 
Therefore, the buyer would need to show that the identity of the person to whom delivery 
was to be made53 had been varied and so he had replaced his seller as that person. 54 
2.4. TRANSFERRING CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER COGSA 1992 
Under s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992, the lawful holder of the bill of lading will be the person 
who has acquired contractual rights of action against the carrier. Therefore, s. 2 (1) breaks 
the link between the transfer of the contractual rights and the acquisition of property "upon 
or by reason of' endorsement or consignment as the Bills of Lading Act 1855. The 
touchstone of the transfer of the rights of suit is to the lawful holder of the bill of lading 
rather than the passing of property or being on risk. Moreover, s. 2 (1) gives statutory 
rights in the case of sea waybills and ship's delivery orders to the person to whom delivery 
is to be made. I shall now examine in detail the statutory mechanism by which this transfer 
of rights is accomplished. 
2. 4. 1. TRANSFERRING CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER BILLS OF LADING 
(Possession a/the bill' under s. 5 (2) COGSA 1992 
The three definitions of a 'lawful holder' in s. 5 (2) of the 1992 Act all refer to a 'person 
with possession of the bill'. What then is the position of a person who is no longer in 
52 Ibid. at 9. 
53 By virtue of s. 1 (4 ) (b) of COGSA 1992. 
54 By virtue ofs. 5 (3) of COGS A 1992. 
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physical possession of the bill either because they have lost or the bill has passed to a third 
party by n1eans of fraud or theft? In neither situation would there be any divestment of 
. h d 55 . 
ng ts un er s. 2 (5). If the bIll was merely lost there would have been no physical 
transfer to a third party. If the bill were stolen, then the thief would be unable to show that 
they had become a 'lawful holder' due to the absence of good faith on their part. To require 
proof of continued physical possession of the bill in such a situation would mean that 
neither the thief nor his victim would have title to sue the shipowner under s. 2 (1). This is 
clearly undesirable and it is likely, therefore, that the courts would take the view that the 
lawful holder who had lost possession of the bill in such circumstances would still be able 
to sue under the 1992 Act. This view is put forward by Gaskell who, nonetheless, notes 
that the "cargo owner might have great difficulties of proof in such circumstances".56 This 
view can be supported by the language of s. 2 (1) which refers to a person who 'becomes' 
a 'lawful holder' rather than a person who 'is' a 'lawful holder. However, under US law 
this problem does not exist since, under eh. 801 05 the title to the goods and the cause of 
action depend on one criterion that is whether the bill has been duly negotiated. 57 
Furthennore, this problem did not exist under the 1855 Act, since the cause of action was 
tied to the passing of property. 
Furthennore, a bona fide holder and a purchaser in good faith should have a cause 
of action against the carrier, even if his transferor had neither title to the goods nor right to 
possession of the bill where the transfer of the bill falls within the Factors Act 1889. This is 
because the transfer would take effect as if the owner had authorised the transaction and so 
55 "Where rights are transferred by virtue of the operation of subsection (1) above in relation to any 
document, the transfer for which that subsection provides shall extinguish any entitlement to those rights 
which derives-
(a) where that document is a bill of lading, from a person having been an original party to the contract of 
carrIage; or ..' . 
(b) in the case of any document to which this act applies, from the prevIOUS operatIon of that subsectIOn In 
relati on to that document; ... " 
56 See Gaskell, N., (et at), Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, LLP 2000, at para. 4. 28. 
57 For more detail about US law see infra sub- title 2.6.2. 1. 
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the transferee would have title to the goods as well as a cause of action. Otherwise the 
court nlight have difficulty in finding an alternative way of imposing liability which would 
enable the shipowner to escape liability. 
Thomas J., in The Aegean Sea,58 held that the physical possession of a bill of lading 
would not, in itself, satisfy the requirements of s. 5 (2) (b) of the 1992 Act, unless there is 
some consensual element on the part of the recipient of a bill of lading. Therefore, the 
meaning of delivery under s. 5 (2) (b) is not just having the possession of the bill but rather 
accepting that delivery and so obtaining possession of the bill of lading as the result of 
completion by delivery of the bill by endorsement. A related issue to the physical 
possession of the bill of lading is whether a claimant can be a lawful holder before coming 
into physically possession of the bill. Rix J., in The Giovanna,59 albeit obiter, agreed with 
the view that the claimant had possession of the bills of lading once the bank had indorsed 
and handed them to couriers for despatch to the claimants.6o Therefore, the exact moment 
at which the claimants acquired the contractual rights of suit would be once the bank had 
indorsed and handed them to couriers for despatch. Accordingly, Rix J., accepted that the 
concept of possession is a flexible one so as to allow the agent to have the actual 
possession and the principal to have constructive possession. 
According to s. 5 (2), the holder of the bill is a named consignee or a person who 
comes to possess of the bill as a result of "completion of any endorsement" or a person 
who has possession of the bearer bill, or the person who has the possession the bill of 
lading which is indorsed in blank. A pledgee, as a bank, who is not a consignee or an 
endorsee, or has the possession of a bearer bill of lading or a bill which is indorsed in 
blank, acquires no contractual rights under s. 2 (1) and the carriage contract still remains 
58 See supra fn. 30 at 59- 60. 
59 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 867 at 874. ... .. . 
60 Gaskell argues that the claimants would not have posseSSIOn of the bIlls of ladmg wIthm the meam.ng of 
the 1992 Act, if the couriers had been engaged by the bank as it would have been able to cancel the delIvery, 
see Gaskell, N., (el al), supra fn. 56 at para. 4. 22. 
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with previous holder. Thus, deliveries of an endorsable bill of lading to a pledgee which do 
not name it as a consignee or an endorsee will not come within the scope of the phrase 
"completion of any endorsement". This is because, endorsement of the bill had not been 
conlpleted by mere delivery of the bill to the pledgee. Otherwise, the pledgee would be the 
holder of the bill and the endorsee could never become the holder since an endorsement of 
a bill of lading can not completed twice.61 For this reason banks generally require the 
tender of a bearer bill under a letter of credit. 
The terms of the contract transferred 
COGSA 1992 uses a different way of transferring the contractual rights to the 
holder of the bill of lading to the one used under the Bills of Lading Act 1855. Under s. 2 
(1) of COGSA 1992, the contractual rights are transferred to the holder of the bill "as if he 
had been a party to that contract" and s. 5 (1) (a) defines the carriage contract as "the 
contract contained in or evidenced by that bill".62 In contrast, the contractual rights were 
transferred under s. 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 as "if the contract contained in the 
bill of lading had been made with himself'. 
In Leduc. v. Ward,63 the Court of Appeal held that the terms of the carriage between 
the endorsee and the carrier were solely those set out in the bill. It, thus, held, on the 
ground of the true construction of the deviation clause on the face of the bill of lading, that 
the deviation clause did not cover the deviation to Glasgow. In contrast, the court in The 
Ardennes,64 held that the carrier was liable for delay resulting from the deviation since the 
bill of lading was not the carriage contract between the carrier and the shipper but only 
evidence of the contract. Therefore, where the bill of lading had been indorsed to a person 
61 Reynolds, B., "Further Thoughts on The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (UK)" 25 lMar.Law & Com. 
r1994]. 143 at 150. ., ..,.. 
62 This definition, unlike that used In relatIOn to the sea waybIll and the ShIP s delIvery order, In s. 1 (3) (a) 
and (4) (a) respectively, does not specify that the contract relate to c~r~iage 'by sea'. . 
63 [1888] 20 Q.B.D. 475. For more detail about the facts and th~ ~ecIsIOn see supra fn. 15. In chapter 1. 
64 [1951] 1 K.B. 55. For more detail about the facts and the deCISIOn see supra fn. 10- 13 In chapter 1. 
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other than the shipper, the carner would not be liable for delay resulting from the 
deyiation, since the contract between the carrier and the holder of the bill would be the one 
which is contained in the bill of lading itself, unless there is an estoppel by the shipowner 
in favour of the endorsee. Since, s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992 refers only to the actual contract 
of carriage which is made between the carrier and the shipper, this does not appear to 
exclude the estoppel on which a transferee can rely on at common law. However, it was 
held, in The Heidberg,65 (as regards the application of Bills of Lading Act 1855) that the 
holder of the bill of lading does not take the same contract as that made between the 
shipper and the shipowner which is evidenced by that bill, but the terms of the contract 
between the holder of the bill and the shipowner are those which appear on the face and 
reverse of that bill of lading. 66 Therefore, it is arguable that, the language used in s. 1 of the 
Bills of Lading Act 1855 is more precise than that used in s. 2 (1) of COGS A 1992.67 
In the meantime, s. 5 (1) (a) would be helpful in cases such as where a bill of lading 
is transferred back to the shipper, as where the last holder of the bill of lading is the shipper 
as a result of transferring the bill back to him. Thus, the rights which he acquires are on the 
terms of the original carriage contract and not on the terms of the bill of lading, because of 
the fiction which governs the rights of the holder of the bill other than the shipper "as if he 
had been party that contract". This is supported by the argument that, if the relationship 
between the shipper and the carrier is governed merely by the terms of the bill of lading, it 
will enable the shipper to get out of the terms of the original contract to which he is a party, 
where they are less profitable to him, by transferring the bill to an intermediate transferee 
65 [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 287 at 310. 
66 For the support of this view see Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 022. 
67 There is an argument that the transferee, as a result of the language of s. 2 (1) (c) of COGSA 1992, steps 
into the shipper's shoes and so, he might be bound by the terms of the original contract which would able the 
carrier to use what is available to him as personal defences against the shipper as well as the transferee such 
as rights of set- off. See White, F., & Bradgate, R., "The Survival of The Brandt .v. Liverpool Contract, The 
Gudermes" [1993] LMCLQ. 483 at 484- 485; also Reynolds, B., supra fn. 61 at 152. 
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and then transferring the bill back to him.68 Also, COGSA 1992 is intended only to resolve 
the problenl caused by the doctrine of privity of contract which prevents a person who is 
not party to the carriage contract to take the advantages of that contract. 69 
Initial contract of carriage is void or voidable 
The agreement between the shipper and the carrier might also be affected by factors 
which might render that contract either invalid by law or void or voidable either by mistake 
or by misrepresentation on the shipper's part. If the contract is voidable, the shipowner 
must rescind before the bill of lading is transferred by the shipper. Thus, no contractual 
rights under s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992 would be transferred to the holder of the bill of 
lading, because the language which used is in s. 2 (1) gives the holder rights under the 
contract "as if he had been a party to that contract". In contrast, the language which is used 
in s. 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 gives the holder of the bill rights "as if the contract 
contained in the bill had been made with himself'. It is arguable, therefore, that the holder 
under s. 1 of the 1855 Act would not have been affected by these factors and the carrier 
could not have relied on these factors as against the holder of the bill of lading, on the 
assumption that the carriage contract had been made between the carrier and the holder of 
the bill of lading. If the initial contract is void for illegality, the holder of the bill would not 
be able to sue under the 1992 Act. Would the concept of the new contract springing up on 
endorsement, as is the case where a charterer/ consignor indorse the bill, help here? It is 
arguable that this mechanism would not be helpful in this case because the carriage 
contract between the carrier and the shipper in this case is embodied into the bill of lading 
rather than the charter- party. Carver argues70 the words s. 1 of 1855 Act were more 
68 An intermediate transferee used solely for this purpose could hardly be said to acquire the bill of lading in 
'good faith'. However, the burden of prove that the intermediate transferee has acquired the bill oflading in 
bad faith, contrary to s. 5 (2) of COGSA 1992 and so, the contractual rights would not be transferred by 
virtue of s. 2 (2) of COGSA 1992, would be hard to satisfy. 
69 For support for this view see Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 023. 
70 Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 027. 
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favourable to the holder as it treats him as a party to the contract which was actually made. 
Accordingly, if the carriage contract was either voidable by fraud or void for illegality 
which could not confer any rights on the shipper and using the fiction that the holder 
having been party to that ineffective contract can not confer any rights on the holder. 
On the other hand, the holder of the bill of lading would have better rights than the 
shipper in respect of the representations contained in the bill and where a breach by the 
carrier has been waived by the shipper but not by the holder. Under s. 4 of COGSA 1992, 
the holder could rely on estoppel against the carrier in respect of the representations 
contained in the bill of lading, since when he acquires the bill, he neither knew nor had 
reason to know, of the actual state of the goods at the time of shipment or when they were 
receiyed for shipment. Nevertheless although, s. 2 (1) may refer to the carriage contract 
which has actually been made, "it does not appear to exclude the estoppel on which a 
transferee can rely at common law".71 Also, the holder of the bill would not be bound by 
waiver of the shipper in respect of any breach committed by the carrier as deviation even if 
the holder had notice of the deviation when he took up the bill of lading because, the 
holder might still be bound to take up the bill by the contract of sale between himself and 
the shipper. 72 Therefore, the carrier would not be able to rely on exemptions or limitation 
of liability terms against the holder of the bill who had not waived the breach.73 
Initial contract of carriage is a charter- party 
It has been noted that a bill of lading which is issued under a charter- party in the 
hands of the charterer is merely a receipt and so it is neither contains nor evidences the 
carriage contract. Transferring the bill to an endorsee or a consignee will transfer the 
contractual rights under the bill of lading contract to the holder of it. Before transferring 
71 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 at para. 18- 085 and for supporting view see Carver on Bills of Lading, 
supra fn. 27 at para. 5- 029. 
72 It was concluded in Cremer .v. General Carrier S.A., [1974] 1 All E.R. 1, where the argument was 
accepted that the carrier can not rely on a contract of sale to which he was no a party. 
73 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 at pars. 18-051- 052 and 18- 086. 
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the bill to the transferee no carriage contract is contained in or evidenced by the bill of 
lading, but is contained instead in the charter- party.74 However, the holder of the bill will 
acquire the contractual rights by virtue of s. 2 (I) of COGSA 1992, but not by virtue of the 
common law rules.75 On which terms should the relationship between the carrier and the 
charterer be governed as a result of transferring the bill of lading to the charterer? COGSA 
1992 does not address that problem, nor did the previous Act. In The Dune/mia,76 the 
charterer had chartered the ship for the purpose of taking delivery of the goods from the 
seller and took the bill of lading by endorsement when the charterer paid the price. The 
Court of Appeal held that the relationship between the carrier and the charterer was 
governed by the terms of the charter- party and the bill of lading in the hands of the 
charterer is a mere receipt. The decision in The Dunelmia would not be different under 
COGSA 1992, since the rights of the charterer are not extinguished by virtue ofs. 2 (5).77 
However, the relationship between the charterer and the carrier could still be 
governed by the terms of the bill of lading in cases such as Calcutta S. S. Co Ltd. v. Andrew 
Weir & Co.,78 where the shipper borrowed money from the charterer while the goods were 
afloat and then indorsed the bill of lading as security for the advance made to him. The 
charterer claimed that the relationship between himself and the shipowner should be 
governed by the terms of the charter- party, but not by the terms of the bill of lading which 
contained exception clauses from liability. It is important to note that there was no 
74 The Bills of lading Act 1855 suffers from the same problem and therefore, the courts held that transferring 
the bill of lading to the transferee would give contractual rights to the holder against the carrier on the terms 
of the bill of lading. The courts explained that a new contract "springs up" when the bill is indorsed. see 
Rudolph A. Oetker. v. I.F.A. Internationale Frachtagentor (The A lmak) , [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 557 at 560. 
75 The acquisition of the contractual rights by virtue of s. 2 (1) is important for imposing liability under s. 3 
(1) of COGSA 1992. Since the acquisition of the contractual rights was based upon the common law, such as 
implied contract, might impose less extensive liabilities than s . 3 (1). 
76 [1970]1 Q.B. 289. 
77 Where rights are transferred by virtue of the operation of subsection (1) above in relation to any document, 
the transfer for which that subsection provides shall extinguish any entitlement to those rights which derives 
(a) where that document is a bill of lading, from a person's having been an original party to the 
contract of carriage. 
78 [1910] 1 K.B. 759. 
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connection between the charter- party and the transaction in pursuance of which the bill of 
lading was transferred to the charterer and, so the court held that the relationship between 
the charterer and the shipowner was governed by the terms of the bill of lading. Therefore, 
even if the charterer to whom the bill is indorsed may fall within the words of s. 2 (1), the 
court should decide whether the relationship should be governed by the bill of lading or the 
charter- party according to the factors which were relevant to such an issue as before 
COGSA 1992. 
'Spent' bills 
The Bills of Lading Act 1855 caused a problem where the transfer of the bill of 
lading took place after the bill had been accomplished, as in The Delfini.79 However, s. 2 
(2) of COGSA 1992 deals with the transfer of the contractual rights to a person who 
acquires the possession of the bill after delivery of the goods covered by that bill to him 
and after it ceased to be a transferable document of title. 80 The effect of s. 2 (2) is to restrict 
the operation of s. 2 (1) and thus, to prevent endorsement of a bill of lading to a person 
who has no interest in the goods but wants to buy a cause of action against the carrier. The 
holder of the bill of lading, under s. 5 (2) (c), extends to include the holder of the "spent" 
bill. Therefore, under s. 2 (2) (a), the person who has acquired the possession of the bill of 
lading as a result of arrangement or any contractual, such as sale contract, made before 
delivery the goods to him, would have contractual rights against the carrier.81 A limited 
exception is made in s. 2 (2) (b) deals with reendorsement of the bill to the transferor after 
delivery had been made to the transferee as result of rejection of the goods as for breach of 
condition and preserves the transferor's title to sue. The true interpretation to the phrase 
79 See supra fn. 6. 
80 However, a bill oflading is not 'spent', when delivery is made to a party not entitled to possession of the 
goods to which it relates. See East West Corporation. v. Dkbs J 9 J 2, supra fn. 28 at para. 19. 
81 The problem which was raised in The Delfini would be resolved by virtue of s. 2 (2) (a) of COOSA 19~2 
and the claimants would have a title to sue the carrier for short delivery of some 275 tonnes less than the bill 
of lading quantity, since the claimants had acquired the possession of the bill of lading as a result of the sale 
contract which was made before delivery of the goods. 
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"goods or docunlents" should be that the transferee has rejected both documents and 
goods, because the reacquiring of the contractual rights under a "spent" bill should be to 
the person who has possession of that bill. 82 However, delivery of the goods to a person 
other than the holder of the bill of lading is a breach of the carriage contract for which the 
holder can claim damages by virtue of s. 2 (1). Provided the holder acquires the bill of 
lading before the goods are actually delivered, the holder's rights to sue the carrier for mis-
deliyery are not affected by the opening paragraph of s. 2 (2) of COGSA 1992.83 The same 
also applies under s. 5 (4) (a) where the goods no longer existed, when the holder acquired 
the possession of the bill of lading, as a result of destruction which amount to a breach of 
84 
contract. 
Divestment of rights 
When rights of suit, under the carriage contract, are transferred to the lawful holder 
of the bill of lading by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992, the shipper's rights as a original 
party to the carriage contract are extinguished, by virtue of s. 2 (5). However, the rule in 
Dunlop . v. Lambert85 can still apply to cases, such as where the bill has never been 
transferred,86where the contractual rights have not been transferred, by virtue of s. 2 (1), to 
the person who has suffered loss. It also covers suit by the charterer, shipper, whose rights 
not deriving from the bill, are unaffected by s. 2 (5) of the 1992 Act. Such cases would not 
be covered by s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992 which entitles the transferee of rights under the 
82 By virtue of both s. 2 (2) and s. 5 (2) of COGS A 1992. 
83 A claimant who is within s. 2 (2) (b) cannot sue the carrier for mis- delivery if delivery was in fact made 
against an original bill of lading. 
84 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 at pars. 18- 091- 18- 093 and, also, see Cooper, J., supra fn. 15 at 50- 04. 
85 [1838-39] 7 ER. 824. The court held that the plaintiff as a shipper could sue the carrier in respect of breach 
of the carriage contract and recover damages in respect of the transferee's loss, as exception to the common 
law rule which is restricted the plaintiffs right to recover damages only for his own loss. 
86 Also, where the bill is lost in transmission and the transferee never acquires possession of it, or where the 
bill was delivered to the buyer but, it lacks a requisite endorsement. 
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carnage contract to recover damages in respect of a third party's loss, but does not entitle 
the original shipper to do that. 87 
The rights, therefore, which are transferred by s. 2 (1) to the holder of the bill of 
lading are the shipper's rights under the carriage contract which are contained in or 
evidenced by the bill of lading by virtue of s. 5 (1) (a) of COOSA 1992. But, what about 
the shipper's rights which are contained or evidenced by some other contract such as the 
charter- party? The leading modem case on this point is The Albazero88where the plaintiff, 
as a charterer, tried to recover the value of the oil, for benefit of the holder of the bill, 
which was lost by reason of the carrier's assumed breach of contract. 89 The House of Lords 
rejected the plaintiffs claim on the ground of the general principles of the law of contract 
which enables him to recover damages for his own loss, but not for loss that has been 
suffered by a third party. The reasoning of the House of Lords means that the principle90 in 
Dunlop. v. Lambert cannot be applied where the person who has suffered loss has a direct 
contractual relationship with the carrier by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COOSA 1992,91 or an 
implied contract at common law. The decision of the House of Lords would have been 
different had the sale contract between the seller, as charterer, and the buyer contained 
terms which left the loss during transit with the seller. The loss which resulted from the 
carrier's breach of contract would have been suffered by the seller as a charterer who could 
sue the carrier for substantial damages for breach of the charter- party, but not the bill of 
lading contract. Recovery of a third party's loss is also possible when the claimant is the 
owner of the goods at the time they are lost or damaged, notwithstanding that risk has 
87 Since the shipper could not, as a result of the transfer of the bill of lading back to him, become a lawful 
holder according to s. 2 (1) (a) which would undermine the intention of COGS A 1992 to resolve the privity 
problem which prevents a person who is not party to the carriage contract to take advantages of that contract. 
88 [1977] A.C. 774. . 
89 The claim under the bill of lading contract had expired by virtue of art. III (6) of the Hague Rules, whIle 
the claim under the charter- party had not been expired yet. 
90 Which would be applied to the contract between the carrier and the claimant whether that contract was 
contained in bill of lading or charter- party. 
91 Or as in The Albazero, supra fn. 88, by virtue ofs. 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855. 
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already passed under the sale contract to the third party. In The Sanix Ace,92 the end- users 
\\'ho suffered the loss had no contractual rights against the carrier, since no bill of lading 
\\'as indorsed to any of them, but instead they received a copy of the single bill which 
covered the whole bulk. The court, therefore, held that the charterer could claim substantial 
damages for the benefit of the end- users93 where the only cause of action against that 
carrier was in contract while the end- users could not bring action against the carrier 
because of the lack of the contractual relationship between them and the carrier. The goods 
\\'ere the shipper's goods at the time of damage, even if they were not at his risk but at his 
buyer's risk, he still could sue and recover in full. This could be regarded as an exception 
to the rule against recovery for third party's loss that is distinct from Dunlop. v. Lambert 
and unaffected by The Albazero. Therefore, the rights which are affected by s. 2 (5) of 
COGSA 1992 are those of the original party to the carriage contract which is defined by s. 
5 (1) (a) as the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading, but not the contract 
contained in the charter- party. It should also be noted that rights of suit in bailment remain 
unaffected by s. 2 (5) as held by the Court of Appeal in East West Corporation .v. Dkbs 
1912.94 
The rights of the intermediate transferee are also extinguished where the 
contractual rights under the bill of lading are transferred by virtue of s. 2 (1) to his 
transferee. Thus, where the transfer of the contractual rights to the second transferee is not 
by virtue of s. 2 (l), such as where the bill was delivered to him without a requisite 
endorsement, the intermediate transferee's rights would not be extinguished. The first 
transfer will have extinguished the rights of the original party to the carriage contract by 
virtue of s. 2 (5), while the second transfer will not have this effect, by virtue of s. 2 (1). 
92 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465. 
93 The damages would be held on trust for the charterer's buyers. 
94 See supra fn. 28 at para. 45. 
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Moreover. where the bill of lading has been transferred from the shipper to the charterer, it 
would be a mere receipt in the hands of the charterer and so, the transfer of the contract to 
the charterer was not by virtue of s. 2 (1) and so, s. 2 (5) (a) would not apply since the 
charter- party is not a carriage contract within s. 5 (1) (a) of COGSA 1992. Also, the 
transfer of the bill of lading to a new transferee would not extinguish the charterer's rights 
under the charter- party. However, the effect of that transfer would be governed by the 
common law principles which have been mentioned above.95 
Extinction of the seller's rights by s. 2 (5) where the bill has been transferred 
according to s. 2 (1) seems unexceptional where the risk passes to the buyer on shipment. 
But, risk may remain on the seller, such as a c.i.f. out-tum contract and also, the seller may 
suffer losses as result of breach of the carriage contract which are not associated with the 
passing of risk such as loss caused by a delay in loading. However, the Law Commissions 
introduced some reason for adopting this line of policy. 
First, it reflects the position under s. 1 of the 1855 Act which used the verb 
"transfer" and it never was clear whether the rights of the shipper were extinguished by 
that transfer. Moreover, COGSA 1992 Act uses the same verb, but to avoid the unclear 
position under the 1855 Act, it was necessary to clarify the position by providing under s. 2 
(5) that such transfer shall extinguish the rights of the original party under the carriage 
contract. Therefore, it was unacceptable to preserve the old law, which did not apply to sea 
. 1 l' 96 waybll s, to create new anoma les. 
Second, while the rights of the original party are extinguished where the goods are 
shipped under a bill of lading, those rights are not extinguished where the goods are 
shipped under a "straight" bill of lading which is a sea waybill for the purpose of the Act or 
under a sea waybill or a ship's delivery order. The Commissions' reports treat the waybill 
95 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 at para. 18- 092. For the common law principles which governs this sort of 
transfer see supra Divestment a/rights. 
96 See Bradgate, R., & White, F., supra fn. 1 at 199. 
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differently from the bill of lading on the ground that the waybill is not a document of title 
and giving the shipper the right of disposal while extinguishing his rights under the 
carriage contract might lead to contradictory results. However, while this could be 
acceptable it does not justify the shipper retaining those rights after the delivery has been 
made to the consignee. Moreover, the rights of the shipper under the charter- party as a 
charterer are not extinguished on the ground that the bill of lading in the hands of the 
charterer is a mere receipt. The position under the bill of lading is nearly the same, since 
the bill of lading is not the carriage contract, but contains or evidences the terms of that 
contract. So, the bill of lading in the hands of the shipper performs the same function as 
where the initial contract of carriage is contained in a charter- party. A minority view was 
expressed by Clive who adds "To introduce a distinction between charterparties and other 
contracts of carriage under or pursuant to which a bill of lading is issued- where no such 
distinction appears on the face of the draft Bill- seems to me to be confusing and 
unsatisfactory". 97 
Third, while s. 2 (5) of COGSA 1992 extinguishes the rights of the shipper as 
original party to the carriage contract, his liabilities under that contract are expressly 
preserved under s. 3 (3) of COGSA 1992. In contrast, the Bills of Lading Act 1855, by 
virtue of s. 2, only expressly preserved the shipper's liabilities for freight. 98 Thus, under 
COGSA 1992, the original party to the contract is exposed to liabilities under that contract, 
but without the rights to enforce it. Also, the Commissions were of the view that to allow 
the shipper to preserve rights of suit against the carrier would "undermine the security of 
97 See Clive, E. M., "Note of Partial Dissent" in The English and Scottish law Commissions, Rights of Suit in 
Respect o/Carriage o/Goods by Sea, (1991) 196 Eng L.C.R. and 130 Scot L.C.R. 41 at 43. . 
98 At the same time, the shipper would be liable to the carrier, under the common law, for a duty not to ShIP 
dangerous cargo and also, it was held in The Giannis N.K., [1998] 2 W.L.R. 206, at 217, that "the liability of 
a shipper for dangerous goods at common law, when it arises, does not depend on his knowledge or means of 
knowledge that the goods are dangerous". For more details see Rose, F.D., "Liability for dangerous goods-
The Giannis N.K." [1998] LMCLQ. 480 and Girvin, S. D., "Shipper's Liability for the Carriage of Dangerous 
Cargoes by Sea" [1996] LMCLQ 487. 
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the new holder by anticipatory action".99 The shipper as a original party to the carriage 
contract cannot demand delivery from the carrier without the presentation of the bill of 
lading, but he can bring a claim against the carrier for loss or damage to the goods even if 
the risk had passed to the holder on shipment. But, the shipper has no motive to do that and 
even ifhe did that he would not be able to recover substantial damages. 100 
Finally, the Commissions suggested that when the shipper or the intermediate 
transferee does bear the risk of loss, they can protect themselves by suing the carrier in tort 
or by assignment of the holder's rights of suit. There are two objections to this. First, a suit 
in tort might well expose the carrier to a liability which is greater than the one under the 
carriage contract. Secondly, assignment would give the shipper or the intermediate holder 
greater rights than those which they would have had under the original contract. !OI 
Recovery of third party losses 
In some cases the person who has suffered loss is not the person who has acquired 
contractual rights under the carriage contract, by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992, against 
the carrier. Therefore, s. 2 (4), entitles the holder of the bill of lading who has acquired 
contractual rights to sue the carrier for breach of contract for the benefit of the person who 
had suffered loss resulting from the carrier's breach of the carriage contract. However, the 
person who is entitled to sue the carrier for the benefit of another person who had suffered 
loss must have acquired the contractual rights by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992. 
Therefore, the shipper who is the original party to the carriage contract can not, under s. 2 
(4), sue in respect of the carrier's breach for the benefit of the person who had suffered 
99 See the Commissions Report supra fn. 2 at para. 2. 34 (iii). 
100 As in The Albazero, supra fn. 88. . . 
101 Under s. 4 of the 1992 Act, the carrier is estopped from denying the accuracy of the statements In the bIll 
of lading against the holder of that bill. However, these statements are only prime facie evidence as against 
the shipper. 
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loss, since the shipper has acquired the contractual rights against the carrier as an original 
party, but not by virtue of s. 2 (l) of COGSA 1992. 102 
However, the shipper as an original party to the carriage contract still can sue the 
carrier for breach of that contract for the benefit of the person who had suffered the loss 
according to Dunlop . v. Lambert, as an exception to the common law rules. The 
entitlement of the shipper as an original party to sue the carrier for a breach of a contract 
which is not covered by COGSA 1992 would not be subject to any restriction that may be 
imposed by s. 2 (4). Thus, the shipper can still claim against the carrier under the carriage 
contract which is embodied in a charter-party. Therefore, s. 2 (4) will not apply to a 
charterer who is suingl03 for the benefit of the person who had suffered loss, because the 
bill of lading which had been transferred to the charterer is, in his hand, merely a receipt 
and so, no rights under the bill of lading would be vested in the charterer by virtue of s. 2 
(l) of COGSA 1992. 104 
Under s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992, the person who had suffered loss should be "a 
person with any interest or right in or in relation to goods to which the document relates". 
In order to sue in tort, as in The A liakm on , the person should have "either the legal 
ownership of or a possessory title to the property concerned at the time when the loss or 
damage occurred". 105 It is, moreover, not sufficient, for a tort action, that the plaintiff has a 
contractual right that the goods should be delivered to him or that the goods were in his 
risk. 106 Therefore, it is not sufficient for the person who has suffered loss that the goods 
were at his risk. Consequently, there is a risk that s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992 would not be 
102 But, an endorsee could sue the carrier, by virtue of s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992, for the benefit of the shipper. 
103 NB; his right to substantial damages under the charter- party will be subject to The Albazero, supra fn. 88. 
104 Another reason for not applying s. 2 (4) to the above case as in The Albazero, [1977] A.C. 774, is that the 
charterer had transferred the bill oflading to the buyer and so, any rights which the charterer may have had as 
a transferee of the bill oflading would have been extinguished by s. 2 (5) of COGS A 1992. See Guest, A. G., 
sUfra fn. 26 at para. 18- 095. 
10 The Aliakmon, supra fn. 9 at 910. 
106 The Wear Breeze [1969] 1 Q.B. 219. 
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available to the buyer where the risk of loss has passed on shipment, but the property has 
not passed yet or for the shipper who have sold the goods at his risk and parted with the 
property, or where the shipper wished to claim against the carrier for losses for breach of 
contract such as delay in loading on the ground that neither the shipper nor the buyer is "a 
person with any interest or right in or in relation to goods to which the documents relates". 
This "iew can be supported by the fact that the Law Commissions, when recommending 
the inclusion of s. 2 (4), contemplated its use by an agent who holds the bill of lading to 
take delivery of the goods or a bank named as the consignee in the bill of lading. 107 Also, 
the Law Commissions, during the discussion of the effect of the inclusion of s. 2 (5), 
pointed out that the seller as well as the intermediate holder, in these situations, can 
arrange an assignment of the buyer's rights against the carrier. 108 
However, the English courts should examine other statutory provisions dealing 
with the words 'interests or 'rights', in particular s. 5 (2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
and whether they have been held to cover a party who has the risk in the goods but not the 
0\' nership. It seems that anyone who has risk in the goods at the time they are damaged, 
under s. 5 (2) of MIA 1906, will have an insurable interest in them. Therefore, it can be 
argued that a person with an insurable interest in the goods can be regarded as having an 
interest in the goods according to s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992. This argument can be 
supported by the words of s. 2 (4) which provides "to the same extent as they could have 
been exercised if they had been vested in the person for whose benefit they are exercised". 
This is because these words would be meaningless if the third party was anyone other than 
107 See the Commissions Report supra fn. 2 at para. 2. 27. See, too, Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at 
para. 5- 070, where it is submitted that s. 2 (4) (a) requires the person for whose benefit the action is brought 
to have 'interest or right' and also to suffer loss otherwise the reference to 'interest or right' would be mere 
surplusage. 
108 See the Commissions Report supra fn. 2 at paras. 2- 38- 39 and 2. 40- 41. 
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the shipper, since the relationship between the carrier and anyone other than the shipper 
would be exclusively on the terms of the bill of lading. 109 
Section 2 (4) of COGSA 1992 provides that the holder of the bill who has acquired 
contractual rights "shall be entitled to exercise those rights" to sue the carrier for the 
benefit of the person who had suffered loss as a result of breach the carriage contract. The 
language of this section does not require that person to sue, but merely gives him the 
ability to do so. Moreover, COGSA 1992 provides no machinery for the person who had 
suffered the loss to compel the holder of the bill to exercise those rights. The only solution 
for the buyer who has no contractual rights against the carrier is to include in the sale 
contract a term which requires his seller to exercise the rights under s. 2 (4) for his benefit. 
But this solution is not always practicable since it requires the buyer to take legal advice at 
the time the sale contract is concluded. 
2.4.2. TRANSFERRING CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER SEA WAYBILLS 
Under s. 2 (1) (b) rights of suit are given under a sea waybill to the person to whom 
delivery is to be made rather than to the named consignee. This is because the sea waybill 
is not a transferable document of title and the shipper retains rights of disposal over the 
goods until delivery, unless he contracts otherwise. Therefore, giving the rights of suit to 
the named consignee from the moment of consignment will prevent the shipper from 
exercising his rights of disposa1. 110 Being the original party to the carriage contract 
contained in or evidenced by the sea waybill, the shipper can sue the carrier without the 
need for statutory rights to be given to him. 
109 In contrast to the suggestion that the damages should only be subject to the terms of the bill of la?ing. 
Since, s. 5 (1) (a) of COGSA 1992 defines the carriage contract as contained in or evidenced by the bIll of 
lading. See Guest, A.G., supra tn. 26 at para. 18- 096. 
110 See Cooper, 1., supra tn. 15 at 50-04. 
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However, what has been said about the language which has been used in s. 2 (1) of 
COGSA 1992 in respect of the bill of lading still applies to the sea waybill. 111 But, the 
named consignee in the sea waybill would not have any better rights than the shipper in 
respect of the representations contained in waybill, since s. 4 of COGSA 1992 would apply 
to a bill of lading but not to a sea waybill. The relationship between the carrier and the 
charterer who has chartered the ship for the purpose of taking delivery from the shipper 
and also who became a named consignee, as in cases such as The Dunelmia,112 would be 
governed by the terms of the charter- party, even if it would appear that the rights which 
have been acquired by the charterer as a named consignee are those under the contract 
between the carrier and the shipper by virtue of s. 2 (1) (b) of COGSA 1992. But, in a 
situation such as in Calcutta s.s. Co Ltd. v. Andrew Weir & Co l13 where the shipper as an 
original party directs the carrier to deliver the goods to the charterer, the rights which have 
been acquired by the charterer would be governed by the terms of the contract which is 
contained in or evidenced by the sea waybill. This is because the charterer is the person to 
whom delivery is to be made by virtue of s. 2 (1) (b) of COGSA 1992, and the subsequent 
direction was not in the contemplation of the charterer and the carrier when they entered 
into the charter- party. 
Also, the shipper as an original party to the carriage contract has the power to 
redirect the carrier to deliver the goods to someone else rather than the named consignee in 
the sea waybill, since the waybill is not a transferable document of title and the shipper has 
the right of disposal. Therefore, where the shipper exercises his power to redirect the 
carrier to deliver the goods to a person other than the named consignee, the rights of the 
named consignee cease and those rights are vested in the new person to whom delivery is 
to be made. Suppose the named consignee sells the goods and asks the shipper to redirect 
111 See supra The terms of the contract transferred. 
112 [1970] 1 Q.B. 289. 
113 [1910] 1 K.B. 759. 
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the carrier to deliver the goods to the new buyer, but the shipper's directions have not yet 
reached the calTier on alTival of the ship. Nevertheless, the calTier agrees to deliver the 
goods to the new buyer who suffers loss as result of the calTier's breach, but who has 
acquired no contractual rights against the calTier by virtue of s. 2 (1) (b) of COGSA 1992, 
since he was not yet the person to whom delivery was to be made when delivery was 
actually made. In such a case, the named consignee who has acquired contractual rights 
can sue the carrier for the benefit of the person who had suffered loss by virtue of s. 2 (4) 
where the requirements of that section were satisfied. 114 
Under s. :2 (5) (b) of COGS A 1992, the rights of the shipper as an original party to 
the carriage contract which is contained in or evidenced by the sea waybill are not 
extinguished. The application of s. 2 (5) (b) of COGSA 1992 depends on the terms of the 
carriage contract contained in a sea waybill, so where the shipper divests his right of 
disposal over the goods to the named consignee, he will not lose his rights against the 
carrier as an original party to the calTiage contract. The justification for treating the shipper 
under a sea waybill differently is the contradiction which would result from retaining the 
right of disposal, including the right to have the goods delivered to himself without the 
rights which might need to sue the carrier in the event of loss or damage to the goods. 
However, the carrier would not be liable twice for the same loss, since double recovery 
would be avoided on the ground that one person could recover substantial loss while the 
other could recover nominal loss. 
2. 4. 3. TRANSFERRING CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER SHIP'S DELIVERY 
ORDERS 
Under s. 2 (1) (c) of COGSA 1992, the contractual rights, under the carriage contract, are 
vested in the person to whom delivery is to be made according to the terms of the ship's 
114 For the implementation of s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992 see supra Recovery of third party losses. 
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delivery order. A ship's delivery order might be issued under a bill of lading or a sea 
waybill and so, the contractual rights which are vested in the person to whom delivery is to 
be made would be transferred as if that person had been party to the bill of lading contract 
or the sea waybill contract. 
The possession of the ship's delivery order is important for the acquisition of 
contractual rights against the carrier. In principle, the acquisition of contractual rights 
against the carrier does not depend upon the possession of the ship's delivery order. The 
person who is identified in the order as the person to whom delivery is to be made does not 
need to be the holder of the ship's delivery order in order to acquire the contractual rights. 
But, this principle should be read in conjunction with s. 2 (3) (a) of COGSA 1992 which 
proyides that "shall be so vested subject to the terms of the order". Therefore, where the 
ship's delivery order contained a term which provides that the delivery of the goods would 
be against the presentation of the ship's delivery order, contractual rights could be acquired 
only by a person with the possession of that ship's delivery order. However, there is no 
requirement that the possession of the ship's delivery order should have been acquired in 
good faith as in the bill of lading. 
The carriage contract in respect of a ship's delivery order, under s. 5 (1) (b), is "the 
contract under or for the purposes of which the undertaking contained in the order is 
given". The bill of lading, as has been noticed above, is merely a receipt in the hands of the 
charterer and the carriage contract between the charterer and the carrier is the charter- party 
itself. Therefore, what are the terms of the carriage contract between the carrier and the 
person to whom delivery is to be made under a ship's delivery order, where the charterer 
who has the bill of lading which is merely a receipt in his hands has asked the carrier to 
issue a ship's delivery order for the goods to that person? The carriage contract, in this case 
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according to s. 5 (1 ) (b) of COGSA 1992, is the charter- party, 115 because the only contract 
between the parties is the charter- party and the undertaking which is contained in that 
order was under or for the purpose the carriage contract which is the charter- party.116 
Suppose that the ship's delivery order which is issued in the above case contains reference 
to the bill of lading rather than the charter- party and provides that delivery of the goods 
would be against the presentation of that order. The concept of a "new contract" which 
'springs up' on transfer of the bill of lading by the charterer to an endorsee would then 
have to be applied to such a ship's delivery order. The justification of the extension of the 
above concept to a ship's delivery order is that it provides a commercially convenient 
result. 117 
The transmission of the ship's delivery order depends upon the terms of the order 
and so, the last buyer who has no possession of the ship's delivery order, where the 
delivery of the goods is made against the production of that order, would not be able to 
take delivery. However, if the intermediate buyer who has the possession of that order took 
delivery, he would be able to sue the carrier for breach of contract according to s. 2 (4) 
where the requirements of that section were satisfied, since he has acquired contractual 
rights against the carrier by virtue of s. 2 (1) (c) of COGSA 1992. But, what if the carrier 
and the ultimate buyer without possession of the order agreed to take delivery of the goods 
against a letter of indemnity? Should the ultimate buyer be regarded as the person to whom 
delivery is to be made according to the undertaking contained in that order? It is arguable 
that the ultimate buyer in this situation might acquire contractual rights against the carrier, 
provided he later acquired that order as is the position with a "spent" bill of lading in s. 2 
(2) of COGS A 1992. 
115 This is a surprising conclusion since the Law Commission Report in pars. 5:25~ 5.31 relating to ship's 
delivery orders contain references only to the bill of lading. Also, the non- applIcatIOn of COGSA 1992 to 
charter- parties. 
116 By virtue of s. 5 (1 ) (b) of COGSA 1992. 
\17 See Guest, A. G., supra fn. 26 at para. 18- 156. 
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Where the ship's delivery order relates to part of a shipment, the contractual rights 
which are vested in the person to whom delivery is to be made relate only to that part of 
shipment according to s. 2 (3) (b) of COGSA 1992. Also, the rights of the original party in 
the bill of lading are extinguished according to s. 2 (5) (b) of COGSA 1992. But, s. 2 (5) 
(b) would not strip the lawful holder of the bill of lading of its rights of suit under s.2 (1) 
relating to the ship's delivery order. However, the application of s. 2 (5) (b) would not 
make the carrier liable twice for the same loss, since the common law rules allow the 
contractual party to recover damages only for his own losses. 
2. 5. THROUGH AND COMBINED TRANSPORT BILLS OF LADING 
2.5.1. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING118 
A through bill of lading is related to a successive carriage of goods by sea under one 
document. The question of whether a through bill of lading is covered by COGSA 1992 is 
related to the questions of whether this document is covered by the mercantile custom 
which is recognised by Lickbarrow . v. Mason and whether this document is a traditional 
bill of lading. The carrier, under a through bill of lading, undertakes to be responsible for 
the goods from the point of receipt to the point of final destination and so the carrier would 
be responsible for the goods throughout the entire voyage, even in the event of 
transhipment or substitution. Therefore, the holder under a through bill of lading will have 
the same level of security as under the traditional bill of lading. It was held in Holland 
Colombo. v. Segu Mohamed Khaja Alawdeen,119 that such a through bill of lading would 
not be a good tender under a c.i.f. contract, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone introduced that 
"A bill of lading with a transhipment clause is not necessarily a bad tender under a c.i.f. 
contract: but it must in some way give 'continuous documentary cover' in respect of the 
118 For details about types of through bills of lading see sub- title 1. 6. 2. of chap. 1. 
119 [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 45 at 53. 
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goods over the whole transit . . . and a bill of lading issued by the shipowner who by the 
transhipment terms in it disclaims all liability in respect of the goods in the event and as 
fronl the time of transhipment, gives no such 'continuous' cover". A through bill of lading 
would normally be a "shipped" bill which is issued by the shipownerI2o and a through bill 
of lading is accepted by the modem mercantile practice in the same way as a traditional bill 
of lading. Moreover, it is transferred from one party to another by endorsement and 
delivery and the parties to the sale contract are willing to pay the price of the goods in 
return of such document and also, it is accepted by banks in return for a loan to finance the 
sale transaction. A through bill of lading, under both UCP 400 and 500, is treated as the 
same way as a traditional bill of lading where the entire ocean carriage is covered by one 
and the same bill of lading, since the only difference between them is that the carrier is 
obliged to sub- contract on- carriage from the point of transhipment on his own name and 
at his expense. I21 Therefore, a through bill of lading is similar to a traditional bill of lading 
in every aspect apart from the fact that the carrier under a through bill of lading is obliged 
to sub- contract on- carriage from the point of transhipment in his own name, which is a 
distinction in fact, but not in law. I22 The scope of application of COGSA 1992 would, 
therefore, seem broad enough to cover a through bill of lading. I23 
In contrast, a false through bill of lading under which each carrier undertakes to be 
only responsible for the goods whilst in his possession would not provide the shipper with 
the same level of security as the traditional bill of lading, since the issuer of this bill would 
escape from liability for the periods which fall outside the mandatory 'tackle to tackle' 
120 If a through bill of lading is issued in the form of a "received for shipment" bill, it could be converted, 
under art. III (7) of the Hague- Visby Rules, into a "shipped" through bill of lading by notation on the bill 
which would confirmed the time of shipment, the name of the ship and the date of shipment. 
121 See art. 23 (b-d) ofUCP 500 and art. 29 ofUCP 400. 
122 For support for this view see Todd, P., Modern Bills of Lading, 2nd Edition, London: ~lackwel.l L.aw 
1993, at p. 69 and Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claim, 3rd Edition, Montreal: InternatIOnal ShIppmg 
Publication- BLAIS 1988, at p. 928. 
123 Since the law commission found that there is no evidence that this document has any particular problem 
ofprivit; which is different from the traditional ocean bill oflading. See the Commissions Report supra fn. 2 
at para. 2. 49. 
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period of liability under the Hague- Visby Rules. 124 Also, there is a fundamental difference 
between this document and the previous one which contains no undertaking by one carrier 
to deliver the goods to the final destination. Under this kind of document, there are several 
carriers and a carrier's liability could be shuffled off in respect of damage or loss to the 
goods on the ground that loss or damage cannot be localised. This problem can be avoided 
by demanding a receipt or a bill regarding the apparent good and condition of the goods. 
Howeyer, it would be difficult in some kinds of transport, such as containerised transport, 
to determine the point of damage or loss and so identify the carrier who is responsible for 
the damage or loss of the goods. This receipt would not resolve the problem of the 
existence of several carriers since the level of liability of each carrier might be different as 
we 11 as the time bars of action. 125 
It is, therefore, arguable that a false through bill seems different from the traditional 
bill of lading, in particular, that it does not provide the shipper with the same level of 
security as the traditional bill and so, it should be treated differently. This document is not 
really a traditional bill of lading and would probably not be a document of title. There may 
also be doubt as to whether it is covered by COGSA 1992, even for that part of contract 
which was personally performed by the issuer of the document, since s. 1 (2) applies only 
to a document of title which is capable of transfer and contains an undertaking by the 
issuer to deliver the goods to their destination. 126 
2. 5. 2. FREIGHT FORWARDER BILLS 
The questions of whether a freight forwarder bill is a true bill of lading or whether it can be 
a document of title and so covered by COGSA 1992 have never been answered by the 
124 See Holland Colombo. v. Segu Mohamed Khaja Alawdeen, [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 45 at 53. 
125 See Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., (et al) Interests in Goods, 2nd Edition, London and Hong Kong: 
L.L.P. 1998, at p. 564. 
126 For a contrasting point of view see Tetley, W., supra fn. 122 at p. 929; Boyd, S. c., (et al) Scrutton on 
Charter parties and Bills of Lading, 20th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1996, at art. 181. 
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English courts. In Carrington S/ipways Pty Ltd. v. Patrick Operations Pty Ltd,127 there 
were two bills of lading, one of them a house bill issued by a freight forwarder and the 
other an ocean bill issued by the time charterer as the actual carrier. The cargo of two 
diesel engines was damaged by the stevedores who claimed protection under the Himalaya 
clause in either or both bills of lading. However, it was held by the Court of Appeal in 
Australia that the stevedores would be protected by the Himalaya clause in the ocean bill 
of lading as the freight forwarder was authorised to enter into a contract of carriage and to 
procure an ocean bill of lading from the actual carrier on behalf of his principal. Therefore, 
the plaintiff. as undisclosed principal, would have the benefit of and be bound by the ocean 
bill of lading which was the actual carrier's bill.128 The Court of Appeal considered the 
question of whether the freight forwarder's bill was a bill of lading. It held that it is not a 
bill of lading129 since there was no evidence that the freight forwarder or his agent had any 
authorisation from the charterer or the shipowner to issue or to sign any bill of lading in 
respect of those goods. 
Sanson has argued that a freight forwarder bill, if made "to order", is a negotiable 
bill of lading and it would be a document of title and so, it should be covered by COGSA 
1992. He also argues that a "House Bill Of Lading" is not a bill of lading, but it is a 
merchant's delivery order which grants neither possession nor property to the holder but a 
right to require delivery of the goods from the issuer and so is not included within COGS A 
1992. However, a freight forwarder's bill should be treated as a true bill since, the issuer 
127 [1991-92] 24 N.S.W.L.R. 745. 
128 Ibid. at 753. Therefore, the carrier would avoid the risk of not obtaining any contractual benefits from 
their bills as against the consignee because of the interposition of another carrier. There was no reference, by 
the Court of Appeal, to arts. 25 and 26 of the UCP which might give a useful guidance in determining 
whether the so- called bill was a negotiable document or not. Hetherington, S., "Freight Forwarders and 
House Bills of Lading, The Cape Comorin" [1992] LMCLQ. 32 and Hetherington, S., "Freight forwarders' 
liability- The Oceania Trader" [1993] LMCLQ 313. . . 
129 The Court of Appeal held that the so- called bill was not a bill oflading according to the descnptIOn of~he 
bill of lading in Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 19th Edition, 1984, at .2; Sewell. v. Burdl.ck 
[1884] 10 A.C. 74 at 105, The Marlborough Hill [1921] 1 A.C. 444 at 450- 451 and FreIght Forwarders, HIll, 
[1972] D. J at 185- 186. 
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has contracted as a principal, as a carrier, who would be responsible for the goods during 
the entire transit and so, the freight forwarder can be treated as bailee with authority to sub-
bail. Moreover, the freight forwarder's bill is approved by art. 30 of the UCP 500 and 
previously by art. 25 (d), 26 c (iv) ofUCP 400. !30 Gaskell argues!3! that such bill of lading 
is essentially the same as a bill issued by a charterer which represents a widespread 
shipping practice. 
However, a bill issued by a NVOCC, if not treated as a true bill of lading, falls 
within the waybill sections of COGSA 1992. This is because the Act defines a sea waybill 
as a document which contains or evidences "a contract of carriage by sea". As against this, 
there is the fact that s. (3) (b), in defining a sea waybill refers to a document that "identifies 
the person to whom delivery of the goods is to be made by the carrier in accordance with 
that contract". While this might cover the named consignee, the definition does not easily 
cover the situation of other third parties, such as one who has taken the NVOCC bill by 
endorsement from the consignee, or a party who is in possession of a bearer bill issued by 
anNVOCC. 
2.5.3. COMBINED TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS132 
A combined transport document is a document which relates to carriage of goods, at least, 
by two different kind of transportation such as sea and rail. 133 However, a combined 
transport document differs from a through bill of lading in one important aspect which is 
that a combined transport document can be issued by the actual carrier as well as by a 
person, such as the multimodal transport operator, who accepts responsibility for the goods 
130 See Sanson, N., "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992- The Practice and Legal Implications, Conference 
Documentation, IBC Legal Studies and Services Limited Maritime Law Division 1993, SAS Portman Hotel, 
London W 1. 1 at pp. 6- 11. 
131 See Gaskell, N., (et aI), supra fh. 56 at para. 1.42. 
132 See in general Proctor, c., The Legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal Transport 
Document Pretoria- Interlegal 1997, in fn. 108 of chapter 5. 
133 A com'bined transport document is preferable by the shipper, since he needs only to contract with ~ne 
person to carry the goods to the final destination by different kind of transportation, instead of contractmg 
with different person in respect of each leg of transportation. 
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through out the entire voyage, but not being the actual carrier. Gaskell argues that a bill of 
lading issued by a NVOCC, other than the actual shipowner, should not cause any 
problem. This is because such bill is similar to a bill issued by a charterer which represents 
a widespread shipping practice. In his view, the essential question is whether the charterer 
assumes the prinlary contractual responsibility of a carrier. Therefore, the charterer who 
assumes such responsibility can be termed as a NVOCC and so a NVOCC' bill is no more 
than a bill issued by a person, including a freight forwarder, who assumes the primary 
responsibility of a carrier. 134 Also, it differs from the traditional bill of lading in that it can 
be issued by a sea carrier or by a carrier of any sort, such as a freight forwarder. Therefore, 
a combined transport document will normally be in the form of a "received for shipment" 
bill, since the shipper, according to the modem trading practices, will handle the goods to 
the contracting party at an inland depot. It has been noted that a "received for shipment" 
bill of lading which is issued by only the sea carrier can be as a document of title, since the 
only bill of lading which has been qualified as a document of title, according to 
LickbarrOH' . v. Mason, was issued by a sea carrier. A combined transport bill is normally 
issued in a received for shipment, rather than shipped form, but it may also be issued by 
either a sea carrier or a carrier of any sort and so, it is important to know whether a 
combined transport bill can be qualified as a document of title no matter whether it is 
. db' . f 135 Issue y a sea carner or a carner 0 any sort. 
However, it has been pointed out that, the courts can recognise any document as a 
document of title where it meets certain conditions. 136 First, it should be issued by a bailee 
who undertakes to deliver the goods to the holder of the document and so the issuer of the 
134 See Gaskell, N., (et aI), supra fn. 56 at para. 1.42. 
135 It was suggested that a combined transport bill of lading is not a document of title, since the 'p.resentation 
of the duly indorsed combined bill for delivery of the goods is no more than a contractual condItIOn, and so 
the Bills of Lading Act 1855 did not apply to this sort ofbiII. 
136 See Debattista, c., Sale of Goods Carried by Sea, London: Butterworths 1990, chapter 8 and Goode, R. 
M., Proprietary and Insolvency in Sales Transactions, 2nd Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1989, at p. 
59 and p. 61. 
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document should be a bailee who has physical posseSSIon of the goods. 137 Issuing a 
combined transport document by someone other than a sea carrier or in fact any sort of a 
carrier should not be an obstacle against the recognition of that document as a document of 
title, since the level of control by the holder of that document would not be affected by the 
identity of the issuer. Moreover, the issuer of a combined transport document should 
undertake to take care of the goods through out of the entire transit and he should promise 
to deliver them to the holder of that document. A combined transport document being in a 
receiyed for shipment form should not be an obstacle since the bailee accepts responsibility 
from the moment of the goods are in his custody. The level of the bailee's responsibility in 
order to qualify the document as a document of title should not be less than the sea 
carrier's responsibility under the Hague- Visby Rules and so, the bailee would be liable in 
the case of negligence subject to the well- known exceptions. 138 Secondly, the goods which 
are the subject matter of the contract should be identified, since passing of constructive 
possession of the goods is one of the important feature of the document of title which can 
be transferred from one party to another by only transferring the document of title related 
to the goods. Thirdly, the right to delivery of the goods should be transferred by 
endorsement and delivery of the document by mercantile custom. However, a combined 
transport bill is treated by mercantile practice in the same way as a traditional bill of lading 
and also it is capable of being transferred from one party to another by delivery and 
endorsement. Moreover, it is accepted by banks, under art. 26 of UCP 500, for financing 
h I .. fi I 139 t e sa e transactIon In return or a oan. 
137 The fact that, the physical possession of the goods might be with the sub- contractor of the bailee, should 
not make any difference since, it can be justified by the bailee's authority to sub- bail. See Sanson, N., supra 
fn. 130 at p. 8. . 
138 See Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., supra fn. 125 at pp. 547, 566. However, the well- known exceptlons 
are found in art. IV 2 (a- q) of the Hague- Visby Rules. 
139 Article 26 of UCP 500 provides that "If a Credit calls for a transport document covering two different 
modes of transport (multimodal transport), banks will, unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, accept a 
d t " ocumen , ..... 
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The definition of document of title, under s. 1 (4) of the Factors Act 1889, seems to 
accept any document which is "used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the 
possession or control of goods" and so the common use of a combined transport document 
as proof of possession or control of goods can facilitate the approval of this document as a 
document of title, since the recognition of the ocean bill of lading itself as a document of 
title canle from the comnlercial practices. 140 Furthermore, these commercial practices can 
be supported by the judgement of Devlin, J., in Pyrene Co. v. Scindia Navigation Co., 141 
\Yho concluded that The Hague Rules can be applied to the sea leg where a single contract 
covers both sea and inland transport. Therefore, the Hague- Visby Rules can be applied to 
a multimodal transport contract, only in respect of the sea leg, which covers sea transport 
as \Yell as land transport. These arguments can push the courts to see the importance of the 
recognition of a custom in international trade and so lead them to accept this document as a 
document of title. However, Lord Devlin mentioned that for a custom to be a good law, it 
should be "certain, reasonable and not repugnant".142 A combined transport document 
would be certain where it is in a form similar to the traditional bill of lading's and would 
also be reasonable since, "The law knows that to require the physical delivery of goods 
whenever they change hands in trade would be unreasonable and recognises the need of 
merchants for a document that will represent the goods". 143 Moreover, the acceptance of 
this document by banks under UCP rules would provide more certainty and reasonability 
for a custom which would recognise this document as a document of title. Thus the 
absence of this custom would be repugnant since "The function of the commercial law is to 
140 See Faber, D., "The Problems Arising from Multimodal Transport", [1996] LMCLQ 503 at 513. 
141 [1954] 2 Q.B. 402 at 415. 
142 SeeKum .v. Wah Tat Bank, [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 439 at 444. 
143 Ibid. at 444. 
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allow. so far as it can, commercial men to do business in the way in which they want to do 
it and not to require them to stick to forms that they may think to be out- moded".144 
The problem with combined bills of lading is not so much their status as documents 
of title but the question of whether multi- modal documents fall within the scope of 
COGSA 1992. Carver argues 145 that such documents do not fall within the scope of the 
1992 Act. Carver states that "there is the further, and more fundamental, difficulty that the 
Act gives no comprehensive definition of the expression "bill of lading" while in the 
English common law this expression has been used to refer only to a document containing 
or evidencing a contract for carriage of goods by sea. The 1992 Act gives no indication of 
any legislative intention to depart from this common law concept of a bill of lading as a sea 
carriage contract document". 146 This argument can be countered by reference to s. 1 (1) (a) 
of the 1992 Act which states that this Act applies to "any bill of lading" and s. 5 (1) (a) 
defines the carriage contract as "the contract contained in or evidenced by that bill". One 
could, accordingly, argue that the combined effect of these sections is to make the Act 
applicable to any bill as long as the carriage contract is contained in or evidenced by such 
bill regardless of whether such carriage contract covers a carriage wholly or partly by sea. 
However, an acceptance of this counter- argument would entail treating a combined 
transport bill of lading differently from a combined transport waybill. This is because the 
Act defines a 'sea waybill' as a document which contains or evidences "a contract of 
carriage by sea".147 As Carver points out these words "do not in their natural meaning refer 
. I bId" 148 to carnage part y y an . 
Apart from the issue of title to sue, both legal and practical consequences would 
flow if combined transport bills were to be recognised as proper bills of lading for the 
144 Ibid. 
145 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at paras. 8- 071- 8- 073. 
146 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 8- 072 
147 Ship's delivery orders are defined in similar fashion. 
148 See Carver on Bills of Lading, supra fn. 27 at para. 8- 073. 
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purposes, including COGSA 1992. At a legal level, there are two issues to be addressed. 
First, such bills would retain their possessory qualities after the end of the sea carriage and 
so would remain transferable during the final road carriage. This goes against Carver's 
argument that a combined transport bill does not fall within the scope of the 1992 Act on 
the ground that such bill covers only carriage contract partly by sea and, consequently, will 
lose its possessory qualities after the end of the sea carriage. Against this, one could argue 
that the 1992 Act is applicable to any bill as long as the carriage contract is contained or 
e\ idenced by such bill regardless of whether such carriage contract covers carriage wholly 
or partly by sea. Therefore, such bill will not lose its possessory qualities after the end of 
the sea carriage. This counter argument can be supported by s. 2 (2) of the 1992 Act "when 
a person becomes the lawful holder of a bill of lading, possession of the bill no longer 
gives a right (as against the carrier) to possession of the goods to which the bill relates". 
Therefore, the endorsements and! or transfers of combined transport bills during the final 
road carriage would not convert such bills to spent bills governed by s. 2 (2) of the 1992 
Act. This is because the reference to the carrier in s. 2 (2) in respect of combined transport 
bills would be to the carrier who issued such bills rather than only to the sea carrier. 
Against this background, the solution would be either to allow such an expansion in the 
period of negotiability or to treat such bill as negotiable only in respect of the sea carriage. 
This would mean a third party could only deal safely with such bill if it could be sure that 
the goods were still in the custody of the sea carrier. 
Secondly, there will be multiple liability regimes attaching to the contract contained 
in or evidenced by a combined transport bill, depending on where the goods are lost or 
damaged. This should not be a reason for denying the status of a document of title to such 
bill. This is because such problem applies to 'port to port' bills of lading. Therefore, the 
solution would be the implementation of the door to door provisions of the Draft 
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Instrument in art. 4 (2) (1), even though these allow for the provisions of a twin- tier 
liability system where the road leg is subject to the mandatory provisions of an existing 
convention such as CMR or COTIF. Therefore, the argument that a combined transport bill 
would only work as a proper bill of lading for all purposes, including COGSA 1992, if the 
Multimodal Transport Convention 1980 rather than the Hamburg Rules have also be 
adopted is doubtful. This is because a two- tiered system of liability is not fatal to the 
recognition of a document as a bill of lading as long as there is continuous documentary 
coyer as in the case of 'received for shipment' bills of lading under the existing law. 
At a practical level, there is the question of finding a way as to oblige the final road 
carrier to deliver only on presentation of the combined transport bill. This can be 
accomplished by an express term in the agreement between the issuer of the combined 
transport bill and the road carrier as to the effect which obliges the road carrier to deliver 
only against the presentation of the combined transport bill. Moreover, the road carrier 
should only issue a transport document to the combined transport carrier rather than to the 
current holder of the combined transport bills. Any different practice would allow two 
different sets of bills in circulation with the risk of both sets of bills end up indorsed to two 
different people. 
2. 6. THE CARGO OWNER'S ABILITY TO SUE THE CARRIER UNDER US LAW 
2. 6. 1. THE TERMS OF THE CARRIAGE CONTRACT 
Under American law, the terms of the bill of lading are the terms of the carriage contract 
between the carrier on one hand and both the shipper and the transferee on the other 
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h d 149 an. The appeal of this approach is strengthened by standard forms of the bill of lading 
which would potentially reduce disputes over the terms of the carriage contract and their 
interpretation to nlinimum. However, under English law, the terms of the carriage contract 
are the terms of the bill of lading only as far as the carrier and the transferee are 
concerned. ISO In respect of the terms of the carriage contract between the carrier and the 
shipper, the English approach is totally different and the bill of lading is considered merely 
as a receipt and at best evidence of the carriage contract. Therefore, as far as the shipper 
and the carrier are concerned the terms of the carriage contract are the terms of the bill of 
lading which could be varied by any antecedent agreement. 151 It is arguable that, the 
English approach might potentially increase disputes over the terms of the carriage contract 
and their interpretation. But the fairness of this approach has been proven by cases such as 
The Ardennes. It is also arguable that, despite the advantages of the American approach, it 
does reduce the value of the negotiation between the shipper and the carrier and also 
strengthens the carrier's power in imposing and changing the terms of the carriage contract 
for his own benefit. Moreover, the initial carriage contract would be created a long time 
before the issuance of the bill of lading and so, according to the American approach, the 
shipper would be bound by the terms of the bill of lading if the loss or damage happened to 
the goods before the issuance of the bill, in which case the terms on which he delivered the 
goods would be different from these on which he is suing. In addition, the acceptance of 
the American approach would enable the shipper to escape the terms of the initial contract 
to which he is a party where they are less profitable to him. 
149 In Bank o/Delaware .v. Oregon Iron Co., 'The Delaware', [1871] 20 L.Ed. 779 at 783, the Supreme 
Court held that the contract between the shipper and the carrier is contained in the bill of lading and Clifford 
J, said that" in so far as [ the bill of lading] is evidence of a contract between the parties, it stands on the 
footing of all other contracts in writing, and cannot be contradicted or varied by parol evidence". For more 
details about the different rationalisations behind this approach see Bools, M., The Bill of Lading- A 
Document o/Title to Goods, An Angola- American Comparison, London and Hong Kong: LLP 1997, chapter 
4 at p. 87. . . 
ISO See Leduc .v. Ward, [1888] 20 Q.B.D. 747. This approach has been recently approved In The Hezdberg, 
[1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 287 at 310. 
lSI See The Ardennes, supra fn. 34. 
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The next question, which is related to the terms of the carriage contract, is on which 
terms should the relationship between the carrier, as shipowner, and the charterer be 
governed as a result of transferring the bill of lading to the charterer. Under both American 
and English law, the bill of lading operates only as a receipt for the goods and as a 
document of title, but not as varying the contract between the charterer and the shipowner. 
However, under American law, the bill of lading can be the carriage contract between the 
charterer and the shipowner by an express intention of the parties to that effect. Therefore, 
the parties are advised to stipulate that the issuance of a bill of lading would be without 
prejudice to the charterparty.152 Transferring the bill of lading to the charterer from a third 
party, such as an endorsee, might create a problem with respect to the terms of the contract 
on which the relationship between the charterer and the shipowner should be governed; the 
charterparty or the bill of lading. It is arguable that, this problem might be solved 
according to the express intention of the parties to the charterparty. Therefore, transferring 
the bill to the charterer from a third party would not change the conclusion that their 
relationship should be governed by the terms of the charterparty, because of the existence 
of an express intention to that effect. In the absence of such an express intention, the 
problem would most probably be solved by reference to factors such as those used by 
English courts in cases such as The Dunelmia. 153 
2. 6. 2. TRANSFERRING CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 
The American law on privity of contract differs from its English equivalent in that a third 
party beneficiary may be granted a right of suit upon a contract to which it is not privy. 
Under this principle, the consignee of a bill of lading, the buyer, would be able to sue the 
carrier for the loss of or the damage to its cargo on the ground that the consignor, the 
152 Schoenbaum, T., Admiralty and Maritime Law, 2nd Ed., Hornbook Series- West Group, chapter 9 at p. 
640. d '1 
153 [1970] 1 Q.B. 289. Also, in Calcutta s.s. Ltd. v. Andrew Weir & Co., supra fn. 113. For more eta! s 
about English law see supra Initial contract of carriage is a charter- party. 
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shipper, contracted with the carrier for the consignee's benefit whereby the carrier promise 
the safe carriage of the cargo to its destination. Accordingly, the consignor as contractual 
principal would be able to sue the carrier but only recover nominal damages for any breach 
of the carriage contract since it suffered no loss; while, the consignee, as a beneficiary of 
the carriage contract, would be able to sue the carrier and recover substantial damages for 
any breach of the carriage contract. 
Nonetheless, American case law is divided on the privity of contract doctrine. One 
strand of authority, the 'privity' cases, such as Newth Morris Box Co. v. Pennsylvania R. 
CO.,I5.+ has allowed the consignor, the shipper, as the principal contractual to recover 
substantial damages for its own loss as well as for others' loss such as the consignee, the 
buyer. This type of case law was supported by the House of Lords decision in Dunlop. v. 
Lambert. IS5 The second strand of authority, the 'either party' cases, has allowed either the 
consignor, the shipper, or the consignee, the buyer, to sue with a decision in favour of one 
baring an action by the other. 1S6 This type of case law has, on the one hand, ignored the 
principle that the consignor would not be allowed to recover substantial damages, but 
rather nominal damages, for the consignee's benefit since he suffered no loss. On the other 
hand, this principle could render the consignee remediless, even in an action for unjust 
enrichment against the consignor (where possible), where the consignor has become 
bankrupt. The final strand of authority, the 'ownership' cases,IS7 has allowed only the 
owner or the person with an immediate right to possession to sue and recover substantial 
damages for any breach of the carriage contract and therefore, this principle is in line with 
the English law on negligence. This principle is based on the agency doctrine that the 
154 78 A. 2d. 655 (1955). 
155 [1838- 39] 7 ER 824. The House of Lords held that the plaintiff as a shipper could sue the carrier for any 
breach of the carriage contract and recover substantial damages in respect of the transferee's loss, .as 
exception to the common law rule which allowed only the plaintiff's to recover substantial damages for Its 
own loss. 
156 See Donut Systems v. Consolidated Ry. Corp., 424 N.E. 2d. 824 (1981). 
157 See Ladex Corp. v. Transports A eros Nationales, 476 S. 2d. 763 (1985). 
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consignor. the shipper, enters the carriage contract as an agent for a disclosed principal, the 
consignee, the buyer, and so such an agent, the consignor, has no right of suit but rather the 
disclosed principal, the consignee. 
In the light of these uncertainties, legislation was introduce to deal with right of suit 
of a third party bill of lading, holder, in the form of the Federal Bills of Lading Act 1916, 
'The Pomerence Act'. In 1994, after some slight revisions, this was replaced by Ch. 801. 
2. 6. 2. 1. Transferring Contractual Rights under Bills of lading 
The position of an endorsee of a bill of lading or a holder of a bearer bill under American 
law. by virtue of Ch. 801 05 (a), is similar to that under COGSA 1992. 158 However, Ch. 
801 05 (a) (2) states that "the common carrier issuing the bill becomes obligated directly to 
the person to whom the bill is negotiated to hold possession of the goods under the terms 
of the bill the same as if the carrier had issued the bill to that person". The language which 
is used in Ch. 801 of the American law provides that a right of action against the carrier 
will be granted to the person to whom the bill of lading is negotiated rather than being 
transferred as under s. 2 (l) of 1992 Act. 159 It is arguable that granting rather than 
transferring the contractual rights to the transferee under the bill of lading would enable the 
transferee to have two important advantages. First, the contractual rights which are granted 
to the transferee would not be affected by any factor which might render the agreement 
between the shipper and the carrier to be either invalid by law, or void or avoidable by 
158 Ch. 80105 (a) replaced s. 31 (b) of Federal Bills of Lading Act 1916 'The Pomerene Act' (FBLA) which 
was less complicated and states that "A person to whom an order bill has been dully negotiated Acquires 
thereby: 
(b) The direct obligation of the carrier to hold possession of the goods for him according to the terms of the 
bill as fully as if the carrier had contracted directly with him". However, the previous section was intended to 
grant the transferee the rights under the bill of lading. So, it is arguable that, the effect of Ch. 801 05 (a) 
would be the same as to grant the transferee the contractual rights under the bill of lading, since the 
legislature's intention by enacting the new section was not to alter the law. Furthermore, the Carmack 
Amendment grants a new cause of action to the holder of the bill and the right of action is linked to "lawful 
holder" of the bill as in s. 2 (1) of 1992 Act. 
159 Despite the fact that the shipper would not have a cause of action against the carrier unless he is the holder 
of the bill which would rebut the presumption that the bill oflading has been transferred. 
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either mistake or l11isrepresentation on the part of the shipper. Second, the transferee would 
be not be bound by the shipper's waiver in respect of any breach committed by the carrier, 
1 d " 160 sue 1 as eVlahon, even though the transferee had notice of the breach when he took the 
bill of lading. However, the holder might still be bound to take up the bill by the tenns of 
the sale contract. 161 Moreover, a transferee of a bill of lading would be in a better situation 
in cases such as where there was no express contract between the consignor and the 
shipowner. Accordingly, by virtue ofCh. 801 05 (a) (2), when a bill of lading is negotiated 
to a third party, a carriage contract recorded in the bill would spring up rather than being 
transferred from the shipper. In contrast, by virtue of s. 2 (1) of 1992 Act, the carriage 
contract is transferred to the transferee rather than granted and so the absence of any 
contractual relationship between the shipper and the carrier would enable the latter to deny 
the existence of any contractual relationship between himself and the transferee. 162 
Therefore, transferring a bill of lading to the transferee under a charterparty would not 
create the technical problem under Ch. 801 05 (a) as it did under s.2 (1) of 1992 Act,163 as 
the contractual rights would be granted on the terms recorded in the bill of lading to the 
transferee rather than transferred. 
Under Ch. 801 05, a transferee would have rights against the carrier where the bill 
of lading has been negotiated to him. Therefore, a transferee should be a bona fide 
160 See Leduc. v. Ward, supra tn. 151. 
161 Cremer .v. General Carrier S.A., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 341 at 351, where the court accepted the argument that 
the carrier can not rely upon the terms of the sale contract to which he was not a party. 
162 This is one of the problems which are caused by the language used by s. 2 (1) of 1992 Act. It is arguable 
that, a brave interpretation, by the English courts, of s. 2 (1) of 1992 Act that the contract which has been 
mentioned in s. 2 (1) refers not to the initial contract between the carrier and the shipper but to the contract 
recorded in the bill of lading. Therefore, the contract which would be vested in the transferee is the one 
contained in the bill, even in the absence of the existence of the initial contract. 
However, this theoretical problem also existed under the Bills of Lading Act 1855 and the solution 
was set out in obiter dicta of Lord Atkin in Hain Steamship Co. Ltd., v. Tate & Lyle, Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 
597 at 602- 603. He concluded that, the relationship between the consignee and the shipowner would not be 
on the terms of the charterparty but a new contract would appear to spring up between the ship and the 
consignee on the terms of the bill oflading. Therefore, it is arguable that, this mechanism can be used by the 
courts to solve the problem mention above under the 1992 Act. 
163 This technical problem has been solved by judicial explanation in Rudolph A. Oetker . v. F. A. 
Internationale Frachtagentor (The A lmak) , [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 557 at 560, where the court held that a new 
contract "springs up" when the bill of lading is indorsed to the endorsee. 
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purchaser in possession of the bill with the necessary endorsement. As under the 1992 Act, 
eh. 801 05 does not require the value to be given for the bill as a condition for acquiring 
the contractual rights against the carrier. Giving value for the bill is required, by virtue of 
eh. 801 04 (b). only where the bill of lading, at some stage, has been negotiated in breach 
of duty, or the owner has been deprived of possession of the bill by fraud, accident, 
mistake, duress, loss, theft, or conversion. In these circumstances, the person to whom the 
bill of lading is negotiated should give value for the bill, in good faith, and without notice 
of the breach of duty, or fraud, accident, mistake, duress, loss, theft, or conversion in order 
1 · . h . h . 164 to C aIm ng ts agaInst t e carner. The above requirements are justified since, under 
American law, negotiation also cuts off the owner's title to the goods. Therefore, it would 
be unacceptable if the owner lost his title to the goods where the subsequent transferee had 
given no value. 
However, by virtue of the 1992 Act, a person in possession of the bill of lading 
would not be considered as a "lawful" holder where the possession of that bill had been 
acquired by either means of fraud or theft, or where the person to whom the bill had been 
negotiated or delivered knew that the person who had negotiated or delivered the bill had 
acquired the possession of the bill by means of fraud or theft. On one hand, the previous 
lawful holder might not have a cause of action against the carrier since he is not in 
possession of the bill. 165 On the other hand, the cause of action would not be transferred to 
next holder because he would not be a lawful holder by virtue of s. 5 (2) of 1992 Act. 
Therefore, it arguable that, the previous lawful holder's cause of action against the carrier 
should remain intact as well as his title to the goods. Otherwise, it would enable the 
164 The requirement of good faith would prevent thieves and fraudsters from recovering against the carrier, 
while the requirement of value would prevent an agent from recovering where there is no reason why he 
should not providing that there is a way to ensure that the damages would find their way to the person who 
has suffered loss. See Bools, M., supra fn. 149, chapter 4 at p. 93. 
165 Unless 'holder' refers to current entitlement to the bill oflading as opposed to physical possession. This 
can be supported by arguing that the holder without physical possession of the bill would not lose his 
contractual rights of suit under s. 2 (l) of the 1992 Act, unless s. 2 (5) of that Act operates. 
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shipowner who had negligently caused the loss to benefit and the court to strive to find 
another way of imposing liability. Moreover, a good faith purchaser should be considered 
as a lawful holder, even thought his transferor has neither title to the goods or a right to 
possess the bill of lading, where the transfer of that bill falls within the Factors Act 1889 
which would take effect as if the owner of the goods had authorised the transfer of the bill. 
Thus, such a good faith purchaser should have a cause of action against the carrier as well 
as a good title to the goods. 166 
The situation would be more problematic if the transferee of a person had neither 
title or ability to transfer a good title who also does not fall within the Factors Act 1889 or 
an agent who has possession of the bill for the purpose of collecting the goods on behalf of 
the buyer or the seller in cases such as The A liakm on. 167 Such a transferee would be 
considered as a holder of the bill with a cause of action against the carrier, cutting off the 
owner's cause of action. However, such a transferee could sue the carrier and recover 
damages on behalf of the owner, but he has little incentive and the owner can not compel 
him to do so. However, this problem would not occur under Ch. 801 since the transferee's 
title to the goods and his cause of action depend on just the one criterion, which is whether 
the bill of lading has been duly negotiated or not. 168 
166 The good faith purchaser, transferee, would have a cause of action only in circumstances where he would 
have title to the goods by virtue of one of the nemo dat exceptions. 
167 [1986] A.C. 785. Where the buyers had the bill as agent for the seller. It is argued that the concept of 
possession could be a flexible one and so to allow the agent to have actual possession while the owner of the 
goods to have constructive possession. . . ' . 
168 This problem could not appear under s. 1 of the 1855 Act because the nght of actIOn agamst the carner 
was linked with the transfer of property. However, the opposite situation could arise where there was .a 
transferee with a title to the goods but without a cause of action. Nevertheless, it is arguable that, thIS 
problem might have been solved, if the Law Commissions had considered the idea of linking the cause of 
action and the transfer of the title to the goods as under American law. See Bools, M., supra fn. 149, chapter 
4 at p. 94. 
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2. 6. 2. 2. Transferring Contractual Rights under Non- Negotiable Bills "Sea 
Waybills" 
A non- negotiable bill is defined at Ch. 801 03 (b) as one where "the bill states that the 
goods are to be delivered to a consignee". Also, the carrier issuing this document must put 
.4non- negotiable" or "not- negotiable" on the face of the bill.169 A non- negotiable bill is 
different from a sea waybill in one important aspect, in that it has the capability of being 
transferred once by delivery and agreement to transfer title to the bill or to the goods 
represented thereby. 170 On the other hand, a sea waybill is a document incapable of being 
transferred and it would only confer the contractual rights to the named consignee. 
By virtue of Ch. 801 06 (c), the contractual rights under a non- negotiable bill or a 
straight bill will not be transferred to the transferee, unless the carrier has been notified that 
a non- negotiable bill has been transferred to him.171 In contrast, under s. 2 (b) of 1992 Act 
the contractual rights under a sea waybill will be given to the person to whom delivery is to 
be made rather than to a named consignee. This is because, the sea waybill is not a 
transferable document of title, as a non- negotiable bill, and so the shipper is the only 
person who has the right to redirect the carrier to deliver the goods to some one else other 
than the named consignee. The right of disposal, under English law, is justified since a sea 
way bill is not a transferable document. Moreover, this right is given only to the shipper in 
a limited case and restricted with conditions which should be satisfied before its 
169 A non- negotiable bill is well known as a straight bill of lading and its corresponding name in other 
jurisdictions, such as the UK, is a sea waybill. However, there is no difference, in terms of definition and the 
carrier's obligation to distinguish this document from an order bill, between Ch. 801 and the Pomerene Act 
1916. 
170 The words "express or implied" do not appear in Ch. 801 06 (a), as in the corresponding s. 29 of the 
Pomerene Act 1916. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the legislature's intention was not to alter the law and 
the courts might presume the existence of these words. .... 
171 Giving notice to the carrier is different from the ship~er's assignment of hI~ rIghts, W~IC? reqUIres the 
shipper's co- operation, and from attornment by the carrIer that does not reqUIre the carrIer s assent. See 




n By virtue of Ch. 801 06 (c) (1), the transferee's title to the goods or 
cause of action can be defeated by a notice to the carrier from the transferor or his 
purchaser of a later purchase of the goods, or by a notice of garnishment, attachment or 
execution on the goods by the creditor of the transferor. 
The contractual rights acquired by the transferee under a non- negotiable bill, by 
yiliue of Ch. 801 06 (c) (1), are limited since the carrier will only owe him the obligations 
which are owed by the transferor before the notification. In contrast, by virtue of s. 2 (1) of 
1992 Act, the person to whom delivery is to be made, the named consignee, shall have 
transferred to and vested in him all rights of suit under the carriage contract as if he had 
been party to that contract. 173 Therefore, it arguable that, the position of the transferee of a 
non- negotiable bill is better under COGSA 1992 than under Ch. 801 06, since his rights 
are not limited to what the carrier owed the transferor before the notification. Moreover, 
the transferee will not need to go down the chain in order to ascertain the transferor's 
rights. 
Bearing the above differences in mind, the named consignee of a sea waybill, under 
COGSA 1992, is in a better position than the transferee of a non- negotiable bill, under Ch. 
801 06,174 since the named consignee's rights can be ascertained at a glance and according 
to the terms of his document rather than needing to go down the chain to decide his 
transferor's rights. Also, under US law the transferee's rights are limited to what the carrier 
owes his transferor, whereas under English law all rights of suit under the carriage contract 
would be transferred and vested in him as if he had been a party to that contract. Therefore, 
he would not be affected by any previous agreement between his transferor and the carrier 
172 The condition, which should be satisfied, are, first, the seller must be unpaid as defined by s. 38 (1) of 
SGA 1979. Secondly, the buyer must be insolvent as explained in s. 61 (4) of SGA 1979. Finally, the goods 
must be in course of transit as described in s. 45 of SGA 1979. 
173 By virtue of s. 1 (3), the terms of the carriage contract between the carri~r and the named consignee ,":ould 
be the terms of the sea waybill, since it is contained or evidenced the carrIage contract between the shIpper 
and the carrier. 
174 For opposite point view see Bools, M., supra fu. 149, chapter 4 at p. 98. 
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where the fomler had waived any breach of contract, such as deviation. In contrast to this 
under Anlerican law the carrier would be unable to avoid liability where this document has 
been transfelTed to some one else other than the named person in it. 175 It is arguable that, 
despite the fact that the sea waybill is a non- transferable document, the named consignee 
\\"ith contractual rights can sue the carrier for the benefit of the person who had suffered 
loss, by virtue of s. 2 (4) of 1992 Act, where the requirements were satisfied, despite the 
fact that he had suffered no loss. 
2. 6. 2. 3. The Shipper's Rights after Transfer 
As has previously been stated, a right of action against the carrier under Ch. 801 will be 
granted to the person to whom the bill of lading is negotiated rather than being transferred 
as under s. 2 (1) of 1992 Act. Therefore, the shipper's cause of action, arguably, should not 
be extinguished. There is, however, no crystal-clear and straight answer to this problem, 
under Ch. 801. However, the shipper will not be able to sue the carrier unless he has the 
possession of the bill of lading which would rebut the presumption that the bill has been 
transferred to someone else. Therefore, it is arguable that, the shipper's entitlement to sue 
the carrier depends upon his ability to produce evidence that the bill has not been 
transferred so to give the cause of action to another person, since the cause of action is 
linked to the bill of lading. 176 
In contrast, by virtue of s. 2 (5) of 1992 Act, the shipper's rights, as an original 
party, are extinguished where the rights of suit are transferred to the holder of the bill by 
virtue of s. 2 (1) of 1992 Act. The shipper might need to sue the carrier for his own loss in 
175 1 M ·b·d See Boo s, ., 1 1 . . 
176 This problem has been considered by the American courts under the ~a:mack Amendment, whIch grants a 
cause of action to the holder of the bill as Ch. 801. However, the maJonty ~ollowed the appro~~h that the 
shipper's ability to have a cause of action depends on being the holder of the bIll. See Bools, M., lbld. chapter 
4 at p. 100. 
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cases such as, where he has sold the goods at his risk but parted with the property.I77 
Although, the holder of the bill, by virtue of s. 2 (4) of 1992 Act, can recover substantial 
damages from the carrier for the benefit of the person who had suffered the loss such as the 
shipper, the holder might not be able to recover substantial damages for the shipper's 
benefit, in the above case, since the latter might not qualify as a person with an interest or 
right to the goods according to s. 2 (4) (a) of 1992 ACt. I78 Moreover, the shipper might be 
the only person with a cause of action, but without a right to recover substantial damages 
for the person who had suffered loss in cases such as where the bill had never been 
transferred so as to give the latter a cause of action according to s. 2 (1) of 1992 ACt. I79 
Howeyer. the shipper as an original party can still sue for the benefit of a third party who 
had suffered loss according to the rule of Dunlop . v. Lambert as an exception to the 
common law rules, provided that his original contract is not contained in or evidenced by 
the charter- party. The shipper's ability to recover substantial damages was restricted by 
the decision in The Albazero. But, a separate exception was recognised in The Sanix Ace 
whereby the shipper may recover substantial damages in contract or tort provided that he 
still the owner of the goods at the time of breach, notwithstanding that risk has passed to a 
third party. 
There is no corresponding section to s. 2 (4) of 1992 Act in Ch. 801, but it is 
arguable that the transferee's ability to recover damages for loss suffered by another person 
can be implied on the ground of Ch. 801 06 (a).180 This provides that a non- negotiable bill 
can be transferred to the transferee with intention to transfer only title to the bill but not to 
the goods. Thus, the transfer of a non- negotiable bill to the agent of the transferee for the 
177 For the other situations see infra fn. 228. 
178 For more details about inability of the holder of the bill to sue for the shipper's benefits in such cases see 
supra Recovery of third party losses. . . ' 
179 Also, where the bill has been lost during transmission and the transferee never acqUIred posseSSIOn of It or 
where bill has been transferred without the requisite endorsement. 
180 Bools, M., supra fn. 149, chapter 4 at p. 105. 
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purpose of collecting the goods would enable him to sue the carrier and recover substantial 
damages, for the benefit of his principal, if he has notified the carrier of that transfer. 
Otherwise, it would be pointless to give him a cause of action but without the right to 
recover substantial damages. Therefore, there is no reason for the transferee of a negotiable 
bill of lading not to have a right of recovering substantial damages as the transferee of a 
non- negotiable bill. 181 Recovery of substantial damages by the shipper for the benefit of a 
person who had suffered loss, but without a cause of action, is also not clear under Ch. 
801. However, under American law, the shipper can be a holder of the bill of lading and 
also the terms of the carriage contract between the carrier and him would be on the terms 
of the bill of lading. Therefore, the shipper, as a holder of the bill of lading, would be able 
to recover substantial damages for his own loss as well as another's 10SS.182 
According to COGSA 1992, the holder of the bill of lading would be able to 
recover substantial damages for his own loss as well as another person's loss, but the 
shipper would only be able to recover substantial damages for his own loss and nominal 
damages for the other's loss. In contrast, under American law, the holder of the bill would 
be able to recover substantial damages by virtue of being a holder of the bill whether he is 
a shipper or not. 
2. 6. 3. FREIGHT FORWARDER' BILLS OF LADING 
Freight forwarders have often attempted to claim the status of carriers in order to have the 
benefits afforded by COGSA, which apply statutorily to the "carrier". Not all freight 
forwarders can claim the status of carriers and so American courts in determining whether 
freight forwarders can be considered as carriers have distinguished between two types of 
freight forwarders. On the one hand, there are those freight forwarders who "locate and 
181 This conclusion is supported by the courts' approach to this problem under Carmack Amen~~ent which 
allows the holder of the bill of lading to sue for any loss or damage to the goods. See Bool~, M.: Ibid .. 
182 The shipper, under COOSA 1992, cannot be qualified as a lawful holder of the bIll, smce It would 
undermined the intention of solving the privity problem. 
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reserve space, prepare bills of lading, arrange for cargo to be picked up and delivered to the 
pier and do other paper work concerned with exporting, They collect fees from exporters 
and sometimes also brokerage commissions from ship owners". 183 On the other hand, there 
are those freight forwarders (Non- Vessel Operating Common Carrier NVOCCs) who 
"consolidate cargoes belonging to may different shippers and charter a ship to carry 
th ., 184 em . 
The Shipping Act 1984 was amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998 and 
was effective May 1, 1999; the regulations were amended by the Federal Maritime 
Commission and were effective the same date. The Federal Maritime Commission, by 
virtue of s. 515 (2) (0), defines the "ocean transportation intermediary" as "an ocean freight 
forwarder or a non- vessel- operating common carrier". On the one hand, by virtue of s. 
515 (2) (0) (1) an ocean freight forwarder is "a person that- (i) in the United States, 
dispatches shipments from the United States via a common carrier and books or otherwise 
arranges space for those shipments on behalf of shipper; and (ii) processes the 
documentation or performs related activities incident to those shipments". On the other 
hand, by virtue of s. 515 (2) (0) (2), the non- vessel- operating common carrier is "a 
common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which the ocean transportation is 
provided, and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common carrier". Accordingly, 
the Federal Maritime Commission differentiates between two types of freight forwarders 
and therefore the non- vessel- operating common carrier, by virtue of s. 515 (2) (I), will 
provide services, such as purchasing services from ocean common carrier and offering 
them for resale to other persons; entering into affreightment agreement with underlying 
shippers and issuing bills of lading or equivalent documents. Therefore, one could argue 
that the non- vessel- operating common carrier, while providing such services, is acting as 
183 See Schoenbaum, Thomas 1., supra fn. 152, fn. 1 in p. 524. 
184 Ibid. 
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a principal in both of its relationships with the ocean common carrier, as the shipper, and 
with the cargo owner, as the common carrier. The cargo owner, as the shipper, has only a 
direct contractual relationship with the NVOCC, but not with the ocean common carrier or 
other carriers. On the other hand, the ocean freight forwarder, while providing the services 
mentioned in s. 515 (2) (0) (1) (i & ii) & (2) (i), is merely acting as the shipper's agent and, 
therefore. the cargo owner. through its agent, the ocean freight forwarder, has a direct 
contractual relationship with the ocean common carrier. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Fireman' Fund American Insurance 
Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co.,185 has observed that "The important point about an 
NVOCC is that although it may not own the ships on which its customers' goods are 
physically transported, it nevertheless is the 'carrier' responsible for the through 
transportation of such goods, including the water portion. As the carrier, an NVOCC issues 
its own bill of lading to each small shipper that employs its services, describing the goods 
for whose transportation it will be held responsible". The court in Zima Corp. v. M V, 
Roman Pazinski,186 have applied a four- part test to decide whether a party acted as a 
freight forwarder or as an NVOCC "(1) the way the party's obligation is expressed in 
documents pertaining to the agreement ...... ; (2) the history of dealings between the parties 
.... ; (3) issuance of a bill of lading .... ; (4) how the party made its profit". 
The court in M Prusman Ltd., and Sahar Insurance Co. Ltd. v. The MIV 
Nathanel,187 concluded that the NVOCC should be included within the definition of 
"carrier" under COGSA as the party who enters into a carriage contract with the shipper 
and holds otherwise itself out to provide transportation of cargo for hire by water. Also, it 
concluded that the bill of lading is the carriage contract under s. 1301 (b) of COGSA and 
so it held that "It is not in dispute that Javelin [NVOCC] issued two bills of lading for the 
185 492 F. 2d 1294 at 1295 (lst Cir. 1974). 
186 493 F. Supp. 268 at 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
187 670 F. Supp. 1141 at 1143,1988 AMC 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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cargo and that it arranged for the transportation of the cargo by water to Israel. Thus, it is a 
conlnlon carrier for the purpose of determining its liability under COGSA".188 
The court in National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Association of America v. 
United States of America, 189 described the role ofNVOCC as follow "NVOCCs, typically, 
are snlall firms that do not own or operate transportation equipment, but instead lease 
facilities and services from others, and have a small workforce of primarily managerial and 
clerical employees. NVOCCs consolidate and load small shipments from multiple shippers 
into a single large reusable metal container obtained from a steamship company, and ship 
the container by vessel under a single bill of lading in the NVOCC' s name; NVOCCs 
charge rates within the margin between the steamship line's (the vessel operator's) rates 
applicable to loose, 'break bulk' shipments, and special lower rates applicable to 
consolidate container loads. The Shipping Act 1984 recognized the NVOCC as a legal 
entity with the status of 'a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common carrier' but the 
status of a carrier in its relationship with exporter customers. 190 An NVOCC assumes 
common carrier responsibilities for the transportation even though it 'does not operate the 
vessels by which the ocean transportation is provided' .191 The NVOCC is compensated 
only by the shipper". 
Moreover, The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Itel Container Corp. v. 
MIV "Titan Scan ",192 defined the NVOCC as "an entity that contracts with a shipper as 
carrier, but then enters into a separate agreement with a vessel owner or charterer for the 
actual carriage of the shipper's cargo". The NVOCC, Candyline, issued a bill of lading to 
188 See Federal Insurance Co. v. Mitsui o.s.K. Lines Ltd., and Summers North- West Express and Others, 
2001 U.S Dist. LEXIS 18209 at [26] (N.D.Ill July 17, 2001), citing M. Prusman Ltd., and Sahar Insurance 
Co. Ltd. v. The MIV Nathanel, held that NVOCC which issues a bill of lading for carriage of goods, altho~gh 
it does not own or operate the physical means by which goods are transported, is a carrier within the meamng 
of COG SA. 
189 883 F. 2d 93 at 101,1991 AMC 302 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
190 46 U. S C. App. section 1702 (17) of the Shipping Act 1984. 
191 Ibid. 
192 139 F. 3d 1450 at 1451, 1998 AMC 1965 (lIth Cir. 1998). 
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the shipper, Hel, while Mammoet, the manager of the vessel, issued a bill of lading to the 
NVOCC for the actual carriage of the containers. Accordingly, the court held that "We 
agree with the district court's conclusion that Hell Candyline and Candylinel Mammoet 
contracts must be evaluated as two separate transactions. The evidence is undisputed that 
Hel and Mammoet had no communication during the negotiation of the respective contracts 
of carriage". 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Prima Us. Inc. v. 
Pall a lp ill a Inc.,1930bserved that the function of an NVOCC is to consolidate cargo from 
numerous shippers into large groups for shipment by an ocean carrier and- as opposed to 
the actual ocean carrier transporting the cargo- it issues a bill of lading to each shipper. 
Accordingly, if anything happens to the goods during the voyage the NVOCC is liable to 
the shipper because of the bill of lading that it issued. The court, then, held that Panalpina 
as a freight forwarder neither issued a bill of lading nor consolidated the cargo but simply 
was hired to arrange for the transportation of the goods, therefore, it was not a carrier so as 
to be liable for the damaged cargo caused by the stevedore's negligent actions. As regard 
Panalpina's agreement with Westinghouse, the shipper, which stated that "shipment 
[would] receive door to door our close care and supervision", the court held that 
"However, because of the well settled legal distinction between forwarders and carriers, 
that statement- mere puffing- cannot transform Panalpina into a carrier, and bestow 
liability upon". 194 The court, however, held that "Of course a party that calls itself a freight 
forwarder might in fact be performing the functions of a carrier, in which case function 
would govern over form. But the burden of demonstrating any deviation from what freight 
forwarders normally do in the maritime context must rest, and heavily so, on the party who 
193 223 F. 3d 126 at 129,2000 AMC 2897 (2d Cir. 2000). 
194 Ibid. 
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would show such deviation". 195 Therefore, it held that, as a general rule, a freight 
forwarder is not a COGSA carrier. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Sabah Shipyard Sdn Bhd v. MIV 
Harbel Tapper Ltd., Industrial Maritime Carriers (Bahamas) and Others,l96 held that to 
determine whether a party is a COGSA carrier one must follow COGSA's plain language, 
focusing on whether the party entered into a carriage contract with the shipper. The facts 
are that Sabah contracted with 1MB for transporting Sabah's cargo from Houston, Texas to 
Labuan, Malaysia. 1MB issued a bill of lading to Sabah' s agent, which provided for 
shipment aboard the M! V Harbel Tapper owned by L & C. The bill listed Houston as the 
"port of loading", Singapore as the "port of discharge", and Labuan as the "place of 
delivery by on- carrier".197 The court, then, considered the interpretation of the "carrier" 
and the "contract of carriage" under COGSA. Section 1301 (a) of COGS A defines the term 
"carrier" so as to "inc1ude[ s] the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of 
carriage with a shipper". Also, s. 1301 (b) of COGSA defines the carriage contract as that 
"covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, insofar as such document 
relates to the carriage of goods by sea". Based on both the facts and its interpretation of the 
respective sections of COGSA and the plain language of COGSA, the court held that 1MB 
and Intermarine entered into a contract of carriage with Sabah. They agreed to carry 
Sabah's goods and they issued a bill of lading and so they are carriers within the provisions 
of COGSA. 198 
195 Ibid. at 130 fn. 1. 
196 178 F. 3d 400,2000 AMC 163 (5th Cir. 1999). 
197 Ibid. at 403. . h 
198 Ibid. at 405. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not address the distinction between a frelg t 
forwarder and freight forwarder- carrier and nor applied the four- part test set forth in Zima C~rp. v. M V, 
Roman Pazinski, nonetheless, it held that applying the four- part would only "bolster our conclUSIOn that 1MB 
and its agent Intermarine were carriers under COOSA". Ibid. at 405 n. 2. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in James N. Kirby v. Norfolk 
Southern Railway,199 considered the issue of whether the sub- contractor, Norfolk, of the 
ocean carrier, Hamburg- Sud, was protected by the Himalaya Clause under the ocean 
carrier's bill of lading against Kirby's claim. Kirby entered into a carriage contract with 
ICC, freight forwarder, to carry the goods from Sydney- Australia to Savannah- USA then 
to Huntsville-the final destination. ICC entered into a carriage of contract with Hamburg-
Sud. ocean carrier, to transport the goods from the port of loading to the final destination. 
Both ICC and Hamburg- Sud issued bills of lading. ICC's bill named Kirby as the shipper, 
and Hamburg's named ICC as the shipper. Both bills of lading included Himalaya Clauses 
that gave the beneficiaries of these clauses the right, amongst others, to rely on the USA 
COGSA package limitation. The court distinguished between a freight forwarder and a 
freight forwarder- carrier and held that "A freight forwarder acts as a principal when it 
takes on the role of carrier itself, and issues its own bill of lading to the cargo owner listing 
the cargo owner as the shipper and itself as the carrier. In this latter scenario, the cargo 
owner pays the forwarder, not the ocean carrier. The forwarder then subcontracts out to an 
ocean carrier its responsibilities under its bill to carry the goods. The ocean carrier issues to 
the forwarder a second bill of lading that lists the forwarder as the shipper, that is, as a 
. . 1" 200 pnnclpa . 
Applying this definition to the facts of the case, the court held ICC was acting as a 
principal and not as Kirby's agent. This was evident, first, from the structure of the 
transaction and, second, from the issuance of two different bills of lading. If ICC had been 
acting as Kirby's agent, there would have been only one bill of lading, issued by Hamburg-
Sud to Kirby and listing Kirby as the shipper. Instead, ICC issued a bill of lading to Kirby, 
and then ICC, in tum, was issued a bill by Hamburg- Sud. The Hamburg- Sud bill listed 
199 300 F. 3d 1300, 2002 AMC 2113 (lIth Cir. 2002). 
200 Ibid. at 1305. 
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ICC, not Kirby, as the shipper, thereby evidencing that Hamburg- Sud was contracting 
with ICC as a principal and not as an agent for Kirby. 
The court supported its conclusion by reference to the language of ICC's bill of 
lading, such as ICC's undertaking to "perform .... the entire transport" or "in [its] own name 
to procure the performance of the entire transport" and ICC's responsibility for "the acts or 
omissions of its servants or agents", which indicated that ICC was acting as a principal 
rather than as Kirby's agent.20l Also, ICC's form of the bill of lading as a FBL/02 
according to the drafters' intention, indicated that ICC, by using this form, had established 
itself as a carrier with carrier liability. Coupled with the fact that ICC and Kirby chose that 
form, this buttressed the conclusion that ICC was acting as a principal rather than an 
agent. 203 Therefore, the court concluded that only the Hamburg - Sud bill of lading would 
protect Norfolk, unless ICC had acted as Kirby's agent, in hiring Hamburg- Sud, which it 
had not. 
Nonetheless, American courts, in some cases, have oddly treated the NVOee as 
the shipper's agent in entering into the carriage contract with the ocean carrier evidenced 
by the ocean carrier's bill of lading, most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Kukje Hwajae Insurance Co., Ltd. v. The "MIV Hyundai Liberty" and Glory 
Express, Inc. 204 Doosan contracted with Glory Express, an NVOCC, to ship a lathe from 
Korea to the United States. The NVOCe issued three bills of lading identifying Doosan as 
the shipper and the "Hyundai Liberty" as the "Exporting Carrier". The NVOCC contracted 
with the ocean carrier who issued a bill of lading, contained a forum selection clause, 
identifying the NVOCC's agent as the shipper. The plaintiff, who was a subrogating 
insurer who had paid the shipper's claim, sued the ocean carrier in tort, claiming that the 
201 Ibid. . 
202 "FBL" is a short name for "FIATA" which stands for International Federation of FreIght Forwarders 
Associations. 
203 See supra fn. 199 at 1306. 
204 294 F. 3d 1171,2002 AMC 1598 (9th Cir. June 26,2002). 
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forunl selection clause did not apply to its claim in tort, since neither it nor the shipper 
were parties to the ocean carrier's bill of lading. 
The court held that the forum selection clause could be enforced against the 
plaintiff because the commercial role of an NVOCC, as well as the facts of the case, led to 
conclusion that the NVOCC was acting as Doosan's agent when it accepted the ocean 
. , b'll fl d' 205 carner s loa Ing. As a result, the plaintiff, as Doosan's subrogee, was bound by the 
bill of lading including the forum clause. As for the commercial role of an NVOCC, the 
court, citing the federal statute which defines an NVOCC, by virtue of s. 1702 (17) (b) of 
-1-6 U.S.C. app .. as "a common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which the ocean 
transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common 
carrier", held that "Both commentators and courts have recognized that an NVOCC 
generally acts as the agent of the cargo owner/ shipper when it contracts with the ocean 
carrier to ship the cargo owner's goods".206 One could argue that it is true that the NVOCC 
is the shipper with its relationship with the ocean carrier, but as a principal rather than as 
the cargo owner's agent. Therefore, the court should have quoted s. 1702 (17) (a) of 46 
U.S.C. app., which defines "ocean freight forwarder" in contrast to the NVOCC's 
definition. 
The court quoted with approval a paragraph in an article by Martin Davies,z°7 
which stated that "A non- vessel operating common carrier, or NVOCC, contracts with its 
customers as principal, agreeing to transport their goods on a voyage that includes an 
ocean leg. An NVOCC commonly issues bills of lading to its customers in its own name, 
even though it does not operate the ship that will carry the goods on the ocean voyage. It 
buys space on the carrying ship like any other customer, receiving a bill of lading from the 
205 Ibid. at 1175. 
206 Ibid. at 1176. 
207 Martin Davies "In Defense of Unpopular Virtues: Personification and Ratification" (2000) 75 Tul. L. Rev. 
337 at 396- 396. 
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owner or charterer of that ship when the goods are loaded on board. It commonly 
consolidates goods from several different shippers into a single container, receiving a bill 
of lading from the ocean carrier in relation to the container as a whole. The NVOCC is not 
authorised by the owner or master of the carrying ship to issue bills of lading that will bind 
the ship; indeed, the ocean carrier may have no idea that the party to whom it issues its bill 
of lading us in fact an NVOCC that has issued bills of lading itself. The relationship 
between ocean carrier and NVOCC is therefore not one of agency, but is a contractual one 
embodied in the ocean carrier's bill of lading, under which the NVOCC is the shipper. The 
NVOCC does not contract with the owners of the goods as agent for the ship. Quite the 
re1'erse, it contracts with the ocean carrier as agent for the owners of the goods". One 
could argue that it is, also, true that the NVOCC does not contract with the owners of the 
goods as agent for the ship, the issue should be the capacity in which the NVOCC 
contracted with the ocean carrier. Did it contract as a principal or only as the cargo owner's 
agent? 
Also, the court cited with approval, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Insurance Company of North America v. SIS American Argosy,208 in which it held that 
"With respect to the vessel and her owner, however, the NVOCC is an agent of the 
shipper".209 It also cited the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
Insurance Company of North America v. MIV Ocean Lynx,210 which held that "Edusystems 
[ the shipper] may treat Mar [NVOCC] as a common carrier for the purpose of COGSA, but 
. M Ed 't" 211 underlying carriers such as Bottacchl [ the charterer] treat ar as usystems agen . 
As a result, the court in Kukje Hwajae Insurance Co., Ltd. v. The "MIV Hyundai Liberty" 
208 732 F. 2d 299 at 301,1984 AMC 1547 (2d Cir. 1984). 
209 Ibid. 
210 901 F. 2d 934, 1991 AMC 64 (l1th Cir. 1990). 
211 Ibid. at 936 fn. 2. See, also, the court in Orion Ins. Co. v. MIV "Humacao ", 581 F. Supp. 575 at ~77- 578 
fn. 4 (S.D.N.Y 1994), which concluded that an NVOCC acts as the agent of the cargo owner when It agrees 
to the terms of the bill of lading issued by the shipowner. 
137 
and Glory E.\press, Inc., 212 held that "Nothing in the record suggests that the relationship 
between Doosan and Glory Express deviated from that commercial norm. To the contrary, 
the record shows that Doosan intended Glory Express to act as its agent for the purpose of 
shipping the lathe". Therefore, the forum selection clause was binding on the plaintiff; the 
action in tort was stayed. 
In conclusion, one could argue that the court decisions in the these cases do not 
reflect the commercial role of the NVOCC, since they do not analyse the commercial 
practices of NVOCC's at length. Therefore, they are suspect as a basis for generalisation. 
This is because the decisions in these cases would subject the cargo owners to direct 
actions by the ocean carrier when they have never dealt with that party or received its bill 
of lading. The fact that the American courts have allowed a freight forwarder, a 
NVOCC, to qualify as a common carrier, so as to take the benefits furnished by COGSA 
makes it arguable that the freight forwarder's bill of lading, if not as a traditional bill of 
lading issued by an ocean carrier or charterer, would qualify as "any similar document of 
title, insofar as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea" under s. 1301 (b) of 
COG SA. The Pomerene Act, by virtue of Ch. 801 02; titled as Application, "applies to a 
bill of lading when the bill of lading is issued by a common carrier" and so, since, the 
freight forwarder can be consider as a common carrier under COGSA, its bill of lading 
would be considered as a bill of lading included by the provisions of the Pomerene Act. If 
such conclusion is accepted, it would reduce, if not demolish, the cargo owner's need to 
sue the freight forwarder under the general maritime law, such as an action in negligence. 
If not, one could argue that this conclusion might be accepted, at least, in relation to freight 
forwarder's bill of lading covering only carriage of goods by sea under as a traditional 
through bill of lading. This is because COGSA, by virtue of s. 130 1 (b), is applicable to 
212 See supra fn. 204 at 1176. 
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"any similar document of title insofar as such document relates to the carriage of goods by 
sea". A traditional through bill of lading is, normally, issued to cover carriage of goods by 
sea by two vessels or more. Because the provisions of COGSA are only applicable to a 
limited period of time, "tackle to tackle", freight forwarders should include in their bills of 
lading a Clause Paramount which has the effect of extending the application of COGSA's 
provisions beyond that period. 
As has been mentioned above, a freight forwarder acting as an agent is a person 
who assumes no responsibility for the transportation of the goods and limits its role to 
arrange for the transportation of the goods and other incidental services. Such a freight 
forwarder neither issues a bill of lading nor consolidates the goods and it will only be liable 
for the loss of or the damage of the goods caused by it own negligence, including 
negligence in choosing a carrier.213 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Prima 
u.s. Inc. v. Pana/pina Inc. ,214 held that Panalpina clearly acted reasonably in hiring CSM 
as a stevedore on behalf of Westinghouse, hence CSM was the designated official Port of 
Genoa stevedore. Therefore, it had fulfilled its duties as freight forwarder and it was not 
liable to Westinghouse for CSM's negligent actions. The issue before the Court of Appeal 
for the Eleventh Circuit in NSC Saudi Arabia v. Omni Lines, Inc.,215 was whether Omni 
Lines must be made to pay twice or whether NSCSA is not paid at all. The facts, put 
simply, are that NSCSA transported the goods as arranged by Exchange, and Omni Lines 
paid Exchange when billed but Exchange did not pay NSCSA. The court held that "We 
cannot, however, say as a matter of law that NSCSA has or has not released Omni from its 
duty to pay. The use of the words 'freight prepaid' appears towards release, as does the fact 
that NSCSA focused its initial collection efforts at Exchange. Nevertheless, both of these 
indications were present in Strachan, and the Fifth Circuit found that the shipper had not 
213 See Zima Corp. v. M V, Roman Pazinski, 493 F. Supp. 268 at 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
214 See supra fn. 193 at 130. 
215 106 F. 3d 1544, 1997 AMC 1708 (lIth Cir. 1997). 
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been released. Weighing against release, NSCSA claims that local custom views 'freight 
prepaid' as an extension of credit to the shipper. We also note that the bill of lading itself 
does not favour finding release".216 
On the other hand, a freight forwarder acting as a carrier, an NVOCC, is a person 
who contracts to deliver the goods to their destination and assumes responsibility for the 
transportation of the goods as a common carrier. Such a freight forwarder issues a bill of 
lading and consolidates the goods and it will be liable for the loss of or the damage of the 
goods, whether the fault or other basis of liability for damage lies with such forwarder or 
with the underlying carrier actually transporting the goodS.217 Accordingly, a freight 
forwarder acting as a carrier will be considered as a common carrier so as to take the 
benefits furnished by COGSA in any claim by the cargo owner.218 A freight forwarder's 
bill of lading normally contains a Period of Responsibility Clause and a Paramount Clause. 
2.7. TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF SUIT UNDER THE DRAFT INSTRUMENT 
The Draft Instrument contains specific provisions dealing with the transfer of rights and 
the rights of suit which are not currently governed by any international convention but 
rather governed by diverse national laws. Under English law, these issues are governed by 
the provisions of COGSA 1992. Some definitions should be considered before dealing 
with the specific provisions relating to the transfer of rights and the rights of suit. The 
Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 1 (12), defines the 'holder' as 
"a person that ( a) is for the time being in possession of a negotiable 
transport document or has the exclusive [access to] [control of] a 
negotiable electronic record, and (b) either: (i) if the document is an order 
216 Ibid. at 1547. The court decision was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
OpInIOn. 
217 See Zima Corp. v. M V, Roman Pazinski, supra fn. 213 at 274. . 
218 See Itel Container Corp. v. MIV "Titan Scan", supra fn. 192 at 1451; Sabah ShIpyard Sdn Bhd~. MIV 
Harbel Tapper Ltd., Industrial Maritime Carriers (Bahamas) and Others, supr~ ~. 197; Jam.es N. KIrby v. 
Noifolk Southern Railway, supra fn. 199 and Federal Insurance Co. v. MItsUI o.s.K. Lmes Ltd., and 
Summers North- West Express and Others, supra fn. 188 at [26]. 
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document, is identified in it as the shipper or the consignee, or is the 
person to whom the document is dully endorsed, or (ii) if the document is 
a blank endorsed order document or bearer document, is the bearer 
thereof, or (iii) if a negotiable record is used, is pursuant to article 2. 4 
able to demonstrate that it has [access to] [control of] such record". 
Accordingly, a shipper, a consignee and intermediate holder are included by this 
definition. An agent of any of these persons acting in its own name and in possession of a 
negotiable transport document or has an exclusive access to or control of electronic record 
can be qualified as a holder. The agent, by virtue of art. 13 (l) (iii) of the Draft Instrument, 
acquires the rights of suit against the carrier or a performing party and so he can sue the 
carrier or the performing party for the benefit of his principal by virtue of art. 13 (2). 
However, art. 13 (3) provides one advantage over s. 2 (4) of COGS A 1992, by allowing the 
claimant who suffers loss or damage in consequence of a breach of the carriage contract, 
but without being the holder, to sue the carrier or the performing party directly, provided 
that he proves that it was he, and not the holder, who suffered such loss or damage. This 
avenue is also available to the shipper or the seller in the case of an out- tum sale where the 
risk remains with the seller or in the case of the seller's losses in consequence of a breach 
of the contract which are not associated with the passing of risk such as loss caused by 
delay in loading. 
As to the requirement in COGSA 1992 that the holder of a negotiable transport 
document should be a lawful holder in good faith, this was not considered by the Draft 
Instrument. This is because 
"Using the term 'lawful' without specifying what is meant by 'lawful' 
possession could, however, invite reference to national law, thus 
undermining uniformity. In any event, paragraph (b) (i) largely addressed 
the underlying concern for order documents. For bearer documents, it 
was thought that there is no real problem in practice that needs to be 
addressed here. If a practical problem did exist, it would not concern 
bearer documents in a wrongdoer'S hands (a problem for which other 
remedies exist) but documents in the hands of a good faith purchaser w?o 
claims through a wrongdoer. It is thought that such a good faIth 
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purchaser deserve protection, and that those who choose to use bearer 
documents should recognise such riskS"?19 
In contrast, one could argue that the failure to address the issue of lawful 
possession would result in its being regulated by national laws and thus undermining 
uniformity. Also, specifying what is meant by lawful possession would not expand the 
scope of the draft instrument since it contains provisions dealing with issues were not 
governed by any international conventions such as the rights of suit. Moreover, it is likely, 
under English law, that a bOlla fide holder of a bearer negotiable transport document and a 
purchaser in good faith should have a cause of action against the carrier or the performing 
party where the transfer of this document falls within the Factors Act 1889, even if his 
transferor had neither title to the goods nor right to possession of the negotiable transport 
document. This is because the transfer of the negotiable transport document would take 
effect as if the owner had authorised the transaction and so the transferee would have title 
to the goods as well as a cause of action.220 
Article 1 (20), defines 'transport document' as "a document issued pursuant to a 
contract of carriage by a carrier or performing party that ( a) evidences a carrier's or 
performing party's receipt of goods under a contract of carriage, or (b) evidences or 
contains a contract of carriage, or both". Also, art. 1 (14) of the Draft Instrument defines 
'negotiable transport document' as "a transport document which indicates, by wording 
such as "to order" or "negotiable" or other appropriate wording recognising as having the 
same effect by the law governing the document, that the goods have been consigned to the 
order of the shipper, to the order of the consignee, or to bearer, and is not explicitly stated 
as being "non- negotiable" or "not negotiable"". Accordingly, a negotiable combined 
219 See UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage ofGoo~s by Se~, United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Nmth seSSIOn U.N. 
Doc. AlCN.9IWG.IIIIWP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. AlCN.9IWG.IIIIWP.21) para. 8. 
The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. . 
220 However, the issue of lawful holder in good faith was considered under COGSA 1992, for more detail see 
supra Being a Lawful Holder of a Bill of Lading in 'Good Faith'. 
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transport docun1ent would probably be considered as a negotiable transport document 
under the Draft Instrun1ent. This is because art. 1 (5) defines the carriage contract as "a 
contract under which a carrier, against payment of freight, undertakes to carry goods 
,,"holly or partly by sea from one place to another". Therefore, this document is a 
negotiable transport document as long as the carrier undertakes to carry the goods partly by 
sea from one place to another. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that this 
docun1ent is essentially no different from a charterer's bill of lading on the ground that art. 
1 (1). defines the carrier as "a person that enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper" 
and so to include a non- sea carrier. Moreover, through bills of lading as well as freight 
forwarder bills would, probably, be included by the definition of a negotiable transport 
document on the same ground as combined transport documents. The application of the 
provisions of COGSA 1992 to these documents depends on qualifying them as documents 
of title. 221 However, by virtue of art. 3. 3. 1, charter- parties are not subject to the 
provisions of the Draft Instrument. 222 
Article 13 (1) provides that 
"Without prejudice to article 13. 2 and 13. 3, rights under the contract of 
carriage may be asserted against the carrier or a performing party only 
by: (i) the shipper, (ii) the consignee, (iii) any third party to which the 
shipper or the consignee has assigned its rights, depending on which of 
the above parties suffered the loss or damage in consequence of a breach 
of the contract of carriage, (iv) any third party that has acquired rights 
under the contract of carriage by subrogation under the applicable 
national law, such as an insurer. in case of any passing of rights of suit 
through assignment or subrogation as referred to above, the carrier and 
the performing party are entitles to all defences and limitations of 
liability that are available to it against such third party under the contract 
of carriage and under this instrument". 
In general, art. 13 (1) is applicable to any carriage contract whether or not a transport 
document or an electronic record has been issued. It is, also, applicable to any transport 
221 For more detail see supra sub- title 2. 5. in chapter 2. 
222 This is also the case under the Hamburg Rules, by virtue of art. 2 (3). 
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docunlent or any electronic record regardless of their nature as being negotiable or non-
negotiable. Therefore, only the contracting shipper and the consignee would assert the 
rights of suit against the carrier or the performing party, provided that they suffered loss or 
damage in consequence of a breach of the carriage contract. Moreover, in general, a third 
party. such as the cargo owner who has suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach 
of the carriage contract, must either acquire the rights of suit from the contracting shipper 
or the consignee, or acquire the rights of suit against the carrier or the performing party 
outside the carriage contract. The distinction between 'transferring' and 'granting' is 
perhaps most significant when one deals with the initial contract containing terms other 
than those set out in the transport document or the initial contract being void or voidable. 
Article 13 (1) refers to third party rights to sue on 'contract of carriage' but it says nothing 
about what the position is if that contract is void or voidable. According to shipping 
practice, a carriage contract will normally be contained or evidenced by a transport 
document, such as a bill of lading. Therefore, if the carriage contract is covered by a 
transport document as defined by art. 1 (20) (b) "evidences or contains a contract of 
carriage", the terms of the carriage contract, between the carrier or the performing party 
and the third party, would be those contained or evidenced by such transport document.
223 
However, art. 13 (2) provides that 
"In the event that a negotiable transport document or negotiable 
electronic record is issued, the holder is entitled to assert rights under the 
contract of carriage against the carrier or a performing party, without 
having to prove that it itself has suffered loss or damage. If such holder 
did not suffer the loss or damage itself, it is be deemed to act on behalf of 
the party that suffered such loss or damage". 
223 See UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage ofGoo~s by Se~, United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Nmth seSSIOn U.N. 
Doc. AlCN.9/WG.I1I/WP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.III/wP.21) at para. 
23. The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. 
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By virhle of this provision, a party who falls outside the four categories in art. 13 (1) will 
still be able to sue on the contract of carriage. To do so they must be the holder of a 
'negotiable transport instrument'. A 'holder' is defined in art. 1 (12) in similar terms as 
adopted by s. 5 (2) (b) and (c) of the 1992 Act. A 'negotiable transport document' is 
defined in art. 1 (14) as a 'transport document that indicates by wording such as "to order" 
or "negotiable" or other appropriate wording recognised as having the same effect by the 
law governing the document, that the goods have been consigned to the order of the 
shipper, to the order of the consignee, or to bearer, and is not explicitly state as being "non-
negotiable" or "not negotiable"'. This wording is probably broad enough to cover bills of 
lading whose status is still doubtful under COGS A 1992, such as combined transport and 
freight forwarder bills. 
Article 13 (2) also entitles the holder of a negotiable transport document or a 
negotiable electronic record to assert rights of suit against the carrier or a performing party 
for the benefit of a third party who suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach of 
the carriage contract without proving that he himself suffered such loss or damage. In this 
case, the holder of a negotiable transport document or the transferee of a negotiable 
electronic record would be deemed to act on behalf of the third party that suffered such 
loss or damage. The effect of art. 13 (2) of the Draft Instrument is to replicate s. 2 (4) of 
cOGSA 1992. However, art. 13 (2) may be more advantageous than s. 2 (4) of the 1992 
Act to a third party on the ground that the holder's of the bill of lading ability to sue for the 
benefit of a third party under the Act is restricted by the words "with any interest or right in 
relation to goods to which the document related". These words may not be sufficient to 
cover a third party who has suffered loss or damage merely because the goods were at his 
risk. In contrast, the holder of a negotiable transports document or the transferee of a 
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negotiable electronic record, by virtue of art. 13 (2) would be able to sue the carrier or the 
perfornling party for the benefit of such a third party. 
There is also the point that s. 2 (4) of the 1992 Act provides no machinery for the 
person who had suffered loss or damage to compel the holder of the bill of lading to 
exercise those rights. In contrast, art. 13 (3) provides that "In the event that a negotiable 
transport document or negotiable electronic record is issued and the claimant is one of the 
persons referred to in article 13. 1 without being the holder, such claimant must, in addition 
to its burden of proof that it suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach of the 
contract of carriage, prove that the holder did not suffer such loss or damage". Therefore, 
the contracting shipper, the consignee and their assigns, without being the holder of a 
negotiable transport document or a negotiable electronic record, could assert rights of suits 
against the carrier or the performing party, provided that they suffered loss or damage in 
consequence of a breach of the carriage contract and that the holder did not suffer such loss 
or damage which would protect the position of the holder against the loss of the rights of 
suit. As a result, the co- operation of the holder of a negotiable transport document or 
negotiable electronic record is not needed under art. 13 (3), unlike s. 2 (4) of the 1992 Act. 
The rationale behind art. 13 (1) and (2) is the lack of regulation in any International 
Convention regulating the carriage of goods by sea. The relevant national laws regulating 
the transfer of rights of suit are diverse and it can be assumed there is no consensus at 
international level. Therefore, it was thought that any successful international regulation 
should deal with the transfer of rights of suit so as to establish uniform rules applicable to 
all aspects of the carriage of goods. Article 13 of the Draft Instrument deals with the 
problem of multiple suits against the carrier by varying the rules on burden of proof rather 
than by divestment. 
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Also, the rights of suit of the contracting shipper and an intermediate holder of a 
negotiable transport document or a negotiable electronic record are not extinguished, 
provided that they suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach of the carriage 
contract and that the holder did not suffered such loss or damage. This is because the rights 
of suit under the Draft Instrument are not linked to being the holder of a negotiable 
transport document or the transferee of a negotiable electronic record. Therefore, as has 
been shown before, there are some situations where the person who suffers loss, because of 
the carrier's breach of the carriage contract, cannot sue the carrier, since no rights have 
been transferred to him by virtue of s. 2 (1) of the 1992 ACt.224 In these situations, the 
person who suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach of the carriage contract, by 
yirtue of art. 13 (3) of the Draft Instrument, would be able to assert the rights of suit 
against the carrier or the performing party, provided that they suffered such loss or damage 
and that the holder did not suffer such loss or damage. In contrast, under s. 1 (2) of the 
1992 Act, the person who suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach of the 
carriage contract would be left to strive to find another foundation, such as implied 
contract theory, for imposing liability. This would make it easier for the shipowner to 
escape liability. 
2. 8. CONCLUSION 
COGSA 1992 has resolved the problems associated with cases such as The Aliakmon, The 
Aramis and The Delfini by increasing the range of cases in which a contractual right to sue 
the carrier is granted to the holder of the bills of lading and the persons to whom delivery is 
to be made under sea waybills and ship's delivery orders. COGSA 1992 therefore, 
encourages contracting parties who are not English to provide for their contracts to be 
224 Such as the buyer who took delivery against a letter of indemnity and the bill was never transferred to him 
as in The Captain Gregos (No 2), [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395. 
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governed by English Law, so preventing the loss of shipping and insurance business, 
litigation and arbitration to the City of London and the national economy. 
It has been noted that each legislation has its own advantages and disadvantages 
that nlight result in solving a problem in a better way than the other. The differences 
between these legislations have resulted from the approaches that had been taken by each 
legislator in dealing with the common law rules such as the privity of contract doctrine. 
Furtheflllore, these differences might have been magnified by the judicial approaches of 
solving the weaknesses of their legislation. 
The aim of both legislations was to enable the transferee to have contractual rights 
against the carrier, which will enable him to sue for the loss of or damage to the goods. As 
shown before, granting, under Ch. 801, rather than transferring, under COGSA 1992, 
seems to be more appropriate and will avoid many problems that are faced or might be 
faced by COGSA 1992. However, the Draft Instrument provides nothing on the terms of 
the carriage contract on which the third party can sue under art. 13. One could argue, 
therefore, that the tefllls of the carriage contract would not include the terms orally agreed 
by the original parties. 
Both sets of legislation provide the transferee of a non- negotiable bill, Ch. 801 06, 
or the person to whom delivery is to be made under sea waybill, s. 2 (b) of 1992 Act, with 
contractual rights against the carrier. But, as has been noted before, the 1992 Act is more 
favourable than Ch. 801 to that person for different reasons, such as the fact that the 
contractual rights can be ascertained at a glance and according to the terms of that 
document rather than the need to go down the chain to ascertain his transferor's rights 
which also are his rights. 
In respect of combined transport documents, the position of such documents under 
English law, COGSA 1992, is uncertain, although treating such documents as true paper 
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bills of lading, for the purpose of COGSA 1992 and other purposes, might cause legal and 
practical problems. Under American law, the position of such documents is also uncertain , 
even if such documents were to be qualified as document of title. However, the enactment 
of the revision relating to freight forwarder bills of lading might allow combined transport 
documents to qualify, as documents of title, but such qualification might not be enough to 
include such documents by the provisions of Ch. 801. However, combined transport 
documents would, probably, not cause any problem under the Draft Instrument. This is 
because the definitions of both the carrier and the carriage contract would allow the 
provision of the Draft Instrument to be applicable to such documents as well as to freight 
fonvarder bills and through bills of lading. 
As has been mentioned before, there are some situations where the person who 
suffers loss, because of the carrier's breach of the carriage contract, cannot sue the carrier, 
since no rights have been transferred to him by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992.225 In 
these situations the shipper, as an original party to the contract, can sue the carrier by virtue 
of the rule of Dunlop. v. Lambert, as an exception to the common law rules in respect of 
the loss or damage to the goods, since the shipper's rights are not extinguished by virtue of 
s. 2 (5) of COGS A 1992.226 
The doctrine of implied contract can also be used to resolve the problem of a 
person who has suffered loss but without rights to sue the carrier by virtue of COGSA 
225 These situations are where the buyer took delivery against a letter of indemnity and the bill was never 
transferred to him in cases such as The Captain Gregos (No.2); the bill was lost in transmission and so the 
transferee never acquires possession of it; the bill was delivered to the buyer without the necessary 
endorsement in cases such as The Agia Skepi; the buyer took delivery against document which is not included 
by s. 1 (1) of the 1992 Act such as a combined transport document; a pledgee with the possession of an order 
bill of lading (without naming him as a consignee or an endorsee by virtue of s. 5 (2) (b) of COGSA 1992) 
which neither names him as consignee nor has been validly indorsed by the named consignee. However, a 
pledgee can sue the carrier where he is named as a consignee or an endorsee, or with the possession of a 
bearer bill or a bill, which is indorsed in blank. . 
226 The shipper will not be able to sue for a third party's loss by virtue of s. 2 (4) of COGSA 1992, smce s. 2 
(4) enables only the transferee, who has acquired the contractual r.ig~ts by. virtue of s. 2 (1), to recover 
damages in respect of a third party's loss but, it does not enable the ongmal shIpper to do that. 
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1992, in the above situations and others.227 It is arguable that suing the carrier under the 
implied contract doctrine would be more profitable than under the rule of Dunlop . v. 
Lambert.
228 
This is because the terms of the implied contract will be those set out in the bill 
rather than the terms of the initial carriage contract, as Leduc. v. Ward, or the tenns of the 
charter-party, as The Albazero. Moreover, the representations in the bill of lading would 
be, by virtue of both s. 4 of the 1992 Act and art. III. 4 of the Hague- Visby Rules, 
conclusive evidence in the hands of a third party, while it would only be prima facie 
eyidence in the shipper's hands. 
The utility of the implied contract theory is also needed, in cases such as the 
absence of an express contract between the consignor and the shipowner, which would 
undermine the application of COGSA 1992. Since, the contractual rights which would be 
transferred, by virtue of s. 2 (1), to the holder of the bill or the person to whom delivery is 
to be made under a sea waybill or a ship's delivery order "as if he had been a party to that 
contract" and the definition of the carriage contract, under s. 5 (1 ) (a), is "the contract 
contained in or evidenced by that bill or waybill". 
Thus, in the absence of an express contract, there would be no contract evidenced 
by or contained in the bill of lading or the waybill and so, a contract should be implied 
between the buyer and the carrier, unless there is an implied contract between the shipper 
and the shipowner. Implied contract can also be used to resolve problems between the 
shipper and the shipowner where is no express contract between them. In Pyrene . v. 
Scindia Navigation,229 Devlin J., held that there is a contract between the shipowner and 
the seller on the basis of an implied contract upon presenting the goods, by the seller, for 
loading and commencing loading by the shipowner. Therefore, the courts should consider 
227 This doctrine is analysed in detail in sub- title 5.2. of chap. 5. . ., . 
228 The decisions of the Court of Appeal in The Aramis and The Gudermes applIed very ~tf1ct restf1C~lOnS for 
a contract to be implied between parties without an express contract between them whIch undermmed the 
mechanism of an implied contract as a good solution to this problem. 
229 [1954] 2 Q.B. 402. 
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an inlplied contract as a vital mechanism to resolve problems which are associated with 
some cases where the cargo owner fall outside the scope of COGSA 1992 for otherwise the 
cargo owners will have to recourse to tort which would undermine the implementation of 
the Hague- Visby Rules.23o 
Such situations would not arise under American law since the title to the goods and 
the cause of action are tied to one criterion that is whether or not the bill has been duly 
negotiated. The Draft Instrument by virtue art. 13 (1 & 2) provide a person who has 
suffered loss under such situations with a right to sue in respect of its loss. Also, the 
absence of an express contract between the original parties under the Draft Instrument 
would not cause any problem. This is because art. 13 (1) is applicable whether or not a 
transport document or an electronic record has been issued. 
230 H wever the 1992 Act does not excl ude or limit rights of suit in tort on the ground that an explic.it clu~ion might prevent the cargo owner from suing the carrier for loss or damage of the goods where he IS ~~able sue under the provision of the Act. See the Commissions Report supra th. 2 at pars. 2. 45 and 5.24. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CARGO OWNER'S LIABILITIES UNDER THE 
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 1992 
3. 1. INTRODUCTION 
COOSA 1992 breaks the link between the acquisition of contractual rights and the passing 
of property. It extends the range of people who can acquire rights against the carrier, 
including banks which become lawful holders of bills of lading only by way of security. 
However, the Law Commissions were of the view that a simple linkage between the 
acquisition of the contractual rights and the imposition of liabilities would be 
unsatisfactory, for it would make all holders of bills of lading, including banks holding the 
bill of lading merely as security, liable to the carrier for freight, demurrage and some other 
charges simply by virtue of their being holders of bills of lading. 1 Therefore, this type of 
link was ruled out on the basis that it would reverse the House of Lords' decision in Sewell 
. v. Burdick2 and it would be commercially undesirable because "It is not part of the 
commercial risks undertaken by a bank, when it merely holds a bill of lading as security, to 
undertake to perform the substantive obligations contained in the bill". 3 
Instead, a system was introduced whereby the holder of the bill of lading would 
only be liable to the carrier where the requirements of s. 3 (1) of COOSA 1992 were 
satisfied.4 This section provides first that the contractual rights should be acquired by 
virtue of s. 2 of the 1992 Act. In addition, before liability would be transferred, the holder 
of the bill of lading would either have to take or demand delivery of any of the goods from 
the carrier, or make a claim against the carrier in respect of any of those goods under the 
1 However, banks as pledgees would not be liable to the carrier under s. 1 of 1855 Act, since they would only 
have a special property but not a general one. 
2 [1884] 10 App. Cas. 74. . 
3 See The English and Scottish law Commissions, Rights of Suit in Respect of Carnage of Goods by Sea, 
(1991) 196 Eng LCR and 130 Scot LCR at para. 3. 3. . .. . . 
4 The shipper's liability continues after it has transferred the bIn of ladmg, by VIrtue of s. 3 (3). ThIS IS 
analysed in detail in sub- title 3.6. 
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carnage contract; or, in the case of 'spent' bill of lading, to have taken or demanded 
delivery from the carrier before the rights under the carriage contract were vested in him 
under s. 2 (1). 
3.2. LIABILITIES' REQUIREMENTS UNDER S. 3 (1) OF THE 1992 ACT 
The application of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act has recently been tested in two cases; Aegean 
Sea Traders Corp. \'. Repsol Petroleo S. A. and Another 'The Aegean Sea' 5 and Borealis 
AB . v. Stargas Ltd. and Others 'The Berge Sisar ,. 6 
The facts of The Aegean Sea 7 are quite complicated, but put simply, the vessel was 
proceeding to berth at La Cornna where she grounded on the rocks, broke in two and 
exploded. The vessel and her cargo were lost, causing large-scale pollution and damage to 
private property. The shipowners sought to recover their losses from the charterer, ROIL, 
on the basis that the discharge port was unsafe. They also proceeded against Repsol, the 
buyers, on the basis that they were liable according to s. 3 (1 ) (c) of the 1992 Act on one of 
the two bills of lading under which the cargo was carried. There were two questions before 
the court regarding the claim against Repsol. First, did Repsol become the holders of one 
of the two bills of lading by virtue of s. 2 (1) of the 1992 Act? Secondly, did Repsol 
become liable to the shipowners under that bill by virtue of s. 3 (1) (c) of the 1992 Act? 
Thomas J., answered the first question negatively on the basis that the requirements of s. 5 
(2) (b) were not satisfied, since Repsol never obtained possession of the bills of lading as a 
result of the completion of an endorsement by delivery. This is because the bills were 
delivered to ROIL, as principals, and then they were sent to Repsol who refused to accept 
the delivery of the bills as endorsees. Therefore, the requirements of s. 5 (2) (b) are that the 
bill must be delivered to the transferee as a principal and that; the transferee must accept 
5 [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39. 
6 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 663, ([2001] UKHL 17). 
7 See supra fn. 5. 
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the delivery of the bills as an endorsee. Thomas 1., furthermore, refused to re- introduce the 
link between the passing of property and the rights under the bill which the 1992 Act 
sought to remove. Moreover, Thomas J., held that the requirement of "good faith" in s. 5 
imposed some consensual elements on the party of the recipient of a bill of lading, since 
Repsol knew that the bills of lading should have been endorsed to ROIL who had 
purchased the cargo from the transferors, Louis Dreyfus. Therefore, it was not necessary to 
Repsol to re- endorse the bills to the transferors in order to allow them to rectify their error 
as to re- endorse the bills to ROIL, since it was not the attention of draftsman of the 1992 
Act to require the re- endorsement as a precondition of rectifying the error. 
As to the second question before the court that related to Repsol' s liability to the 
shipowners under s. 3 (1) (c) of the 1992 Act,8 Thomas 1., held that the issuance of this 
letter of indemnity, on its particular terms, by Repsol was not a demand for delivery. This 
is because it was no more than an agreement to indemnify the shipowners if delivery was 
to be made to the order of Repsol and according to that agreement the shipowners were 
neither obliged to deliver the cargo to Repso1 nor were Repsol obliged to take delivery. 
Therefore, delivery of the cargo to Repsol under the letter of indemnity would affect the 
ability to deal with the bills of lading on the basis that it would have no longer governed 
the delivery obligation. Moreover, the delivery of some of the cargo into Repsol's refinery 
under the orders of the civil government was not taking delivery according to s. 3 (1) (c) of 
the 1992 Act. This is because taking or demanding delivery from the carrier under s. 3 (1) 
was a reflection of the principle that it would only be fair to impose liabilities on the lawful 
holder ifhe had done any of the steps mentioned in that section voluntarily. Thus, Repsol's 
taking of delivery was by an involuntary act, in that it was compelled by the orders of civil 
government. 
8 NB; Thomas J's., conclusion as to the second question is an obiter dictum on the basiS. that Respol never 
obtained the contractual rights of suit under s. 2 (1), and so they would not have become lIable under s. 3 (1) 
of the 1992 Act. 
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The application of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act was also considered in The Berge Sisar9 
but in more detail. The facts of The Berge Sisar are no less complicated than those in The 
AL'gt!an Sea. In brief, the vessel sailed from Yanbu in Saudi Arabia to Stenungsund in 
Sweden and on arrival the intended buyer, Borealis AB, took some samples for analysis. 
The analysis results showed that the cargo of oil was contaminated. As Borealis's terminal 
was not able to deal with that type of contaminated cargo, they sold the contaminated cargo 
to Dow Europe and the vessel was diverted back to Temeuzen in Holland. As a result of 
that, the shipowners' financial loses were substantial which led to the making of claims 
and cross- claims by and against the different parties involved in the venture. Before the 
House of Lords, there were two issues involved the construction of the 1992 Act. First, 
were Borealis were ever liable to the shipowners, Bergesen, under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act? 
If so, did Borealis cease to be liable under s. 3 (1) when they endorsed the bills of lading 
over to Dow Europe? 
The House of Lords emphasised the importance of the 'relevant consideration' 
behind the imposition of liabilities on the holder of the bill of lading which was reflected 
throughout the Law Commissions' Report and eventually the 1992 Act, namely, "[T]he 
mutuality of the contractual relationship transferred to the endorsee and the reciprocal 
contractual rights and obligation which arise from that relationship".l0 Therefore, the 
contractual rights must first be transferred and vested in the holder of the bill by virtue of 
the operation of s. 2 (1) of the 1992 Act and then, the holder must enforce those rights 
transferred to him against the carrier by taking one of the positive steps mentioned in s. 3 
(1) of the 1992 Act. Those positive steps could take the form of either taking or demanding 
the perfonnance of the contractual carrier's obligation of delivery by virtue of s. 3 (1) (a) 
9 See supra fn. 6. 
10 Ibid. at 674. 
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and (c), or making a claim against the carrier for a breach of the carriage contract by virtue 
of s. 3 (1) (b). 
The House of Lords held that taking delivery of the goods would not cause any 
problem, since it would involve a voluntary transfer of the possession of the goods from 
the carrier to the holder of the bill. It would also be the final act of the performance of the 
contractual carrier's obligation. However, "co- operating in the discharge of the cargo from 
the vessel and providing" or "arranging a berth at which the vessel can discharge" would 
not be as taking delivery of the goods. I I Nonetheless, the House of Lords pointed out that 
demanding delivery or making a claim might create problems to the parties involved in the 
venture as well as to judges and legal advisers. Therefore, the House of Lords confined the 
phrase 'makes a claim under the carriage contract' to "[A] formal claim against the carrier 
asserting a legal liability of the carrier under the carriage contract to the holder of the bill 
of lading". Accordingly, "issuing a writ or arresting the vessel" but not "expressing a view 
in the course of a meeting or letter as to the liability of the carrier" would be a formal 
claim. 12 Also, it confined the phrase 'demands delivery' to "[A] formal demand made to 
the carrier or his agent asserting the contractual rights as the endorsee of the bill of lading 
to have the carrier deliver the goods to him". Accordingly, "more formal express 
communication, such as would have sufficed to support an action in detinue" but not "an 
invitation or request, or perhaps, even implied form making arrangements" would be a 
d 13 formal deman . 
Therefore, the making of a demand which would trigger the operation of s. 3 (1) (a) 
must arguably be accompanied by the willingness to surrender the relevant bill of lading to 
the carrier or his agent before or at the time of delivery. It seems therefore right to argue 
that demanding delivery by a person who is not in possession of the relevant bill would not 




trigger the operation of s. 3 (1) ( a). This is because such a demand would not be made as of 
right and would therefore not amount to a true 'demand'. Only a bill of lading holder, in 
possession of the relevant bill, is in a position to demand that the carrier or his agent 
deliyer the goods to him. Therefore, Lord Hobhouse was almost certainly right in 
concluding that it was difficult to envisage circumstances in which a demand for delivery 
would be made within s. 3 (1) (c). 14 This is because such a demand would be made when 
the yessel and its cargo arrive at the destination before the bills of lading which are still in 
their journey up the chain of banks and buyers. Thus, the intended receiver would demand 
delivery without the willingness to surrender the relevant bills of lading which would not 
constitute a demand as of right. 
The House of Lords, however, held that what Borealis AB had done appeared to 
haye been to direct the vessel to their import jetty and then, having allowed it to berth 
there, to take the routine samples before clearing it for discharge into their terminal. All 
these acts were no more than co- operative acts which could not trigger the operation of s. 
3 (1) (a) and (c) of taking delivery and should not be confused with demanding delivery. 15 
Taking a routine sample of the cargo was a necessity in the trade in which the parties were 
involved and so "What occurred did not even get as far as the stage of Borealis expressing 
their willingness to receive the cargo into their terminal". Therefore, one could argue that 
the decision of the House of Lords would be the same had Borealis been in possession of 
the bill of lading at the time they requested samples. 
But, suppose that the intended receiver who is demanding delivery issues a letter of 
indemnity asking the carrier to deliver the goods to him which also contains an undertaking 
to indemnify the carrier for any loss might result out of that demand. Would that demand 
14 Treitel comments on Lord Hobhouse's wording that "His use of the words 'unlikely in t~e extreme': as 
opposed to 'impossible', has rather the flavour of judicial caution", see Treitel G., "BIlls of Ladmg: 
Liabilities of Transferee- The Berge Sisar" [2001] LMCLQ 345 at p. 349. 
15 See supra fn. 6 at pars. 36 and 38. 
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be sufficient to trigger the operation of s. 3 (1) (c) of the 1992 Act? The House of Lords in 
The Berge Sisar anticipated that a letter of indemnity would be required in the absence of 
the surrender of the relevant bill of lading and so "The Letter of Indemnity will probably 
be the best evidence of what arrangement has been made and will probably contain 
appropriate express terms". 16 Moreover, Thomas J in The Aegean Sea 17 held the letter of 
indemnity issued by Repsol, on its terms, was not a demand for delivery. This implies that 
a letter of indemnity in different terms might constitute a demand for delivery as to trigger 
the operation of s. 3 (1) (c) of the 1992 Act. On the one hand one could argue that any 
demand accompanied by a letter of indemnity, on those terms, might satisfy the 
requirements of the formal demand specified, above, by the House of Lords. The reason 
for that is the intended receiver, throughout the letter of indemnity, is expressing his 
willingness to receive the cargo from the carrier and that type of step is positive and 
voluntary made to enforce the potential rights which would be transferred to and vested in 
him by virtue of s. 2 (2) of the 1992 Act. On the other hand, if it is the entitlement to take 
delivery rather than willingness to do so which constitutes a formal demand for delivery, 
only the holder of bill of lading would be entitled to take delivery of the goods as of right. 
Thomas 1., in The Aegean Sea,18 stated that 
"Although the letter of undertaking was in my view (on the basis of the 
facts set out at p. 57, ante) provided by Repsol, even if in the context of 
ROIL's obligations under cl. 13 of the charter- party, I do not consider it 
was a demand for delivery. The letter of undertaking was on its terms an 
undertaking that, if delivery was made to the order of Repsol, then 
Repsol would indemnify the owners against any claim that ~ight be 
made under the bills of lading. It did not oblige Repsol to take dehvery or 
oblige the owners to deliver to the order of Repsol. It was in short an 
agreement to indemnify that took effect only if delivery was made to the 
order of Repsol. On its terms the letter of indemnity was therefore not a 
demand for deliver". 
He then proceeded as follows 
16 Ibid. at 676. 
17 See supra fn. 5 at 61- 62. 
18 Ibid. at 6l. 
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"Furthermore,. th~ owners, despite the letter of indemnity, remained 
under the oblIgatIon under the bills of lading to deliver to the lawful 
holder of the bills. They were not obliged to deliver under the letter of 
indenlnity. If, for example, insolvency had supervened had Louis 
Dreyfus had not endorsed the Sun Oil bill of lading but retained it, then 
the owners' obligation would have been to deliver the cargo to Louis 
Dreyfus as lawful holder of that bill of lading. If the owners had in fact 
entered into an agreement under which they had undertaken to deliver the 
cargo comprised in the bills of lading to the order of Repsol, then that 
would have affected the ability to deal with the bills of lading as the bills 
of lading would no longer have governed the obligation to deliver". 19 
Nonetheless, it is arguable that the effect of demanding delivery under s. 3 (1) (c) 
should not be different from taking delivery, since the carrier in both cases is under no 
obligation to deliver the goods to the intended receiver without the surrendering of the 
re leyant bill of lading. A contrasting conclusion might arguably undermine the application 
and the existence of s. 2 (2) of the 1992 Act. 
As to the issue of whether Borealis AB ceased to be liable to the shipowners when 
they endorsed the bills to Dow Europe so as to transfer their rights of suit to the latter,20 the 
House of Lords, solely upon the construction of the 1992 Act unqualified by any special 
factors, were of the view that an intermediate endorsee's liabilities under s. 3 (1) would 
cease when he endorsed over the bill of lading to another person so as to transfer the rights 
of suit to that person. The House of Lords based its decision, as to the intermediate 
endorsee's liabilities, upon two principles. First, the draftsman of the Act did not intend to 
reverse the decision in Smurthwaite . v. Wilkins, 21 despite the fact that the decision in 
Smurthwaite. v. Wilkins was based on the wording of s. 1 of the 1855 Act. The 1992 Act in 
both s. 2 (1) and s. 3 (1) adopted the same crucial words22 and so their repetition implies 
that the construction of those words must be done in the same way. Secondly, the 
19 Ibid. at 62. 
20 The Court of Appeal in The Berge Sisar, [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 475, decided in favour ofBoreali~ AB by 
the majority, Millett and Schiemann, against the minority, Sir Brian Neill who preferred the VIew that 
Borealis's liability continued even after the endorsement of the bill to Dow Europe. 
21 [1862] 11 CB (NS) 842. .. . . 
22 The words adopted in s. 2 (l) are "shall have transferred to and vested In hIm all nghts of SUIt under the 
contract of carriage" and in s. 3 (l) "shall become subj ect to the same liabilities under that contract". 
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intennediate holder's rights are extinguished, by virtue of s. 2 (5) of the 1992 Act, where 
those rights are transferred to and vested in a new holder by virtue of the operation of s. 2 
(1) of 1992 Act. The non- existence of any corresponding section in the 1992 Act as to the 
intermediate holder's liabilities should not create a problem, because the principle of 
mutuality between s. 2 (1) and s. 3 (1) should prevent the continuity of an intermediate 
holder's liabilities where his rights are extinguished.23 
In general, it is arguable that the House of Lords in The Berge Sisar was right in 
concluding that the draftsman of the 1992 Act did not intend to reverse the decision in 
Smurtlnraite . v. Wilkins. 24 However, the decision in Smurthwaite . v. Wilkins anticipated 
only that an intermediate holder should not be liable to the carrier who simply transferred 
the bill of lading in pursuance of normal commercial dealing without taking a further 
positive step such as demanding delivery. Therefore, reaching that conclusion on the basis 
of a comparison between the words of the 1855 Act and the 1992 Act regardless of the 
words which specified the conditions on which liability would be imposed seems strange 
and unconvincing. 25 This is because an intermediate holder would not be liable to the 
carrier under the 1992 Act unless the conditions of s. 3 (1) were satisfied. Furthermore, the 
Law Commissions argued in favour of the bill of lading holder being subject to liabilities 
that "It would be unfair to shipowners to widen the category of persons able to assert 
contractual rights against them whilst, at the same time, taking away the ability of the 
shipowner to assert contractual rights against such person". 26 Using the same argument 
should arguably prevent any expansion to the category of persons being subject to 
23 For the opposite point view see Thomas 1's preliminary view in The Aegean Sea, supra fn. 5 ~t.63, t?at "if 
a person who is, at the time he makes the demand for delivery the lawful holder, then the condItIOns In s. 3 
are satisfied as he is at that time the person in whom 'rights are vested' under s. 2 and liabilities are therefore 
imposed on him under s. 3 and they remain with him". Approved by Sir Brian Neill in his dissenting 
judgment in the Court of Appeal in The Berge Sisar, supra fn. 20 at 484. 
24 See supra fn. 21. 
25 For the support for this view, see Reynolds, F. M. B., "The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1992 Put To The 
Rest" [1999] LMCLQ, 161 at 163. 
26 The Law Commissions Report supra fn. 3 at para. 3. 10. 
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liabilities without taking one of the steps mentioned in s. 3 (a- c) of the 1992 Act. The 
shipowners' argunlent would entail such an expansion. Nonetheless, the principle of 
mutuality anticipated by the House of Lords' obiter views could arguably entail a 
contraction of the class of potential defendants when compared to the position under the 
1855 Act because under that Act the contractual benefits and burdens are transferred 
together. Suppose SmurthH'aite's facts were replicated under COGSA 1992 but with the 
lawful holder not triggering s. 3 (1). Neither the eventual holder of the bill of lading nor the 
intermediate holder would be liable, if the operation of s. 3 (1) was not triggered by the 
final holder of the bill. This conclusion would not be possible under the 1855 Act on the 
basis that the contractual burdens and benefits are tied together. 
However, the House of Lords in The Berge Sisar, anticipated that the inter- relation 
of s. 2 and s. 3 of the 1992 Act depends on the particular facts in any subsequent case "the 
conduct of one or other party may give rise to estoppels as where one party has been led to 
exercise forbearance in reliance upon some conduct of the other. In most cases there will 
be other documents or agreements to take into account besides the bill of lading such as 
charter parties, letters of indemnity, non- separation agreement, or ad hoc agreements".27 
The criterion used by Millett L J., in the Court of Appeal in The Berge Sisar,28 where he 
concluded that "Liability does not remain irrevocably with the holder of the bill who takes 
any of the steps mentioned in the section unless, of course, the nature of those steps 
precludes any further dealing with the goods", can also be used as a guidance. 
Accordingly, taking delivery, under s. 3 (1) (a), should not cause any problem as it 
would involve a voluntary transfer of the possession of the goods from the carrier to the 
holder of and would also be the final act of the performance of the contractual carrier's 
obligation of delivery. Under such circumstances, the bill would normally be surrendered 
27 See supra fn. 6 at para. 43. 
28 See supra fn. 20 at 487. 
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on taking that delivery of the goods and so it would prevent any further of dealing with the 
bill of lading as well as with the goods. This conclusion is in consistent with Lord 
Hobhouse's criterion "The character of the conduct which attracks the liability imposed by 
s. 3 (1) is expected to have an element of relative finality; it is not conduct which is 
tentative or equivocal nor conduct which is equally consistent with the person leaving it to 
a later endorsee to exercise the rights transferred by s. 2 (1)". Also, taking delivery, under 
s. 3 (1) (c), should not cause any problem, even though such taking of delivery would not 
be against the surrender of the bill of lading but, perhaps, against a letter of indemnity. 
Accordingly, would the intermediate holder of the bill of lading who, for example, asked 
the carrier to discharge the cargo at another port during the course of the voyage remain 
liable to the carrier even if he decided to endorse to the bill of lading to another transferee? 
By virtue of Lord Hobhouse's 'principle of mutuality' such intermediate holder would 
have had the benefit of such delivery, but as a result of the further transferring of the bill of 
lading to another transferee, he will have lost the benefit of being able to sue the carrier for 
the loss of or the damage to the cargo as a breach of the carrier of the carriage contract. 
Therefore, the final transferee would have the contractual rights of suit under s. 2 (l) and 
so would be liable to the carrier under s. 3 (1) where the requirements of that section were 
. fi d 29 satIs Ie . 
However, the potential problem might exist under s. 3 (1) (a) and (c) relating to 
demanding the delivery of the goods. Therefore, the intermediate holder of a bill of lading 
who demanded delivery which is later withdrawn should not remain liable to the carrier. 
Millett L 1., in the Court of Appeal in The Berge Sisar,30 stated that "Liability does not 
remain irrevocably with the holder of the bill who takes any of the steps mentioned in the 
section unless, of course, the nature of those steps precludes any further dealing with the 
29 For Treitel's comments on Lord Hobhouse's wording see supra fn. 14 at p. 349. 
30 See supra fn. 20 at 487. 
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goods". Therefore, demanding delivery without the actual delivery of the goods would not 
make the intermediate holder's position irreversible.31 This conclusion is also consistent 
with Lord Hobhouse' s criterion "The character of the conduct which attracts the liability 
imposed by s. 3 (1) is expected to have an element of relative finality; it is not conduct 
which is tentative or equivocal nor conduct which is equally consistent with the person 
leaving it to a later endorsee to exercise the rights transferred by s. 2 (1 )". 32 
The other questionable type of demanding of the delivery from the carrier would be 
under s. 3 (1) (c) would arguably not be relevant. This is because such a demand would not 
be made as of right and would not therefore amount to a true 'demand'. Only a bill of 
lading holder, in possession of the relevant bill, is in a position to demand that the carrier 
or his agent deliver the goods to him. Therefore, Lord Hobhouse was probably right in 
concluding that it was difficult to envisage circumstances in which a demand for delivery 
would be made within s. 3 (1) (c). 33 This is because such a demand would be made when 
the vessel and its cargo arrive at the destination before the bills of lading which are still in 
their journey up the chain of banks and buyers. Thus, the intended receiver would demand 
delivery without the willingness to surrender the relevant bills of lading which would not 
constitute a demand as of right. 
Making a claim against the carrier under the carriage contract, by virtue of s. 3 (1) 
(b), would not make the intermediate holder's position irreversible similar to that of 
demanding delivery of the goods under s. 3 (1) (a). Therefore, if the intermediate holder 
decided to withdraw the claim and instead endorsed the bill of lading to another transferee, 
he should also remain liable to the carrier by virtue of s. 3 (1) (b) of the 1992 Act. 
31 But, it is arguable that demanding delivery without the actual delivery can. be irreversib~e where the car?o 
is lost and there are no goods to be delivered. Therefore, the holder of the bIll would be lIable to the c~rner 
on demanding delivery which was the purpose of making him liable to the carrier so as not to enable hIm to 
wake out of the carriage contract in the absence of actual delivery. 
32 See supra th. 6 at para. 41. 
33 For Treitel's comments on Lord Hobhouse's wording see supra th. 14 at p. 349. 
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However, indicating that the intennediate holder of the bill of lading will be holding the 
carrier responsible for the damage of the cargo during the voyage should not be considered 
as nlaking a claim. This is because Lord Hobhouse in The Berge Sisar34 concluded that 
"expressing a view in the course of a meeting or letter as to the liability of the carrier" 
would not be a fonnal claim but rather "issuing a writ or arresting the vessel". 
3.3. THE CARGO OWNER'S LIABILITY UNDER THE DRAFT INSTRUMENT 
The Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 12 (2) (2) provides that "Any holder that is not the 
shipper and that exercises any right under the contract of carriage, assumes any liability 
imposed on it under the contract of carriage to the extent that such liabilities are 
incorporated in or ascertainable from the negotiable transport document or the negotiable 
electronic record". Accordingly, the final holder of a negotiable transport document or the 
final transferee of a negotiable electronic record who claimed or took delivery of the goods 
at their destination, under art. 10 (3) (a) (i & ii), or who exercised his right of control under 
art. 11 (1) and art. 11 (2) (b & c), would assume any liabilities imposed under the carriage 
contract to the extent that such liabilities are incorporated in or ascertainable from the 
negotiable transport document or the negotiable electronic record. The notes to art. 12 (2) 
(2) make it clear that the intention is to impose certain liabilities only on the shipper, such 
as liabilities under the articles 7 (1) and 7 (3).35 The Draft Instrument, by virtue of both 
arts. 12 (2) (1 & 2), provides that the contracting shipper would still assume liabilities 
imposed under the carriage contract and therefore, the effect of these articles is to replicate 
s. 3 (3) of the 1992 Act. 
34 See supra fn. 6 at 675. .. 
35 See UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carnage of Goo~s by Se~, Umted 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Nmth seSSIOn U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. D~c. A/CN.9/.'VG.III/WP.21) at para. 
199. The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncltral.org!en-mdex.htm. 
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Article 12 (2) (1) provides that "Without prejudice to the provisions of article 11. 5, 
any holder that is not the shipper and that does not exercise any right under the contract of 
carriage, does not assume any liability under the contract of carriage solely by reason of 
becoming a holder". Under this provision a holder would not assume any liability under 
the carriage contract solely by reason of becoming the holder which replicates the effect of 
s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. On the one hand, by virtue of art. 11 (2) (d), the intermediate 
holder of a negotiable transport document or the intermediate transferee of a negotiable 
electronic record who transferred the right of control without having exercised that right 
shall be discharged from the liabilities imposed on the controlling party by virtue of the 
carriage contract or by virtue of this set of Rules. On the other hand, by virtue of art. 11 (2) 
( b & c), the intermediate holder of a negotiable transport document or the intermediate 
transferee of a negotiable electronic record who transferred the right of control but having 
exercising that right shall also be discharged from the liabilities imposed on the controlling 
party by virtue of the carriage contract or by virtue of this set of Rules, provided that such 
instructions are stated on the negotiable transport document or in the negotiable electronic 
record, under art. 11 (2) (b) (iv) or art. 11 (2) (c) (iii). However, the only liability an 
intermediate holder or transferee can incur, under art. 11 (2) ( b & c), is that of giving 
instructions to the carrier under that article. Accordingly, the intermediate holder's 
liabilities are extinguished, under the Draft Instrument, whether or not he exercised his 
right of control, as long as the right of control has been transferred, or the possession of a 
negotiable transport document has been transferred with the necessary endorsement to a 
new holder or the exclusive access to or control of a negotiable electronic record has been 
transferred to a new transferee, in pursuant to art. 12 (4). In contrast, under s. 2 (5) of the 
1992 Act, the rights of the intermediate holder are extinguished but there is no equivalent 
provision specifying whether his liabilities are also be extinguished. The issue of 
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intennediate holder's liabilities, therefore, has been left to be decided by the English courts 
as in The Berge Sisar. 36 
In contrast, the liability of consignee named in a sea waybill, by virtue of art. 12 
(...j.), seems to be left to national law applicable to the carriage contract relating to the 
transfer or rights. This considerably undennines the unifonnity of the Rules. 
3.4. UNDISCLOSED LIABILITIES RUN WITH S. 3 (1) OF THE 1992 ACT 
The other issue related to the eventual cargo owner's liability under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act 
is the question of what risks of undisclosed liabilities does the eventual cargo owner take 
when he triggers the operations of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act, particularly as regards 
dangerous cargo and freight. This is because the Law Commissions in their Report decided 
neither to distinguish between pre- shipment and post- shipment liabilities nor to make a 
special provision relieving the consignee or the endorsee from liability caused by the 
shipper's breach of warranty as not to ship dangerous cargo.37 
3. 4. 1. LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS CARGO 
3. 4. 1. 1. Liability for Dangerous Cargo under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act 
The question of whether the eventual cargo owner would be liable to the carrier in respect 
of dangerous cargo under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act was not answered by the Law 
Commissions' Report. This issue was not also considered by English courts neither under 
s. 1 of the 1855 Act nor under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. However, the House of Lords in 
36 See supra tn. 6. 
37 See the Law Commissions' Report supra fn. 3 at paras. 3. 20- 3.22. 
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Effort Shipping Co. Ltd. \'. Linden Management AS alld Others "The Giannis NK",38 albeit 
obiter, took the view that the liability of the holder of thc bill of lading under s. 1 of the 
1855 Act would be "by way of addition, not substitution". This issllc call he dccid<.;d under 
English law by examining the words of both s. J (1) oCthe I ()()2 Acl ;111<1 ;111 IV «() cd the 
Hague- Visby Rules; COGSA 1971. 
As to the words of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act, which might givc ;111 cldi)"htl:lltllf;nt ti, 
this issue, suggest that the third party assumes all the liabilities to which the OJ i),,1tJ:d f);l1t I 
to the carriage contract was subject. 39 Liabilities under the carriage contract cw 1)1; 
imposed on the shipper either by the tenns of the bill of lading or the statutory provisj(JTj', 
such as the Hague and Hague- Visby Rues. It is arguable therefore that any liability 
imposed upon the shipper by the statutory provisions, such as arts. IV (6) and III (5) of the 
Hague and Hague- Visby Rules, should not be transferable to the third party on whom the 
liabilities are imposed by virtue of s. 3 (1). This argument can be supported by s. 5 (5) of 
the 1992 Act which provides that "The preceding provisions in this Act shall haye effect 
without prejudice to the application, in relation to any case, of the rules (the Hague- Yi~by 
Rules) which for the time being have the force of law by virtue of section 1 nf the Carri~l~l' 
of Goods by Sea Act 1971". Therefore, the courts should not manipulatl' the \\l)rd:-; l)fthc 
Hague- Visby Rules so as to impose liability on the third party. This i:-; hl'\.';llI~l' till' a iIll \) t' 
38 [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 337 at 344. However, the House of Lords held that tlll~ shipper. under the I ~5-" \l'l. 
remains liable to the carrier for his breach of warranty not to ship dallgcnllis rargll. Alsll, 1\ Iuslill .I., in 1'Ii,' 
Athanasia Comninos and Georges Chr. Lemos, [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 277 at 2S I. held thaI "hut thl' .\\.'1 
cannot in my judgment have been intended to divest the shipper or respo\lsihilit~· Illr till' l'llnSl'ljlll'nl.'l'S ll( 
loss, arising from the act of shipment itself'. The continuity of the shlpplT's 1IaI1Ilitv is iliadI.' l''l.prl'ssh h\ the 
wording of s. 3 (3) of the 1992 Act and so the issue in Thc (iii/I/I/is NA wlluld IIl'ithl'l ;IIISl' Illlr l'allSl' ;1 
problem under the 1992 Act. 
39 It is submitted that the transferee under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act IS trcated ;IS II" Ill' kid bl'l'n;1 p;lrl, III Ihl' 
original carriage contract by using the words "that contract" and so inclIlTcd 1I1111;lhllll Il'S. This IS hl'1.';IlISl' thl' 
holder is liable only if he takes one of the active steps, mentioned illS. J (I)' In CLlIlII the hl'lIl'l'ils llf tilL' 
carriage contract. See Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F.M.M., ('arl'cr on /hils o( /'i/,IiIl.I!., I lllllilHl S\\l'l'l ,\: 
Maxwell 2001, at para. 5- 095 and para. 9- 220. 
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the 1992 Act is to remove the privity problem but not to substitute 'the third party' with 
'the shipper' for all purposes.40 
A contrasting view can be found in The Giannis NK 41 where both Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick and Lord Steyn were of the view that all the shipper's liabilities are transferred to 
the eventual buyer on whom the liabilities are imposed under the s. 1 of the 1855 Act. 
Millett L J in the Court of Appeal in The Berge Sisar agreed with the above dictum of both 
Lord lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn in The Giannis NK and added "The liability of an 
endorsee was by way of addition to that of the consignor but by way of substitution for that 
of a previous endorsee. Although different mechanisms were employed in relation to the 
yesting of rights and liabilities, they were closely linked; it was only the consignee or 
endorsee who had the rights of suit who was subject to liabilities".42 Furthermore, the Law 
Commissions' Report declined to include a special provision to prevent third parties from 
being liable in respect of the shipment of dangerous goods on the basis that 
"We do not think that liability in respect of dangerous goods is 
necessarily more unfair than liability in respect of a range of other 
matters over which the holder of the bill of lading has no control and for 
which it is not responsible, as for instance liability for loadport 
demurrage and dead freight. Also it may be unfair to exempt the endorsee 
from dangerous goods' liability in those cases where he may have been 
the prime mover behind the shipment. Furthermore, it is unfair that the 
carrier should be denied redress against the indorsee of the bill of lading 
who seeks to take the benefits of the contract of carriage without the 
d· b d ,,43 correspon lng ur ens . 
However, one could argue that making the third party liable for pre- shipment 
charges such as dead freight and loadport demurrage can be accepted on the ground that he 
40 For support for this view see Gaskell, N.,(et aI), Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, LLP, 2000, at para. 4. 
49- 4.55 and Baughen, S., and Campbell, N., "Apportionment of Risk and the carriage of Dangerous Cargo" 
[2001] IML 1 at 7. However, Gaskell reaches different conclusion on this issue at para. 15.52. 
41 See supra fn. 38 at 344 and 349. 
42 See supra fn. 20 at 485. However, the House of Lords in The Berge Sisar, supra fn. ~, proc~eded o~ the 
assumption that the shipper's liability in respect of dangerous goods is transferable to thud partIes prOVIded 
they trigger the operation of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. .. . . 
43 See the Law Commissions' Report supra fn. 3 at para. 3. 22. However, thIS argument IS subject to dIfferent 
criticisms. For these criticisms see Gaskell, N., supra fn. 40 at para. 4. 54 and Baughen, S., and Campbell, N., 
supra fn. 40 at 7. 
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can be warned of his potential liabilities for those charges by the tenns of the bill of lading 
or the tenus of the charter- party which are suitably incorporated in the bill of lading. It 
should also be noted that the words of s. 3 (1) have yet to be ruled on by English court in 
this context, since the dicta of both Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn in The Giannis 
NK were an obiter. Furthennore, the absence of any special provision in respect of the 
shipment of a dangerous cargo in the Law Commissions' Report leaves the door open to 
the courts to decide this matter, favourably, in favour of third parties. This is because the 
third party would not be able to give a notice to the carrier as to carry the goods safely as a 
result of the lack of the means of knowledge of its dangerous characteristics or its 
insufficient packing. 
However, apart from the common law, the shipper's obligation and liability relating 
to dangerous cargo are also governed by art. IV (6) of the Hague- Visby Rules; COGSA 
1971. Therefore, the question of whether the shipper's liability is transferable to the 
eventual cargo owner under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act is related to the question whether this 
liability can be transferable to another person other than the shipper under the Hague-
Visby Rules. Thus, the interpretation of the shipper's obligations under the Hague- Visby 
Rules is decisive as to whether any person other than the shipper could be liable to the 
carrier for the shipper's breach of his obligation as not to ship dangerous cargo under art. 
IV (6). This view is supported by Lord Cooke of Thorndon in The Giannis NK 44 where he 
commented upon the expression 'free- standing' as to the question of the interrelation 
between art. IV (3) and art. IV (6) "Like every other document, the Rules have to be read 
as a whole and Article N, r. 6 is an integral part of them". The Hague- Visby Rules, unlike 
the Hamburg Rules, provide no definition to the word "shipper" which could arguably be 
useful in providing guidance for the above question. It is arguable therefore that the 
44 See supra fn. 38 at 350. 
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language of the relevant parts of the Hague- Visby Rules would provide authoritative 
guidance to the intention of the framers of the Rules so as to create consistent meaning 
which reflects the intention of the Rules. 
The shipper, under art. III (5) of the Hague- Visby Rules, should guarantee to the 
carrier the accuracy of the marks, number, quantity and weight, as furnished by him, at the 
time of shipment. As a result, the shipper would indemnify the carrier for all losses, 
damages and expenses arising out of inaccuracies of such information. The shipper's 
guarantee, under art. III (5), is a personal guarantee so as the shipper is the only person 
who would be liable to the carrier under this guarantee. Therefore, the liability under this 
guarantee would not be transferable to any other person, such as the eventual buyer, by 
virtue of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. 45 Thomas J., in The Aegean Sea 46 held that the shipper's 
obligation under this guarantee is solely of the shipper and would not be transferred. In his 
opinion, the nature and the source of this obligation was such as it remained with the 
shipper and was not transferred. This conclusion is confirmed by the last sentence of art. 
III (5) which provides that "The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no way limit 
his responsibility and liability under the contract of carriage to any person other than the 
shipper". Furthermore, one could argue that a contrary conclusion would undermine art. III 
(4) which prevents the carrier from introducing a proof to the contrary regarding such 
information "when the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party in good faith". 
The carrier, by virtue of art. IV (2) (i) of the Hague- Visby Rules, would not be 
liable for loss or damage resulting from "Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the 
goods, his agent or representative". This article was considered by the Court of Appeal in 
Filikos Shipping Corporation of Monrovia . v. Shipmair B. v., (The Filikos)47 which held 
45 For support for this view see Boyd, S., (et at) Scrutton on Charter parties and Bills of Lading, 20th edition, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 1996, at pp. 433- 434. 
46 See supra fn. 5 at 70. 
47 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 9. 
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that any reference in the Hague Rules to the shipper or owner of the goods would not be 
read as a reference to the charterer, since the charterer is not the shipper or owner of the 
goods. Dillon LJ., added that "I can see no reason for doing such violence to the language 
of art. IV and I can see nothing in Adamastos to warrant it. The position may for, any of 
many reasons, be different if the charterer is the sole owner of the goods, but that we do 
not have to consider".48 Therefore, the term "shipper" in art. IV (2) (i) of the Hague- Visby 
Rules could not be read as a reference to the eventual buyer but only and solely to the 
shipper. 
The shipper, by virtue of art. IV (3) of the Hague- Visby Rules, would not be liable 
to the carrier for any loss or damage resulting from any cause without "the act, fault or 
neglect of the shipper, his agents of his servants". The interpretation of art. IV (3) of the 
Hague- Visby Rules was considered by Thomas J., in The Aegean Sea.49 Thomas 1., held 
that the term "shipper" in art. IV (3) could only refer to the shipper and not to any other 
person such as the eventual buyer to whom the liabilities are imposed under s. 3 (1) of the 
1992 Act. 50 He also refused to qualify the other obligations which are transferred by art. IV 
(3) on the basis that "Article IV, r. 3. is dealing with the obligations of the shipper in his 
capacity as shipper and not with the other liabilities of those who become subject to those 
other liabilities under the bill of lading by virtue of s. 3 of COGSA 1992".51 
Finally, art. IV (6) of the Hague- Visby Rules relating to the shipment of dangerous 
cargo provides that 
Goods of an inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to the shipment 
whereof the carrier, master or agent of the carrier has not consented with 
knowledge of their nature and character, may at any. time before 
discharge be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered Innocuous by 
48 Ibid. at 12. 
49 See supra fn. 5 at 69. . . . 
50 Th J agreed with the observations made by the edItors of Scrutton on Charter parties and Bills of Ladin~~~s th'~ commentary to art. III (5) at p. 434, art. IV (3) at p. 451 and art. IV ~6) at p. 453. For full 
citation of these observations see Boyd, S., supra fn. 45 at pp. 434, 451 and 453 respectIvely. 
51 See supra fn. 5 at 70. 
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t?e carrier without compensation and the shipper of such goods shall be 
hable for all ~amages directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting 
from such shIpment. If any goods shipped with such knowledge and 
consent shall become a danger to the ship or cargo, they may in like 
manner be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the 
carrier without liability on the part of the carrier except to general 
average, if any. 
Thomas 1., in The Aegean Sea 52 considering the term 'shipper' in art. IV (3) of the Hague-
Visby Rules was of the view that the obligation not to ship dangerous cargo is solely that 
of the shipper and will not be transferred to the eventual buyer on whom the liabilities are 
imposed under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. Scrutton argues that the term 'shipper' where it 
appears in the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules should be interpreted in the same way as to 
refer solely to the shipper. His view based on the interpretation of the guarantee imposed 
on the shipper under art. III (5) of the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules as the shipper should 
only, and not the third party, be liable under this guarantee. 53 However, this argument has 
been subject to criticism by Mildon and Scorley54 on the basis of the last sentence of art. III 
(5) which states that "The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no way limit his 
responsibility and liability under the contract of carriage to any person other than the 
shipper". Accordingly, they argue that the term 'shipper' where it appears in the Rules will 
not, without more specification, imply that liability created by that article is either personal 
to the shipper or incapable of being transferred to a third party. However, Baughen and 
Campbell oppose this argument on the basis that it would contradict the use of the term 
'shipper' linguistically. 55 They also argue by analogy with the decision of the House of 
Lords in The Miramar56 where the House of Lords refused to manipulate the wording of 
the charter- party as to impose liability on the holder of the bill of lading on the basis that 
52 Ibid. 
53 See Boyd, S., supra fn. 45 at pp. 434 and 453. 
54 Mildon, D., and Scorley, D., "Liabilities of the Transferees of Bills of Lading" [1999] IJOSL 94. 
55 See Baughen, S., and Campbell, N., supra fn. 40 at 7. 
56 [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 129. 
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its wording was not elect to impose liability on any other person other than that the 
charterer. Nevertheless, the absence of an equivalent words in art. IV (6) as to that of the 
last sentence of art. III (5) might arguably indicate the transferability of this obligation to 
the third party.57 One could argue, however, that this argument is based on misreading of 
the ainl behind the words contained in the last sentence of art. III (5). That aim is to 
prevent a potential contradiction between the sub- rules (4) and (5) of art. III as not to 
undermine sub- rule (4) of art. III which prevents the carrier from introducing a proof to 
the contrary regarding such information "when the bill has been transferred to a third party 
in good faith". 
It is sumitted, however, that the view of Thomas J., should be preferred on the basis 
that the issue should be considered solely on the words of art. IV (6) of the Hague- Visby 
Rules. in addition to the words of arts. III (5), IV (2) (i) and IV (3) which might give useful 
guidance, rather than the words of either s. 3 (1) of the 1922 Act or s. 1 of 1855 Act, in 
deciding whether the shipper's obligation not to ship dangerous cargo is a personal 
obligation, which is not be transferable to a third party by virtue ofs. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. 
Furthermore, Lord Campbell in Brass . v. Maitland58 held that the shipper's implied 
liability at common law should be strict on the basis of the shipper having the means of 
ascertaining the dangerous characteristics of the cargo. He commented that 
Although those employed on behalf of the shipowner have no reasonable 
means during the loading of a general ship to ascertain the quality of the 
goods offered for shipment, or narrowly to examine the sufficiency of the 
packing of the goods, the shippers have such means; and it seems much 
more just and expedient that, although they were ignorant of the 
dangerous quality of the goods or insufficiency of the packing, the loss 
occasioned by the dangerous quality of the goods and insufficient 
packing should be cast upon the shippers than upon the shipowners. 
57 See Gaskell, N., supra fn. 40 at para. 15.52. 
58 [1856] 6 E & B 470 at 483. 
173 
According to this reason of policy, third parties would not arguably be considered as 
ignorant but rather not having the means of knowing that the goods were dangerous or 
insufficiently packed, since the third party can hardly be said to have induced the shipment 
of the goods in their dangerous condition, even they might have induced the shipment of 
those goods as the Law Commissions' Report anticipated. 59 Furthermore, the second 
sentence of art. IV (6) declines to make the shipper liable in damages to the carrier when 
the goods are shipped with the carrier's consent and knowledge of their nature and 
character. 
Accordingly, the third party would not have the chance of satisfying the 
requirement of non- responsibility on the basis of the absence of the means of knowing the 
dangerous characteristics of the goods or its insufficient packing prior taking delivery. This 
line of argument is supported by Colinvaux, R., where he argues that "That concerned the 
implied warranty of a shipper to give notice of the dangerous character of the cargo 
shipped. But that would appear to be a warranty outside the terms of the bill of lading, non-
compliance with which may induce the master to accept the goods and to sign the bill of 
lading, ... , if that is so, it would not create a liability apt to be transferred to the consignee 
under the Act". 60 Making the third party liable under art. IV (6), without having the chance 
of satisfying the requirement of non- responsibility, would arguably be undesirable and 
unacceptable. This is because it would put the shipper in a better position and would not 
create consistency and uniformity between the language of the relevant parts of the Rules; 
arts. III (5), IV (2) (I) and IV (3). 
The issue of overlap between the obligation imposed under art. IV (6) and that 
imposed impliedly at common law orl and expressly by the terms of the bill of lading will 
be critical if, however, English courts decide to confine the obligation imposed under art. 
59 See the Law Commissions' Report supra fn. 3 at para. 3.22. 
60 See Colinvaux, R., Carver's Carriage by Sea, 13th Ed., London: Stevens & Sons 1982, fn. 96 at p. 68. 
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IV (6) to the original shipper and so to allocate the loss occasioned by the dangerous 
quality of the goods and insufficient packing upon the shipper rather than the third party. 
One of the critical points of the overlap between the obligation imposed under art. IV (6) 
and that imposed impliedly at common law is that whether the shipowner would be able to 
sue a third party at common law for loss or damage caused by the shipment of goods which 
d . h . 1 1 61 62 are angerous In a non- p YSIca or egal manner. In The Fiona Diamond J., concluded 
that the shipowner's exclusive remedy must be governed by art. IV (6) of the Hague-
Visby Rules and so the common law obligation not to ship dangerous cargo should not be 
considered, provided that the Rules applied by statute. At the first instance in The Giannis 
lVK
3 
Longmore J., concluded that art. IV (6) deals only with physical dangerous cargo but 
not with non- physical dangerous cargo and so the rights of the parties in relation to such 
cargo should be governed by the provisions implied by the law governing the carriage 
contract. Hirst L J., in the Court of Appeal confirmed the dictum of Longmore J., and 
emphasised the lack of overlap between the obligation imposed under art. IV (6) and that 
imposed impliedly at common law.64 Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn in the House 
of Lords did not deal with this issue, even though Lord Steyn (obiter) agreed arguably with 
the dictum of Longmore J. 65 
The other critical point of the overlap between the obligation imposed under art. IV 
(6) and that imposed impliedly at common law is whether the shipowner would be able to 
sue a third party at common law for loss or damage caused by the shipment of goods, in 
61 Mustill J., in The Athanasia Comninos, [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 277 at 281, (obiter) concluded that the 
holder of the bill of lading could not be liable, under an implied contract, for the breach of warranty as to the 
fitness of the goods for carriage. He stated that "There is to my mind no reason to assu~e, from the bare fa~ts 
of presentation and delivery, that the parties intended the consignee to be made subject to a retrospectIve 
liability for acts with which he had nothing to do". 
62 [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 257 at 268. 
63 [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 at 180. 
64 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 577. . . .. . 
65 See supra fn. 38 at 341 and 346, respectively. The reason for not dealmg WIth thIS Issue ~s that both Lord 
Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn in the House of Lords held that the good~ were physIc.ally dangerous 
according to art. IV (6) on the basis that it resulted of an order for the dumpmg of the entIre cargo, even 
though it caused no direct physical damage to the other goods. 
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circumstances in which the master's consent would prevent the claim from being made 
under art. IV (6) of the Hague- Visby Rules but not under common law. This is because a 
c lainl can be advanced against a third party under an express term of carriage contract; the 
bill of lading rather than under art. IV (6) of the Hague- Visby Rules as in Chandris . v. 
Isbrandtsen- Moller. 66 The unfortunate non- committal attitude of the House of Lords in 
The Giannis NK to recovery of pure economic loss under art. IV (6) leaves the door wide 
open to further litigation. However, one could argue that the third party should not be 
liable in respect of the shipment of dangerous cargo under the common law duty on the 
basis that they would not be able to give notice to shipowners as to enable them to carry 
dangerous cargoes in safe ways. 
In the absence of any conclusive judicial decision on the question of whether the 
liability in respect of dangerous cargo is transferable to third parties, express terms in the 
bill of lading may be the only way of resolving this problem. On the one hand, express 
clauses in some bills of lading clarified this issue and imposed the obligation not to ship 
dangerous cargo on the consignor, such as clause 19 of 'Multidoc' form bill and clause 18 
of 'Combidoc' form bill. One could argue that the inclusion of such clauses would relieve 
third parties from a potential liability in respect of dangerous cargo, under art. IV (6), on 
the basis of art. V of the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules allows the carrier "to surrender in 
whole or in part all or any of his rights and immunities" under these Rules. On the other 
hand, an express clause in a bill of lading, such as clause 14 of the 'K' Line form of bill of 
lading, imposed the obligation not to ship dangerous cargo on the merchant. One could 
also argue that such clause would not be helpful a part of alerting third parties of their 
potential liability in respect of dangerous cargo. However, the validity of such a clause 
would arguably be doubtful where the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules apply, on the basis 
66 The claim in Chandris .v. Isbrandtsen- Moller, [1951] 1 KB 240, was advance on the express provision of 
the charterparty rather under the 'paramount clause' incorporating the COGSA 1936 (US). 
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of art. III (8) of the Rules, provided that the courts decided in favour of the assumption that 
the obligation under art. IV (6) of the Rules is not transferable to a third party. 
3. 4. 1. 2. Liability for Dangerous Cargo under the Draft Instrument 
Article 7 (6), provides that the shipper is liable to the carrier "for any loss, damage, or 
injury caused by the goods and for a breach of its obligations under article 7. 1, unless the 
shipper proves that such loss or damage is caused by events or through circumstances that 
a diligent shipper could not avoid or the consequences of which a diligent shipper was 
unable to prevent". In general, the Draft Instrument considered the distinction between 
dangerous and non- dangerous cargoes as being out of date. Moreover, the criterion as 
whether the goods were carried with or without the carrier's consent has become irrelevant 
under art. 7 (6), unlike art. IV (6) of the Hague- Visby Rules. 67 The balance between the 
shipper's liability and the carrier's liability, under the Draft Instrument, is that any damage 
resulted from the nature of the cargo should fall on the shipper, while any damage caused 
by improper handling or through the carriage should fall on the carrier. 
The answer to the question of whether the shipper's liability In relation to 
dangerous cargo would be transferable to a holder of a negotiable transport document or a 
transferee of a negotiable electronic record, under art. 12 (2) (2), depends on the 
interpretation of art. 7 (1 & 6). On the one hand, the eMI Outline Draft, by virtue of art. 1 
(19), defines the 'shipper' as "a person who enters into a contract of carriage with a 
carrier". On the other hand, art. 7 (1) provides that 
"Subject to the provisions of the contract of carriage: .the shipper sh~l1 
deliver the goods ready for carriage and in such condItIon that they ,;111 
withstand the intended carriage, including their loading, stowage, lashIng 
and securing, and discharge, and that they w~l1 not cause inj.ury or 
damage. In the event the goods are delivered In or on a contaIner or 
67 The Hamburg Rules also made the carrier's consent irrelevant as precondition for imposing liability on the 
shipper for the loss or damage caused by the goods. 
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trailer ?acked by the shipper, the shipper must stow, lash and secure the 
g~ods In or on t~e container or trailer in such a way that the goods will 
~Ithstand the Indented carriage, including loading, handling and 
dIscharge of the container or trailer, and that they will not cause injury or 
damage". 
It seems, therefore, that the combined effect of both art. 7 (1 & 6) and art. 1 (19) is 
to qualify the shipper's obligation, not to ship dangerous cargo, as a personal obligation 
and the liability of a breach of such obligation as only of the shipper. However, the 
consignor, defined by virtue of art. 1 (3) as "a person that delivers the goods to a carrier for 
carriage", may become liable, under art. 7 (6), by virtue of art. 7 (7), for the shipment of 
dangerous cargo. Article 7 (7) provides that when "a person identified as shipper in the 
contract particulars, although not the shipper as defined in article l. 19, accepts the 
transport document or electronic record, then such person is (a) subject to the 
responsibilities and liabilities imposed on the shipper under this chapter and under article 
11. 5". 
The commentary to this article identifies three parties who might fall within its 
provisions because of being identified as "shipper" in the contract provisions. The first is 
an FOB seller who 'usually complies with the requirement of this article 7.7 in that the 
seller is mentioned as shipper in the document and has accepted the document. . . . In 
addition, if a negotiable document is issued, the seller becomes the first holder and has all 
the rights and liabilities of a holder, including the right of control. If a non- negotiable 
document is issued, such an FOB seller has the right of suit as per article 13 .... ,.68 The 
second is an agent who is mentioned as shipper in the shipping document. The 
commentary states that this situation '.... can only arise when such agent, expressly or 
impliedly, is authorised by the shipper (as defined) to be such 'documentary shipper'. If 
such agent accepts the document, its position is the same as outlined above with respect to 
68 See (U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21) at para. 121. This commentary would, presumably, ~pply equally 
to elF seller who had contracted with a time charterer on the basis that a shipowner's bill ofladmg would be 
issued to it. 
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the FOB seller. Its alternative course is not to accept the document'.69 Thirdly, there is 'the 
person who actually delivers the goods to carrier in cases where such person is a person 
other than those mentioned under (1) and (2)' .70 The definition of 'consignor' in art. 1 (3) 
includes such a person. Such a consignor's only right is to obtain a receipt according to art. 
8 (1) and therefore, he assumes no liabilities under art. 7 (7) or under art. 11 (5). Article 9 
(3) (i) renders invalid any cesser clause insofar as it relates to any liability imposed on the 
shipper. or other party caught by art. 7 (7). 
As a result, the holder of a negotiable transport document or the transferee of a 
negotiable electronic record, under the Draft Instrument, would probably not be liable to 
the carrier in respect of loss or damage caused by the shipment of dangerous cargo. This 
conclusion is supported by the following definition of the 'holder' under art. 1 (12) 
"a person that (a) is for the time being in possession of a negotiable 
transport document or has the exclusive [access to] [control of] a 
negotiable electronic record, and (b) either: (I) if the document is an 
order document, is identified in it as the shipper or the consignee, or is 
the person to whom the document is duly endorsed, or (ii) if the 
document is a blank endorsed order document or bearer document, is the 
bearer thereof, or (iii) if a negotiable record is used, is pursuant to article 
2.4 able to demonstrate that it has [access to] [control of] such record". 
As to the 'consignee' who is defined, by virtue of art. 1 (2) as "a person entitled to take 
delivery of the goods under a contract of carriage or a transport document or electronic 
record", that party would not be liable for the shipment of dangerous cargo under art. 7 (6), 
unless that consignee is defined as the shipper in the transport document or the electronic 
record, by virtue of art. 7 (7), and accepted such document or record. This is because such 
consignee would be considered as the shipper's agent who, expressly or impliedly, is 
authorised by the shipper to be the documentary shipper. 
69 See (U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.21) at para. 122. 
70 See (U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.III/WP.21) at para. 119. 
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However, where a negotiable transport document or a negotiable electronic record 
contains a clause, which defines the 'Merchant' as to include among others, the shipper, 
consignor, holder, consignee etc., and states that the 'Merchant' bears the shipper's 
responsibilities under the carriage contract, this might cause a problem in the sense that it 
might make the shipper's liability for the shipment of dangerous cargo transferable to such 
a third party. This argument might be supported the words of art. 12 (2) (2) which might 
give a statutory effect to any standard clause which imposes any or all of the shipper's 
obligations under art. 7, in particular the obligation as not to ship dangerous cargo, on such 
holder or transferee. It is arguable, therefore, that any clause imposing any or all of the 
shipper's obligations on the holder of a negotiable transport document or the transferee of a 
negotiable electronic record would be effective, but without any appealing justification.71 
This conclusion is also supported by the commentary on art. 12 (2) (2) which states that 
"This may be particularly important if the carrier and shipper have agreed that certain 
liabilities, which otherwise would have been the shipper's liabilities, shall (also) be 
assumed by a later holder".72 Nullifying these standard clauses by virtue of art. 17 (a) of 
the Draft Instrument is doubtful since such standard clauses might not be considered as 
contractual stipulations with the effect of increasing the liability for any breach of the 
consignee's obligations under the Draft Instrument. This is because the effect of such 
clauses is to make the consignee liable to the obligations under art. 7 in addition to the 
shipper. This can be supported by art. 7 (7) of the Rules which allows a person who is not 
identified as a shipper according to art. 1 (19) to be subject to the shipper's responsibilities 
71 For the supporting view, see the comments on text of UNCITRAL. T~ansport Law- ~reliminary Draft 
Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, United Nations CommISSIOn on InternatIOnal Trade La,:, 
Working Group III (Transport Law) Ninth session U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.211Add.l, (15- 26 Apr~l 
2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/wP.211Add.l) at para. 127. The full text of the document IS 
available on the net; http://www.uncitral.orgien-index.htm. 
72 See (U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21) at para. 199. 
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under art. 7 of the Rules, provided that person is identified as a shipper in the contract 
particulars. 
However, In the absence of a standard clause which extends the shipper's 
responsibilities to other parties such as the holder of a negotiable transport document or the 
transferee of a negotiable electronic record, neither the holder nor the transferee would be 
liable to the carrier for any of the shipper's obligations embodied in art. 7, in particular for 
shipping dangerous cargo. 
3. 4. 2. LIABILITY FOR FREIGHT 
3. 4. 2. 1. Liability for Freight under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act 
Broadly speaking, the shipper would initially be liable to pay the freight to the carrier, 
since the payment of the freight is a personal liability and falls upon the person who 
contracted with the carrier performing the carriage contract. Nevertheless, the shipper 
might be acting as an agent on behalf of his principal which would not make him 
personally liable to the freight but the person on whose name the carriage contract was 
made with the carrier, such as the consignee. The shipper's liability to pay the freight 
would not cease with the endorsement of the bill of lading to a consignee or an endorsee. 
This is because s. 3 (3) of the 1992 Act reserved the continuity of the shipper's liabilities, 
including his liability for the freight, as an original party to the carriage contract. However, 
an endorsee or a consignee would also become liable to the pay the freight to the carrier 
where the requirements of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act were satisfied.73 Complex contractual 
schemes might complicate the issue of whom liable to pay the freight to the carrier, in 
particular where there is either a voyage or a time charter- party. Clausing the bill of 
lading, however, by the words "freight pre- paid" might create an estoppel in favour the 
73 For more detail see Boyd, S., supra fn. 45 at p. 345; art. [172]; Wilson, 1. F., Carriage of Goods by Sea, 
4th Edition., Longmam/ Pearson Education 2001, at p. 289 and Colinvaux, R., supra fn. 60 at para. 1748. 
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consignee or the endorsee, preventing the shipowner from claiming the freight due under 
the bill of lading. The rule of estoppel was considered in two cases; Cho Yang Shipping 
Co. Ltd. l'. Coral (UK) Ltd.,74 and India Steamship Co. v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Ltd. (The 
Indian Reliance) 75 
As between the shipper and the shipowner, the inclusion of the words "freight pre-
paid" in the bill of lading does not prevent the shipowner from claiming the freight from 
the shipper, if it is due and has not been paid. However, the shipper who takes a "pre-
paid" bill of lading might not be liable for the freight, if the shipper was not under a 
contractual liability to pay the shipowner the freight. This is because the inclusion of these 
words, whilst not conclusive evidence that the freight has been paid, is, nonetheless, an 
important part of the evidence as to whether the shipper ever undertook to pay freight. This 
issue was considered by the Court of Appeal in Cho Yang Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Coral (UK) 
Ltd .. -6 where the shipper, Coral, contracted with Nortrop for the shipment of containers of 
sugar. Nortrop contracted with Interport who also contracted with EOS as agents of the 
shipowners. Interport failed to pay the freight due under their contract with the shipowners 
and so they sued Coral, as the named shipper in their bill of lading, for the freight due 
under their contract with Interport. At first instance, Hallgarten QC held that Coral and all 
other parties involved were acting as principals and Coral was the shipper under the bills of 
lading contracts. Furthermore, he denied Coral the entitlement to rely upon the rule of 
estoppel on the ground that the words "freight pre- paid" would not prevent the shipowners 
from claiming the freight from the shipper, if it has not in fact been pre- paid. Therefore, 
Coral was liable to pay the bill of lading freight to the shipowners. 
Hobhouse L J in the Court of Appeal disagreed with the first judgment on the basis 
that 
74 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 641. 
75 [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 52. 
76 See supra fn. 74. 
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"~n my judgment the Judge came to the wrong conclusion and asked 
hImself the wrong question. He did not ask himself whether it was to be 
inferred that Coral had agreed to pay freight to the plaintiffs. He did not 
take adequate account of the fact that the bill of lading is only evidence 
of the contract between the shipper and the carrier which has been made 
before the goods were shipped nor of what terms and what agreement 
were to be inferred from what had happened prior to shipment. He asked 
himself the question whether there was anything in the bill of lading to 
preclude liability. He should have asked whether having regard to the 
facts of this particular shipment it is to be inferred that Coral were 
undertaking to the plaintiffs that they would pay freight to them". 77 
Looking at the facts surrounding the shipment, the Court of Appeal held that Coral 
neyer agreed to pay freight due under the contract between the shipowners or EOS and 
Interport, since all the parties were acting as principals not as agents. Also, EOS only knew 
that Coral required a freight pre- paid bill of lading which would be issued against 
Interport's undertaking to pay the freight within the agreed period of credit. Therefore, the 
Court of Appeal held that Coral was not liable contractually to pay the freight to the 
shipowners. Therefore, an endorsee or a consignee in a situation like Cho Yang case would 
not be liable, by virtue of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act, on the ground that the initial consignor 
has undertaken no liability to pay freight and so there would be no freight liability to be 
transferred to a third party holder of the bill of lading under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. 
The inclusion of the words "pre- paid" into the bill of lading which incorporates the 
provisions of either the head charter or the sub- charter makes the issue of who is liable to 
pay the freight more complex, as seen in India Steamship Co. v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Ltd. 
(The Indian Reliance).78 The shipowners, India Steamship Co. Ltd., time chartered the 
vessel to Cosemar who sub- chartered the vessel to the sub- charterers, Louis Dreyfus, 
under a voyage charter. The payment of the freight, under the shipowners' bills of lading, 
would be according to the provisions of the sub- charter "FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER 
CHARTER PARTY". The sub- charter provided that an advance freight of95% to be paid 
77 Ibid. at 645. 
78 See supra fn. 75. 
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to the charterers and the freight was paid to a designated bank account in the charterers' 
name by the sub- charterer. As a result of the time- charterers' failure to pay the 
shipowners, the latter asked the sub- charterers to pay the freight due as a condition of 
continuing the voyage to Alexandria and discharge the cargo. The sub- charterers refused 
to pay and the issue was resolved by an agreement between themselves as to discharge the 
cargo at its destination with preserving the parties' legal rights. Rix J., as to the words 
"freight prepaid", held that the sub- charterers who were named as the endorsees could not 
rely upon the rule of estoppel on the basis that "They were, after all, parties to the sub-
charter and knew whether that freight had been made or not". 79 In contrast, it is likely 
therefore that the holder of the bill of lading who is not party to the charter would be able 
to rely on the rule of estoppel as to defeat the shipowner's claim for freight under s. 3 (1) 
of the 1992 Act. This is because that holder is neither party to the charter nor knew of 
whether the outstanding freight had been in fact paid or not. 80Reliance on estoppel will 
require proof of detrimental reliance by the holder of the bill of lading. It is important to 
note that as the bill of lading incorporated the terms of the charter- party there was no 
issue, as in the Cho Yang case, as to whether the original consignor had ever undertaken to 
pay freight. Accordingly, the 'freight repaid' clause was analysed solely from an estoppel 
perspective. 
As to the issue of whether the payment of the freight which was made by the sub-
charterers would discharge their liability to the shipowners under the bill of lading, Rix J., 
held that the sub- charter's provisions as to the payment of the sub- charter freight were 
incorporated. This is because the words "FREIGHT PAY ABLE AS PER CHARTER 
79 Ibid. at 55. . 
80 For the shipper's liability for the freight under the bill of lading which includes the words "fr~Ig~t pre-
paid" see Baughen, S., "Does a 'freight prepaid' bill of lading mean what it says?" [1999] ShIPPI.ng. & 
Transport Lawyer. p. 12 where he concluded that these words would prevent the shipowner from c.laImmg 
the freight from the shipper who is not a party to the charter under s. 3 (3) of the 1992 Act on the baSIS ofthe 
rule of estoppel. 
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P ARTY" did not define only the rate of freight but also the manner of payment as to when, 
where and to whonl freight is payable.8 ! Therefore, a bill of lading which incorporates the 
provisions of the charter would make the holder of the that bill contractually liable to the 
shipowners for the payment of the freight. On the one hand, if the bill of lading 
incorporates the head charter, the payment of the freight to the shipowner will discharge 
the holder of the freight liability but not the payment to the sub- charterer. Lloyd J., in The 
COllstall:::a A,f,82 held that the payment of the freight to the sub- charterer would not 
discharge the consignee or the shipper where the shipowners' bill of lading incorporates 
the head charter rather than the sub- charter. This is because the sub- charterer could not be 
considered as the shipowners' agent unless he has express, implied or ostensible authority 
to receive the bill of lading freight on behalf of the shipowners. On the other hand, if the 
bill of lading incorporates the sub- charter, the payment of the freight to the sub- charterer 
will discharge the holder of the bill from liability and prevent the shipowner from claiming 
the freight again from the holder of the bill of lading. Rix J., was prepared to extend the 
principle which provides that the payment of the freight to the shipowner's agent would be 
payment to the shipowner as to the payment of the freight to the charterer under the sub-
charter which would discharge the bill of lading holder's liability to the shipowner. 83 
3. 4. 2. 2. Liability for Freight under the Draft Instrument 
Article 9 (3), provides that 
"(a) Unless otherwise agreed, the shipper is liable to pay the freight and 
other charges incidental to the carriage of the goods. (b) If the contract of 
carriage provides that the liability of the shipper or any other person 
identified in the contract particulars as the shipper will cease, wholly or 
partly, upon a certain event or after a certain point of time, such cess~tion 
is not valid: (i) with respect to any liability under chapter 7 of the shIpper 
or a person mentioned in article 7. 7; or (ii) with respect of any amounts 
payable to the carrier under the contract of carriage, except to the extent 
81 See supra fn. 75 at 58. 
82 [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505 at 514. 
83 See supra fn. 75 at 56. 
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that the carrier has adequate security pursuant to article 9. 5 or otherwise 
for the paynlent of such amount. (iii) to the extent that it conflicts with 
the provisions of art. 12. 4". 
Under art. 9 (3) (a), the shipper would initially be liable to pay the freight and other 
outstanding charges relating to the carriage contract. Under art. 9 (3) (b) (ii), the party 
identified as the shipper in the contract particulars would remain liable to pay any amount 
payable to the carrier under the carriage contract, even if this party never agreed 
contractually to pay. Therefore, clausing the negotiable transport document or the 
negotiable electronic record by the words "freight pre- paid" would not prevent the 
shipowners from claiming the freight from the party identified as the shipper, by virtue of 
art. 9 (4) (a). In contrast, the Court of Appeal in Cho Yang shipping Co. Ltd., v. Coral (UK) 
Ltd. .8'+ held, looking at the facts surrounding the shipment, that the named shipper, Coral, 
in the bill of lading was not liable contractually to pay the freight to the shipowner. The 
combined effect of both art. 9 (3) (b) (ii) and art. 9 (4) (a) would clearly be difficult to 
justify and it would reflect US law rather than English law after Cho Yang shipping Co. 
85 Ltd., v. Coral (UK) Ltd. 
On the other hand, art. 9 (4) provides that 
"( a) If the contract particulars in a transport document or an electronic 
record contain the statement "freight prepaid" or a statement of a similar 
nature, then neither the holder nor the consignee, is liable for the 
payment of the freight. This provision does not apply if the holder or the 
consignee is also the shipper. (b) If the contract particulars in a transport 
document or an electronic record contain the statement "freight collect" 
or a statement of similar nature, such a statement puts the consignee on 
notice that it may be liable for the payment the freight" 
Article 9 (4) (a) reflects the principle that the holder or the consignee who is not the 
party identified as the shipper should be allowed to rely conclusively against the carrier on 
the statement in the transport document or the electronic record which provided that the 
84 See supra fn. 74. 
85 Ibid. 
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freight has been pre- paid. However, art. 9 (4) (a) would not provide such protection to the 
party identified as the shipper. It is not clear whether or not this would also cover a non-
contracting consignor. The liability of such a party in relation to dangerous cargo is 
expressly provided for in art. 7 (7) but no equivalent provision exists in art. 9. However, it 
is possible that such a party could still be regarded falling within the definition of 'shipper' 
provided in art. 1 (19), by virtue of an implied contract. On this analysis, art. 9 (4) (a) 
would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cho Yang Shipping .v. Coral (UK) 
Ltd. Article 9 (5) (b) provides that the statement "freight collect" would have the effect of 
putting the consignee or the holder on a notice that he may be liable for the payment of 
freight. However, it is entirely not clear as whether a statement "freight payable as per 
charterparty" would have the effect of putting the consignee or the holder on a notice that 
he may be liable for the payment of freight and so would make the consignee or the holder 
liable to pay the freight, even if the sale contract provided that the freight should have been 
paid by the shipper, seller. Therefore, the holder or the consignee might be liable to pay the 
freight by suitable incorporation of the charter- party provisions into the bill of lading, 
which would also reflect the position under US law. This is because the holder's liability 
for the payment of the freight, by virtue of art. 9 (4) (b), depends on the terms of the bill of 
lading. In contrast, art. 16 (4) of the Hamburg Rules provides that in the absence in the bill 
of lading of any indication that the freight is payable by the consignee or the holder of the 
bill, a proof to the contrary by the carrier is not admissible when the bill has been 
transferred to a third party, including the consignee, who in good faith has acted in reliance 
on the absence of such indication. However, this issue is solved under English law by the 
decision of the court in India Steamship Co. v. Louis Dreyfus Sugar Ltd., (The Indian 
Reliance). Therefore, a bill of lading which incorporates the provisions of the charter 
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would make the holder of that bill contractually liable to the shipowner for the payment of 
the freight. 86 
3. 5. TRANSFERRING OF LIABILITIES UNDER US LAW 
Ch. 80 1 makes the bill of lading a safe document to deal with, by attaching the rights of 
suit to that document, but the tradability of the bill of lading is impaired by leaving the 
transferee with indeterminable liabilities. Therefore, the transferee's liabilities would be 
determined under American law by the common law rules, in particular those relating to 
implied contract. Despite the fact that the implied contract device has only been used to 
imposed liability on receivers, the evidence from which a promise to pay has been implied 
has been widen that it now make sense to talk of common law liabilities rather than 
implied contract. 
American courts have applied the common law rules which made the transferee 
liable for charges which he knew nothing about. 87 Therefore, a bank which takes the bill of 
lading as security would not be able to calculate the risk which runs with its security, if it 
needs to have recourse to the goods, since it might be faced with liability for the carrier for 
any other outstanding charges. Moreover, the transferee would be liable to outstanding 
charges embodied in the charterparty, even where the bill of lading made no reference to 
them. 88 Also, the transferee would potentially be liable for the freight, even though the bill 
states that it had been prepaid.89 However, the transferee would be able to estop the carrier 
from denying that the freight had been paid, if he proved that he had relied upon it, unlike 
the consignor who would be unable to satisfy the requirement of reliance as in Cho Yang 
Co., Ltd., v. Coral (UK) Ltd. Under American law, the carrier will not be estopped from 
86 See supra fn. 75. 
87 USA. v. Ashcraft - Wilkinson Co., The Vittorio Emmanuele III, [1927] A. M. C. 872. 
88 Amerada Hess. v. S. S. Plillips Oklahoma, [1983] A. M. C. 1528. 
89 Ivaran Lines and Farovi Shipping Corp. v. Sutex paper and Cellulose Corp., [1987] A. M. C. 690. 
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c lainling the freight against the transferee by merely the words "freight prepaid". The 
transferee must also show it relied upon these words. In contrast, under English law, the 
words "freight prepaid" have full effect in respect of the relationship between the carrier 
and the consignee or endorsee as part of the bill's of lading terms. The Court of Appeal, in 
Clio rang Co. Ltd., v. Coral (UK) Ltd.,9o gave full effect to the words "freight prepaid" in 
the bill of lading, at least, where the bill does not incorporate the terms of the charterparty. 
Because the words show that the consignor did not agree to pay freight, they do not take 
effect by way of estoppel, with its requirement of reliance, as is the case under American 
la\\'. Thus, both the consignor and any third party holder of the bill would be in a better 
situation under English law rather than under American law.91 
The divergence from English law has recently been accentuated by the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Contship Containerlines, Inc. V. Howard 
Industries, Inc. 92 where they concluded that the shipper would be liable for the payment of 
the freight, for the second time, to the carrier on the basis of an implied contract in law. 
Howard contacted Transworld, freight forwarder agent, to arrange for the transportation its 
cargo from Houston- Texas to Syria. Howard had delivered its cargo directly to vessel and 
had paid Transworld the freight due to Contship, the carrier. Bills of lading listed the cargo 
and specified the shipping charges but were unsigned. Contship brought an action for the 
non- payment of the ocean freight for three shipments of chemical products shipped by 
Howard on board its vessel. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
undisputed facts are sufficient to establish the necessary elements of an implied contract in 
law rather than in fact. An implied contract in law may exist based on principles of equity 
and to prevent unjust enrichment, even when a "meeting of the minds" does not occur. 
90 See supra fn. 74. .. d . 
91 However, the holder of the bill oflading, under English law, could be responsIble for ch~rg~s embodle m 
other document, such as charterparty, where there is suitable incorporation in the bill of ladmg Itself. 
92 309 F. 3d 910 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2002). 
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Those facts were, the direct delivery of the goods by Howard to Contship and the 
transportation of those goods exactly as Howard wished by Contship.93 Therefore, the 
concept of an implied contract in law can arguably be used to make the transferee of a 
Bolero bill of lading liable to the carrier for charges such as freight under such bill. 
As to the obligation not to ship dangerous goods, the American COOSA 1936 is 
regarded as a negligence- based statute and so negligence would be considered as 
precondition for incurring liability.94 In Serrano. v. Us. Lines Co.,95 the shipowners were 
denied the right to be paid by the shipper for what he had paid to the injury claimant on the 
basis of the absence of an actual fault on the shipper's part by virtue of art. IV (3) of 
COOSA 1936. Therefore, the application of art. IV (6) was not raised and so the 
interrelation between art. IV (6) and art. IV (3) was not considered. Also, in Williamson .v. 
Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navigacion,96 in which the goods were considered as 
dangerous cargo by virtue of art. IV (6), the issue of whether art. IV (6) was subject to art. 
IV (3) was neither raised nor considered. Furthermore, In General S.A., General Traders 
Enterprises and Agencies. v. P. Cosorcio Pesquero del Peru S.A.,97 the shipowners were 
denied the right for indemnity on the basis of the absence of fault or negligence on the 
shipper's part by virtue of art. IV (3), even though the goods were considered as dangerous 
cargo according to art. IV (6). In this case, the shipowners had consented to the shipment 
of the goods with his knowledge of their dangerous character. The issue of whether the 
shipper's obligation not to ship dangerous cargo under art. IV (6) is reduced by virtue of 
art. IV (3) was not an issue. It seems therefore that one could argue that the issue of the 
93 ibid. at 914. 
94 Sukhninder, P., "The Shipment of Dangerous Goods and Strict Liability" Inte~ational ~ompany and 
Commercial Law Review [1998] 1 at 6 and Excel Shipping Corporation. v. Sea Tram InternatIOnal SA, 584 
F. Sup 734 [1984]. 
95 [1965] A.M.C. 1038. 
96 [1971] A.M.e. 2083. 
97 [1974] A.M.e. 2343. 
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interrelation between art. IV (6) and art. IV (3) under American law was not considered in 
any of the above cases, and so the issue still waits to be decided. 
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Senator Linie GmbH & 
Co. KG ". Sumvay line, Inc., et al,98 considered the question of whether the shipper is 
strictly liable under s. 1304 (6) of COGSA for damages and expenses resulting directly or 
indirectly of inherently dangerous cargo when neither the shipper nor the carrier had actual 
or constructive pre- shipment knowledge of the goods' dangerous nature. In construing the 
wording of s. 1304 (6), the court held that "The only reference to 'knowledge' in [that 
section] implicates the carrier. A plain meaning approach would suggest that it is the 
carrier's knowledge of the goods' dangerous nature, not the shipper's, that conditions 
shipper liability".99 However, the court noted that such conclusion would be inconsistent 
with the general rules ofs. 1304 (3) of COGS A which sets forth a basic fault- based theory 
of the shipper liability. Moreover, the court criticised previous American decisions relating 
to dangerous cargoes or injurious events aboard ships as having been ".... surprisingly 
silent on the interplay of ss. 1304 (3) and 1304 (4)" and then held that "In any event, courts 
in the United States simply have not examined the text of s. 1304 (6) either on its own 
terms or in the light of its history and policy". 100 Among these cases are, Serrano . v. Us. 
Lines Co.,101 where the shipowners were denied the right to be paid by the shipper for what 
he had paid to the injury claimant on the basis of the absence of an actual fault on the 
shipper's part by virtue of art. IV (3) of COGSA 1936. Therefore, the application of art. IV 
(6) was not raised and so the interrelation between art. IV (6) and (3) was not considered. 
98 291 F. 3d 145,2002 AMC 1217 (2d Cir. May 12,2002). 
99 ibid. at 154. d . L' b'l' " 
100 Ibid. For a contrary view see Sukhninder, P., "The Shipment of Dangerous Goods an Sn:Ict . Ia Iity 
International Company and Commercial Law Review [1998] 1 at 6, where he ~otes that the obhgatIOn not to 
ship dangerous goods, the American COGSA 1936 is. reg~rd~~ as a neghgence- ba~ed. statute and. so 
negligence would be considered as precondition for incurnng habIhty. See, also, Excel ShIppmg CorporatlOn 
.v. Sea Train International SA, 584 F. Sup 734 at 747 (E.D.N.Y 1984). 
101 238 F. Supp. 383 at 388 (S.D.N.Y 1965). 
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Another such case is Williamso1l . v. Compania Anonima Venezolana de Navigacion, 102 
where the goods were considered as dangerous cargo by virtue of art. IV (6), but the issue 
of whether art. IV (6) was subject to art. IV (3) was neither raised nor considered. 
Furthermore, in General S.A., General Traders Enterprises and Agencies .v. P. Cosorcio 
Pesquero del Peru S.A., 103 the shipowners were denied the right for indemnity on the basis 
of the absence of fault or negligence on the shipper's part by virtue of art. IV (3), even 
though the goods were considered as dangerous cargo according to art. IV (6). In this case, 
the shipowners had consented to the shipment of the goods with his knowledge of their 
dangerous character. 
These cases were reviewed by English courts in cases such as The Giannis NK 104 
and the Athanasia Comninos.105 However, conflicting conclusions were reached 
concerning the position under American law, despite the fact that the interrelation between 
art. IV (6) and art. IV (3) of COGS A 1936 was not in issue in any of them. 106 Nevertheless, 
there is a suggestion that the shipper's obligation not to ship dangerous cargo, under 
American law, is qualified by art. IV (3) and so the shipper would not be liable without 
actual fault or negligence.107 However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
1108 d h' I" . Senator Linie GmbH & Co. KG v. Sunway line, Inc., et a , note t at Its cone uSlOn IS III 
line with the House of Lords' decision in The Giannis NK. 109 Moreover, the court refused 
the shipper's argument that one of the purposes of COGSA had been to codify the pre-
102 447 F. 2d 1339 at 1341 (2d Cir. 1971). See, also, Excel Shipping Corporation .v. Sea Train International 
SA, ibid. 
103 [1974] AMC 2343. 
104 See supra tn. 38. 
105 See supra tn. 61. . .. 
106 See both Mustill 1., in the Athanasia Comninos, ibid. at 281, and Lord Steyn 1., In The Gwnnzs NK, [1998] 
1 Lloyd's Rep. 337 at 347, agreed that American law have taken the view that art. IV (3) qualifies art. IV (6) 
of COGS A 1936. In contrast, Lord Lloyd of Berwick The Giannis NK, [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 337 at ~42, 
argued that Mustill 1., conclusion in the Athanasia Comninos was based on incorrect reading to the Amencan 
cases. 
107 See Wilford, M., Coghlin, T., and Kimball, 1., Time Charters, 4th Edition., LLP Lo.ndon, New York, 
Hamburg and Hong Kong: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., 1995, at 169 and 174 where KImball argues that 
the shipper's obligation under art. IV (6) is reduced by art. IV (3). 
108 291 F. 3d 145 at 156- 157,2002 AMC 1217 (2d Cir. May 12, 2002). 
109 See supra fn. 38. 
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existing general maritime law of the United States and then added that "COGSA legislators 
appear to have been more intent on preserving the international consensus embodied in the 
language of the Hague Rules, and getting carriers and shippers to agree to that language, 
than on codifying particular rules of general maritime law as expressed in U.S. case 
I ,,110 Th I 
aw . e court, a so, noted that COGSA cannot have been intended to codify pre-
existing maritime law on the shipper's dangerous- goods liability since the decisions at that 
time were inconsistent and stated that "To sum up, we concluded that the nature of a 
shipper's dangerous- goods liability under general maritime law in the United States was 
not firmly settled in 1936".111 Finally, the court held that to the extent that pre- COGSA 
decisions are inconsistent with the provisions of COGSA, such decisions are pre- empted 
to the extent that the provisions of COGSA govern such a claim. 1 12 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in Senator Linie GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Sunway line, Inc., et a/,113 in respect of the inter- relation between ss. 1304 (3) 
and 1304 (6), as the two provisions have separate and distinct roles to play in COGSA's 
allocation of risk between shippers and carrier, may place such strict liability on the 
transferee of the bill of lading. It was argued before that the shipper's obligation not to ship 
dangerous cargo, under art. IV (6) of the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules, should be a 
personal obligation. Therefore, one could argue that making the transferee of a bill of 
lading liable to the carrier under s. 1304 (6) would be undesirable and unacceptable. This is 
because it would place the shipper in a better situation since the transferee would not be 
110 See supra fn. 108. . 
III Ibid. at 166. However, Benedict suggests that "Prior to the enactment of the carrIage ofGood~ by se~ ~ct, 
it was held that while the shipowner impliedly warrants that his ship is fit for the voy~ge, and w~ll not ~n~ure 
the cargo, there was no corresponding warranty on the part of the cargo owner that hIS goods WIll not Injure 
or delay the ship", 2A Benedict of Admiralty, para. 99 at ?-, 14 (2000~. 
112 Ibid. at 168. However, the court agreed with BenedIct s suggestIOn that the enactment of s. 1304 (6) of 
COGSA replaced the common law rule of non- strict liability for the shippers of dangerous cargoes. 2A 
Benedict of Admiralty, para. 99 at 9- 14 (2000). 
113 291 F. 3d 145 at 156- 157,2002 AMC 1217 (2d Cir. May 12, 2002). 
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able to satisfy the requirement of non- responsibility set out in that section and therefore 
this conclusion should still be applicable even if s. 1304 (6) is not qualified by s. 1304 (3). 
3.6. THE SHIPPER'S LIABILITY UNDER S. 3 (3) OF THE 1992 ACT 
It was argued before the Law Commissions that the holder of the bill of lading should not 
be liable to the carrier in respect of the carriage contract because the carrier may always 
enforce the carriage contract against the shipper, as the original party to that contract, and 
he has also a possessory lien over the goods against the holder of the bill for certain 
charges. A separate contract, under Brandt. v. Liverpool, could also come into existence 
behveen the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading by releasing the shipowner's lien 
and delivery of the goods without payment of those charges. The Commissions decided, 
however, that any limitation on the types of claim for which liability was to be imposed on 
the holder of the bill of lading and other documents, such as demurrage incurred prior to 
the issue of the document in question, would be impracticable and undesirable. Receivers 
should be aware of this potential liability and therefore, they should try to protect 
themselves by suitable conditions in the sale contract. Thus, it is arguable that fairness 
requires that the liability of the shipper as original party should be extinguished as well as 
his rights which are extinguished by virtue of s. 2 (5) of COGSA 1992. The reason for that 
is the shipper would not be allowed to set up a defence of set-off based on any breach of 
h · 114 t e carnage contract. 
114 It has been noted that set-off is not permitted against claim of freight in Bank of Boston and. Conne~;icut 
.v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd, [1989] 1 All ER. 545. Also, see Bradgate, R., & WhIte, P., The 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" [1993] 56 MLR 188 at 204. 
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Moreover, under s. 3 (3) the ability of the shipper to rely on clauses such as choice 
of law 115 is not clear since the Commissions argued that such a clause would be difficult to 
characterise as one conferring rights or one imposing liability.116 It would be more just if 
the holder of the bill of lading were the only person to be liable to the carrier under the 
carriage contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading even if that holder chose to 
walk out of the carriage contract where loss of the goods was caused by an excepted 
peril. 117 Carriers would be aware of this potential risk and therefore, they could protect 
themselyes by inserting a contractual term into the bill of lading to maintain the shipper's 
liability in such cases. lI8 
In contrast, under Ch. 801, the shipper's entitlement to sue the carrier will depend 
upon either being the holder of the bill of lading or his ability to produce evidence that the 
bill has not been transferred so to give the cause of action to another person. Therefore, it 
is arguable, that the shipper would not be liable to the carrier, unless he is the holder of the 
bill of lading. Nevertheless, the shipper might be responsible for other outstanding charges 
where it has been mentioned in the bill of lading. The reason for that is the terms of the 
carriage contract between the shipper as well as the transferee and the carrier would be 
those contained in the bill of lading, regardless of any antecedent agreement. 
115 Gaskell argues that jurisdiction clause and other clauses should be classified as defences rather than 
positive claims and so the shipper by virtue of s. 2 (5) of the 1992 Act would be stripped of t~ose righ~s under 
s. 2 (1) but not such defences which the shipper might have under the express terms of the bIll of ladmg. See 
Gaskell ,N., supra fn. 40 at 4.34. . . 
116 This argument has been forward by the Commissions in favour of making the holder of the bIll of ladmg 
subject to a liability. See supra the Law Commissions Report fn. 3 at para 3. 17. . . 
117 Since the holder of the bill of lading would be liable to the carrier under the carriage contract by vIrtue of 
s. 3 0), even if the carrier's failure to comply with the holder's demand i.s not a ?reach of contract, bec~use 
the loss of the goods was caused by excepted peril. So, in this case the fIght whIch the holder has acqUIred 
against the carrier was no more than empty one. . ' . 
118 This suggestion has been forward by the Law Commissions as a solutIOn for makmg the holder .ofthe bIll 
of lading liable for the pre- shipment as well as the post- shipment charges: In respect of the s~Ipment of 
dangerous goods, the shipper would be liable at common law and so the carrIer would not be demed redress 
as in The Giannis N.K, See supra fn. 38. 
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3. 7. SECTION 3 (1) OF THE 1992 ACT AND CHARTERER'S BILLS OF 
LADING 
If the court decides that the bills are charterers' bills rather than shipowners' bills, the 
cargo owner will be liable to the charterers by virtue of the operation of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 
Act. However, the positive steps, apart from making claim under the carriage contract, 
which would activate the operation of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act, would be taken from or 
against the shipowners rather than the charterer. Therefore, the cargo owner, in theory, 
would neither be liable to the charterers by virtue of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 nor to the 
shipowners on the ground of the absence of any contractual relationship between them, 
unless the court were willing to consider the shipowner as acting as the charterer's agent 
for the purpose of delivery. On this assumption, the charterer would be able to sue the 
cargo owner and pursuant to s. 3 (1) might also recover for the shipowners' losses. This is 
because most time charter- parties normally contain an express indemnity clause under 
which the charterer is to indemnify the shipowners for any losses resulting of their 
compliance with the charterer's orders as to the employment of the vessel. 
The next question is whether the shipowners under charterers' bills of lading could 
sue the cargo owner directly for the loss or the damage caused to their vessel. One 
possibility would be for the shipowners to sue the cargo owner on the basis of the 
Himalaya clause whose effectiveness has been recently proven in The Starsin where the 
courts at every level held that the shipowners were independent contractors according to cl. 
5 of the bills of lading. However, the effectiveness of the Himalaya clause as to enable to 
the shipowners to rely on jurisdiction and choice of law clauses must now be doubted as a 
result of the decision of the Privy Council in The Mahkutai. 119 More importantly, Himalaya 
clauses are not worded so as to give positive rights of suit to third party. A Himalaya 
119 [1996] 3 W.L.R. 1. 
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clause would only operate to gIve the shipowner a right to sue the cargo owner for 
dangerous cargo, if it was worded in a different way from the usual clause and if the courts 
were prepared to extend what is already a very artificial doctrine to this new situation. 
Moreover, the shipowner under a charterer's bill of lading would not be able to have rights 
of suit as against the cargo owner by virtue of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999. This is because the 1999 Act is not applicable to contract of carriage of goods 
contained in or evidenced by a bill of lading, by virtue of s. 6 (5) (a). Although, a third 
party such as the shipowner under the charterer's bill of lading would be able to rely on a 
Himalaya clause, byvirtueofs.l (l)(a) ands.1 (6) of the 1999 Act, as to avail himself of 
the exclusion and limitation of liability clauses into the bill of lading, this would not assist 
the shipowner who wished to assert positive rights under the charterer's bill of lading. 
Another method for the shipowners to sue the cargo owner would be through the 
implied contract device. An implied contract could come into existence between the 
shipowners and the holder of the bill where the shipowners, in giving up their lien, make or 
agree to make delivery and the holder of the bill seeks or obtains delivery. 120 Nevertheless, 
it is arguable that the utility of the implied contract device was reduced by the Court of 
Appeal's decisions in both The Aramis 121 and The Gudermes,122 though the Court of 
Appeal's decision in The Captain Gregos (No 2) 123 suggested that the implied contract 
device might still have a role to play. A problem is whether the shipowner could be said to 
have any lien to give up when delivering cargo carried under charterer's bill of lading. In 
any event, the cargo owner would not be liable to the shipowners for the loss or the 
damage caused by dangerous cargo, even if a contract was implied by the court between 
120 Lord Bingham 1., in The Aramis, [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213 at 224, sugges~ed ~h~t an im~li~d contract on 
the terms of the bill of lading could come into existence where the shipowner, m gIvmg up hIS hen, makes or 
agrees to make delivery and the holder of the bill seeks or obtains delivery. 
121 Ibid. 
122 [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 311. 
123 [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395. 
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the shipowners and the cargo owner. Mustill 1., in The Athanasia Comninos124 obiter 
, , 
concluded that the holder of the bill of lading could not be liable for breach of warranty as 
to the fitness of the goods for carriage on the basis that "There is to my mind no reason to 
assume, from the bare facts of presentation and delivery, that the parties intended the 
consignee to be made subject to a retrospective liability for acts with which he had nothing 
to do".1:!5 In contrast, the right to a quantum meruit freight when goods are carried under 
charterer's bill of lading seems to have been accepted in The lalamohan. 126 But the issue 
was never explored given the finding that a shipowner's bill of lading had been issued. 
Hain Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Tale & Lyle Ltd., 127 shows judicial unwillingness to imply 
quantllm meruit freight when the shipowner still has an express right to recover freight 
under a charter- party. 
Another possibility would be for the shipowners to sue the cargo owner according 
to the doctrines of bailment and sub- bailment on terms. This would require the courts to 
hold that there had been an attornment to the successor in title. Delivery of the goods 
would not constitute an attornment under a shipowner's bill, there is no reason why it 
should not do so under charterer's bill of lading. However, Colman 1., held that there was 
no attornment on the facts of The Starsin so it is likely that an express attornment is 
required by the shipowner even when it is not the carrier under the bill of lading. What is 
uncertain, though, is whether an attornment has the effect of transferring liabilities of the 
head bailor as well as it rights of suit. Palmer128 also notes that there is no authority as to 
the bailor's duty as regards the safety of goods bailed and concludes that any such duty is 
likely to be a due diligence one. To allow a successor in title to be liable for the bailor's 
breach of such duty would, in effect, be to impose a strict liability as that party would have 
124 See supra fn. 61. 
125 Ibid. at 281 
126 [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 443. 
127 [1936] 2 All E.R. 597. 
128 Palmer, N., Bailment, 2nd Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1991, at p. 777. 
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had no means of ascertaining the condition of the cargo. It is, therefore, unlikely that the 
courts would find such a party to be liable as sub- bailor to the shipowners. 
The Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 6 (3) (1) (a), provides that "A performing 
party is subject to the responsibilities and liabilities imposed on the carrier under this 
instrument, and entitled to the carrier's rights and immunities ..... ". Therefore, one could 
argue, that under a charterer's bill of lading a shipowner, as a performing party, would be 
able to claim against the shipper under art. 7 (1), by virtue of art. 6 (3) (1) (a), which 
entitles the performing party to the carrier's rights under this instrument. 
3. 8. CONCLUSION 
The Law Commissions found that the link between the acquisition of the contractual rights 
and the imposition of liabilities would be unsatisfactory, since it would make all holders of 
the bills of lading liable to the carrier by virtue of their being holder of the bill and so a 
bank which held a bill of lading as security would be liable for charges such as freight and 
demurrage simply because it held the bill of lading. Therefore, the holder of the bill of 
lading, according to s. 3 (1) of COGSA 1992, would be liable to the carrier only where the 
requirements of that section were satisfied. 
However, the question of whether the shipper's liability for the shipment of 
dangerous cargo is transferable to third parties, is not settled conclusively by English 
courts. Nonetheless, it was argued before that the shipper's liability for the shipment of 
dangerous cargo should not be transferable to third parties. 129 This is because the shipper 
would be liable for dangerous cargo at common law and so, the carrier would not be 
denied redress as in The Giannis NK. 
However, it was argued before the Law Commissions that the holder of the bill of 
lading should not be liable to the carrier in respect of the carriage contract, since the carrier 
129 For these arguments see supra sub- title 3. 4. l. l. 
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may enforce the carriage contract against the shipper, as original party to that contract and 
has also a possessory lien over the goods against the holder of the bill for certain charges. 
Moreover, a separate contract, according to Brandt . v. Liverpool, could come into 
existence between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading by releasing the 
shipowner's lien and delivery of the goods without payment of those charges. l3O 
In contrast, Ch. 801 provides nothing about the holder's liabilities and so the 
holder, under American law, might be only liable to the carrier by reason of becoming the 
holder of the bill of lading. 131 As to the question of whether the shipper's liability for 
dangerous cargo is transferable to a third party is also still waiting to be decided by 
American courts under American law. Although the Court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit's decision in Senator Linie GmbH & Co. KG. v. Sun way Line, Inc., et aI, held, 
obiter, that the inter- relation between ss. 1304 (3) and 1304 (6) may place such strict 
liability on the transferee of the bill of lading. 
A holder, under the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 12 (2) (1), would not assume 
any liability under the carriage contract solely by reason of becoming the holder which 
replicates the effect of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act. The interpretation of the provisions relating 
to the shipper's obligations under the Draft Instrument provide that the shipper's liability 
not to ship dangerous cargo is a personal liability and so it would not be transferable to 
third parties. However, the notes to art. 12 (2) (2) allow the original parties to the carriage 
contract, by suitable incorporation clause, to agree that certain liabilities, which otherwise 
would have been the shipper's liabilities, shall be assumed by a later holder. This 
contradicts the assumption in article 7 that only the shipper will be liable in respect of the 
130 The Aramis, [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213 at 224, where Bingham L. ~., sugges~ed ~h~t an im?Ii~d contract 
on the terms of the bill of lading could come into existence where the shIpowner, m gIvmg up hIS hen, makes 
or agrees to make delivery and the holder of the bill seeks or obtains delivery. . . 
131 It has been observed that the carrier has no express rights against the transferee of a bIll u.n~er eIther Ch. 
801 or under the Uniform Commercial Code. See Beatson, 1., & Cooper, 1., "Rights of SUIt In respect of 
carriage of goods by sea" [1991] LMCLQ. 196 at 205. 
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shipn1ent of dangerous cargo. Furthermore, given that the liability of the shipper under 
article 7 is fault based, it is uncertain how it would operate were the contract to extend the 
liability to third parties. Would the third party inherit the shipper's liability or would their 
liability depend upon their own personal fault. 
The shipper's liabilities are not extinguished under s. 3 (3) of the 1992 Act. Under 
An1erican law the shipper would be liable to the carrier only where he is the holder of the 
bill of lading. The shipper's rights of suit as well as liabilities are not extinguished under 
the Draft Instrument, by virtue of both art. 12 (2) (1 & 2) and art. 13 (3). This is fairer 
result than the current position under English law where the bill of lading shipper remains 
liable after transfer of the bill but is divested of rights of suit. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ELECTRONIC BILLS OF LADING 1 
4. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of the orthodox bill of lading in international commerce causes delay of the goods 
and, more dangerously, fraud due to the mercantile practice of issuing bills in sets of 
originals. The replacement of the orthodox bill of lading by the electronic bill of lading 
\,"ould reduce if not denl0lish the need for a letter of indemnity issued customarily by the 
time charterer or the final purchaser of the goods should delivery be made to the wrong 
person. It would also minimise and reduce the opportunity of taking delivery against a 
forged bill of lading which might lead to lengthy and costly litigation. Moreover, the 
quantity of paper used in each international transaction represents an enormous proportion 
of the price that would be reduced by replacing the orthodox bill of lading and other 
shipping documents with electronic equivalents. 
4. 2. WHETHER AN ELECTRONIC BILL IS A DOCUMENT OF TITLE? 
The electronic bill of lading is unlikely to be accepted as a document of title under 
the English common law. This is because the orthodox bill of lading is the only document 
recognised by the English common law as a document of title. Given the speed of 
technological innovation, recognition of electronic bills as documents of title might only 
take a few years. However, this process might arguably take longer compared to other 
1 Caplehorn, R., "Bolero.net- Provides New Legal Framework for Electronic Trade" [1999] S & T.L.l. 12, 
Richardson, J., "At the Cutting Edge" [1999] S & T.L.1. 14, Nilson, A., "Bolero- An Innovative Legal 
Concept" [1995] 6 Comps. & Law 17, Burden, K., "EDI and Bills of Lading" [1992] 8 C.L.S.R. 269, Chuah, 
1., "The Bolero Project- the International Chamber of Commerce's electronic bill of lading project" [2.000] 
Student Law Review 56, Livermore, 1., and Euarjai, K., "Electronic Bills of Lading and FunctIOnal 
Equivalence" [1998] 2 1.1.L.T., <http://elj.warwick.ac.ukljilt/ecomm/98_2liv/>, Emerson, V., "The Concept 
of Negotiability and the Electronic Bill of Lading- An Overview" [2001] 3 1.E.C.L. & P. 10, Mallon, P., and 
Tomlinson, A., "Bolero: Electronic 'Bills of lading' and electronic Contracts of Sale" [1998] I.T.L.Q. 257, 
Bond, R., ''The Future of Electronic Commerce in International Trade" [1999] I.T.L.Q. 15 and Todd, P., 
"Dematerialisation of Shipping Documents" [1994] 1.I.B.L. 410 
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documents which have been in use for a much longer time, such as a combined bill of 
lading. Therefore, any attempt to substitute the orthodox bill of lading with the electronic 
bill of lading should produce a contractual solution whereby the functionality of the 
orthodox bill of lading is replicated for the electronic bill of lading. However, the Law 
Conlmission Advisory Report on 'Electronic Commerce: Formal requirements in 
Commercial Transactions,2 anticipated the existence of adequate 'contractual' schemes 
such as Bolero system reduce the need for immediate domestic reform relating to the 
carriage of goods by sea. A sea waybill in its electronic form represents no more than 
information which can be easily, speedy and cheaply be transmitted electronically by 
computerising system or international trade data communication. A sea waybill is not a 
document of title under English common law and so an electronic sea waybill would cause 
no problem since it is no more than information transmitted electronically rather than a 
proof of entitlement to the goods. However, the replacement of the orthodox bill of lading 
by the sea waybill or other non- negotiable documents would not be appropriate in cases 
such as oil cargo which is typically sold and resold many times during transit. 
A related aspect of the acceptance of the electronic bill of lading as a document of 
title is the requirement of the common law rules of that such a document must be signed 
and as to whether an English court would accept the electronic authentication as equivalent 
to signature. However, art. 7 (1) of the Electronic Communication Act 2000 provides that 
"( a) an electronic signature incorporated into or logically associated with 
a particular electronic communication or particular electronic data and; 
(b) the certification by any person of such a signature, shall e~~h be 
admissible in evidence in relation to any question as to the authentIcIty of 
the communication or data or as to the integrity of the communication or 
data". 
2 Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions- Advice. from the Law 
Commission, December 200l. The full text is available on the net; http://www.1awcom.gov.hbrary. 
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Despite the fact that electronic signatures are admissible in legal proceedings, their validity 
would still be left for the court to decide on a case by case basis as to whether the 
electronic signature was used correctly and what weight it should be given against other 
e,idence in relation to the authenticity and the integrity of the communication or data. 
However, digital signatures such as those incorporated into or associated with Bolero bills 
of lading would arguably be admissible before English courts since they would satisfy the 
requirement of art. 7 (I) of the Electronic Communication Act 2000 relating to the 
authenticity and the integrity of the communication or data.3 Moreover, an express 
agreement between the parties involved in the carriage contract relating to the validity of a 
digital signature would not be affected by the provisions of the Electronic Communication 
Act 2000 such as the agreement between all the users of the Bolero system embodied in the 
Bolero Rulebook as not to assert paper- based writing and signature against each other in 
any litigation under the Bolero Rulebook. 
An orthodox bill of lading is no more than information recorded in a paper 
medium4 and so the concepts of "delivery" or "endorsement" or "possession" which are 
related to the function of the bill of lading as a document of title would cause no legal or 
practical problems. The only advantage of using a medium of paper is its inherent security 
against being tampered with. However, employing cryptography technology to provide 
high level of security to all transactions in order to prevent tampering with the data and to 
deny unauthorised access can satisfy this advantage. Under the Bolero system, the 
Bolero.net acts as a certification authority; an independent third party, to issue digital 
certificate to each user which confirms to the recipient that the public key used to sign the 
3 This view is supported by Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions-
Advice from the Law Commission, December 2001, at para. 3. 31 on Digital Signature and at para. 3. 39. 
The acceptance of a digital signature is based on satisfying the statutory .function requirement of 
demonstrating an authenticating intention of the signatory rather than the form reqUIrement. . 
4 For more details see Digital Signature in the Bolero System, 1999 Bolero Internatl~nal Ltd., at 
http://www.bolero.netidecisionilegalllegalandCaplehorn.R .... Bolero.net- The Global ElectrOnIC Commerce 
Solution for International Trade", [1999] 14 B.J.I.B. & F.L. 421. 
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nlessage was In fact the one issued to the sender. The result of the message being 
encrypted by the private key would be compared with the message being decrypted by the 
public key to decide whether the message has been tempered with or changed III 
transmission. Moreover, the 'Title registry' records electronically all changes in the right to 
possession of the goods which are the subject of the Bolero bill of lading as the goods are 
sold in transit. 
Section 1 (5) of the 1992 Act empowers the Secretary of State to make provisions 
for the application of the 1992 Act to "cases where a telecommunication system or any 
other information technology is used for effecting transactions corresponding to (a) the 
issue of a document to which this Act applies; (b) the endorsement, delivery or other 
transfer of such a document; or (c) the doing of anything else in relation to such a 
document". Also, s. 5 (1) of the 1992 Act defines information technology as to "include[ s] 
any computer or other technology by means of which information or other matter may be 
recorded or communicated without being reduced to documentary form". Accordingly, the 
information can be recorded in a non- paper medium, as in the case of the electronic bill of 
lading, without being reduced to documentary form. Therefore, the concepts of "delivery" 
or "endorsement" or "possession" in relation to the electronic bill of lading should be 
considered differently and by comparison with the function of the orthodox bill of lading 
as a document of title. This is because s. 1 (6) (a) of the 1992 Act empowers the Secretary 
of State to make modifications to the provisions of the 1992 Act which are "appropriate in 
connection with the application of this Act to any case mentioned" in s. 1 (5) of the 1992 
Act. As a result, the concept of possession in relation to the electronic bill of lading should 
not and could not be physical one which would also be applicable equally to both concepts 
of delivery and endorsement. Although, it would be a relatively straightforward matter for 
s. 1 (5) to be applied to the Bolero system, to date the Secretary of State has not used his 
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powers to do so. The status of an electronic bill of lading must therefore be ascertained by 
reference to the common law. Even if an electronic bill of lading were to become 
recognised as a document of title at common law, it is unlikely that it would be recognised 
as a 'bill of lading' for the purposes of the 1992 Act if the Secretary of State had not 
exercised his powers under s. 1 (5) of the Act. Moreover. s. 7 of the Electronic 
Communication Act 2000 cannot solve the problem of title to sue for bills of lading in that 
it cannot allow electronic bills of lading to be treated as 'bills of lading' for the purposes of 
COGSA 1992, even if it enables them to achieve recognition as document of title. This is 
because of s. 1 (5) which will allow them to come within COGSA 1992, the Secretary of 
State has to use his powers set out therein. 
There is no authoritative definition of a document of title to the goods at common 
law. However, the core nature of a document of title to the goods is that it must be capable 
of transferring the constructive possession of the goods and may operate so as to transfer 
the property in them.5 As a result of that the transferee of an orthodox bill of lading would 
have a constructive delivery of the goods and a proof of ownership which would allow him 
to have control over the goods and enable him to resell the goods to a new buyer during 
transit. Also, the bundle of rights locked up in the orthodox bill of lading as a document of 
title would be transferred to the new transferee by endorsing and delivering the bill of 
lading. 
Carver6 has argued that the Bolero bill of lading does not have the distinctive 
characteristics of an orthodox bill of lading as being a document of title. But it is equally 
arguable that the Bolero system was not striving to create a new document of title but 
rather to achieve the essential negotiability of a document of title through its function using 
electronic messages; the Bolero bill of lading. The Bolero bill of lading achieves the 
5 See Guest, A. G., (el at) Benjamin's Sale a/Goods, 6th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 2002, at para. 18- 176. 
6 Carver on Bills a/Lading, 1st Edition, London: Sweet and Maxwell 2001, at para 8- 086. 
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essential negotiability of a document of title through a novation of the carriage contract and 
the common law concept of attornment. Therefore, the constructive possession and the 
rights to take delivery of the goods under the Bolero bill of lading are transferred from the 
transferor to the transferee by a form of attornment by deeming that the Bolero is the 
carrier's agent for that matter. The requirement that notice must be given to the carrier, 
which was a hundred years ago impractical, under the Bolero bill of lading should not 
affect its ability to achieve the essential negotiability of a document of title, in the light of 
the improyement in communication during the last ten years. Moreover, the transferee of 
the Bolero bill of lading would have a new and a separate contractual relationship with the 
carrier by way of novation of the carriage contract. Novation under the Bolero system7 will 
eliminate the need for an exception to the doctrine of privity, such as provided by the Bills 
of Lading Act 1855 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. The consent requirement 
of all the parties involved in the process under novation would not affect the bundle of 
rights or obligations of the parties involved and so the result would be the same whether 
these rights are transferred by virtue of the 1992 Act or acquired by way of novation. From 
the foregoing, one could argue that the Bolero bill of lading has achieved the essential 
negotiability of a document of title by becoming the functional equivalent of the orthodox 
bill of lading. This is because the essential negotiability of a document of title, which is the 
subject of the transaction, is being transferred rather than the paper or the electronic 
message, which is only the medium. 
Another voluntary code is to be found in the CMI Rules which are discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 8 Like the Bolero system, they will be applicable only 
if the parties to the carriage contract agree so, by incorporating them into their contract. 
7 Novation under the Bolero system will be considered in sub- title 4.6. . 
8 See UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goo~s by Se~, Umted 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Nmth seSSIOn U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/wP.21) The full 
text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitral.org!en-index.htm. 
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One of the nl0st inlportant difference between eMI Rules and the Bolero system is that the 
former provide for a private registry9 system controlled by the carrier for electronic 
messages while the latter provides for a central registry, the so called 'Title Registry', 
controlled by an independent third party. Having an independent third party rather than the 
carrier to control and verify the electronic messages, Bolero bills of lading in the case of 
Bolero system, should prove more acceptable to the cargo owners since it would prevent 
the carrier from tampering with the terms of the carriage contract and the representations 
relating to the goods. This is because the carrier's involvement under the orthodox bill of 
lading \yould only be restricted to the issuing of that bill and collecting the cargo. 
Therefore, the Bolero system provides a strong security control and procedures to protect 
the integrity and confirm the authenticity of electronic messages, Bolero bills of lading, in 
particular by the use of digital signature. 
The Bolero system provides a set of rules in the 'Bolero Rulebook,.10 These have 
only a contractual effect and their application depends on express agreement as to their 
use. The Bolero Rulebook governs the validity of the electronic transactions and the legal 
effect of the Bolero bills of lading. However, one of the most important draw backs of the 
Bolero system, unlike eM! system where it is open to anyone to use, is that it is a locked 
system in which all the interested parties should be members and have signed an 
undertaking to abide by the rules set out in the Rulebook. Therefore, the novation of the 
carriage contract and the common law concept of attornment would not be a conceivable 
solution to the transferee that is not a member of the Bolero system. The feasible solution 
to this problem is to issue a paper bill of lading to that transferee as to trigger the current 
9 See art. 7 of the CMI Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading produced by the Co mite Maritime International 
[1990] at http://www.comitemaritime.orgirulesebla.html.However.this issue is left ~o the 'Rules of 
Procedure' between the carrier and the shipper according to art. 2 (4) of CMI Draft Outlme Instrument on 
Issues of Transport Law at http://www.uncitral.orglen-index.htm. . . 
10 For the full text of the Rulebook of the Bolero System see Bolero ASSOCIatIOn at 
http://www . boleroassociation. orgl downl oads/rulebook 1 or http://www.boleroassociation.orgldow-docs.htm. 
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regulation governing the orthodox bill of lading. However, issuing an orthodox bill of 
lading would undermine the commercial rationale behind any initiative to dematerialise the 
shipping documents such as the Bolero system. The retention of the orthodox bill of lading 
was one of the major reasons for the failure of the Seadocs schemel I beside the absence of 
any provision for transferring the contractual rights and liabilities to the holder apart of the 
original shipper. 
4. 2. 1. THE CMI RULES ON ELECTRONIC BILLS OF LADING 
In 1990 the eMI published its 'Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading'. The eMI Rules do 
not have the force of law and are entirely voluntary. This is because a set of voluntary rules 
was thought to be more appropriate than a convention, which would take many years to 
establish and be very difficult to modify. Moreover, the system of the eMI Rules on 
Electronic Bills of lading is open to anyone to use, unlike the Bolero system, and so there 
is no need for the parties to be members of a group. 
The CMI Rules preserve the full functionality of the paper bill of lading; receipt, 
contract, title, insurance verification and documentary credit verification. To fulfill all 
those functions, several messages are required under the eMI Rules, unlike the paper bill 
which fulfils all those functions on a single piece of paper. However, the end result would 
be the same. One of the essential elements of the CMI Rules is the use of the 'private key' 
to replace the transfer of a paper bill. However, the function of the 'private key' is merely 
to verify the message and was never intended to provide security for the message. 
Therefore, other means of security such as digital signatures would still be needed. The 
other essential element is the 'private registry', which leaves the risk and duty of delivery 
II The main rationale behind Seadocs scheme was to avoid delay by lodging the paper bill of lading with a 
central registry while the ownership of the goods would be transferred electronically. Under Seadocs .schem.e 
cargo owners and banks would only be able to check the bill of lading through .the central re~str.y, If 
requested to do so. This practice would arguably undermine one of the purposes ofusmg an electrOnic bIll of 
lading which is reducing if not demolishing fraudulent bills of lading. 
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with the carrier under the CMI Rules. This would allow the carrier to have more direct 
communications and so reduce the risk of non- delivery. 
The CMI Rules on Electronic Bills of Lading has many disadvantages. First, the 
eMI Rules provides no specific provisions as regards the transfer of contractual rights and 
liabilities along with the documentation. Therefore, the contractual rights would only be 
with the original shipper, unlike the Bolero System. However, a new contract might spring 
up between the new holder and the carrier when the right of control and transfer is 
accepted. Secondly, a holder who has accepted the right of control and transfer, but who 
has not paid for the goods, should have all the rights, against the carrier, in the goods after 
a transfer, otherwise a subsequent holder who has paid would have obtained no security of 
any "alue. However, this problem can be solved by an express term in the sale contract, in 
line with s. 19 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, requiring the buyer to re- transfer the 
right of control and transfer to his seller in the event of non- payment and reserving a right 
of disposal in the goods until paid. Thirdly, the CMI Rules provide no provision for the 
passing of property in the goods. However, this problem can also be solved an appropriate 
provision in the sale contract regarding the passing of property. Finally, the CMI Rules 
seem comparatively insecure against fraud. This is because it is quite difficult to provide a 
system which is both completely open and completely secure, although either one or the 
other ought to be possible. One could argue that this problem might be solved by having a 
central registry, like the Bolero System- the 'Title Registry' controlled by an independent 
third party. 
4. 2. 2. THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC BILLS OF LADING 
"In preparing the Model Law, the Commission agreed that such rules dealing with specific 
uses of electronic commerce should appear in the Model Law in a way that reflected both 
the specific nature of the provisions and their legal status, which should be the same as that 
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of the general prOVISIons contained in part one of the Model law".12 Moreover, "In 
preparing the Model Law, the Commission noted that the carriage of goods was the context 
in which electronic communications were most likely to be used and in which a legal 
franlework facilitating the use of such communications was most urgently needed".l3 
Accordingly, article 16 (Actions related to contracts of carriage of goods) of the Model 
Law contains provisions that apply equally to negotiable bills of lading as well as to non-
negotiable transport documents and any specific document such as charter- parties. It is, 
also, applicable to maritime transport as well as transport of goods by other means, such as 
road, railroad and air transport. 
Article 17 (Transport documents) of the Model Law, by virtue of (1 & 2), is 
intended to replace both the requirement for a written contract and the requirements for 
endorsement and transfer of possession of a bill of lading. Article 17 (3) of the Model Law 
establishes uniqueness as an absolute requirement to transfer rights by means of data 
messages. Such a provision would serve to validate voluntary rules for the transfer of 
rights in goods, such as the CMI Rules on Electronic Bills of Lading, and is an important 
development for such usages. Article 17 (4) of the Model Law sets the standards of 
reliability for such messages, while article 17 (5) addresses the fundamental need to avoid 
the risk of duplicate transport documents. Therefore, paper- based communications for 
ancillary messages and electronic communications for bills of lading cannot be used 
concurrently, otherwise uniqueness would be destroyed. Article 17 (6) ensures that if a 
cargo conventions, such as the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules, would have been 
compulsorily applicable to a paper bill of lading, had it been issued, a contract of carriage 
created by data messages would also be subject to such convention. Although, the 
12 See United Nations commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)- UNCITRAL Mo~el Law on 
Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment- 1996 with additional article 5 bis as adopted In 1998, at 
para. 108. The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitral.org. 
\3 Ibid. at para. 110. 
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UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce will continue its work and add 
further articles to the Model Law, its work in the maritime arena is complete. 
4. 3. AN ELECTRONIC BILL OF LADING AND THE DRAFT INSTRUMENT 
Article 1 (9) defines 'electronic record' so as to cover electronic signature "information 
attached or otherwise linked to the electronic record contemporaneously with" and to 
include electronic endorsement "subsequent to its issue by the carrier or a performing 
party". Also, art. 2 (4) provides that an electronic record should perform the typical 
document of title functions by allowing the record to be indorsed electronically, identifying 
the ultimate receiver of the goods to whom the carrier is obliged to deliver the goods 
without the need of a paper bill of lading and describing the manner in which the record 
would be exhausted. Under art. 12 (1) (2), the rights incorporated into a negotiable 
electronic record would be transferred to the new holder provided that the negotiable 
electronic record passed according to the rules of procedure referred to in art. 2 (4) of the 
Rules. These rights are the right of control embodied in art. 11 including the right to 
demand delivery of the goods at their destination embodied in art. 11. Also, by virtue of 
art. 12 (2) (2) the holder of a negotiable electronic record who exercised any right under 
the carriage contract would assume any liabilities imposed under the carriage contract to 
the extent that such liabilities are incorporated in or ascertainable form the negotiable 
electronic record. Therefore, by virtue of art. 12 (2) (1) the holder of a negotiable 
electronic record would not be liable merely by reason of being the holder of a negotiable 
electronic record and should not also be liable for the shipper's liabilities specified in art. 7 
(1 & 3) such as those in respect of dangerous cargo.14 However, in the absence of a 
standard clause which extends the shipper's responsibilities to other parties such as the 
14 However, there is a possibility that those liabilities may be imposed on third parties by express contractual 
provision. For more detail see sub- title 3. 4. 2. 2. of chapter 3. 
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holder of a negotiable electronic record, the holder of that record would not be liable to the 
carrier for any of the shipper's obligations embodied in art. 7, in particular for shipping 
dangerous cargo. 
In contrast, the Bolero system provides for a novation of the carriage contract to the 
transferee via the Rulebook. Accordingly, a contract between two parties is extinguished 
and an identical contract is created between one of the parties and a third party. Therefore, 
it operates as a complete transfer of the rights and liabilities under the contract from one 
person to another. The report prepared by Allen & Overy and Richards Butler for Bolero 
International Limited,15 states that novation in the Rulebook "will replicate the system 
established by the English- based bills of lading legislation". 16 However, this statement can 
be challenged on the basis that the provisions of COGSA 1992, governing the orthodox bill 
of lading, established a statutory assignment rather than a novation of the carriage contract. 
This is because the contractual rights of suit, under s. 2 (1) of the 1992 Act, are transferred 
to and vested in the lawful holder of a bill of lading as ifhe had been a party to the carriage 
contract, while the contractual liabilities would only be transferred to and vested in that 
holder where the requirements of s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act were satisfied. Therefore, the 
holder of the bill of lading, under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act, would not be liable to the carrier 
merely by reason of being the lawful holder of the bill of lading. The position is the same 
under art. 12 (2) (2) of the Draft Instrument. In contrast, with a novation, the transferee of 
the Bolero bill of lading would be liable to the carrier by virtue of being the transferee of 
the Bolero bill of lading. As regards the shipper's liabilities under the carriage contract, 
these are reserved both by virtue of s. 3 (3) of the 1992 Act and by virtue art. 3 (5) (3) of 
15 For the full text of the report prepared by Allen & Overy and Richards But~e:,. London, ,;or Bolero 
International Limited operators of the Bolero System titled "International Legal feaSIbIlIty Report , 
2nd Edition, No~ember 1997 (updated August and Decemb~r 1999) at http://www. 
bolero.netJdecisionilegal/legal.php3 or http://www.bolero.net/content/searchlhbrary. 
16 See the report prepared by Allen & Overy and Richards Butler, at p. 72. 
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the Rulebook of the Bolero system. With respect to the conclusion made by Nicoll 17 who 
concluded that the Bolero system emulates the legislation model by ensuring that the 
shipper's obligations to the carrier are retained despite the transfer of the Bolero bill, one 
could argue that the transferee of the Bolero bill of lading would be liable for the shipment 
of dangerous goods 18 as well as for the freight, unless it contained a clause to the effect that 
'freight pre- paid' in particular after Cho Yang Shipping. v. Coral (UK). 19 This is because 
the legal effect of novation is to operate as a complete transfer of the rights and liabilities 
under the contract, the carriage contract, from one person to another. This line of argument 
is supported by the statements embodied in the report prepared by Allen & Overy and 
Richards Butler for Bolero International Limited,20 which state that "The carrier's interest 
in a transfer of these liabilities of the shipper to a new BBL Holder is to retain an 
acceptable source of recovery so that the identity of the BBL Holder is significant" and 
"Where a BBL contract of carriage is novated, it would appear that the carrier's position is 
little different from a novation achieved by English- based bills of lading legislation". In 
contrast, the consignor of a negotiable electronic record which contained a clause to the 
effect that 'freight pre- paid' under the Draft Instrument by virtue of art. 9 (4) (a) would be 
liable to pay the freight.21 Moreover, the transferee of a negotiable electronic record under 
art. 9 (4) (b) might be liable to the carrier for the freight where the record provided for 
freight to be paid 'as per charterparty', although the freight under contract between the 
transferee and the shipper should have been paid by the shipper, on the ground that "such a 
statement puts the consignee on notice that it may be liable for the payment of the freight". 
17 Nicoll, C. c., "BOLERO Makes the Bill of Lading ~bsolete" [1999] Int.M.L. 148 at p. 151. 
18 For more detail about the shipper's liable for the shIpment of dangerous cargo u~der the ~ommon law and 
the Hague- Visby Rules and whether this liability is transferred to a hol~er of the bIll ofladmg under s. 3 (1) 
of the 1992 Act and the CMI Outline Draft see chapter three under sub- tItle 3.4. 1. 
19 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 641. 
20 See the re ort repared by Allen & Overy and Richards Butler a~ p. 73. 
21 P P b h h ld ' b·ll flading liability for freIght under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act and the For more detaIl a out teo er s I 0 
Draft Instrument see chapter three under sub- title 3.4.2. 
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4. 4. THE BOLERO SYSTEM AND THE HAGUE- VISBY RULES 
The Draft Instrument would govern the rights and the obligations of all the parties involved 
in the carriage contract, carriers, shippers, transferees and others. This is because their aim 
is to provide a comprehensive and a complete scheme. In contrast, the Bolero system via 
art . .3 (2) (4) of the Rulebook provides that "A contract of carriage in respect of which the 
carrier has created a Bolero Bill of Lading shall be subject to any international convention, 
or national law giving effect to such international convention, which would have been 
compulsorily applicable if a paper bill of lading in same terms had been issued in respect 
of that contract". Accordingly, any international carriage convention or any national law 
giying effect to such international convention would be applicable to the carriage contract 
coyered by a Bolero bill of lading where that particular voyage is covered by the relevant 
conyention as if it would have been compUlsorily applicable if a paper bill of lading in the 
same terms had been issued in respect of that contract. However, the Hague or Hague-
\ Tis by Rules, by virtue of art. I (b), are only applicable to carriage contracts covered by a 
paper "bill of lading or any similar document of title". Also, as mentioned before, the 
Bolero system was not striving to create a new document of title but rather to achieve the 
essential negotiability of a document of title through its function by using an electronic bill 
of lading. Section 7 of the Electronic Communication Act 2000 might qualify the Bolero 
bill of lading or any other electronic bills of lading as documents but more importantly it 
would not qualify them as documents of title. Evidently, the Hague or Hague- Visby Rules 
would not be applicable to the Bolero bill of lading or any other electronic bill of lading 
and more importantly they would not have the force of law even if the particular carriage 
contract adopts these Rules contractually. 
Could, however, the contractual adoption of these Rules be acceptable under the 
English law and before English courts? The answer to this question is important because 
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art. 2 (5) (2 & 3) of the Rulebook of the Bolero system provides that "This Rulebook is 
governed by and shall be interpreted in accordance with English Law" and "Where the sole 
nlatter at issue between the parties is a claim for non- compliance with or breach of this 
Rulebook, all proceedings in respect of such claim shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts". As said before, the Bolero system is trying to achieve 
the essential negotiability of a document of title through its function by using an electronic 
bill of lading. Also, the Bolero system via the Rulebook intends that the Bolero bill of 
lading would and should have the same effect as a paper bill of lading. This intention 
presents itself in art. 3 (1) (3) of the Rulebook which states "any statement a Carrier makes 
as to the leading marks, number, quantity, weight, or apparent order and condition of the 
goods in the BBL Text will be binding on the Carrier to the same extent and in the same 
circumstances as if the statement had been contained in a paper bill of lading" and 
therefore, art. III (3 & 4) of the Hague- Visby Rules relating to the evidential effect of the 
carrier's statement would be applicable to the Bolero bill of lading. 
One could, therefore, argue, like others,22 that the application of the provisions of 
the Hague- Visby Rules to the Bolero bill of lading would not cause any public policy 
objections. This is because the Bolero bill of lading or any other electronic bill of lading is 
not regulated, until now, by either the Parliament or the Secretary of State by virtue of s. 1 
(5) of the 1992 Act. Moreover, English courts would arguably show respect to this 
commercial practice since a similar commercial practice was the motivation behind 
extending the application of the Hague- Visby Rules to a non- negotiable document by 
virtue of s. 1 (6) (b) of COGSA 1971. Establishing that English courts would accept the 
contractual adoption of the provisions of the Hague- Visby Rules, COGSA 1971, all users 
of the Bolero system would be denied to plea that the language used by the Rules, relating 
22 Nicoll, C. c., "BOLERO Makes the Bill of Lading Obsolete" [1999] Int.M.L. 148 at p. 150 and Clarke, 
M., "A black Letter Lawyer Looks at Bolero" [1999] I.T.L.Q. 69 at 71. 
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to infornlation to be "noted' in art. III (7) or 'inserted' and 'embodied' as in art. IV (5) (a) 
& (t) or 'enlbodied' as in art. V, can only be compatible with the paper bill of lading. This 
is because this information can be recorded electronically in the Bolero bill of lading and 
its adnlissibility in any legal proceeding would be governed by s. 7 of the Electronic 
Communication Act 2000. Moreover, electronically recording such information into the 
Bolero bill of lading should not have the effect of a covenant relieving the carrier or the 
ship fron1 liability or lessening such liability which is forbidden by virtue of art. III (8) of 
the Hague- Visby Rules. Also, the application of the Hague- Visby Rules to the Bolero bill 
of lading should be in substance rather than form as terms incorporated in the carriage 
contract. This conclusion is also emphasised by art. 3 (2) (4) of the Rulebook which 
provides that "In the event of a conflict between the provisions of any international 
convention or national law giving effect to such international convention and other 
provisions of the contract of carriage as contained in BBL Text, the provisions of that 
national law or international convention shall prevail". 
4. 5. THE BOLERO SYSTEM AND THE HAMBURG RULES 
The question of whether the Hamburg Rules would be applicable to the Bolero bill 
of lading or any other electronic bill of lading is less urgent because of the absence of a 
widespread recognition of the Rules. However, the Hamburg Rules, by virtue of art. 1 (6), 
are applicable to any carriage contract "whereby the carrier undertakes against payment of 
freight to carry goods by sea from one port to another". Also, art. 1 (7) of the Rules defines 
a bill of lading as "a document which evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the taking 
over or loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to deliver 
the goods against surrender of the document. A provision in the document that the goods 
are to be delivered to the order of a named person, or to order, or to bearer, constitutes such 
undertaking". Moreover, art. 14 (3) of the Rules allows the bill of lading to be signed 
217 
electronically as states "The signature on the bill of lading may be in handwriting, printed 
in facsimile. performed. stamped in symbols, or made by any other mechanical or 
electronic means, if not inconsistent with the law of the country where the bill of lading 
issued". It is right to argue that the draftsmen of the Hamburg Rules have not anticipated 
the application of the Rules to an electronic bill of lading such as Bolero bill of lading. But, 
it equally right to argue that a bill of lading can not be signed electronically unless the 
whole docun1ent is in an electronic form such as the Bolero bill of lading. Therefore, this 
argument can be used to support the application of the Hamburg Rules to the Bolero bill of 
lading.23 However. if this argument is not accepted, art. 18 of the Rules provides that 
"\\nere a carrier issues a document other than a bill of lading to evidence the receipt of the 
goods to be carried, such a document is prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the 
contract of carriage by sea and the taking over by the carrier of the goods as therein 
described". Thus, if a bill of lading signed electronically would be governed by the Rules, 
other documents which are signed electronically should also be governed by the Rules. 
Accordingly, the Bolero bill of would be governed by the Hamburg Rules since it is no 
more than a document signed electronically in accordance with arts. 14 and 18 of the 
Rules. 
4.6. NOVATION AND IMPLIED CONTRACT 
As has been said before, the Bolero system solves the problems of privity through the 
novation of the carriage contract. Accordingly, a new contract would emerge and therefore, 
under English law, the consent of all parties should be obtained and a consideration should 
be provided. The requirement of consent would be satisfied via the electronic messages 
and the involvement of the 'Title Registry' as the carrier's agent in the electronic 
equivalent of endorsement. However, the requirement of consideration would not be met 
23 For opposite view see Nicoll, C C, ibid. at p. 149 in 48 fn. l. 
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unless the transferee of the Bolero bill of lading is obliged to pay freight or some other 
outstanding charges such as demurrage. The absence of any of these charges would 
therefore undermine the workability of the novation as a mechanism of transferring the 
contractual rights to the transferee under the Bolero bill of lading under English law. 
Howeyer, the consideration requirement was considered by English courts in many cases 
dealing \\"ith the implied contract doctrine and the outcome of these reduced the need for 
compliance with this requirement. The Court of Appeal in The Aramii4 held that "Once an 
intention to contract is found no problem on consideration arises, since there would be 
ample consideration in the bundle of rights and duties which the parties would respectively 
obtain and accept". Moreover, it was held, in The Captain Gregos (No. 2),25 that the active 
co- operation between the BP and the crew of the vessel was enough to imply contract 
between BP and the shipowners as "to give business reality to the transaction between 
them and create the obligations which, as we think, both parties plainly believed to exist". 
It is arguable therefore that an analogy might be drawn by the English courts so as to be 
less rigid with the consideration requirement in the case of novation of the carriage 
contract, for the same reasons as to give business reality and to give effect to underlying 
commercial convenience,z6 Also, under novation the mutual exchange of promises could 
constitute a consideration between the transferee and the carrier. 
Another issue relating to the novation of the carriage contract under the Bolero 
system is the maintaining of the original shipper's liabilities under art. 3 (5) (3) of the 
Rulebook. Chitty states that "It should, however, be noted that the effect of a novation is 
not to assign or transfer a right or liability, but rather to extinguish the original contract and 
24 [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213 at 225. 
25 [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 395 at 403. ., " 
26 For more detail about commercial convenience and commercIal speCIalty see Clarke, M., A black Letter 
Lawyer Looks at Bolero" [1999] I.T.L.Q. 69 at 76- 78. 
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to replace it by another". 27 One could argue, therefore, that the shipper could plead before 
an English court that the effect of novation is to extinguish the original carriage contract 
between hin1self and the carrier and so he should not be liable to the carrier for the 
shipment of dangerous cargo under art. 3 (5) (3) of the Rulebook. The shipper would be 
able to challenge the validity of art. 3 (5) (3) on the ground of art. 2 (5) (2 & 3) of the 
Rulebook of the Bolero system which provides that "This Rulebook is governed by and 
shall be interpreted in accordance with English Law" and "Where the sole matter at issue 
between the parties is a claim for non- compliance with or breach of this Rulebook, all 
proceedings in respect of such claim shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English courts". Establishing that the Bolero system solves the problem of privity through 
the noyation of the carriage contract would allow the English court to decide the effect of 
that novation in accordance to the English law. Therefore, it is arguable that the decision of 
the court would be in favour of the shipper and so to invalidate any maintaining of the 
original shipper's liabilities such as in respect of the shipment of dangerous cargo. 
Nonetheless, if both the requirement of consideration and the rigid application of 
that requirement by English courts undermined the application of the novation of the 
carriage contract adopted by the Bolero system, the doctrine of implied contract might 
arguably provide a possible solution to the problems of privity. Under the doctrine of 
implied contract, a contract would be implied from the conduct of both the consignee and 
the carrier. The involvement of the 'Title Registry' of the Bolero system as the carrier's 
agent in the electronic equivalent of endorsement does seem to place the Bolero situation 
closer to the facts of The Captain Gregos (No. 2)28 than to those of The Aramis.29 This is 
because in The Captain Gregos (No.2), BP neither paid the freight or undertook to pay it, 
27 See the Common Law Library, Chitty on Contracts, 28th Edition, Vol. One, General Principles, London: 
Sweet and Maxwell 1999, at para. 20- 086. 
28 See supra fn. 25. 
29 See supra fn. 24. 
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nor was there evidence that BP knew that the freight was outstanding. Also, BP neither 
presented the bills of lading to the shipowners to take delivery nor undertook to do so 
latter. These facts would arguably support the present of a contractual intention and 
therefore the delivery of the goods to the transferee of the Bolero bill of lading by the 
carrier would not be consider as a performance of a pre- existing obligation. However, 
Faber 30 argues that this line of argument is unlikely to be upheld on the ground that "The 
carrier would be already be obliged under his contract with the original shipper to use these 
electronic messages to pass the right of control and transfer. Therefore, in themselves, they 
are unlikely to provide a basis for an implied contract". But, it is arguable that the carrier is 
not obliged to use electronic messages to pass the right of control and transfer under the 
carriage contract with the original shipper but rather via the Rulebook of the Bolero 
system. If this argument is accepted, the transferee of the Bolero bill of lading might not 
be liable for the shipment of a dangerous cargo on the ground that the obligations created 
by the doctrine of implied contract are limited to "those rights and obligations which 
concern the carriage and delivery of the goods, and payments therefor".3! Moreover, the 
existence of art. 3 (5) (1) (3) of the Rulebook which provides that "The immediately 
preceding Holder- to- order's rights and liabilities under its contract of carriage with the 
Carrier shall immediately cease and be extinguished" would ensure that the intermediate 
parties are divested of rights and liabilities provided that the rights of control were 
transferred to a new transferee of the Bolero bill of lading. 
Finally, it should be noted that the provisions of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
1999 Act are not applicable to a carriage contract embodied into an electronic bill of 
lading, by virtue of s. 6 (6), on the ground that this bill is included by the provisions of the 
1992 Act. However, the application of the 1992 Act to this document is, by virtue of s. 1 
30 See Faber, D., "Electronic Bills of Lading" [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 232, fn. 25 at 243. 
31 See The Athanasia Comninos and Georges Chr. Lemos, [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 277 at 281. 
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(5). conditional on regulations made by the Secretary of State. No such regulations have 
yet been made. 
4.7. ELECTRONIC BILLS OF LADING UNDER US LAW 
An electronic bill of lading is a document that is electronically transmitted and digitally 
signed.
32 
Article 2- 201 (1) of uee establishes the requirement of writing for certain 
contracts and signature. Accordingly, a party who attempts to enforce the contract should 
introduce evidence of a signed writing document. On the one hand, article 1- 201 (39) of 
uec defines "signed" as "any symbol executed or adopted by a third party with the 
present intention to authenticate a writing". On the other hand, article 1- 201 (46) of 
uee defines 'writing' as to include "printing, typewriting or any other intentional 
reduction to tangible form". As a result, article 2 ofUCC does not recognise any electronic 
document. including an electronic bill of lading, unless it is reduced to a signed paper. 
Howeyer, article 2 of UCC is under revision by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws and the drafting committee has anticipated some changes that 
reflect the importance of electronic contract formation and digital signatures. 
eOGSA in its current form applies, by virtue of s. 1303 (b), only to a bill of lading 
and any similar document of title insofar as it relates to contract of carriage of goods by 
sea. Electronic bills of lading would not be considered as documents of title so as to be 
governed by the current COGSA's provisions. This is because the definition of a document 
of title under art. 1- 201 (15)33 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not include an 
electronic bill of lading as a document of title. Moreover, an electronic bill of lading could 
32 See Livermore, 1., & Euarjai, K., "Electronic Bills of Lading: A Progress Report" (1997) 28 J. Mar. L. & 
Com. 55. 
33 Article 1- 201 (15) defines a "document of title" as to include "bill oflading, dock warrant, dock receipt, 
warehouse receipt or order for the delivery of goods, and also any other document which in the regular 
course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that person in possession of it is entitled to 
receive hold and dispose of the document and the goods it covers. To be a document of title, a document 
must p~rport' to be issued by or addressed to bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession 
which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass". 
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not be considered as a negotiable document of title, by virtue of art. 7- 104 (a)34 of the 
Uniform Comnlercial Code, because the delivery and the holder definitions under art. 1-
201 (14 & 20)35 would prevent an electronic bill of lading from being in a negotiable 
fornl.
36 
Accordingly, the Pomerene Act would not be applicable to an electronic bill of 
lading as to govern the transfer the contractual rights since it is not a negotiable bill of 
lading, by vi11ue of art. 7- 104 (a) of UCC, under Ch. 801 03. 
Current US law does not deal with the issues relation to electronic bills of lading. 
On the one hand, the Electronic Signature in Global & National Commerce Act 2000 is not 
specifically directed to maritime commerce and, indeed, it does not address negotiable 
instruments such as bills of lading. On the other hand, the Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act focuses on negotiable instruments rather than negotiable documents of title such as 
bills of lading. 37 Nonetheless, some states have already addressed the validity of digitally 
signed documents, such as the Utah Digital Signature Act 1995.38 The Utah Act 1995 
provides that digitally signed documents are as valid as signed paper documents. 
Accordingly, an electronic bill of lading under the Utah Act 1995 will be valid as a paper 
bill of lading, but such validity is limited to the State of Utah. Despite the validity of an 
electronic bill of lading under the Utah Act 1995, it would not be governed by COGSA as 
"any similar document of title". This is because such bill could not be considered as a 
34 Article 7- 104 (a) defines a "negotiable document of title" as "A document of title is negotiable if by its 
terms the goods are to be delivered to bearer or to the order ofa named person". 
35 Article 1- 201 (14) defines a "delivery" as "with respect to instruments, document of title, chattel paper, or 
certificated securities means voluntary transfer of possession" and article 1- 201 (20) defines a "holder" as 
"with respect to a document of title means the person in possession if the goods are deliverable to bearer or to 
the order of the person in possession". 
36 See, also, Whitaker, David R., "Letters of Credit and Electronic Commerce" (1995) 31 Idaho L. Rev. 699 
at pp. 709. 
37 For more detail see Boss Amelia H., "The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in a Global Environment" 
(2001) 37 Idaho L. Rev. 275 at pp. 348- 349 and Sharpe, David B., "E- Commerce in the United States" 
9200105 Int. M. L. 160 at pp. 160 -161. 
38 The State of New York has, also, addressed the validity of a digital signature by the amendment of New 
York's General Obligations Law 1994. However, the amendment was limited to qualified financial contracts 
(QFCs), which provides that enforceable QFCs are not rendered void for a lack of a wr.iting, i.f there ~s 
sufficient evidence of contracting. The State of California, also, has adopted the TransactIOns WIth PublIc 
Entities Digital Signatures Act 1994, which is limited only to transaction with a public entity. 
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docunlent of title under art. 1- 201 (15) of UCC or even a negotiable document of title 
under art. 7- 104 (a) ofUCC. Moreover, the Pomerene Act would not be applicable to such 
document as to govern the transfer of the contractual rights since it is not a negotiable bill 
of lading, by virtue of art. 7- 104 (a) ofUCC, under Ch. 801 03. 
COGSA is currently under discussion in the Proposed Amendments to the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act.39 By its enactment, by virtue of s. 1 (b) of the Proposed Bill, it 
applies to all contracts of carriage which "includes, but is not limited to, negotiable or 
'order' bills of lading and non- negotiable or 'straight bills of lading', whether printed or 
electronic". By virtue of s. 1 (g), the Proposed Bill applies to electronic bills of lading "If 
the parties agree to use an electronic bill of lading, it shall be a 'contract of carriage' 
governed by the Act and the procedures for such bills of lading shall be in accordance with 
rules agreed upon by the parties". The application of the Proposed Bill to an electronic bill 
of lading depends on the parties' agreement and it will only govern the parties' liabilities 
and rights toward each other. The Proposed Bill contains no special provisions dealing 
\\'ith transferring the contractual rights and liabilities under such an electronic bill of 
lading. Although, the Proposed Bill incorporates fifteen sections of the Pomerene Act and 
therefore it would, inter alia, contain the definitions of negotiable and non- negotiable bills 
of lading, it would not make the Pomerene Act applicable to an electronic bill of lading 
since it is neither a negotiable or a non- negotiable bill of lading under Ch. 801 03 of the 
Pomerene Act, nor a document of title under art. 7- 104 (a) ofUCC. 
As a result, article 7 of UCC is under revision by the Committee acting for the 
National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws.40 The aim of the revision is, 
as stated by the Drafting Committee, to provide a framework for the further development 
39 The Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act [h~reafter as the Prop?se~ Bill] is waiting 
for an enactment by the Senate and House of Representative of the Umted States of Amenca In Congress. 
40 For the full text of the Drafting Committee to revise Uniform Commercial Code Article 7, Document of 
Title see the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws- Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 7- Document of Title available on the web. www.nccus1.org. 
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of electronic documents of title and so to allow the commercial practice to determine what 
records issued by bailees are "in the regular course of business or financing" are "treated as 
adequately evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to 
receive, control. hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers".41 The 
Drafting C on1n1ittee has revised article 742 and the related articles, 143 , 2, 5 and 9 of the 
UnifoID1 Con1mercial Code.44 Moreover, the Drafting Committee has revised s. 16 of 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act relating to transferable record in order to make sure 
that the rules of article 7 provide the dominant set of rules governing electronic documents 
of title. On one hand, the enactment of such revision would qualify an electronic record as 
a document of title, where it is suitable, in the same way as a paper document of title. On 
the other hand, however, such an electronic record is not included by the definition of a bill 
of lading and so the provisions of the Pomerene Act would not govern such record. A 
~ 1 See the Drafting Committee to revise Uniform Commercial Code Article 7, Document of Title at p. 10 
[hereafter DC]. 
42 Article 7- 102 (10) defines a "record" as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is 
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form" and art 7- 102 (11) defines 
"sign" as "with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record: (A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or 
(8) to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process". Article 7- 106 
(a) defines control as "(a) A person has a control of an electronic document of title if a system employed for 
evidencing the transfer of interests in the electronic document reliably establishes that person as the person to 
which the electronic document was issued or transferred". 
43 Article 1- 201 (15) defines a "document of title" as " a record (i) that in the regular course of business or 
financing is treated as adequately evidencing that person in possession or control of the record is entitled to 
receive, control, hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers and (ii) that purports to be 
issued by or addressed to bailee and to cover goods in the bailee's possession which are either identified or 
are fungible portions of an identified mass. The term includes a bill of lading, transport documents, dock 
warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, and order for delivery of goods". 
Article 1- 201 (14) defines a "delivery" as "with respect to an electronic document of title means 
voluntary transfer of control and with respect to instruments, tangible document of title, chattel paper, or 
certificated securities means voluntary transfer of possession" and article 1- 201 (20) (C) defines a "holder" 
as "a person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title". 
44 Section 16 of UET A (a) provides that "In this section, 'transferable record' means an electronic record 
that: (1) would be a note under [Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code] or a document under [Article 7 
of the Uniform Commercial Code] if the electronic record were in writing". This part has been omitted (or a 
document under [Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code]). 
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potential solution to such problem is to extend the definition of bills of lading under art. 1-
201 (6) of UCC45 to include a bill of lading in an electronic form. 
Ho\\,eyer, the enactnlent of such revision would allow the current COOSA, but not 
the POInerene Act, to be applicable to an electronic record, since such record would be a 
document of title and so included by the definition of the contract of carriage of goods by 
sea under s. 1903 (b) of COOSA. 
Until the Pomerene Act is extended to electronic bills of lading, users of electronic 
bills must striye to find solutions within the existing law. There seems to be no US 
equivalent to Bolero System. However, the American P & I Club is sympathetic to the 
aims of Bolero, and has released special circulars, titled "Paperless Trading- The Bolero 
Project", dealing with the Bolero Project.46 The International Oroup of P & I Clubs, 
including the American P & I Club, has fully reviewed the Bolero System and has 
introduced the Paperless Trading Endorsement which would be applied to liabilities- other 
than those would, in any event, have arisen under a conventional paper system- arising 
from a document containing or evidencing a contract of carriage which has been created or 
transmitted under a Paperless System.47 It is, therefore, likely that US carriers who wish to 
use electronic bills of lading will do so under aegis of Bolero. 
U sing the Bolero System in the United States raises the question of how rights and 
liabilities under a Bolero bill might be transferred under the existing American law. Under 
American law, third party beneficiaries are granted rights of suit upon contracts to which 
they are not privy. Using this principle, the transferee of a Bolero bill, the buyer, might be 
45 The revised version of art. 1- 201 (6) defines "bill of lading" as "a document of title evidencing the receipt 
of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of directly or indirectly transporting or 
forwarding goods. The term does not include a warehouse receipt". . 
46 These circulars are Nos. 211 98, 111 99 and 9/02 are available at the web: http://www.amencan-
club.com/circulars. 
47 See circular No. 9/ 02 titled- Paperless Trading- The Bolero Project and Similar System at 
http://www.american-club.com/circulars/cir9-02.htm. The Clubs in the International Group are willing to 
cover risks created only by Bolero System. 
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able to sue the carrier for the loss of or the damage to its cargo on the ground that the 
transferor, the shipper, contracted with the carrier for the transferee's benefit whereby the 
carrier promised the safe carriage of the cargo to its destination. Accordingly, the 
transferor as contractual principal would be able to sue the carrier but only recover nominal 
damages for any breach of the carriage contract since it suffered no loss; while, the 
consignee, as a third party beneficiary of the carriage contract, would be able to sue the 
carrier and recover substantial damages for any breach of the carriage contract. However, 
American case law is divided on the privity of contract doctrine. On the one hand, "either 
party" cases and "the owner" cases would allow the transferee of a Bolero bill of lading to 
sue the carrier for any breach of the carriage contract and so it would pose no problem to 
such transferee. On the other hand, the "privity" cases would allow only the transferor to 
sue the carrier for any breach of the carriage contract so as to leave the transferee of a 
Bolero bill depending on the transferor's will. In this case, the transferee of a Bolero bill 
can avoid such a problem by stipulating, in the sale contract, that the transferor should sue 
the carrier for its benefit for any breach of the carriage contract. 
As mentioned before, the Pomerene Act does not deal with the transfer of liabilities 
of the transferee of a bill of lading. The transferee's liabilities, under American law, would 
be detennined and governed by the common law rules. Therefore, the transferee's 
liabilities of a Bolero bill, under American law, would need to be determined by the 
common law liabilities discussed in chapter three. 
4. 8. CONCLUSION 
It is important to note that neither the novation of the carriage contract nor the implied 
contract doctrine would replicate precisely the effect of COGSA 1992. This is because 
under the English common law rule of novation, the original shipper's liabilities should not 
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be maintained, even with the existence of art. 3 (5) (3) of the Rulebook of the Bolero 
Systelll. Moreover, the inlplied contract doctrine would not provide a viable solution to a 
transferee in the case of non- delivery. This is because no contract could be implied 
between the cargo owner and the carrier in the case of total loss of the goods as in The 
/ . 48 
,"1rmms. 
Under current US law, Ch. 801 will not be applicable to electronic bill of lading 
since it is not a negotiable bill under art. 7- 104 (a) ofUCC. COGSA 1936 will, also, not 
be applicable to such bill since it is not a document of title under art. 1- 201 (15) ofUCC. 
Ho\\'e\'er, the enactment of the revision of article 7 would allow the current COGSA, but 
not the Ch. 801, to be applicable to an electronic record, since such record would be a 
document of title, but not a negotiable bill as required by Ch. 801, and so included by the 
definition of the contract of carriage of goods by sea under s. 1903 (b) of COGSA. 
The legal issues relating to dematerialisation of the shipping documents In 
particular the bill of lading are complex. Any international proposal such as the Draft 
Instrument would be hard to achieve as a result of the traditional differences between the 
legal system of different jurisdictions. Therefore, an electronic commerce proposal such as 
the Bolero system which provides a set of contractual provisions dealing with the legal 
issues would be preferable one. This is because the set of contractual provisions would, 
speedily and cheaply, be changed or modified in the case of any unsatisfying solution to 
any of the relating legal issues. 
48 [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CLAIMING OUTSIDE COGSA 1992 
5. 1. INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of privity of contract causes a lot of difficulties to anyone who seeks to 
enforce the rights and the obligations arising under bill of lading contract. Both the courts 
and the legislature have tried to circumvent these difficulties by various mechanisms. On 
the one hand, the courts have tried to resolve the problems derived from the Bills of Lading 
Act 1855 by different ways, such as implied contract, until the legislature intervened to fill 
the gap by enacting the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. But, the common law doctrine 
of privity of contract is still a source of problems to a set of litigants who, as a result of 
being outside the ambit of COGSA 1992, are trying to enforce the rights and the 
obligations of the bill of lading contract. On the other hand, there is a set of defendants, as 
a result of the exclusion of independent contractors of the ambit of COGSA 1971, who do 
not have contractual relationships with the cargo owner and who seek to rely on defences 
created by their contracts. Therefore, the courts have tried to circumvent the defendants' 
difficulties by applying the doctrine of bailment and sub- bailment on terms. 
5. 2. IMPLIED CONTRACT 
5.2. 1. IMPLIED CONTRACT BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF COGSA 1992 
As has been argued before, l there are some situations where the person who suffers loss, 
because of the carrier's breach of the carriage contract, cannot sue the carrier, since no 
rights have been transferred to him by virtue of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992. For example, 
where: the buyer takes delivery against a letter of indemnity and the bill is never 
I For these situations see infra sub- title 5. 5. 3. 
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transfened to hinl, as in cases such as The Captain Gregos (No. 2)2; the bill is lost in 
transmission and so the transferee never acquires possession of it; the bill is delivered to 
the buyer without the necessary endorsement, in cases such as The Agia Skepi3; the goods 
are sold after the bill of lading has become a 'spent' bill; the buyer takes delivery against a 
document which might fall outside s. 1 (1) of the 1992 Act such as, arguably, a combined 
transport docunlenf+; a pledgee takes possession of an indorsable bill of lading without 
being nanled as consignee or having the bill indorsed to him by the consignee by virtue of 
s. 5 (2) (b) of COGS A 1992.5 
The utility of the implied contract theory is also needed, in cases such as the 
absence of an express contract between the consignor and the shipowner, which would 
otherwise undermine the application of COGSA 1992. The effect of s. 2 (l) is to treat the 
holder of the bill, or the person to whom delivery is to be made under a sea waybill or a 
ship's delivery order, "as if he had been a party to that contract", defined as "the contract 
contained in or evidenced by that bill or waybill".6 Thus, in the absence of an express 
contract, a contract on bill terms needs to be implied between the shipowner and the 
consignor, for, otherwise there would be no contract to which the lawful could be become 
a party under s. 2 (1).7 
Implied contract can also be used to resolve problems between the shipper and the 
shipowner where is no express contract between them. One of the reasons for the decision 
of Devlin 1., in Pyrene Co. Ltd. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.,8 was that a contract 
between the shipowner and the fob seller should be implied on the basis of the seller 
2 Compania Portorafti Commerciale S.A. v. Ultramar Panama Inc. The Captain Gregos (No.2), [1990] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 395. 
3 Compania Continental del Peru S.A. v. Evelpis Shipping Corp., [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 467. 
4 Also in the case of both electronic bills oflading and merchant's delivery orders. 
5 HO\';ever, a pledgee can sue the carrier where he is named as a consignee or is an endorsee, or is in the 
possession of a bearer bill or of a bill which is indorsed in blank. 
6 Under s. 5 (1) (a) of the 1992 Act. . . 
7 However, this problem also exists where the consignor h~s charte~ed. the vessel from th~ shIpowner, m 
which case a new contract is thought to 'spring up' when the bIll of ladmg IS transferred to a thIrd party. 
8 [1954] 2 Q.B. 402. 
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presenting the goods for loading and the shipowner commencing loading. Therefore, the 
courts should consider an implied contract as a vital mechanism to resolve problems which 
are associated with some cases where the cargo owners fall outside the scope of COGSA 
1992 for otherwise the cargo owners will have to recourse to tort which would undermine 
the implementation of the Hague- Visby Rules. However, the Act does not exclude or limit 
rights of suit in tort on the ground that an explicit exclusion might prevent the cargo owner 
from suing the carrier for loss or damage of the goods where he is unable sue under the 
provision of the Act. 9 Double recovery or liability would not be allowed for the same loss 
by the courts and the person who has contractual relationship with the carrier cannot 
escape the contractual terms by suing the carrier in tort. 10 
The implied contract is a valuable and flexible device which provided a means for 
the courts to circumvent the doctrine of privity and to enable certain classes of cargo 
owners who fell outside the scope of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 to establish contractual 
rights to sue the shipowners on the terms of the bill of lading in respect of loss or damage 
to their goods. The use of the implied contract was gradually extended from cases where 
the consignee or endorsee has presented a bill of lading and paid the freight or other 
outstanding charges to cases where the conduct of the parties indicated an intention to 
adopt and perform the bill of lading contract. 
An implied contract comes into existence between the holder of the bill and the 
shipowner when a bill of lading is presented to the shipowner at the port of discharge and 
its holder obtains delivery of the goods, on the terms of that bill of lading. The leading case 
is Brandt. v. Liverpool,11 where the shipowner was liable under the implied contract when 
the plaintiff, the pledgee, as an endorsee presented the bill of lading and paid the freight 
9 See the Commissions Report, Rights of Suit In Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea, (1991) 196 Eng. LCR 
and 130 Scot. LCR at para. 2. 45 and 5. 24. 
10 By virtue ofs. 5 (5) of COGS A 1992 and art. IV Bis 1 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971. 
11 [1924] 1 K.B. 575. 
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then took delivery of the goods. However, whether a contract is to be implied in any 
particular case is always a question of fact. Therefore, whilst some judges have urged a 
restricted use of the doctrine of implied contract, others have been prepared to extend its 
application, so that the doctrine is extended to cases where the recipient of the goods was 
not a holder of a bill of lading but only a holder of a delivery order12 or where the goods 
were delivered against a guarantee that the bill of lading would be presented as soon as that 
becanle possible.1 3 
However, such a contract may not be easy to establish because there must be some 
consideration on either side. Therefore, in The Aramis,14 the buyers sued the shipowner for 
short and non- delivery under two bills of lading in respect of goods forming part of a large 
bulk. The holder of the bill of lading No 5 could not sue the shipowner according to s. 1 of 
the 1855 Act because no delivery had been made under his bill and no property had passed 
to him upon or by reason of endorsement. Although, the holder of the bill No 6 might have 
been able to sue the shipowner in respect of short delivery according to the wide 
interpretation of s. 1 of the 1855 Act, no argument to this effect was advanced by the 
plaintiffs and so the Court was not called on to determine the fate of the dictum contained 
in The San Nicholas 15 and the subsequent cases. 
However, the main issue which was discussed before the Court of Appeal was 
whether the holder of bill No 6 could rely upon an implied contract in the absence of the 
payment and acceptance of freight and, in respect of bill No 5, whether a contract could be 
implied where no goods at all were delivered under the tendered bill. The Court of Appeal 
12 In cases such as Cremer .v. General Carriers S.A. (The Dona Mari), [1974] 1 W.L.R. 34l. 
13 The Elli 2 [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 107. 
14 [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213. .".. 
15 Roskill, L.l., at the first instance, [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep. 8 at l3, SaId I am dIs.posed .to prefer the WI?er 
view because the narrow view would in some cases at least greatly lessen the secu~lty whIch those advancI~g 
money against shipping documents would acquire the benefit of no contract .on WhICh t~ey coul~ sue t~e ShIP 
under the principles of Sewell. v. Burdlick, but would be left to sue a foreIgn flag shIpowner In tort In any 
country when, where and if they could find him". 
232 
refused to imply a contract from the mere presentation of the bill of lading without any 
~orresponding response from the carrier which would be interpreted as an acceptance of 
the consignee's offer. Therefore, the consignee had no remedy against the shipowner under 
an inlplied contract in respect of non- delivery. Moreover, the mere presentation of the bill 
of lading followed by partial delivery did not constitute sufficient evidence from which to 
imply a contract, especially in circumstances where the conduct of the parties is equally 
explicable as constituting performance of their obligations and rights under the original 
sale and carriage contracts and in the absence of any consideration by the party presenting 
the bill of lading. It is arguable that the decision of the Court of Appeal would have been 
different on the assumption of delivery of the whole bulk on presentation of all the bills of 
lading. in that the shipowner was accepting the offer made by each holder to accept 
deli,'ery and to pay the freight and the other outstanding charges under the terms of the 
bill. Before and until the bulk was split, none of the holders knew that the bulk was short 
and it could not be said which of them would receive some of his goods or receive nothing 
at all. Therefore, the implied contract would be made with each of them at that stage and so 
the shipowner was in breach of the implied contract in respect of both bills by reason of 
short or non- delivery.16 Therefore, there should be some kind of consideration on either 
side in order to infer the implication of the implied contract. 17 The problem of 
consideration could be resolved but, it is important to find whether there is any intention by 
the parties to create legal relations with each others. 
16 For more details see De Va, P., "More points on the Brandt. v. Liverpool contract, The Aramis", [1987] 
LMCLQ. 255 at 256. 
17 It is, therefore, doubtful whether an implied contract would be found where the ship sinks or where it is 
known and accepted that the cargo in question is not on board on arrival at the port of discharge. However, 
the problem of consideration could be resolved by arguing either that the carrier was not bound to deliver by 
virtue of his lien and provided consideration by releasing that lien as in Seotson .v. Pegg, [1861] 6 H. & N. 
295 or the carrier's duty to deliver was owed by the shipper and the performance of a duty owed to the shi~per as a third party could constitute consideration for the holder'~ of the biIl of lading promise as in. The 
Eurymedon, [1975] A.C. 154. Moreover, the implied or express promIses ~f each pa~y, t~e mutual promIses, 
could be consideration for each other, as long as at the time of the formatIOn of the ImplIed contract at least 
one of them on each side remains unperformed. 
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The Court of Appeal concluded that the implied contract theory could not be 
applied just as a result of presentation of the bill of lading and taking delivery, as Evans, 1. 
had held. because it would eliminate the need for the Bills of Lading Act 1855 and so the 
holder of the bill of lading would be always party to the bill of lading contract. 18 The Court 
of Appeal applied strictly the principles as to formation of contracts, ignoring previous 
cases such as The EurYIIledon 19 and Pyrene Co. Ltd. . v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd.,2o 
despite the fact that the reasoning in The Aramis could be applied equally to the facts of 
those cases. The court applied the doctrine of implied contract, in The Eurymedon, between 
the cargo owner and the stevedores not only because of the Himalaya clause but also on the 
operation of Brandt . v. Liverpool, despite the fact that no money had been paid to the 
ste\,edores by the cargo owner. Also, Devlin 1., was prepared to find an implied contract, in 
P.l'rene . v. Scindia Navigation, between the seller and the shipowner, from the seller's 
action in presenting the goods for loading and that of the shipowner in commencing 
loading. Treitel argues that "One can indeed fall back on the argument that "whether a 
contract is to be implied is a question of fact"; but the judgments in The Aramis do not take 
this easy way out: "whether on such facts [i.e ., those before the court] a contract may be 
implied must be considered in the light of ordinary contractual principles". In other words, 
the question what facts need to be established is one of law; it is only the question whether 
those facts have been established which is one of facts"? 1 Therefore, the Court of Appeal 
should have taken into account the policy consideration of the implied contract theory 
which is the need to circumvent the doctrine of privity and the restrictions on the scope of 
18 It is arguable that the need for s. 1 of the 1855 Act would only have bee~ redu~ed, but not be eliD?inat~d, 
because the implied contract could still be excluded by evidence of contrary mten:lOn. Therefore, the Imphe~ 
contract theory would be out of order if either the holder of the bill or the carner refused to perform theIr 
obligations under the bill of lading contract. For support for this view see Treitel, O. H., "Bills of lading and 
implied contracts", [1989] LMCLQ. 162 at 173. 
19 [1975] A.C. 154. 
20 [1954] Q.B. 402. 
21 See Treitel, O. H., supra fn. 18 at 171. 
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s. 1 of the 1855 Act, as a way of justifying the Brandt. v. Liverpool contract in general 
temlS but not to detennine its scope. Moreover, Evans 1., called for "authoritative 
reassessnlent" but at the sanle time he applied the implied contract theory. In contrast, 
Binghanl, L.1., concluded that the solution was "to be found in an amendment of the 1855 
Act along the lines now under consideration by the Law Commission, rather than in the 
implication of a contract where the grounds for such implication do not exist" and refused 
to apply the implied contract theory. 
Howeyer, the Court of Appeal, III The Captain Gregos (No2),22 qualified their 
decision in The Aramis by implying a contract between BP and the shipowners, even 
though no money had been paid to the latter, on the ground that the discharge had been into 
BP~s tenninal which had necessitated a high degree of co- operation between the parties. 
Bingham LJ., found that BP's position differed from that of the plaintiffs in The Aramis in 
two respects. First, BP were the owner of the goods before discharge began and secondly, 
BP had clearly and explicitly consented to the carriage to be on tenns which included the 
Hague- Visby Rules. There is no explanation regarding the link between the ownership and 
the conclusion of the contract at destination. Also, the consent of BP does not make the 
facts of the case different from the previous cases such as The Aramis.23 Moreover, 
Bingham L.J., in the Court of Appeal found the active co- operation between the BP and 
the crew required the implication of a contract "to give business reality to the transaction 
between them and create the obligation which, as we think, both parties plainly believe to 
. t,,24 eXlS 
22 See supra th. 2. . ' 
23 Clarke, Malcolm., "The consignee's right of action against the carner of goods by sea, The C:aptam G.regos 
(No.2)" [1991] LMCLQ. 5 at 7. However, the only consent by BP was in the sale contract WIth B and It was 
not at Rotterdam. . . 
24 See supra fn. 2 at 403. It is not clear why did Bingham L 1., accept the idea of giving the busmess reahty 
but not in The A ram is. 
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Therefore, it is arguable that the utility of the implied contract device was reduced 
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Aramis,25 but its subsequent decision in The 
Captain Gregos (No 2) suggested that the doctrine might still have a role to play, until its 
recent decision in The Gudermei6 which renewed doubts about its utility. 
The facts of The Gudermes are that Mitsui bought a shipment of oil from SNE who 
was the charterer of the defendants' vessel The Gudermes. Bills of lading were issued 
which incorporated the Hague- Visby Rules. Mitsui, the plaintiff, sold the oil shipment to 
ENEL who o\vned the receiving terminal at Ravenna. The latter rejected the cargo as a 
result of lack of heating on the voyage which might clog the underwater sealine at which 
the yessel was to discharge. In order to discharge the cargo, Mitsui arranged transhipment 
off Malta to another vessel with heating coils. Later, Mitsui tried to recover the cost of the 
transhipment and other charges from the shipowners on the ground that a contract on the 
terms of the bills should be implied on the basis of the extensive co- operation involved the 
transhipment. Mitsui could not sue the defendants by relying on s. 1 of the 1855 Act 
because the property in the oil passed on loading. Mitsui claimed, in the alternative, that 
the defendants were in breach of bailment and in breach of a tortious duty of care. The 
Court of Appeal held that the shipowners were bailees and they did attorn to Mitsui, but 
not on the terms of the bill of lading which would have required them to heat the cargo 
during the voyage. Instead, the bailment was on the terms of the charter, the charterer 
being the initial consignor, and so the bailment claim fell with the implied contract claim. 
In respect of the tort claim, the Court of Appeal held that the shipowners owed a duty of 
care to Mitsui and the shipowners' duty of care was qualified by the charterer's consent to 
25 Davenport also disagreed with the decision of the Court of ~ppeal in The A ram. is and added "Nevertheless, 
the strength of English commercial law is that in the past the Judges sought to g~ve effect to good sense and 
underlying commercial convenience. If the judges of the past had adopted the attItude of the Court of Appeal 
in The Aramis, would we today have the letter of credit- or even the bill of exchange?" Davenport, B.1., 
"Problems in the Bills of Lading Act" [1989] 105 LQR 174 at 178. 
26 [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 311. 
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canlage the goods without heating system. The key to the case was whether the 
transhipnlent operation would be considered as extensive co- operation and would lead to 
the implication of a contract on the terms of the bill of lading. 
Hirst 1., at the first instance, in The Gudermei7 found that the transhipment went 
beyond the existing obligations of the parties and the extensive co- operation in this case 
was more than the one in The Aramis, and therefore a contract incorporating bill of lading 
terms should be implied.28 Hirst 1., considered the issue of implied contract in three stages: 
(1) it was necessary to imply a contract between Mitsui and the shipowners on the terms of 
the bill of lading~ (2) there was an implied term in that contract that the shipowners were 
not obliged to heat the cargo~ (3) the implied contract was governed by the Hague- Visby 
Rules and so the implied term was, according to art. III (8) inconsistent with other 
provisions in the Rules. The Court of Appeal by Staughton L.1., held that Hirst 1., was 
wrong in considering the facts in three stages while "the issue of implied contract must be 
considered as a whole in one stage.,,29 Staughton L.J., emphasised that "What they do must 
be consistent only with there being a new contract implied, and inconsistent with there 
being no such contract. ,,30 The Court of Appeal agreed that there was co- operation 
between the parties through their direct communication with each other and through the 
transhipment operation which went beyond and was inconsistent with the existing rights 
and obligations of the parties. However, the Court of Appeal found that the co- operation 
was not the decisive factor and it was necessary to resolve the delivery problem. 
The Court of Appeal held that the decisive factor was the defendants' refusal to 
accept liability for the transhipment costs "Just as one does not imply a contract from 
27 [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 456. ., 
28 Hirst J., found that the intensive co- operation between the partIes, as showmg by the natu~e ?f the 
transhipment operation and the direct communication between Mitsui and. the master, were more sIgmficant 
than the other factors such as the refusal of the shipowner to pay the transhIpment costs. 
29 See supra fn. 26 at 320. 
30 Ibid. 
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refusal to enter into a contract, so one does not imply terms which one party has refused to 
"qTh h accept . - us, t e Court of Appeal held, according to its view of the facts of the case as 
,,"hole, that there was no inlplied contract between the defendants, the shipowners, and the 
plaintiff, Mitsui. According to the facts of The Gudermes, there was no evidence that 
~1itsui accepted the defendants' refusal for liability for the transhipment costs. 
Neyertheless, the refusal of the defendants does not necessarily indicate the refusal to enter 
into a contract with Mitsui:12 Staughton LJ., reinforced the view that the implication of a 
contract depends upon the intentions of the parties, while firmly stressing that such a 
contract is inlplied in fact rather than in law.33 
The plaintiff in The Gudermes would now be able to sue under s. 2 (l) of the 1992 
Act since the bill of lading had been indorsed to them. But, the claimant in such 
circumstances, might not be able to recover the cost of transhipment since it was carried 
out under the subsequent agreement between the shipowner and the plaintiff rather than 
under the bill of lading contract. However, this problem would probably be solved by suing 
the shipowner under the bill of lading contract for the breach of his duty of taking a proper 
care of the cargo or by arguing that the ship was unseaworthy and that the subsequent 
agreement should be regarded as mitigation of potential losses deriving from these 
breaches. Nor would the shipowner be able to invoke his agreement with the charterer/ 
shipper that the cargo did not require to be heated as this would be irrelevant as against the 
holder of the bill of lading. 34 
31 Ibid. at 323. Tn G d " [1993] 
32 Wh't F & Bradgate R. ''The Survival of the Brandt. v. Liverpool Contract, 1, e u ermes 1 e, ., , , 
LMCLQ. 483 at 487. 
33 See Treitel, G. H., supra tn. 18. 
34 See Leduc .v. Ward, [1888] 20 Q.B.D. 475. 
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5.2.1. IMPLIED CONTRACT AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF COGSA 1992 
It \yould be tempting to conclude that the doctrine of implied contract has no role to play in 
filling the gaps left by the enactment of COGSA 1992. Such conclusion, however, may be 
too pessin1istic. This is because the doctrine may still operate in the following 
circumstances. First, where the bill of lading is presented by a party who is the owner of 
the cargo at that time. The Court of Appeal in The Captain Gregos (No 2) gave this as one 
of the its reasons for in1plying a contract between BP and the shipowners. The 
implementation of s. 20 (A) of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 increases the 
range of third parties who will satisfy this condition. Such a third party might not be able to 
sue in negligence if the loss or damage precedes its acquisition of proprietary or possessory 
rights in the cargo. However, such consideration will be irrelevant if the ownership is to be 
the basis for implying a contract, as the contractual rights will cover any breach committed 
during the carrier's period of responsibility under the bill of lading. In this respect, the 
position resembles that under a bailment following an attornment in favour of a successor 
in title. 
Secondly, where the discharge of the goods requires the co- operation of both the 
carrier and the cargo owner. This was the second reason giving by the Court of Appeal in 
The Captain Gregos (No 2) for implying a contract and has not been rendered redundant 
by the Court of Appeal in The Gudermes. What that decision has done is to qualify the 
factor of co- operation by disregarding it where there is a clear evidence that the carrier is 
clearly rejecting the terms of the proposed implied contract at the same time it is co-




that a contract may be implied in cases involving delivery 
without production of a bill of lading but rather against a letter of indemnity. This is 
because. in doing so, the shipowner is doing something is not obliged to do under the bill 
of lading and therefore the parties' conduct can no longer be explained by reference to 
their existing contract. This line of argument might benefit third parties who take delivery 
against a letter of indemnity where a combined transport bill has been issued. Under such 
bill. whether it is a true bill of lading or a straight bill, the carrier is under an obligation to 
deliver only on presentation of an original bill, unlike a sea waybill. However, this 
argument would favour third parties who take delivery against a letter of indemnity rather 
than by presenting a bill of lading. Moreover, the parties' conduct in such circumstances 
can be explained by reference to the express contract, the letter of indemnity provided to 
the carrier. The letter of indemnity normally focus on the carrier's delivery obligation 
rather than its carriage obligations and, therefore, the existence of an express contract will 
tend to militate against the finding of a second, implied, contract to deal with the carrier's 
carriage obligations. 
Fourthly, the courts might follow the example of US courts in Contship 
Containerlines, Inc. v. Howard Industries, Inc.,36 and imply a contract in law to avoid 
unjust enrichment. The unjust enrichment in that case was the carriage of the goods 
without payment of the freight by the shipper. The unjust enrichment when a receiver takes 
delivery of a cargo would be the risk that, in the absence of a contractual relationship, the 
receiver might be able to sue in negligence without reference to the exceptions and 
limitations in the bill. There is also the risk that the receiver would avoid potential 
liabilities in the bill of lading. However, this second factor would arguably be relevant only 
if the liability for dangerous cargo was imposed under implied contract. For the liability for 
35 Todd, P., Cases and Materials on International Trade Law, 1st Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003, 
at pars. 13- 070- 13- 07l. 
36 309 F. 3d 910 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2002). 
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freight and denlurrage. the carrier has a lien over the cargo and the receiver would obtain 
the cargo only by paying the sum due to the carrier, which would be enough for a contract 
to be implied under The Aramis. 
Finally. it must be noted that the doctrine of implied contract is deficient at filling 
the gaps in COGSA 1992 in two aspects. First, it is unclear a contract will be implied in 
favour of a third party taking delivery of a cargo covered by a sea waybill, because the 
production of a sea waybill is not part of the process of obtaining delivery of the goods. 
Secondly. problenls of conflicts law may arise where English law does not apply and the 
relevant foreign law does not recognise the implied contract theory.3? The court in The St. 
Joseph. 3s held the implied contract will be subject to the law of the state where the goods 
were discharged. However, if that state does not recognise implied contracts, then it will be 
difficult to give effect to a clause in the bill of lading which gives jurisdiction to a state that 
dose recognise them, as there will be no contract for the bill of lading clauses to adhere to. 
The same consideration is applicable to the operation of the Hague- Visby Rules. 
Therefore, if the bill of lading is issued in a contracting state the Rules will have the force 
of law but if there is no implied contract there will be no 'contract of carriage' regulated by 
the bill of lading as per art. I (b). 
5.3. CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) 1999 ACT 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, by virtue of s. 1 (3), provides that "The 
third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class or 
as answering particular description but need not be in existence when the contract is 
entered into". Accordingly, a third party merely has to show that it fits the description of a 
'third party' under this section and has acquired rights of enforcement under the 1999 Act. 
37 Reynolds,. F.M.B., "The significance of tort in claims in respect of carriage by sea", [1986] LMCLQ. 97 at 
102. 
38 [1933] 45 Li. L. Rep. 180. 
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Therefore, there will be no need for that third party to prove that the contracting party was 
acting as an agent for the third party so as to establish a direct contractual relationship 
between him and the contracting party. Satisfying the requirements of s. 1 (3) will confer 
on a third party, who is not a party to the carriage contract, the right to enforce a term of 
that contract, but such right is subject to the so- called the exceptions clause s. 6 (5). 
Section 6 (5) provides that 
"section I confers no right on a third party in the case of- (a) a contract 
for the carriage of goods by sea, or (b) a contract for the carriage of 
goods by rail or road, or for the carriage of cargo by are, which is subject 
to the rules of the appropriate international transport convention, except 
that a third party may in reliance on that section avail himself of an 
exc lusion or limitation of liability in such a contract". 
The first limb of this exception relates to a 'contract for the carriage of goods by 
sea' which is defined in s. 6 (6) as "(a) contained in or evidenced by a bill of lading, a sea 
\\'aybill or a corresponding electronic transaction, or (b) under or for the purposes of which 
there is given an undertaking which is contained in a ship's delivery order or a 
corresponding electronic transaction". Section 6 (7) provides that "(a) 'bill of lading', 'sea 
waybill' and 'ship's delivery order' have the same meaning as in the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act 1992, and (b) a corresponding electronic transaction is a transaction within section 
1 (5) of that Act which corresponds to the issue, endorsement, delivery or transfer of a bill 
of lading, sea waybill or ship's delivery order". The purpose of the exception is to prevent 
confusing overlap between the 1999 Act and other international conventions that confer 
rights of suit on third parties. Without this exception, the provisions of s. 2 (5) of COGSA 
1992 could be undermined by a clause drafted in conformity with s. I (3) of the 1999 Act. 
The 1999 Act could still be used to confer rights of suit on third parties claiming under sea 
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carriage docunlent, such NVOCC bills, in the event that these were found to fall outsider 
COGSA 1992.39 
The position is nlore complex where other modes of transport are involved. A 
conlbined transport bill which contains or evidences a contract for the carriage of goods 
pa rtzl' by sea would not be covered by the first limb of s. 6 (5) of the 1999 Act. Therefore, 
a named consignee in such bill would be able to rely on s. 1 of the 1999 Act so as to 
enforce a term of that contract as a third party, provided that the 1992 Act only covers a 
bill which contains or evidence a contract for carriage of goods by sea wholly rather than 
part~\·. If the combined transport bill which covers a contract for the carriage of goods 
part~\· by sea and partly by road is not a contract for the carriage of goods by sea, then it 
doubtful if it can be classified, instead, as a contract for the carriage of goods by road, so 
as to be excluded by virtue of the second limb of the exception. Carver,40 nonetheless, 
argues that such bill will still be included by the second limb of the exception where the 
"whole contract for the carriage of goods covered by such bill is subject to an international 
convention such as CMR convention. Therefore, a combined transport bill involving road 
carriage that complied with s.l (3) of the 1999 Act would still be taken out of the 1999 Act 
by virtue of s. 6 (5- 7), unless it fell outside COGSA 1992 but also fell outside the 
provisions of CMR.41 This is likely to occur only rarely. If, say, a contract was concluded 
to carry goods from Birmingham to Paris, and the goods where unloaded from their trailer 
for the sea leg, then by virtue of art. 2 CMR, this contract would fall outside the provisions 
of that convention and would not, therefore, be caught by either heading (a) or (b) of s. 6 
(5) of the 1999 Act. However, if the contract was from Birmingham to Warsaw, 
international road carriage would be involved on conclusion of the sea leg. This road leg 
39 But the 1999 Act cannot be used to give positive rights of suit to shipowners against the holders of 
Charterer's bill. Such a bill fall within the 1992 Act and therefore is caught by s. 6 (5) (a) of the 1999 Act. 
40 Carver on Bills of Lading, 1st. Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 200,1, at para. 8- 074., , 
41 This possibility is recognised in Law Commission's Report on whIch the Contracts (RIghts of ThIrd 
Parties) Act 1999 was based. 
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\yould be subject to CMR, as was held by the Court of Appeal in Quantum Corporation 
Inc and Others. )'. Plane Trucking Ltd. and Another,42 a case involving mixed air and road 
transport. 
5. 4. BAILMENT UNDER US LAW 
As nlentioned before, Anlerican courts, under US Law, answered the question of the 
carrier's identity by the principle of agency and also, in some cases, by conferring the 
status of carrier on both the charterer and the shipowner who participate in the carriage 
contract. Accordingly, the 'practical approach' provides that all parties involved in the 
carriage of goods are carriers for COGSA 1936. This approach, arguably, would reduce, if 
not demolish. the need of cargo owners to sue in bailment law under the general maritime 
law. This is because COGSA provides an exclusive remedy to the cargo owner, although 
COGSA is silent on its pre-emptive scope. However, COGSA 1936 provides that it does 
not supersede any laws "insofar as they relate to duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of 
the ship or carrier prior to the time when the goods are loaded on or after the time they are 
discharged from the ship".43 Nonetheless, the application of the provisions of COGSA 
supersedes other laws during the time after cargo is loaded and before it is removed from 
the ship.44 In contrast, under the 'agency approach' the charterer might be the carrier under 
the bill of lading and so the shipowner would not be considered as the COGSA carrier. 
Therefore, this approach would allow the cargo owners to sue the shipowners in bailment 
when a charterers' bill of lading is issued. In Tuscaloosa Steel Corp. v. MIV "NAIMO ,,45 it 
42 [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25, ([2002 EWCA Civ 350). 
43 See 46 U.S.C.App. s. 1311 (1999). 
44 See Sail America Foundation. v. MIV TS. Prosperity, 778 F. Supp. 1282 at 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); St. Paul 
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Marine Transp. service Sea Barge Group, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1438 at 1442 (S. D. Fla. 
1989); Thyssen Steel Co. v. MIV Kavo Yerakas, 50 F. 3d 1349 at 1354 (5th Ci:. 1995) and Polo Ralph 
Lauren, L.P. v. Tropical shipping & Constr. Co., 215 F. 3d 1217 at 1220 (lIth Or. 2000) and Kvandal, 1., 
"Extending the COGSA Umbrella: The Eleventh Circuit Sets L.imits f~r t?e Standing of ~argo O,;vners not 
Named in Bills of Lading in Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P. v. TropIcal ShIppmg & ConstructIOn Co. 25 Mar. 
Law. 537. 
45 1993 AMC 622, (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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was held that "Fairness dictates the law of bailment be an available remedy to a shipper 
where the owner is not bound to the contract of carriage".46 However, the decisions of the 
Southern District of New York in both Sail America Foundation .v. MIV rs. Prosperity47, 
St. Paul & Marine Ins. Co. v. Marine Transp. service Sea Barge Group, Inc.,48 and 
Tuscaloosa Steel Corp. v. MIV "NAIMO" 49 provide that on the one hand, COGSA is the 
exclusiye remedy for the cargo loss or damage against carriers when it is applicable while, 
on the other hand, the general maritime law applies when COGSA is inapplicable to a 
particular party or under particular circumstances. 
The carrier might, however, be liable to the shipper or the cargo owner as a bailee 
for the loss of or the damage to the goods during the period before loading or after 
discharge. In Leather's Best, Inc., v. s.s. Mormaclynx,50 the carriage contract continued in 
effect after the cargo had been discharged, but it failed to specify the precise 
responsibilities of the carrier in respect of the container during that period before delivery. 
The court held that "upon landing the cargo, the carrier assumed the status of bailee and 
continued to occupy that status, remaining liable for the cargo's safe delivery, regardless 
into whose hands it placed the cargo, unless it terminated its liability by placing the cargo 
in a public dock or warehouse in accordance with the bill of lading".51 It held, then, that 
"thus, although the container was in possession of Tidewater [terminal operator] at the time 
the loss occurred, we have no doubt that, for purposes of determining Mooremac's liability 
[shipowner], it stands in the shoes of the agent it utilised to perform its obligations, the 
46 Ibid. at 626- 627, the court also permitted a cargo owner to bring a tort claim against a negligent shipowner 
who was not a 'carrier' within the meaning of COOSA; D B- Trade International, Inc. v. Astramar Cia 
Argentina Navegacion S.A.C., 1988 AMC 766 at 767, (N.D.IlI. 1987) (sa~e), and EAC Tim~erlane v .. Pisces, 
Ltd., 745 F. 2d. 715 at 721, 1985 AMC 1594 (lst Cir. 1984) (general marItIme law also applIes to partIes who 
are not regulated by COOSA). 
47 778 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
48 272 F. Supp. 1438 at 1442 (S. D. Fla. 1989). 
49 See supra fn. 45. 
50 45 1 F. 2d 800 at 811,1971 AMC 2383 (2d Cir. 1971). 
51 Ibid. at 812. 
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negligence of the agent being imputed to the principal". 52 The court applied federal 
bailnlent law to the shipowner's liability and concluded that the shipowner was liable since 
it could not rebut the bailor's prima facie case.53 
The courts have established that cargo owners or shippers would only be able to sue 
the carriers, under federal bailment law, as bailees, when COGSA is inapplicable to a 
particular party or under particular circumstances. Although no formal contract is required 
to create a bailment, lawful possession and a duty to account for thing as the property of 
another, is necessary. However, physical control coupled with an intent to exercise control 
over the goods constitute possession. 54 The Court held in Hartford Fire Insurance co. v. 
Empresa Ecuatoriana De Aviacion d/b/a Ecuatoriana Airline, and AMR Services, Inc.,55 
that "In the absence of a mutual contract of bailment, an implied bailment arises when a 
party comes into lawful possession of the personal property of another". The court 
applying the common law of bailment, held, "the subject shipment entered the possession 
of AMR Services after the cargo was placed outside the terminal door by American 
Airlines. Nieves' handling of a portion of the freight is sufficient proof that AMR had 
possession of the cargo".56 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Graham 
Whitcombe v. Stevedoring Services of America,57 held that the bailment relationship 
between the cargo owner, Whitcombe, and terminal operator, SSA, came into being when 
Whitcombe caused the cars to be delivered to SSA. 
52 'b'd I I . 
53 Ibid. at 813. 
54 See Otto Wolff Han delsgesellsch aft, mbh v. Sheridan Transportation Company, 800 F. Supp 1359 at 1366, 
1993 AMC 406. . .,., d t h dl" 
55 945 F. Supp. 51 at 56 (S.D.N.Y 1996). This case dealt WIth the bailment s Issue m regar 0 an mg 
services on land. 
56 Ibid. at 57. 1 . h h . 1 t th t 
57 2 F. 3d 312, 1993 AMC 2097 (9th Cir. August 16, 1993). This case dea tWIt t e termma opera or a 
provided stevedoring services as well as storage services. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P. v. 
Tropical shipping & Constr. CO.,58 dismissed Polo's bailment claim against the shipowner 
on its finding that Polo, as a cargo owner who was neither the shipper nor specifically 
named in the bills of lading, was able to sue the shipowner by analogy of its vulnerability 
to that of a stevedore who is granted COGSA protections through the use of a Himalaya 
clause. 59 The court held in Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc., v. MIV "OOeL 
Inspiration", Orient Ol't.!rseas Container Line (UK) Ltd., and Sea- Land Service, Inc.,6o 
citing Tuscaloosa Steel Corp. v. MIV "NAIMO", that the shipowners, under charterers' bill 
of lading. were liable as bailees for the damage to the cargo while in its possession. The 
terms of the bailment between the cargo owner and the shipowners were the terms of the 
charterers' bill of lading. 61 
In Thyssen Steel Co. v. MIV Kavo Yerakas,62 Thyssen Steel Company (Thyssen) 
and Associated Metals and Minerals Corporation (AMMC) entered in a carriage contract 
with Eurolines, the time charterer, to transport steel pipe from Europe to United States 
aboard MIV Kavo Yerakas. The cargo was loaded pursuant to bills of lading issued and 
signed by Euroline's agent "for the master". On arrival, some of the cargo was damaged 
and thus, both (Thyssen) and (AMMC) sued Eurolines and Dodekaton, the shipowner. The 
Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in Thyssen Steel Co. v. MIV Kavo Yerakas,63 
considered the bailment issue as an alternative head of claim in the event the cargo owners 
58 215 F. 3d 1217 at 1220,2000 AMC 2129 (lIth Cir. 2000) 
59 The bills of lading contained a clause binding the shipper, consignee, or the owner of the goods to the 
stipulations of the ocean bill of lading. Ibid. at 1221- 1224. The court did not explore the doctrine of sub-
bailment on terms as a ground for allowing Polo to sue the shipowner. 
60 961 F. Supp. 55 at 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
61 However, clause (2) of the charterers' bill of lading identified both the charterers and the shipowners as the 
carriers and clause (4) stated that "The carrier identified in Clause 1 [the charterers 'OOCL' (UK)] hereof 
agrees to perform the ocean transportation between the Port of Loading a~d Port of Discharge on.the Vessel 
named in the Bill of Lading or any substitute vessel". The court, also, dId not explore the doctnne of sub-
bailment on terms as a ground for applying the shipowner's tariff that was higher than COOSA. Instead, the 
court held that "To the extent the Bill of Lading is ambiguous with regard to whether COOSA or Sea- Land's 
tariff [shipowners] should apply, such ambiguity must be interpreted against the drafting party, in this case 
Defendants [charterers and shipowners]". Ibid. at 60. 
62 50 F. 3d 1349 at 1351 (5th Cir. 1995). 
63 Ibid. at 1354. 
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failed to prove that the master had granted Eurolines permission to sign the bill of lading 
on his behalf. Therefore, the court in Thyssen Steel Co. v. MIV Kavo Yerakas,64 held that 
"Bailnlent is the delivery of goods or personal property to the bailee in trust, under an 
express or implied contract, which requires the bailee to perform the trust either to 
redeliver the goods or to otherwise dispose of the goods in conformity with the purpose of 
the trust". Accordingly, the court held that (Thyssen) and (AMMC) have not established a 
prima facie bailment against the shipowner, Dodekaton, on two grounds. First, the absence 
of an express or implied bailment contract between them. Second, Thyssen's failure to 
establish that the cargo was within the exclusive possession of Dodekaton during transit.65 
Therefore, it held that on the alternative ground, Dodekaton was not liable as a bailee for 
the cargo damage under general maritime law. 
In Office of Supply Government of the Republic of Korea v. M V. Najiop0 ros, 
Sanko Steamship Co., Ltd. ,66 Anne, the shipowner, time chartered the vessel to Sanko. 
Then, Sanko voyage chartered the vessel to American Coal, the seller, to deliver the cargo 
of coal to Samsung, the buyer. The master of the vessel authorised American Coal's agent 
to issue a bill of lading covering the coal. A bill of lading signed by American Coal's agent 
as an agent "for the master" was issued which named Samsung as the shipper and Office of 
Supply, the plaintiff, as consignee of the cargo. Sanko as a time charterer was neither a 
party to the bill of lading nor a carrier within COG SA. The court held that "assuming that a 
bailment relationship can exist between a cargo owner and a time charterer which is not a 
64 Ibid. at 1354- 1355. . 
65 See T.N.T Marine service, Inc. v. Weaver Shipyard & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F. 2d 585 a~ 588 (5th CIr. .198~) 
where it was held that under the general admiralty law, bailment does not aris.e unless delIvery to !he ?aI1e~ IS 
complete and he has exclusive possession of the bailed prope~y, ev~n as agamst the owner. A b~llee s dutles 
are limited when the owner or his agent or employee remams WIth vessel or has access to It. See, also, 
Continental Insurance Co. v. Washeon Corp., 524 F. Supp. 34 at 37 (E.D.Mo. 1981). 
66 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671 at [2] (S.D.N.Y 1985). 
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carrier. the plaintiff failed to prove that Sanko ever had the cargo within its custody and 
control".67 
It has long been recognised under the law of admiralty that for many, if not most, 
purposes the denlise charter is to be treated as the owner, generally called the owner pro 
hac vice. Accordingly. the cargo owner's remedies would be solely against the demise 
charterer or the vessel in rem. Therefore, the court in Otto Wolff Han delsgesellsch aJt, mbh 
v. Sheridan Transportation Company,68 held that the shipowner under a demise charter 
\,"ould not be liable to the cargo owner as a bailee, because the shipowner has no control 
over the carriage contract between the demise charterer and the cargo owner and so the 
court agreed with the shipowner that bailment is contractual in nature, and that "the bill of 
lading is the contract of carriage" where a charterer issues one to a consignee and 
therefore. there would no non- contractual liability on the shipowners. 
The burden of proof under federal bailment law differs from that under COGSA. 
Under federal bailment law, a bailor makes out a prima facie case of bailment by 
establishing that the goods were delivered in good condition and returned in damaged 
condition.69 The court held in Caemint Food, Inc. v. Brasileiro,70 that the prima facie case, 
is, in reality, a species of res ipsa loquitur, and is comprised of two elements. First, the 
delivery of the goods to the carrier in good order and condition, and secondly, the 
discharge from the vessel in damaged condition.71 The Court in Hartford Fire Insurance 
co. v. Empresa Ecuatoriana De Aviacion d/b/a Ecuatoriana Airline, and AMR Services, 
Inc.,72 citing New York Law, also, held that "When there is admission or other proof that 
67 Ibid. at [14- 15]. 
68 800 F. Supp 1359 at 1366, 1993 AMC 406. 
69 See Leather's Best, Inc., v. s.s. Mormaclynx, See supra fn. 50 at 812. 
70 647 F. 2d 347 at 352 (2d Cir. 1981). . . 
71 The court, also, in Acwoo International steel Corp. v. Toko Kaiun Kaish,. Ltd., ~nd Nlcholson Termmal & 
Dock Co., 840 F. 2d 1284,1988 AMC 2922 (6th Cir. 1988) endorsed theprzma!acle case. 
72 See supra fn. 55 at 57. 
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the property entered into the possession of the bailee and then was not returned, it is the 
duty of the bailee to explain the loss". 
Moreover, the court in Leather's Best, Inc., v. s.s. Mormaclynx,13 held that the 
burden of production, but not the burden of persuasion, then shifts to the bailee. The 
nleaning of this rule was developed in Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank 
Barge Corp. ,74 where it held that "the burden of proof in litigation, wherever the law has 
placed it, does not shift the evidence, and in determining whether petitioner has sustained 
the burden in question often is, as in this case, what inference of fact he may summon to 
his aid. In answering it in this, as in others where breach of duty is the issue, the law takes 
into account the relative opportunity of the parties to know the fact in issue and to account 
for the loss, which it is alleged, is due to the breach. Since the bailee in general is in a 
better position than the bailor to know the cause of the loss and to show that it was one not 
involying the bailee's liability, the law lays on him the duty to come forward with the 
information available to him. If the bailee fails, it leaves the trier of fact free to draw an 
inference unfavourable to him upon the bailor's establishing the unexplained failure to 
deliver the goods safely. Whether we label this permissible inference with the equivocal 
term 'presumption' or consider merely that it is a rational inference from the fact proven, it 
does no more than require the bailee, if he would avoid the inference, to come forward 
with evidence sufficient to persuade that the non- existence of the fact, which would 
otherwise be inferred, is as probable as its existence. It does not cause the burden of proof 
to shift, and if the bailee does go forward with evidence enough to raise doubts as to the 
validity of the inference, which the trier of fact is unable to resolve, the bailor does not 
sustain the burden of persuasion which upon the whole evidence remains upon him, where 
it rested at the start". 
73 See supra fn. 50 at 812. 
74 314 U.S. 104 at 111,62 S. Ct. 156 (1941). 
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To rebut the bailor's prima facie case, the court in Leather's Best, Inc., v. s.s. 
Alormaclynr,75 held that the bailee must show either how the disaster in fact occurred and 
that this was in no way attributable to his negligence, or the he exercised the requisite care 
in all that he did with respect to the bailed article so that, regardless of how the accident in 
fact transpired, it would not have been caused by any negligence on his part. The court 
held in Transatlantic Alarine Claims Agency, Inc., v. MIV "OOCL Inspiration ", Orient 
Overseas Container Line (UK) Ltd., and Sea- Land Service, Inc.,76 that "Defendants 
[chaterers and shipowners] have not provided an alternate explanation of how the cargo 
was sea water wetted, or proof that Sea-Land [the shipowners] exercised the requisite care 
with respect to the bailed cargo. Consequently, Defendant Sea- Land is also liable as 
bailee". 
Under American law, the burden of proof under bailment law differs from that 
under negligence. The court held in Caemint Food, Inc. v. Brasileiro,77 that in order to 
establish a claim in negligence against the carrier, the plaintiff must, not only, prove the 
existence of a negligent act on the part of the defendant, but must also prove that the 
defendant's negligent act was a proximate cause of its injury. The court held in EAC 
Timberlane v. Pisces, Ltd., 78 that "the defendants would be liable in tort for the loss of 
cargo only upon proof that their negligence caused the loss. Accordingly, the district 
court's finding that the defendants affirmatively proved freedom from any fault in 
75 See supra fn. 50 at 813. See, also, Nichimen Co. v. MIV Farland, 462 F. 2~ 319 at 325- 3267 & n. 1 (2d 
Cir. 1972) (had COGSA not applied to plaintiffs claim, the defendant carrIer would have had to meet a 
different standard defending against a federal bailment claim). 
76 See supra fn. 60 at 61. 
77 647 F. 2d 347 at 352 (2d Cir. 1981). . .. 
78 745 F. 2d. 715 at 722, 1985 AMC 1594 (1st Cir. 1984). The question before the court was the .apphcabIh~y 
of the Limitation of Liability Act 1982, of COGSA 1936 and of principles of general marItIme law In 
detennining the liability of the shipowners, charterers and the vessel's operators for the .cargo lost when the 
vessel carrying the cargo exploded and sank on the high ~eas. The court concluded that, It was not ne~es~~ry 
to decide which party was the carrier under COGSA, SInce all defendants were exonerated fr0I? lIabIlIty 
whether their responsibility for the loss is properly ascertained under COGSA or under general marItIme law. 
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connection with the loss and that the plaintiffs failed to rebut this proof is sufficient to 
exonerate each of the defendants from liability under the general maritime law". 
Terminal operators are independent contractors to the carrier and the provisions of 
COGSA do not govern their liabilities. Nonetheless, terminal operators, which provide 
steyedoring services as well as storage services, have the status of bailees under state law. 
As bailees, terminal operators will be liable for negligence or lack of due care that results 
in loss or damage to cargo. Suits against terminal operators for the loss of or the damage to 
the goods while in storage are governed by state bailment law rather than by federal 
bailment law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Graham Whitcombe v. 
Stevedoring Sen-ices of America,79 that the liability of SSA, a terminal operator, as a bailee 
was governed by the State of California bailment law on the ground that the location of the 
injury was on land and the activity led to the injury has no sufficient nexus to traditional 
maritime activities of loading or discharging the cargo. Accordingly, the burden of proof 
under federal bailment law differs from that under state bailment law. The court in 
Leather's Best, Inc., v. s.s. Mormaclynx,80 citing New York law, held that "In cases of loss 
due to theft, New York requires the bailee to establish only the fact of theft in order to 
meet the bailor's prima facie case. The bailee is not required to go on to show that the theft 
was not the result of its negligence; rather it is for the bailor to demonstrate negligence on 
the part of the bailee in the context of loss by theft". The Court in Hartford Fire Insurance 
co. v. Empresa Ecuatoriana De Aviacion d/b/a Ecuatoriana Airline, and AMR Services, 
Inc.,8! citing New York law, held that "Even where the bailee claims that the property was 
stolen, if the bailor has demonstrated that the theft was due to the bailee's negligence, the 
bailee has the burden of showing that the theft was not occasioned by its negligence". The 
similarities between state bailment law and federal bailment law, in the above cases, ended 
79 See supra fn. 57. 
80 See supra fn. 50 at 814. 
81 See supra fn. 55 at 60. 
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in respect to the burden of proof in the cases of loss due to theft. However, the courts are 
diyided in respect of the law applicable to the period outside the "tackle to tackle" period 
of COGSA. On the one hand, some courts have applied the state law rather than federal 
law. as in the above cases. On the other hand, other courts have applied the federal law 
rather than the state law as in Wemhoener Press en v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc. 82 
5. 5. LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE 
In international sales, when the goods are lost or damaged in transit as a result of fault of 
the carrier or his servants, the buyer is the only person who is interested in pursuing a 
claim against the carrier. The buyer could not sue the carrier by virtue of s. 1 of the 1855 
Act, either because the property had not passed "upon or by reason of endorsement or 
consignment" but at a later time or he is the holder of a delivery order, or he is claiming as 
a consignee named in a sea waybill. Also, the buyer will not be able to establish an implied 
contract on the terms of the bill of lading between himself and the carrier in the absence of 
the consideration or intention to create contractual relations as if he took delivery of the 
good as agent of another person such as the seller. Thus, the question is whether the buyer 
can sue the carrier in tort and the most obvious claim would be in negligence for the 
damage done to the goods in transit. 
However, there was a conflict of authorities in respect of who has the right to sue 
where the claim in negligence is concerned. The first authorities were founded in The Wear 
Breeze83 and The Elafi84, which supported the view that the buyer must be the owner of the 
goods or have an immediate possessory right to them when they were damaged in order to 
be such claim available to him. The second authorities were founded in The Irene's 
82 5 F. 3d 734, 1993 AMC 2842 (4th Cir. 1993). . 
83 [1969] 1 Q.B. 219. Where the claim in tort succeeded because the property had passed at the relevant tIme. 
84 [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 679. 
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SllCCt'SS85 and The Nea Tyhi86 , which supported the view that the risk must have passed to 
the buyer when the damage was done, even if he was not yet the owner of the goods, in 
order such claim to be available to him. The House of Lords were to resolve the conflict in 
The Aliakmon.87 A consignment of steel coils was shipped from Korea to Immingham 
under a c & f contract. As a result of the buyer's bank refusal to back the bill of exchange 
by which the payment for the goods was to be made, the original contract was 
subsequently varied. Thus, the risk passed to the buyer on shipment but the property 
remained with the sellers by reason of their reservation of the right of disposal of the 
goods. On discharge of the goods they proved to be in damaged condition. The question 
before the House of Lords was whether the shipowner owed a duty of care in tort to the 
buyer in respect of the carriage of such goods and if so, whether and to what extent such 
duty is qualified by the terms of the bill of lading under which the goods were carried. 
However, the House of Lords regarded The Wear Breeze as part of a long line of 
authority and concluded that 
[the] principle of law that, in order to enable a person to claim in negligence 
for loss caused to him by reason of loss or damage to property, he must 
have had either the legal ownership of or a possessory title to the property 
concerned at the time when the loss or damage occurred, and it is not 
enough for him to have only had contractual rights in relation to such 
88 property. 
The buyers in The Aliakmon were not the owners of the goods at the time of loss or 
damage but they had only a contractual right against the sellers to have the possession and 
the property of the goods at later time. Moreover, the transfer of the bill of lading which 
constituted a constructive delivery of the goods to him was not sufficient to found a 
85 [1982] Q.B. 48l. 
86 [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606. 
87 [1986] 2 W.L.R. 902. I . d' t . ht t 
88 Ibid. at 908. According to The Wear Breeze, [1969] 1 Q.B. 219 at 228, on y an Imme Ia e ng 0 
possession which is sufficient to amount to 'possessory title' for this purpose. 
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possessory title to enable the buyers to sue in negligence.89 In order to enable the buyer to 
sue in negligence he must have an immediate right to the actual possession of the goods. 
But the buyers, in The Aliak11l011, had no immediate right to the possession of the goods 
against either the carrier since the freight was prepaid, which is not relevant to this case, or 
against the sellers who still had the right of disposal of the goods by the terms of the 
original contract of sale.
9o It is arguable that the person who is going to bear the risk should 
be the person who have the title to sue in tort. Also, why should the concept of risk be 
treated as "an alien" to the carriage of goods by sea while the concept of the property 
which is also "an alien" is regarded as relevant to the carriage by sea?91 
The House of Lords rejected the argument of the buyer which was based upon the 
equitable ownership as a result of the goods having been appropriated to the contract, 
unless either the equitable owner has a possessory title to the goods or the legal owner 
joins him as a party to the action.92 Moreover, equitable ownership is doubtful in sales 
contracts since the Sale of Goods Act 1893 "is a complete code of law in respect of 
contracts of sale in sale of goods" and also ss. 16 to 19 deal with the passing of property 
without "distinction between the legal and the equitable property in goods" and are 
"intended to comprise both the legal and the equitable title".93 
The buyers tried, as a result of the buyers position under a c.i.f. or c & f. contract to 
whom the risk but not yet the property in the goods has passed, to "create a strictly limited 
exception to the general rule based upon the circumstance that the consideration of policy 
on which that general rule was founded did not apply to that particular case".94 The House 
89 This is because the buyers took delivery of the goods as agents for the seller.. ,,' 
90 See Treitel, O.H., "Bills of lading and third parties" [1986] LMCLQ. 294 at 299; SIr Lloyd, A., The bIll of 
lading: do we really need it" [1989] LMCLQ. 47 at 54. 
91 Certainly the concept was far from 'alien' to the Bills of Lading Act 1855. . .. 
92 See supra fn. 87 at 910. It would mean that the buyer could have succeeded by merely Jommg the sellers as 
co- defendants. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. at 914. 
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of Lords rejected the argun1ent on the ground of the certainty which "would be seriously 
undem1ined". However, the buyers called for qualification of the duty of care owed by the 
shipowner according to the tem1S of the bill of lading by relying on Junior Books Ltd. v. 
JTeitchi Co. Ltd.95 But, this argument was also rejected by the House of Lords as a result of 
the absence of the legal basis for qualifying a duty of care "owed by A to B by reference to 
a contract to which A is, but B is not, a party".96 The buyers' argument that the duty of care 
did exist but it was subject to the terms of the bill of lading was also rejected, since the 
duty of care owed by the shipowners to the buyers in tort would be the same as the 
contractual duty of care owed to the shipper.97 Finally, the buyer relied upon the bailment 
on terms to qualify the duty of care owed by the shipowners by the terms of the bill of 
lading. But, this argument failed because the bill of lading had never been negotiated to the 
buyers and no attornment by the shipowners had ever taken place. 
The House of Lords suggested that the buyers could have resolved their problem by 
including a further term in the variation to make the sellers obliged to either to exercise this 
right for the buyers account, or to assign such right to them to exercise for themselves. By 
taking such steps, the buyers would not have been prejudiced by their lack of a tort claim 
in negligence against the carrier. According to the House of Lords' suggestion, the buyer 
will have a less extensive right than the rights under s. 1 of the 1855 Act or under an 
implied contract. The buyer will lose the benefit of estoppels arising from false statements 
in the bill of lading, because such estoppels are not available to the seller who is the 
original shipper. However, in The Aliakmon, the buyers' loss was not suffered in this way, 
since the buyers knew that the goods were damaged when the sellers' claim for the price 
was settled and they never paid against the bill of lading. Suing the carrier for 
95 [1983] 1 A.C. 520. 
96 See supra fn. 87 at 915. 
97 Ibid. See also Sir John Donaldson M.R., in The Mineral Transporter, [1985] Q.B. 350 at 368. 
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Inisrepresentation would achieve the same result as using the estoppel doctrine.98 The 
assignment, as a way of filling the gaps of the 1855 Act, should be in writing with notice of 
the assignment gi\'en to the obligor, depends upon the willingness of the seller to co-
operate and the ability of the seller to have both a cause of action and the right to claim 
substantial damages such as in The Albazero.99 The buyer of part ofa large bulk cannot use 
this \Yay because partial assignment is not covered by section 136 of the Law of Property 
:-\ct 1925. Moreoyer. every one in the trading chain should assign his rights in turn and so 
any break in the chain of assignment would be fatal to the ultimate buyer's claim. 100 
Regarding recovery of substantial damages, the seller, according to The Sanix 
Ace lOl which had been distinguished from The A lbazero , 102 should have either the property, 
or a right to the possession of the goods, even if the goods were at the risk of the buyer at 
the time of the breach. Moreover, the assignment will not introduce a satisfactory solution 
in the case of c harterp arty , because it may contain more extensive limitations on the 
carrier's liability than those which are permitted by the Hague Rules or Hague- Visby 
Rules, or action in tort. Therefore, where the shipper is the charterer and the rights which 
are assigned are those in the charterparty which may be inferior to those in the bill of 
lading. Lord Brandon adds 
These considerations show, in my opinion, not that there is some lacuna 
in English law relating to these matters, but only that the bu~ers, when 
they agreed to the variation of the original contract of sale, dId not take 
the steps to protect themselves which, if properly advised, they should 
lOr have done. 
98 For more details see Treitel, G. H., supra fn. 90 at 304. 
99 [1976]2 Lloyd's Rep 467. . " 
100 d'l W' R M "The Dellfini and its Consequences for ClF TransactIOns 80GLTR For more etal s see Iseman, . ., . ' . d' C " 7 
[1988/ 89] 220 at 222- 223; Bassindale, J., "Ownership, Risk and TItle to Sue m 011 Tra mg ontracts 
OGLTR [1988/ 89] 171 at 177. 
101 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465. 
102 See supra fn. 99. 
103 See supra fn. 87 at 917. 
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The buyers in The Aliakmon agreed with the sellers, as a result of the meeting 
between thenl and the sellers, to take delivery of the goods as agents but not as principals 
and then the bill of lading was indorsed to the buyers as agents for collection the goods 
from the carrier. Therefore, the buyers could have sued the carrier, by virtue of s. 2 (1) of 
the 1992 Act, on the terms of the bill of lading. But, would the agent be considered as a 
lawful holder of the bill for the purpose of the 1992 Act and so be able to sue for the 
benefit of his principal? There is a suggestion that the concept of possession can be flexible 
so as to allow the agent to have actual possession and the principal to have constructive 
possession. Therefore, if the agent can not be considered as a lawful holder of the bill, the 
seller might be able to sue the carrier for his loss and for the benefit of any person who had 
suffered loss as in The Aliakmon according to Dunlop. v. Lambertl04 as an exception to the 
common law rules. 
The problem in The Gosforth, which prompted the enactment of COGSA 1992, is 
solved now by the enactment of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. 105 The sub-
buyers, who in The Gosforth received only merchants's delivery orders, claimed priority 
over the cargo against the unpaid seller who exercised his right to arrest the ship under the 
Dutch law. The Dutch Commercial Court held that the sub- buyers had no priority over the 
goods since no property had passed to them under both English and Dutch law. However, 
buyers with a merchant's delivery order, as the sub- buyers in The Gosforth, will not be 
able to sue the carrier under the 1992 Act, since this document is not included by its 
provisions. Also, the buyer will not be able sue the carrier under the implied contract 
theory since, delivery of the goods will be without presentation of this document as in the 
case of sea waybill. However, the buyer will obtain property in common with the other 
104 [1838- 39] 7 E.R. 824. " 
105 For more details about this Act see Thomas, W.H., "Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. 3 [1995] 
Current Law Statutes 28- 1; Uiph, 1., "The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995: Co- o~ershlp and t~e 
Regue Seller" [1996] LMCLQ 93 and B. 1. D., "Ownership of Bulk Cargoes- The Gosforth [1986] Lloyd s 
Maritime and Commerce Law 4. 
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buyers of bulk, by virtue of s. 20 A of the Sale of Goods (amendment) Act 1995, ifhe has 
paid the price and the bulk has been identified according to that section and therefore, the 
buyer would be able to sue the carrier in tort. But, the bulk cargo owner still has a problem 
if he has not paid the price, at the time where the loss or damage to the goods occurred, 
since no property in common would have passed according to s. 20 (A). This problem will 
be magnified by the ambiguity of s. 2 (4) of the 1992 Act which depends on how the courts 
\yill interpret the words "rights or interest". 
A further problem with a claim in negligence exists where there is progressive 
deterioration of goods on a voyage. Rix L.J., in the Court of Appeal, in The Stars in , 106 
concluded that a successful claim in tort of negligence consists of three elements; the 
existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty and a loss or damage caused by that 
breach, adding that "it must fellow that only the person with title to the goods when that 
loss or damage occurs can sue in respect of it". In respect of the existence of a duty of care, 
Rix L.J., refused to give decision on the question of whether a shipowner owes a duty of 
care towards further holders of a bill of ladingl07 on the ground that the dicta of both 
Roskill J., in The Wear Breeze 10 8 and Lord Brandon in The Aliakmon109 were relating to 
"claimants there [who] never obtained title while the goods were on board the vessel or 
before all relevant loss had already been suffered" but not to "a claimant who had actually 
suffered damages to his goods during the voyage, and after they had become his goods on 
the voyage".110 Therefore, Rix L.J., held that the dicta in both cases reflects the English 
law that the shipowner's duty of care only exists towards the owner of the goods at the 
106 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437 at para. 78, ([2001] EWCA Civ 56). ." . 
107 Colman 1. at first instance, in The Starsin, [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 85 at 102, took the VIew that ... m 
principle, the 'duty of care owed by the shipowners in respect of the cargo in their possession is engen.dered 
by the proximity of the shipowners to the goods in their possession and to th~se who presently h~ve. title t.o 
such cargo or who may acquire title in the course of the voyage and whIle the goods remam m t~eIr 
possession". Colman 1., also, held that the shipowner's duty was unaffected by the fact that under the time 
charter stowage was the responsibility of the time charterer. 
108 See supra fn. 83. 
109 See supra fn. 87. 
I \0 See supra fn. 106 at para. 94. 
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time of the breach of duty occurs. On the facts of The Starsin, the breach of duty, defective 
stowage, caused a progressive condensation damage which continued throughout the 
yoyage and the question before the Court of Appeal was whether the progressive damage 
done in this case does create a new cause of action in respect of the later stages of the same 
progressive danlage? Rix LJ., held that "the progressive damage done in this case does not 
create a new cause of action in respect of the later stages of the same progressive damage, 
eyen in the hands of a new cargo- owner and even upon the assumption that the new cargo-
owner was always within the scope of the shipowner's duty of care".lll Therefore, the 
claimants' claim in tort was denied because the cause of action in negligence was 
completed before the acquired title to their particular cargo of timber, with one exception 
to the holder of the set of bills who acquired title shortly after the completion of loading 
and before the commencement of the ocean voyage. This analysis of the position in tort 
was subsequently approved by the House of Lords. 
Article IV bis (l) Hague- Visby Rules 
Would the conclusion of The Aliakmon have been different had the bill of lading 
been subject to the Hague- Visby Rules rather than the Hague Rules? Article IV bis (1) 
provides that 
The defences and limits provided for in these Rules shall apply in and 
action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage t? the goods c?vered 
by a contract of carriage whether the action be founded In contract or In tort. 
This could mean either that a party to the contract of carriage cannot improve his position 
by suing the carrier in tort with disregarding the contract of carriagell2 or that the Hague-
Visby Rules are applicable to a tort claim by someone who is not a party to the carriage 
III Ibid. at para. 105. d' 20 h Ed' . L d . S eet & 
112 See Boyd, S. c., (et al), Scrutton on Charter parties and Bills of La mg, t ltlon, on on. W 
Maxwell 1996 at p. 454. 
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contract. I 13 According to the first view, the buyers in The Aliakmon were not a party to the 
. 114 . 
carnage contract and therefore, the carner would be deprived of the benefit of the Rules 
had the buyers established their title to sue in tort. Bingham, LJ., in The Captain 
Gregos,115 found that the principal object of art. IV (1) is "to ensure that a cargo- owner is 
no better off suing in tort than he would be if he sued in contract".116 Bingham, LJ., 
rejected the carrier's argument that the Hague- Visby Rules had statutory effect simply 
because the bills of lading were issued subject to the Rules, regardless of whether the 
person making the claim was party to the contract or not. 
Bingham, L.J., justified his conclusion upon three grounds. First, he thought that 
the bill of lading was the "bedrock" of the Rules, stating "It is not clear to me why the 
[C]ode should treat the existence of a bill of lading as a matter of such central and 
overriding importance if the [C]ode is to apply with equal force as between those who are 
not parties to the contract which the contains or evidences". 1 17 Secondly, the language of 
the Carriage of Good by Sea Act 1971 suggests that the Rules are intended to govern the 
relationships between the parties of the bill of lading contract. Thirdly, "whatever the law 
in other jurisdictions, the general principle that only a party to a contract may sue on it 
well- established here" and "If the draftsmen had intended the respective rules to infringe 
that principle or appreciated that that was their effect, I think they would have sought to 
make that clear in the Acts" 1 18 
113 Diamond, A., "The Hague- Visby Rules" [1978] LMCLQ. 225 at 248- 249. . 
114 The buyer sued the carrier in respect of the damaged goods. However, the buyer can n~t sue the car:ner by 
virtue of s. 1 of the 1855 Act because the property, as a result of the sellers' reservatIOn of ~he nght. of 
disposal of the goods, in the goods did not pass "upon or by reason" of the endorsement of.the bIll of ladmg 
but upon payment of the price after the goods had been discharged and warehoused at Immmgham. [1986] 2 
W.L.R. 902 at 909. 
115 [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 310. 
116 Ibid. at 315. 
117 Ibid. at 318. . 
118 Ibid. at 318. However, it is arguable that, the carrier would be depnved of the ~enefits. of the H~gue-
Visby Rules had the buyers established their title to sue in tort and had no contractual nghts WIth the camer. 
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It appears that art. IV bis (1) of the Hague- Visby Rules did not provide an 
exclusive solution to all the problems concerning non- contractual claims and so, the 
interpretation of art. IV bis (I), by the courts, would play a vital role for solving those 
problems. It is clear that the cargo owner would not be able to sue the carrier if there is a 
contractual relationship between him and the carrier and so art. IV bis (1) did not add 
anything to English law, since the cargo owner would be unable to sue the carrier in tort 
\yhere he has a contractual relationship with the carrier. But, the important question is 
whether the defences and the limits of liability would be applies by suing the carrier 
directly in tort, such as the shipowner in the case of charterer's bill of lading. On the one 
hand, Diamond has argued that art. IV his (I) of the Rules applied where the carrier, as 
defendant, is a carrier as defined in art. I (a) of the Rules, namely an owner or charterer 
who enters into a carriage contract with the shipper and thus, the freight forwarder who 
enters a carriage contract, as a shipper, with the carrier would included by art IV bis (1) of 
the Rules. 119 On the other hand, Berlingieri has argued that art. IV bis (1) would be applied 
to any action in tort against the carrier who is contracting carrier in respect of loss or 
damage to the goods covered by a carriage contract to which the Rules apply whether the 
cargo owner, as a plaintiff, is a party to the carriage contract or not. l2O However, the above 
arguments were rejected by Bingham L.J., in The Captain Gregos,121 where he held that 
art. IV bis (1) only applies where there is privity of contract between the plaintiff, the cargo 
h . 122 owner, and the defendant, t e carrIer. 
119 See Diamond, A., supra fn. 113 at pp. 248- 249. . . " . 
120 See Berlingieri, F., "The Hague- Visby Rules and actIOns m tort [1991] L:Q.R. 1~ at 2l. .It.IS arguable 
that the effect of art. IV bis (1) of the Rules might, as Francisco concluded, be dIfferent If the ongmal draft of 
this article which was prepared by the International Sub- Committee w~s not ame~ded at the Stockhol~ 
Conference. The original draft provides that, "Any action ~~r damage.s ~gamst t~e carne.r, w~ether fou~de? m 
contract or in tort, can only be brought subject to the condItIOns and hmIts prOVIded for m thIS ConventIOn. 
121 See supra fn. 115.. d 
122 This construction has been rejected by both DIamond, A., see supra fn. 113 at pp. 248- 249 an 
Berlingieri, F., see supra fn. 120. But, Bingham's L.J., conclusion is supported by Boyd, S. c., supra fn. 11~ 
at p. 454; Cooke, J., (et al), Voyage Charters, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd. 1993, at p. 796, 
Davenport, B. 1., "Limits on the Hague Rules" [1989] L.Q.R. 52l. 
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It is likely that the conclusion of Bingham LJ., is right on the ground that the 
draftsmen of the Rules provided no answer to the question of who can sue and who can be 
sued and these question would be left to be answered by the national law. Privity of 
contract is one of the most important general principles of the English law providing that 
only a party to a contract may sue on it. Therefore, if Parliament had intended to infringe 
that principle, it would have done that by simple and clear indication in the 1971 Act. Also, 
if the draftsmen of the Rules had intended to entitle the non- contracting carrier to the 
defences and the limits of liability, they would expressly have done that in the same way as 
under the Hamburg Rules. It is also arguable that the above conclusion can be supported by 
reference to art. 10 (2) of the Hamburg Rules which provides the actual carrier with the 
same protection as the contractual carrier, since the actual carrier's responsibility is 
governed by the provisions of the Rules, by virtue of art. 1 (2) which defines the actual 
carrier as "any person to whom the performance of the carriage of goods, or part of the 
carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such 
performance has been entrusted". In contrast, art. I (a) of the Hague- Visby Rules defines 
the carrier as "includ[ing] the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage 
with the shipper" and so the actual carrier is not included. However, art. 11 contains a 
departure from the rule that the contractual carrier is responsible for the whole carriage 
performed by the actual carrier and so the contractual carrier can avoid responsibility for 
the part of carriage performed by the actual carrier if the requirements of art. 11 (1) are 
satisfied. Therefore, a non- contracting carrier has only the option either to rely upon the 
bailment on terms doctrine or alternatively to imply a contract on the terms of the bill of 
lading including the provisions of the Hague- Visby Rules. 
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5. 6. BAILMENT- THE NATURE OF THE DUTY 
Apart fron1 an action in negligence, a claimant may also be able to sue in bailment The 
nature of the duty owed by the bailee towards the owner of the goods is different from the 
general duty of care where no bailment is involved. For a cargo claimant an action in 
bailment has three advantages over an action in negligence. First, the duty of taking care of 
the goods in bailment, as opposed to negligence, includes not only the obligation to 
exercise due care for the safety of the goods, but also one of taking all reasonable steps to 
preyent their theft. Secondly, the bailee for reward is prevented from delegating his 
responsibility and would be liable for the faults of any independent contractor engaged in 
the perfonnance of the contract. Thirdly, the bailee, unlike the case in negligence where 
the burden of proof is on the bailor, will be liable unless he can prove either the lack of 
negligence on his part where the goods are lost or damaged, or that although he did not 
take proper precaution the loss would have occurred in any events. 123 This applies equally 
to actions against a sub- bailee and his duty would be that of a bailee for reward, despite 
the fact that the consideration will move from the bailee to the sub- bailee. In the words of 
Lord Goff of Chieveley in The Pioneer Container 
Their Lordships . . . consider that, if the sub- bailment is for reward, the 
obligation owed by the sub- bailee to the owner of the goods must 
likewise be that of a bailee for reward notwithstanding that the reward is 
h b ·1 124 payable not by the owner but by teal ee. 
There is, initially, no relationship between the owner of the goods and the sub-
bailee. But taking possession of the goods, voluntarily by the sub- bailee, with the 
acknowledgement that they belong to some one else than the bailee, will make the sub-
bailee owe duties towards the intennediate bailee as well as towards the principal bailor, 
123 For more details about the bailee's duty see Baughen, S., "Bailment continuing role in cargo claims" 
[1999] LMCLQ 393 at pp. 394- 395; Devonshire, P., "Sub- bailment on terms and the.efficacy of,~ontrac~ual 
defences against a non- contractual bailor" [1996] JBL 330 at 331 at 340- 343 and WIlson, 1. F., A fleXIble 
contract of carriage- the third party dimension?" [1996] LMCLQ. 187 at 193- 194. 
124 [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 593 at 599. 
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the 0\\ ner of the goods. 
The Privy Council, in The Pioneer Container, considered the nature of the sub-
baillee's duty toward the principal bailor in cases such as the former is unaware of the 
existence of the principal bailor and believes that the goods are his bailor's goods. It was 
held that, the sub- bailee would not owe a bailee's duty toward the principal bailor, on the 
assumption that the sub- bailee could not have voluntarily taken the principal bailor's 
goods into his possession and so the sub- bailee would not be liable to the principal bailor 
where the goods were lost or damaged want of care. However, this dictum, arguably, 
contradicts the Court of Appeal decision in Awad . v. Pillai, where it was held that sub-
bailee owes the principal bailor a general duty of care in negligence. 125 As a result of the 
existence of a sub- bailment for reward, the sub- bailee owes a duty of a bailee toward the 
owner, despite the fact that the bailee's duty may be less than that of the sub- bailee's. This 
is because the principal bailee can modify or negate his duty according to his contract with 
the cargo owner. But, the sub- bailee's ability to rely on the terms of the sub- bailment 
depends on the bailor's consent to the terms of the sub- bailment (or the on ostensible 
authority of the bailor). Therefore, the court should not prevent the sub- bailee invoking the 
terms of his contract with the head bailee, as a result of the nature of the sub-bailee's duty, 
provided the bailor has consented to such terms. 126 
5.6.1. LEGAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION 
N ext one needs to consider the extent to which the acquisition of physical possession is , 
necessary to constitute a party as a bailee. A person to be qualified as a bailee should 
acquire legal possession of the goods and so a person having at the most custody of the 
125 [1982] R.T.R. 266. Therefore, the nature and the extent of the sub- bailee.'s l.iabilit~ ne~ds definition, as 
does the sub- bailee's ability to rely on the terms of his contract against the ~nnclpal.baIlor m the absence of 
a sub- bailment from which those terms may be incorporated. See Bell, A., Sub- baIlment on terms: A new 
land mark, The Pioneer Container" [1995] LMCLQ. 177 at 182. . 
126 S D shl're P "Sub- bailment on terms and the efficacy of contractual defences agamst a non-ee evon ,., 
contractual bailor" [1996] JBL 330 at p. 342. 
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goods for strictly limited purpose would not be qualified as a bailee. Therefore, carriers 
and warehousemen would be qualified as bailees since they would have acquired legal 
possession of the goods. Stevedores who are engaged only to load or discharge the goods 
would not be considered as bailees since they have the custody of the goods for strictly 
limited purpose, such discharging the goods. In contrast, stevedores could be qualified as 
bailee if they are warehousing the goods until the time of collection by the consignee or his 
agent. On those facts, there would be an intention that the stevedore should acquire legal 
possession of the goods and so, as bailee, he would owe a duty of care towards the owner 
of the goods.1:!7 The Court of Appeal dealt with this issue in Lotus Cars Ltd. and Others. v. 
Southampton Cargo Handling PIc. and Others and Associated British Ports, The 
Rigoletto,128 where the stevedores company (SCH) received the cars six days before the 
scheduled loading of Rigoletto, and in the meantime had to store them in the compound. 
Accordingly, Rix LJ., held that "In the present case, however, SCH were the 'receiving 
authority' who received the goods for shipment and were obliged to take care of them, 
subject to their conditions, which inter alia plainly contemplated that goods might be in the 
possession of SCH and subject to a particular and general lien".129 However, Rix LJ., 
distinguished the present case from Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd., on the ground 
that "In my judgment, Viscount Simond's dictum effectively treats a stevedore in the 
classic situation as an example of a relationship where possession of the chattel is not 
" 130 
transferred, but the things is merely handled or used for some temporary purpose . 
Therefore, if stevedores are not acquiring the legal possession of the goods, they should 
seek protection throughout the Himalaya clause. 
127 The Privy Council in Gilchrist Watt .v. York Products, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1262, rec~gnised the creation of,a 
sub- bailment of the goods when the independent contractor owed the duty of taking care of the owner s 
cargo and took legal possession of the cargo. 




In Spectra International PLC .v. Hayesoak LTD 131 Mr Th d h h 
. , . omas, argue tat, t ere 
was no bailnlent relationship between Spectra and Frans Maas, because they never had 
actual or physical possession of the goods. The above point was addressed in The Pioneer 
Container, and The Privy Council dismissed the propositions on the ground that the bill of 
lading issued by Scandutch in respect of the goods represented that Scandutch had received 
them for transportation from the place of receipt and no evidence was adduced to 
contradict this statement. The Privy Council added 
it is difficult to see why the shipowner should not, when they received 
the goods of the Scandutch' s plaintiff into their possession, have become 
responsible as bailees to the owner of the goods even if the goods were 
never in the possession of Scandutch and, if so, it is not easy to see they 
should not be able to invoke against the owners and terms which the 
intermediary (Scandutch), with the owner' consent, intrusted the goods to 
them. 132 
5.6.2. BAILMENT AND SUCCESSORS IN TITLE 
Suing in negligence depends on the claimant's having ownership or constructive 
possession at the time when the loss or damage to the goods occurred. Therefore, suing in 
negligence will not always be available to a successor in title to the original shipper. Can 
such a claimant sue in bailment instead? This depends on the establishment of the 
attornment by the bailee or his sub- bailee to the successor in title.133 An attornment 
requires the bailee to acknowledge that he now holds the goods on behalf of the successor 
in title. An attornment is still required even though the claimant has acquired constructive 
possession by transfer of the bill of lading, which would enable him to sue in negligence if 
the loss or damage occurred after such transfer. The need for an attornment is supported by 
the decisions in The Captain Gregos (No. 2)134, The Guderme/35 and The Future 
131 [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 153. This case will be discussed in details in chapter 6. 
132 See supra tn. 124 at 604. . . 
133 In The Aliakmon, [1986] 1 A.C. 785 at 815, Lord Brandon concluded that attornment IS necessary In order 
for the bailment on terms to take place between the shipowners and the buyer. 
134 [1900] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395, at 405- 406. 
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Et ., 136 H M M I 137 h 
. pUSS. owever. c ee suggests t at attornment is not needed where the goods 
are carried under a bill of lading which is a document of title, in particular in the light of s. 
29 (4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. He, then, criticised the above maritime authorities, 
which suggest the contrary as "they are introducing unnecessary refinements and are 
d" 138 I 7'7 S . 139 C I unsoun. n 1 de tarslIl 0 man 1., held that the bailment action failed through the 
lack of attornment. However, Lord Hobhouse expressed the view that no attornment by the 
sub- bailee to the goods owner is necessary. 140 Mance LJ in East West Corporation. v. 
Dkbs 1912,141 averted to the issue noting that Carver suggests142 that a transferable 
attornment may apply in favour of successors in title under a bill of lading. A wider 
judicial acceptance to a transferable attornment would allow successful actions in bailment 
by claimants who had been divested of their contractual rights under the bill of lading 
contract and who would be unable to recover in negligence. It would also allow recovery 
by the consignee who endorsed the bill to an agent. This is because such consignee would 
not be able to show that it had occurred proprietary or possessory rights in the goods at the 
time of the carrier's breach of duty and so it would be unable to proceed in negligence, but 
it would still be able to proceed and recover in bailment. 
This requirement will not be needed where the plaintiff is the original shipper as in 
The Pioneer Container. 143 Therefore, delivery of the goods against the presentation of the 
bill of lading will not be considered as attornment, since it cannot be seen as an express 
undertaking by the bailee to hold the goods on behalf of the successor in title of the 
135 [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 311. 
136 [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 542. 
137 McMeel, G., "The Redundancy of Bailment" [2003] L.M.C.L.Q. 169 at 196. 
138 Ibid. at 197. 
139 See supra fn. 107 at 101- 102. 
140 [2003] 2 W.L.R. 711 at para. 136, ([2003] UKHL 12). 
141 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239 at para. 42, ([2003] EWCA Civ 83). . . 
142 See Sir Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F.M.B., Carver on Bills of Lading, 1 st. EdItIon, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 2001, at pars. 7- 037- 7- 042. .. d b h 
143 See supra fn. 124. Attornment was not an issue, but it appears that takmg posseSSIOn of the goo s y t e 
sub- bailee will trigger the latter's duty towards the owner. 
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original shipper. But, what of delivery of the goods without the presentation of the bill144 
or deliyery of the goods against a document not included by COGSA 1992 Act, which will 
not allow the goods' owners to have a cause of action by virtue of s. 2 (I)? The courts 
nlight well consider both these types of delivery as an attornment which will enable the 
goods' owner to bring an action within the bailment on terms doctrine. 
In Sonicare International LTD. v. East Anglia Freight Terminal LTD., 145 Sonicare, 
the plaintiffs, agreed with Metero to purchase 1000 radios and pursuant to that agreement, 
Metero's suppliers shipped the goods in question on board Dragon Sumatra at Tanjung 
Priok for carriage to Jakarta and then for on- carriage to Felixstowe for ultimate delivery in 
Southampton. A combined bill of lading was issued by the second defendants, freight 
forwarder, VTP. The later sub- contracted with NOL to carriage the goods from Jakarta to 
Felixstowe. NOL issued bill of lading naming VTP as shipper and PFE as consignee. NOL 
engaged with EAFT, the first defendants, for the purpose of warehousing and clearing 
facilities at Felixstowe. Sonicare, the plaintiffs, sought to recover from EAFT, the first 
defendants, for the loss of 50 cartons that went missing from their warehouse. 
Hallgarten 1., held that the negotiation of the bill of lading would create a simple 
bailment between the bailee and the sub- bailor, Sonicare, and he then states that 
But, if, as in the present case the original bailor has caused the benefit of 
the contract representing the head bailment to be assigned - i.e. by 
negotiation of the VTP bill of lading - then it s~~ms to. me that. the 
transferee does indeed step into the shoes of the ongInal baIlor and IS to 
h b 'l 146 be treated to all intents and purposes as t e aI or. 
The combined bill of lading had been negotiated to Sonicare prior to the demand for 
delivery and thus they were fully vested with a claim in bailment against the first 
defendants, EAFT. 
144 As in The Gudermes, [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 311, The Captain Gregos (No.2), [19?O] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395, 
and Sonicare International Ltd. v. East Anglia Freight Terminal Ltd., [1997] 2 Lloyd s Rep. 48. 
145 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48. 
146 Ibid. at 53. 
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As alternative route to the simple bailment, Hallgarten 1., held that EAFT attorned 
directly to Sonicare upon the acceptance of release/ removal authority and therefore, the 
successor in title was owed a duty of care in bailment by the sub- bailee. 147 Importantly, 
Hallgarten 1., took the view that once there was an attornment the successor in title could 
sue for pre- attornnlent loss without having to show it had become successor in title at the 
time of the loss. This is critical distinction from the position in negligence and a distinct 
adyantage to a clainlant. Therefore, proceeding in bailment has substantial advantage over 
proceeding in negligence other than the relevant burden of proof. Had the plaintiffs in The 
Starsin been able to establish an attornment then they might well have been able to recover 
in bailment what they were unable to recover in negligence. Proceeding in bailment will, 
therefore, enable claimants to claim in respect of pure economic loss. 
The need for attornment would be magnified by a chain of sub- bailees, since the 
goods' owner would not be able to prove that the loss or damage to the goods occurred 
while were in the custody of the attorning bailee. There is a suggestion that delivering the 
goods would be with the authority of the head bailee which would bind him by the sub-
. l' bl h . 'tl 148 bailee's attornment and so becomIng Ia e to t e successor In tI e. 
5.6.3. THE OVERALL ROLE OF BAILMENT 
Bailment is important to three cases of cargo owners who are not with the ambit of 
COGSA 1992. First, there is the cargo owner with an electronic bill of lading who would 
not be able to sue the carrier, since this document is not included by the 1992 Act on the 
., 149 . . f C t t ground that it is neither in a written form nor IS SIgned. The prOVISIOns 0 on rac s 
(Rights of Third Parties) 1999 Act are not applicable to a carriage contract embodied into 
147 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48 at 53. 
148 See Baughen, S., supra fn. 123 at 398. . . 
149 See Faber, D., "Electronic Bills of Lading" [1996] LMCLQ 232; Baughen, S., lbld at 398. 
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an electronic bill of lading, by virtue of s. 6 (6), on the ground that this bill is included by 
the provisions of the 1992 Act. However, the application of the 1992 Act to this document 
is. by yirtue of s. 1 (5), conditional on regulations made by the Secretary of State. No such 
regulations have yet been made. As has been mentioned before,150 the involvement of the 
shipowner in the process of transmitting the private codes, directly or indirectly through its 
agent· Title Registry', under the Bolero System, to enable the transferee to take delivery of 
the goods n1ight well constitute an acknowledgement by the shipowner to the transferee's 
possessory title to the goods represented by the electronic bill of lading. Such 
acknowledgement by the shipowner might well be considered as an attornment by the 
shipowner. as a bailee, to the transferee and so giving the transferee rights of suit in 
bailment. 
Secondly, there is the cargo owner with possession of either a charterer's bill of 
lading who wants to sue the shipowner as a bailee of the cargo he carries. Delivering the 
goods to the holder of the charterer's bill of lading according to the charterer's order might 
also be constituted as an attornment to the successor in title of the original bailor. 151 
Thirdly, there is the cargo owner in possession of a freight forwarder's bill of 
. 152 h' b Th' . b h lading who wants to sue the freIght forwarder or IS su - contractor. IS IS ecause t e 
application of s. 2 (1) of COGSA 1992 to this document is uncertain as a result of the 
uncertainty as to whether this document qualifies as a document of title. I53 The freight 
forwarder might be considered as a bailee on the ground of having contractual control over 
the goods, even if he has no physical custody of them. The need of attornment could create 
a problem to the successor in title to the shipper in the case of a chain of sub- bailees. 
However, this problem, arguably, might be resolved by considering the delivery of the 
150 See chapter four on the electronic bill of lading.. . 
151 But, against this, there is the finding of Colman 1., In The Starszn that there was no attornment by the 
shipowner. , 
152 See Spectra International PIc. v. Hayesoak Ltd, [1997] 1 Lloyd s Rep. 153. 
153 For more details see sub- title 2.5.2 of chap. 2. 
271 
goods against those bills to the successor in title as attornment which would be upon the 
head bailee's instruction which would also be bound to the sub- bailee. In addition, an 
action against a sub- bailee will help a cargo owner who wishes to sue a second carrier in 
whose custody the goods are lost or damaged following a transhipment. Delivering the 
goods to the holder of the first carrier's bill of lading might be viewed as an attornment to 
the holder of that bill so as to found a claim in bailment in respect of the post- transhipment 
events, provided that the sub- carrier is aware that the goods belong not to the first carrier. 
Fourthly, there is the claimant that has mistakenly surrendered its contractual rights 
by triggering s. 2 (5) of the 1992 Act, such as the shipper in East West Corporation . v. 
Dkbs 1912. 15~ The shipper procured the issue of bills of lading naming its bank as 
consignee. Although the bank acted solely as the shipper's agent, on receipt of the bills it 
became the 'lawful holder' and the shipper lost its contractual rights by virtue of s. 2 (5). 
The shipper recovered from the carrier in bailment in respect of the misdelivery of cargo. 
5. 7. THE HAMBURG RULES 
Under art. 10 (1) of the Hamburg Rules the contracting carrier remains responsible for the 
entire carriage of the goods, even though the performance of the whole or part of the 
carriage thereof has been entrusted to an actual carrier. The actual carrier is protected 
under the Hamburg Rules, by virtue of art. 10 (2), since the actual carrier's responsibility is 
governed by the provisions of the Rules. But art. 11 (1) of the Rules contains a departure 
from the rule that the contracting carrier is responsible for the whole carriage performed by 
an actual carrier, and so the contracting carrier can avoid responsibility for the part of 
carriage performed by the actual carrier where the requirements of art. 11 (1) are satisfied. 
The contracting carrier will have the benefit of this departure if the carriage contract 
provides "explicitly that a specific part of the carriage covered by the said contract is to be 
154 See supra fn. 141. 
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performed by a named person other than the carrier". Moreover, the contracting carrier is 
a Howed to include a clause into the carriage contract which provides that "the carrier is not 
liable for loss, damage or delay in delivery caused by an occurrence which takes place 
while the goods are in the charge of the actual carrier during such part of carriage". 
Therefore, the tranship and cesser clauses are accepted under the Hamburg Rules as long 
as "judicial proceedings can be instituted against the actual carrier in a court competent 
under paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 21". The enactment of the Hamburg Rules, into English 
law, would reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the need for the doctrine of bailment and sub-
bailment on terms. 
5. 8. THE DRAFT INSTRUMENT 
The Draft Instrument adopts a scheme of dual liability that is similar to that to be found in 
the Hamburg Rules. Instead of the 'contracting carrier' and the 'actual carrier', it refers to 
the 'carrier' and the 'performing party'. Under art. 6 (3) (1) (a) the performing party is 
"subject to the responsibilities and liabilities imposed on the carrier under this Instrument 
.... ". Under art. 6 (3) (2) (a) the carrier remains responsible for the acts or omissions of the 
performing party. 
Article 6 (3) (1) provides that 
"(a) A performing party is subject to the responsibilities and liabilities 
imposed on the carrier under this instrument, and entitled to the carrier's 
rights and immunities provided by this instrument (i) during the period in 
which it has custody of the goods; and (ii) at any other time to the extent 
that it is participating in the performance of any of the activities 
contemplated by the contract of carriage. (b) If the carrier agrees to 
assume responsibilities other than those imposed on the carrier under this 
instrument, or agrees that its liability for the delay in delivery of, lo~s ~f, 
or damage to or in connection with the goods is higher ~han the ~ImIts 
imposed under articles 6. 4. 2, 6. 6. 4, and 6. 7, a performIng party IS not 
bound by this agreement unless the performing party expressly agrees to 
accept such responsibilities or such limits". 
273 
The effect of art. 6 (3) (1) (a) is to treat a performing party falling within art. 1 (17) as a 
carrier during the period of its responsibility. It is arguable, however, that the two sub-
rules of art. 6 (3) (l) (a) relating to the period of responsibility can be substituted and 
defined as "fronl the tinle when the carrier or a performing party has received the goods 
until the time when the goods are delivered to the consignee" in coherence with art. 4 (1) 
(l). Moreover, art. 6 (3) (b) provides that the carrier's agreement which increased his 
responsibilities and the limits of liabilities would not bind to a performing party, unless the 
latter agreed to accept such responsibilities or such limits. It is noticeable that art. 6 (3) (b) 
fails to mention where such agreement should be recorded, with whom the performing 
party \yould expressly agree and who would be entitled to enforce such agreement. 155 It is 
arguable that, the initial agreement as to increase both the responsibilities and the limits of 
liability would be between the contracting carrier and the shipper and so to trigger the 
application of art. 6 (3) (1) (b) the initial agreement should also be recorded in the 
agreement between the contracting carrier and the performing party. Moreover, such 
secondary agreement should provide that the parties who would be entitled to enforce such 
agreement are the contracting party and the shipper including his successor. 
The definition of a 'performing party' under the Draft Instrument differs from the 
definition of an 'actual carrier' under the Hamburg Rules. The definition is not limited to 
sub- carriers and covers a far wider range of sub- contractors. Article 1 (1 7) defines 
the 'performing party' as 
"a person other than the carrier that physically performs [or fails to 
perform in whole or in part] any of the carrier's responsibilities under a 
contract of carriage for the carriage, handling, custody, or storage of the 
goods, to the extent that that person acts, either directly or indirectly, at 
the carrier's request or under the carrier's supervision or control, 
155 See the comments on text of the UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instr~ment on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.' Workmg Gro.up III 
(Transport Law) Ninth session U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.211Add.l, (15- 26 A~nl 20.02), (Heremafter 
U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.211Add.l) at para. 70. The full text of the document IS avaIlable on the net; 
http://www.uncitral.orglen-index.htm. 
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regardl~ss of whether that person is a party to, identified in, or has legal 
responsl~ly under the contract of carriage. The term "performing party" ~oes not Include any person who is retained by a shipper or consignee, or 
IS an emplo~ee, age~t, contractor, or subcontractor of a person (other 
than the carner) who IS retained by a shipper or consignee" 
Howeyer, a performing party would only cover a person who physically performs or fails 
to perform the carrier's obligations namely "carriage, handling, custody, or storage of the 
goods". Therefore, a performing party who is performing one of the carrier's obligations 
other than those specified in art. 1 (17), such as a security company guarding a container • 
yard, would not be included by the definition of the performing party under art. 1 (17). In 
addition, a party who undertakes to perform or to procure the performance of one of the 
carrier's obligations, mentioned in the definition, such as a sub- contracting ocean carrier 
who has sub- contracted the performance of its obligations, would not be included by the 
definition. 
However, it is arguable that if the Draft Instrument adopted the broad definition 
which provided that "a person that performs, or undertakes to perform, or procures to be 
performed any of the carrier's responsibilities under a contract of carriage, to the extent 
that"156 would avoid the great deal of complication and uncertainty created by art. 1 (17). 
The suggested broad definition is similar to the definition of the "actual carrier" adopted by 
the Hamburg Rules under art. 1 (2). 
Moreover, to distinguish between sub- contractors who actually perform and those 
who undertake to procure performance of any of the sub- contracted obligations seems 
unjust and artificial. This is because the so- called parties outside the definition of the 
'performing party' would be entitled to the benefit of "the defences and limitations of 
liability available to the carrier under this instrument" without bearing any responsibilities, 
156 See UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage ofGoo~s by Se~, United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III (Transport Law) Nmth seSSIOn U.N. 
Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), (Hereinafter U.N. Doc. AICN.9~G.IIIIWP.21) at para. 
]4. The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitraI.orgien-mdex.htm. 
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under art. 6 (3) (3) which provides that "If an action is brought against any person, other 
than the carrier, nlentioned in article 6. 3. 2, that person is entitled to the benefit of the 
defences and linlitations of liability available to the carrier under this instrument if it 
proves that it acted within the scope of its contract, employment, or agency". According to 
art. 6 (3) (2) (a) (ii), these persons are "any other person, including a performing party's 
sub- contractors and agents, who performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier's 
responsibilities under the contract of carriage, to the extent that the person acts, either 
directly or indirectly, at the carrier's request or under the carrier's supervision or control, 
as if such acts or omissions were its own". The words "any other person" would apparently 
include a sub- contractor of the carrier who further sub- contracts the performance of his 
obligations to another party and a party performing other functions under the carriage 
contract than those mentioned in art. 1 (17).157 As a result of the complexity and the 
restrictive nature of art. 1 (17), the identity of the performing party would be difficult to be 
ascertained by the cargo claimant within the one- year time limit. This is because the 
liability of the performing party depends on a claim being brought against the right party in 
the right jurisdiction within that short period of time. 
Period of responsibility 
Article 4 (l) (l), provides that "Subject to the provisions of article 4. 3, the responsibility 
of the carrier for the goods under this instrument covers the period from the time when the 
carrier or a performing party has received the goods for carriage until the time when the 
goods are delivered to the consignee". The period of responsibility, under art. 4 (1) (1), 
would be wider than that of the Hague- Visby Rules, 'tackle to tackle', and the Hamburg 
Rules, 'port to port'. Accordingly, the period of responsibility of the carrier or the 
performing party would cover the period from the actual receipt to the actual delivery of 
157 For the support for this view see the comments on text of the CMI Rules (U.N. Doc. 
AICN.9/WG.III/wP.211Add.l) at para. 72 and at para. 75. 
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the goods to the consignee and so t . 1 d th' . 
o Inc u e e penod of takIng the goods at inland point, 
unlike the Hamburg Rules 158 Wh It' d 1 . " .. 
. ere mu Imo a carrIage IS Involved, provISIOn has to be 
made for the relationship betwe n th D ft I " 
e e ra nstrument and other InternatIonal transport 
conventions, such as COTIF and the CMR. This is achieved by art. 4 (2) (l). The 
commentary on this article states, "This article deals with that problem and provides for a 
network system, but one as minimal as possible. The draft instrument is only displaced 
where a convention constituting mandatory law for inland carriage is applicable to the 
inland leg of a contract of carriage by sea, and it is clear that the loss or damage occurred 
solely in the course of the inland carriage. This means that where the damage occurred 
during more than one leg of the carriage, or where it cannot be proved where the loss or 
damage occurred, this draft instrument will prevail during the whole door to door transit 
. d" 1"9 peno .-
However, the period of responsibility under the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 4 
( 1) (2 & 3) can be shortened according to the parties agreement, in the absence of such 
agreement by the customs, practices or usages in the trade and in the absence of both such 
agreement and such customs, or practices or usage by the time of actual taking custody of 
the goods by the carrier or the performing party. Clausing the transport document or the 
electronic record by terms which minimise the period of responsibility should not arguably 
be considered as disadvantageous on the ground that it would reflect the parties' freedom 
to the carriage contract as to allocate the responsibilities for various tasks in the carriage. 
Moreover, art. 4 (1) (2) and (1) (3) is incoherent with art. 5 (2) (2) which provides that 
"The parties may agree that certain of the functions referred to in article 5. 2. 1. shall be 
performed by or on behalf of the shipper, the controlling party or the consignee. Such 
agreement must be referred to in the contract particulars" and which gives the parties the 
158 For the opposite point of view see (U.N. Doc. AlCN.9IWG.IIIIWP.21/Add.1) at para. 42. 
159 See (U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.III/WP.21) at para. 49. 
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freedonl to allocate the responsibilities for various tasks in the carriage which are not 
performed by the carrier. 160 These clauses are effective under the Hague and Hague- Visby 
Rules, in most jurisdictions, as well as under the Hamburg Rules. However, the period of 
responsibility should not be left to be decided according to the customs, practices and 
usanes which would creat rt . ty h' h 
C' e unce aIn as to w IC custom, practice or usage is applicable. 
Also, the draftsmen of the Draft Instrument should use the same criterion as to where 
parties' agreement must be referred to as in art. 5 (2) (2) which provides that "Such 
agreement must be referred to in the contract particulars", which would put a third party on 
a notice of such agreement. 
As has been mentioned above, by virtue of art. 5 (2) (2), the parties to the carriage 
contract are free to allocate the responsibilities for certain duties, such as loading and 
discharge operations, under art. 5 (2) (1) between themselves and that allocation must be 
referred to the contract particulars. In the absence of such agreement, shipowners will bear 
the responsibilities of the performance of such operations by virtue of art. 5 (2) (1). 
Clausing the bill of lading to that effect would not cause a problem as long as it is referred 
to the contract particulars which would put the shipper, the controlling party and the 
consignee on notice. The shipping practice, nonetheless, is not so straight as it seems since 
the allocation of responsibilities for these duties would be referred to in the charter- parties, 
FIOS or similar clauses, rather than the bill of lading, as they are the charterer's 
responsibilities. Would the incorporation of the charter- party's terms, including a clause 
160 Under English law see G. H. Renton .v. Palmayra Trading Corporation of Panama, [1957] A.C. 147 at 
174, where it was held that the aim of art. II of the Hague Rules is to give the parties to the carriage contract 
the rights to decide which particular functions should be performed by the carrier, and so the performance of 
any of the designated functions by the carrier, should be governed by the Hague Rules. Therefore, the effect 
of art. III (2) of the Rules is only to prevent the carrier from contracting out of liability where he undertakes 
the performance of one of those functions but not to specify those functions. The Court of Ap~eal has 
recently in The Jordan II, [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87 at pars. 34, 47 and 48, ([2003] EWCA Ctv 144), 
confirmed that this reasoning means that a clause allowing responsibility for loading and stowing to the 
shipper, and for discharge to the receiver, means that the shipowner assumes no responsibility for these 
activities under the bill of lading. 
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such as FIOS, into the bill of lading be effective, under art. 5 (2) (2) and art. 17 (1), as 
a(Tainst a third party'~ On Id h 
b • e cou argue t at such a general incorporation would not fulfil 
the requirenlent, mentioned in art. 5 (2) (2), which demands such agreement to the 
allocation of responsibilities of certain duties must be referred to in the contract particulars. 
i\10reover, such a general incorporation should be considered as an allocation of 
responsibilities to a non- contractual party, away from the shipowner, rather than a true 
allocation of responsibilities according to art. 5 (2) (2). If one could argue that such general 
incorporation is no more than an exception clause in favour of the shipowner, it should be 
considered as an agreement to exclude and to limit the carrier's liabilities under the Draft 
Instrument and thus null and void by virtue of art. 17 (1). 
Transhipment 
Article 4 (3) covers mixed contracts of carriage and forwarding, with art. 4 (3) (1), 
providing that "The parties may expressly agree in the contract of carriage that in respect 
of a specified part or parts of the transport of the goods the carrier, acting as agent, will 
arrange carriage by another carrier or carriers". Mixed contracts of carriage and forwarding 
are commonly used in the liner trade and initially it reflects the parties' freedom as to 
determine the scope of their agreement. Nonetheless, the parties' freedom as to determine 
the scope of their agreement should be expressly reflected in the carriage contract in order 
to protect shippers and their consignees. Therefore, any provisions regulating the mixed 
contracts of carriage and forwarding should be carefully drafted so as to avoid any kind of 
uncertainty and ambiguity and to provide an equal protection of the interests of all parties, 
in particular cargo owners. Looking at common shipping practice, mixed contracts of 
carriage and forwarding are covered by standard terms so- called liberty to tranship and 
cease of liability clauses which are issued by the carrier without any form of negotiation 
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and dangerously might leave the cargo owner without contractual remedy against both 
carri~r in cases where the loss or damage is sustained after transhipment. 
The above standard terms, liberty to tranship and cesser of liability clauses, would 
be excluded from the ambit of art. 4 (3) (1) as drafted because these clauses do not indicate 
that these clauses were the subject to discussion between the parties and that they were 
accepted by them. Moreover, such clauses normally would not specify which part or parts 
of the transport would be carried out by the sub-carrier. 161 One could argue, however, that 
art. -+ (3) (1) could be drafted in a better way by requiring the recording of the name of the 
sub- carrier who will perform the specific part or parts of transport, like art. 11 (1) of the 
Hamburg Rules, which can be used as an indication of the fulfilment of requirement of 
'expressly agree'. The requirement of recording the name of the sub- carrier plays an 
important role in relation to art. 14 (1) relating to the one year time limit. This is because a 
successful claim against the second carrier depends on the cargo claimant establishing a 
claim in the right jurisdiction within the one year time limit which might leave the cargo 
owner without a remedy, unlike art. 11 (1) of the Hamburg Rules which provides that 
"Nevertheless, any stipulation limiting or excluding such liability is without effect if no 
judicial proceedings can be instituted against the actual carrier in a court competent under 
paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 21". Moreover, art. 4 (3) (2), which provides that "In such 
event the carrier shall exercise due diligence in selecting the other carrier, conclude a 
contract with such other carrier on usual and normal terms, and do everything that is 
reasonably required to enable such other carrier to perform duly under its contract", does 
not require the head carrier, acting as agent, to obtain a transport document or to handle 
such document to the shipper or the consignee. 
161 For the opposite point of view, (U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.211Add.l) at para. 45. 
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Obtaining a transport document is vital for establishing the carrier responsible for 
the loss or damage of the goods, under which carriage contract and under which regime. 
This is because the burden of proof of the head carrier's negligence would be on the 
shipper, the controlling party or the consignee in the case of loss or damage to the goods, 
by yirtue of art. 6 (1) (3) (ix), resulting from "handling, loading, stowage or unloading of 
the goods by or on behalf of the shipper, controlling party or the consignee". In contrast, 
art. 11 (1) of the Hamburg Rules provides "The burden of proving that any loss, damage or 
delay in delivery has been caused by such an occurrence rests upon the carrier". However, 
the head carrier, acting as agent, would not be liable for the defaults of the sub- carrier by 
reason of art. 6 (3) (2) (a) since he would not be qualified as a performing party under art. 
6 (3) (2) (a) (i), by virtue of the words of art. 1 (17) which provides that "any of the 
carrier's responsibilities under a contract of carriage" and so the sub- carrier's defaults 
would not be one of the head carrier's responsibilities under the head carriage contract. 
Also, the sub- carrier would not be considered as "any other person, including a 
performing party's sub- contractors and agents" under art. 6 (3) (2) (a) (ii), by virtue of the 
words "who performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier's responsibilities under 
the contract of carriage" since what the sub- carrier performs or undertakes to perform is 
not part of the head carrier's responsibilities under the head carriage contract but rather 
under one the sub- carrier's responsibilities under his sub-carriage contract. 
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CHAPTER SIX: LIMITING CLAIMS OUTSIDE COGSA 1992 
6. 1. INTRODUCTION 
A coherent systenl of shipping law needs not only to enable those who suffer loss to have 
adequate means of recovery from sea carriers, but also needs to be able to confine any 
recovery within the scheme set out by international conventions such as the Hague Rules. 
Recoyery from parties that fall outside those conventions will tend to undermine the 
uniformity of their application. The point was made by Lord Steyn in The Nicholas H as 
follows, 
"The dealings between shipowners and cargo owners are based on a 
contractual structure, the Hague Rules, and tonnage limitation, on which 
the insurance of international trade depends . . . . . The result of a 
recognition of a duty of care in this case will be to enable cargo owners, 
or rather their insurers, to disturb the balance created by the Hague Rules 
and the Hague- Visby Rules as well as by tonnage limitation provisions, 
by enabling cargo owners to recover in tort against a peripheral party to 
the prejudice of the protection of shipowners under the existing system"l 
As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the courts' decisions on the implied 
contract cases created many limitations on the scope of the implied contract doctrine which 
made implied contract less viable as a means of solving the problems of title to sue by third 
parties. Moreover, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 1999 Act, even if it is applicable 
to such cases, would only allow third parties to acquire the benefits of carriage contracts 
but would not impose any liabilities on third parties. To do so a new mechanism would be 
required. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the means by which the English courts can 
confine non- contractual claims within the ambit of the Hague and the Hague- Visby 
Rules. 
1 Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Bishop Roch Marine Co. (The Nicholas H), [1996] A.C. 211 at 239D, and 240C. 
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6. 2. BAILMENT AND SUB- BAILMENT ON TERMS 2 
The bailee's duties n1ay be modified or negated by the terms of the head bailment as set 
out in the head contract of carriage. This situation is of little importance as, generally, the 
bailment on terms will be subsumed by the contract of carriage. Possession generally will 
follow the contractual rights. However, in the case of an agent who obtains a bill of lading 
in which it is named as consignee, or in the case of a bill of lading which is personally 
indorsed to it, this will not be the case. The agent will have contractual rights under 
COGSA 1992 and the principal will have rights in bailment. Therefore, in East West 
Corporation. ", Dkbs 1912, the seller lost its contractual rights under COGSA 1992 when 
it transferred the bill to its agent as consignee. However, the seller still retained its right of 
suit in bailment and therefore was able to recover damages in respect of a mis- delivery 
from the carrier.3 The sub- bailee's duties may also be modified of negated by reference to 
the terms of the sub- bailment in their contract with the bailee, provided the bailor has 
consented to those terms. The defendant here seeks to rely on the terms of his own contract 
to which the claimant is not a party. There is also an intermediate category where a bailee 
seeks to rely on the terms of the head bailment, even though he is a stranger to the contract 
of setting out the terms thereof. This will happen when a shipowner is sued in bailment and 
seeks to rely on the terms of a charterer's bill of lading. In this situation, unlike sub-
bailment, the defendant will seek to rely on the terms of a contract to which it is not party; 
the carriage contract between the charterer and the claimant. 
6. 2. 1. THE BAILOR'S CONSENT AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
APPLICATION OF THE SUB-BAILMENT'S TERMS 
Transferring the goods to the hands of a third party will create a bailment relationship 
2 Wilson, John F., "A flexible contract of carriage- the third party dimension?" [1996] LMCLQ. 187. 
3 [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239 at pars. 44- 49, ([2003] EWCA Civ 83). 
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between the later and the cargo owner which will be called a sub-bailment on terms.4 In 
j\!orris . v. AIartin & Son Ltd.,s the plaintiff sent a mink stole to a furrier and the latter 
, , 
with the consent of the owner, gave the stole to reputable cleaner, the defendant. The 
agreement between the furrier, as principal bailee, and the defendant, as a sub- bailee, was 
subject to the conditions of trade. Those conditions of trade excluded the liability of the 
defendant. as a cleaner. for damage to or loss of the stole. An employee stole the mink 
stole, while it was in the defendant's possession. The Court of Appeal had to decide 
whether the plaintiff could sue the cleaners direct. 
According to Lord Denning M.R., no direct contractual relationship existed 
behveen the cleaners and the plaintiff, the owner, but the cleaners would be liable for their 
employee's conversion. This was because, they owed a duty to take a reasonable care of the 
fur, not only towards the intermediate bailee, but also towards the principal bailor, the 
plaintiff. 6 Under Lord Denning's dictum, the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
c leaners was one of sub- bailee and bailor. But when will the plaintiff be bound by the 
terms of the sub- bailment between the principal bailee and the sub- bailee? Lord Denning 
concluded that, the principal bailor will be bound by the terms of the secondary contract if 
he had consented to it. In the words of Lord Denning 
The owner is bound by the conditions if he has expressly or impliedly 
consented to the bailee making a sub- bailment containing these 
conditions, but not otherwise 7 
The consent of the bailor plays a very vital role in the doctrine of bailment on terms and 
the Court of Appeal supported this formulation in Compania Portorafti Commerciale S.A. 
4 If the sub- bailee believes that the goods belongs to the head bailee rather than to a different person, he 
owes the undisclosed owner of the goods no more than a duty in common negligence to take a reasonable 
care of the goods while they are in his possession. See Awad .v. Pillai and Another, [1982] R.T.R. 29l. 
(CA.) 
5 [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63. . 
6 Devonshire, P., "Sub- bailment on terms and the efficacy of contractual defences agamst a non- contractual 
bailor" [1996] JBL 330 at 331. 
7 See supra fn. 5 at 72. 
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\'. Ultramar Panama Inc. The Captain Gregos (No.2) 8 
like Lord Justice ~almon in Morris .v. Martin ....... we would, if it were 
necessary to decIde the question, be strongly attracted by the rule 
adunlbrated b~ Lo~d Denning M.R. in that case that if A bails his goods 
to B and ~, wIth hIS consent and knowledge, sub- bails the goods to C on 
terms, A IS bound by these terms in any claim he may make against C.9 
The nlost important terms to be invoked by a sub- bailee would be exemption 
clauses, linlitation of liability and the time bar provisions, contained in the sub- bailment 
contract. As has been noted above, in Morris. v. Martin, the consent of the principal bailor 
is the basis for the sub- bailee's entitlement to invoke any term of the sub- bailment 
between hinl and the principal bailor. The bailor's consent, according to Lord Denning 
dictum, may be expressed or implied in the head contract and there would be no problem, 
as in Tilt' Pioneer Container, where the bailor, the owner of the goods, has consented 
expressly that the bailee could sub- contract "on any terms" the whole or part of the 
carriage contract to a sub-contractor. 
The facts of Pioneer Container, 10 put simply, are that the plaintiffs contracted with 
the carrier to transport their goods and the carrier issued bills of lading to the plaintiffs 
provided that 
on any terms the whole, or part, of the carriage, loading, unloading, 
. h' h dl' 11 stonng, ware ouslng, or an Ing. 
The carrier contracted with the defendants, sub- contractors, and the latter issued feeder 
bills of lading containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The ship carrying the goods 
involved in a collision and sank with loss of all the cargo. The plaintiff sued the 
defendants, shipowner, for the loss by the issue of a writ in rem in Hong Kong against a 
sister ship, The Pioneer Container. The defendants sought to a stay the proceedings on the 
ground of the exclusive Taiwanese jurisdiction clause in the feeder bills. The court held 
8 [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395. 
9 Ibid. 405. 
10 [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 593. 
II Ibid. at 597. 
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that the jurisdiction clause was binding on the plaintiffs but the court declined to stay the 
proceedings. The Court of A I f H K ppea 0 ong ong allowed the defendants' appeal and 
granted a stay. Therefore, the plaintiffs appealed the decision of the Appeal Court to the 
Privy Council. Lord Goff of Chieveley observing that 
Th~ difficu~ty ~hich has arisen with respect to .... [the plaintiffs] is that, on 
ordInary pnncIple of law, there was no contractual relationship between 
them and the shipowners; and accordingly these two classes of plaintiff 
haye claimed that the exclusive J' urisdiction clause clause 26 is not , , 
binding upon them. However, that contention was rejected, both by Sears 
1. and the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong, on the ground that there was a 
bailment to the shipowners on tenns (including clause 26) which these 
plaintiffs had expressly or impliedly authorised; and that, on the principle 
stated by Lord Denning M.R. in Morris .v. CAW. Martin & Sons Ltd ... 
these plaintiffs were bound by clause 26. Whether the courts below were 
correct in so holding is the principal issue which falls for consideration12 
The Privy Council, relying on Morris . v. Martin, found that there was no 
contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and their rights and 
obligations existed independently of contract. The law of bailment governed their 
re lationships with the relation between the principal bailor and sub- bailee being equivalent 
to that of a bailee and bailor. The question at issue was to what extent the sub- bailee could 
invoke the tenns of the sub- bailment between him and the bailee contained in the feeder 
bills of lading. In the words of the Privy Council 
if the effect of the sub-bailment is that the sub- bailee voluntarily 
receives into his custody the goods of the owner and so assumes towards 
the owner the responsibility of a bailee, then to the extent that the tenns 
of the sub- bailment are consented to by the owner, it can properly be 
said that the owner has authorised the bailee so to regulate the duties of 
the sub- bailee in respect of the goods entrusted to him, not only towards 
the bailee but also towards the owner. 13 
However, there were two conflicting authorities. The first, propounded by Lord 
Denning M.R., in Morris . v. Martin, was that the principal bailor is bound by the tenns 
contained in the sub- bailment to which he has consented to make sub- bailment containing 
12 Ibid. at 597. 
J3 Ibid. at 600. 
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those tenns "but not otherwis " Th . 
e. e competIng strand put forward by Donaldson 1., in 
Johnson Matthey & Co Ltd V Ct· 7" 14 '" 
. . . ons antme 1 ermmals Ltd, was that the pnnclpal baIlor is 
bound by all the terms of the sub- bailment whether he consented to them or not. 
Donaldson 1., did not consider the principal bailor's consent to be the basis for 
incorporating the terms of the sub- bailment into the collateral bailment. His view was 
based on the fact that the principal bailor sues the sub- bailee for breach of his obligation 
according to the sub- bailment and so the bailor cannot rely on part of the agreement and 
ignore the rest of that agreement concerned with the limitation of liability or the exemption 
clause. Moreover, by voluntarily taking possession of the owner's goods, the sub- bailee 
\Y3S aware of his duty towards the principal bailor and then entitled to rely on the 
conditions on which he undertook that responsibility. In the words of Donaldson 1., 
I really do not see how the plaintiffs can rely upon one part of the 
contract while ignoring the other. 15 
According to Donaldson J's view, the principal bailor would be bound by the terms 
of the sub- bailment in two different situations. First, when the principal bailor has 
authorised the sub- bailment, but the terms of sub- bailment was not authorised. Second, 
where the sub- bailment was itself unauthorised. 16 Therefore, the sub- bailee could rely 
upon the terms of his contract with the bailee against in any action brought by the bailor, in 
certain circumstances, even if the latter had neither known of nor acquiesced in the 
introduction of those clauses. But, this conclusion depends upon two conditions. First, the 
clause of the sub- bailment should be an essential part of the sub- bailee's consideration for 
entering into the sub- bailment contract. The possession of the bailor's goods must be taken 
upon those provisions, which would define the sub- bailee's liability towards the bailor. 
Secondly, the bailor must sue the sub- bailee for breach of a duty of taking care which 
14 [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 215. 
15 Ibid. at 222. 
16 See also Bell A. "Sub- Bailment on Terms: A New Land Mark, The Pioneer Container" [1995] LMCLQ 
177 a; 181 ~nd S~adling, W. 1., "Sub- bailment on terms, The Pioneer Container" [1993] LMCLQ 9. 
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would not have con1e into existence but for the secondary contract. 17 
Nethertheless, Johnson Matthey & Co Ltd. v. Constantine Terminals Ltd., agreed 
with l\lorris . v. Martin in two aspects. First, that the sub- bailee may be liable directly to 
the principal bailor, although the decisions disagree on the tactic of incorporating of those 
terms in the collateral bailment. Secondly, the liability of the sub- bailee may be affected 
by the terms of the sub- bailment contract. 
However. the Privy Council, in The Pioneer Container, accepted Lord Denning's 
dictum as to the necessity of consent. On the facts this was present because that the 
defendants, the carriers, had the right to sub- contract "on any terms" the whole or part of 
the carriage contract by virtue of the bill of lading terms. I8 Also, it was held that the 
exclusiye jurisdiction clause was consented to by the principal bailor on the basis of the 
usual and the reasonable test, which is applicable to an express consent as well as to an 
implied consent. Therefore, the Privy Council, in The Pioneer Container, accepted the 
inclusion of the exclusive jurisdiction clause as a term in the sub- bailment by holding that 
it was common and reasonable to find such a clause in the container trade19 and that only 
an unusual and the umeasonable clause would be excluded from the ambit of such a 
collateral bailment. 
Consent to a term need not be express, but may be implied. The issue of implied 
consent has been considered in the following three cases. In Singer (UK) Ltd. v. Tees & 
Hartlepool Port Authority,2o the plaintiff employed a freight forwarder to crate a drilling 
machine and deliver it to the defendant port authority for shipment to Brazil. The machine 
was damaged while being loaded by the defendant's servants. The plaintiff sued the 
17 Palmer N. E. "Sub- bailment on terms" [1988] LMCLQ. 466 at p. 448. 
18 Theref~re, th~ Privy Council disagreed with Donaldson's view that the principal bailor would be bound by 
the terms of the sub- bailment irrespective of the latter's consent. 
19 See supra fn. 10 at 605. See also Sing, T. K., "Jurisdiction Clauses in Bill of Lading- The Cargo 
Claimant's Perspective- The Pioneer Container" [1995] LMCLQ 183. 
20 [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 165. 
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defendant who sought to rely on th l' 't' f" . .. . e ImI atlOn 0 lIabIlIty clause In theIr contract WIth the 
freight forwarder. The court held that the defendant could invoke the limitation clause 
against Singer's action. In the words of Steyn, J., 
.... I am .... satisfied on the evidence that by entrusting to [the freight 
forwarder ~ the package of services involving the carting and delivery of 
the. machInes to the ship. Singer conferred implied authority on [the 
freIght forwarder] to create a sub- bailment upon terms which include the 
port authority's general conditions.21 
Steyn, 1., based the inference of implied consent on Singer's part from the facts of the case. 
The plaintiff realised that the goods would be delivered to the defendants upon his terms 
and conditions. As the limitation of liability clause in the sub- bailment was less wide than 
that inserted in the head contract, Singer would be in no worse position under those terms 
than under the main contract. 22 
In Spectra International PLC . v. Hayesoak LT,23 the goods were shipped from 
Hong Kong to Southampton under a bill of lading dated Nov. 20. Spectra, the plaintiffs, 
instructed Frans Maas, freight forwarders, that the goods, upon clearance, were to be 
delivered to a Bradford address. Spectra confirmed the instruction by Fax on Dec. 21 
\\"hich stated 
d 1· 24 .... upon clearance .... can you please arrange to e Ivery to ..... 
According to Spectra's instruction, Frans Maas sub- contracted the haulage to DRW, a 
third party, who then sub- contracted the delivery of the goods to Hayesoak. Over a 
weekend 1050 audio units and seven speakers were stolen from one of Hayesoak's lorries. 
Spectra, the plaintiff, sued Hayesoak, the defendants, seeking to recover the damages in 
respect of the loss. The latter admitted liability as a bailee, but submitted that they were 
entitled to limit their liability under the conditions of Road Haulage Association 1991 
21 Ibid. at 168. 
22 For more details see Palmer, N. E., supra fn. 17 at pp. 467- 468. 
23 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 153 
24 Ibid. at 155. 
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(RHA conditions) on the basis th t th b ·1 . .. 
a e al ment was authorIsed by Spectra VIa a chaIn of 
intermediaries. 
As a result of the absence of privity of contract between them, the main question 
was whether the defendants, Hayesoak, were entitled to rely on RHA conditions against 
th I· ·ff: J" e paInt! s, -. Spectra. According to the Privy Council in The Pioneer Container, a sub-
bailee could invoke his terms to the extent that the owner of the goods has expressly or 
in1pliedly consented to them. From the relevant contract between Spectra and Frans Maas, 
and from certain documents and the agreed statements,26 the Court concluded that, the 
latter were authorised to make a sub- contract with DRW and that sub- contract would not , 
represent a breach of contract. 
However, there was no express consent in accordance with the test of The Pioneer 
Container which authorised the carrier "to sub- contract on any terms". Moreover there 
was no e\'idence that the RHA conditions were ever part of any agreement between Spectra 
and Frans Maas and the BIFA conditions made no reference to any particular terms upon 
\"hich Frans Maas might sub- contract. 27 
The Court found, in respect of implied consent, that the cargo owners were bound 
by the terms of the bills of lading to which they were not parties if "in the known and 
contemplated form,,28 This conclusion was supported by the following observation of Lord 
Denning MR in Morris. v. C. W Martin 
In this case the plaintiff agreed that [ the furrier] should send the fur to the 
defendants and by so doing I think she impliedly consented to his 
'. . 29 
making a contract for cleanIng on the terms usually current In the trade 
The Court, therefore, held that Spectra did impliedly consent to sub- bailment, including 
25 The RHA conditions of carriage 1991 have since been revised, in 1998. . 
26 Frans Maas are an firm of freight forwarders and Spectra were aware that Frans Maas had no warehousmg 
facilities and so such services would be delegated to others concerns. 
27 See supra fn. 23 at 155. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See supra fn. 5 at 73. 
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sub- bailnlent on temlS of the RHA d't' d h ' , 
' con I IOns, an t e Court regarded those condItIOns as 
"usually current in the trade", 
rvlr. Thomas argued that, according to what Steyn 1. said in Singer, RHA conditions 
could only be impliedly consented to if they were less onerous than BIF A conditions in the 
bill of lading, The Court dismissed the argument on the ground that it was based on a mis-
conception of what Steyn 1., had said in Singer, Steyn 1., had concluded that the difference 
ben,\,een two sets of terms was unexceptional and rejected the idea that the terms of a sub-
bailment could be deemed to have been consented to only where they were less than those 
in the head contract. Lord Denning, in Morris ,v, Martin, disregarded the absence of an 
exclusion clause in the head contract, between the plaintiff and the furrier, as an 
impediment to the application of the defendants' terms in the sub- contract. 30 
The implied or express consent of the principal bailor does not mean that the 
consent covers all the terms of the sub- bailment. Such consent would encompass only 
those contractual provisions, which were reasonable and expected in their context. The 
Pri \:' Council, in Pioneer Container, held in respect of inclusion of the jurisdiction clause 
in the sub- bailment that it 
would be in accordance with the reasonable commercial expectations of 
those who engage in this type of trade and that such incorporation will 
generally lend to a conclusion which is eminently sensible in the context 
of carriage of goods by sea, specially in a container ship, in so far as it is 
productive of an ordered and sensible resolution of disputes in a single 
jurisdiction, so avoiding wasted expenditure in legal costs and an 
undesirable disharmony of consequences where claims are resolved in 
different jurisdictions, 31 
Thus the terms of the sub- bailment might be reasonable and expected in their context, , 
where the exemption and the limitation of liability clauses were less wide than those in the 
head contract. 
30 See supra fn. 23 at 156 & 157, 
31 See supra fn. 10 at 605. 
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Finally, there is Sonicare International Ltd. v. East Anglia Freight Terminal Ltd.32 
Haying found that Sonicare h d t·tl t . . 
a leo sue III baIlment, the court then proceeded to 
consider whether the defendants could invoke the NAWK conditions, which were part of 
the agreement between them and NOL, according to the principles set out in The Pioneer 
Container. The court in held that from the relevant facts, there was no express consent by 
the bailor to the NA WK conditions. Therefore, the court, according to the circumstances 
set out in the case, concluded that implied consent to the adoption of the conditions was to 
be deduced. Thus, the defendants could invoke those conditions against the claim, which 
brought by the plaintiffs on the basis of attornment, which constituted a form of estoppel. 
..... and in my view any representation that EAFT held the consignment 
for Sonicare's account was impliedly on the basis such was subject to the 
terms - i.e. the NAWK conditions - applicable between EAFT and their 
immediate bailors,33 
The sub- bailee will be prohibited from using the terms of sub- bailment where the 
principal bailor has forbidden the bailee from transferring possession to a third party on 
terms that exclude or limit his liability. But, sometimes, the bailee may have apparent 
authority to entrust the goods to a third party on terms customarily imposed by the latter. It 
is hard to prevent the sub- bailee from relying on his contractual terms as a defence to the 
bailor's action. Therefore, in Singer, Steyn J., confirmed that, "ostensible authority may be 
sufficient to create a sub- bailment contained limitation and exemption clauses". 34 
Moreover, The Privy Council, in Pioneer Container, agreed with the above approach and 
Lord Goff remarked that 
Such consent may, as Lord Denning M.R. pointed out, be express or 
implied; and in this context the sub- bailee may be able to invoke, where 
appropriate, the principle of ostensible authority.35 
It is unclear from this passage whether ostensible authority is propounded as component of 
32 [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48. 
33 Ibid. at 54. 
34 [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 165 at 168. 
35 See supra fn. 10 at 601. 
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an expanded definition, or whether l't IS merely . C d.c: th I f L d Inlerre lrom e anguage 0 or 
Denning in A/orris .l'. Martin. 36 
6. 2. 2. THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAUSE AS 
A TERM IN BAILMENT AND SUB- BAILMENT ON TERMS 
Where a charterer's bill is issued, the shipowner will be a bailee of the goods on the terms 
of that bill. However, unlike a sub- bailment on terms, the bailment will not be subject to 
any exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterer's bill of lading. In The Mahkutai, 37 
Indonesian shipowners chartered their vessel for total period of 24 months to the carrier, an 
Indonesian corporation. The carrier sub- chartered the vessel to the shippers, Indonesian 
Timber Exports, for carriage a cargo of plywood from Jakarta to Shantou. The carrier's 
agents issued a shipping order directing the vessel to receive the plywood cargo for 
carriage to Shantou subject to the carrier's bill of lading provisions. The master signed the 
shipping order, which constituted a mate's receipt, and authorised the carrier's agents to 
sign the bill of lading "in accordance with the mate's receipt and relevant charterparty". 
The carrier's agents issued the bill of lading provided, inter alia, that any dispute should be 
determined exclusively by An Indonesian Court and governed by Indonesian law, and 
contained a Himalaya clause. 
In Hong Kong, the cargo owner sued the shipowner in respect of the damaged 
cargo by reason of breach of contract. The shipowners tried to release their vessel which 
had been arrested as a result of the cargo owner's claim by providing security in the form 
of a bank guarantee. The shipowners then issued a summons seeking to a stay of 
proceedings, either on the ground of breach of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the bill 
36 An example of ostensible authority might be where the .oral a~eeI?e.nt between the sh~pper an~ the carrier 
prevents the transhipment of the goods, but the bilI o~ ladmg whIch IS I~sued by the carrIer contams a clause 
allowing the carrier to tranship the goods, and the carrIer actually transhIps the goods. 
37 [1996] 3 W.L.R. l. 
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of lading, or on the grounds of forum non- conveniens,38 
The Privy Council faced tw ' b " , o Issues su mltted by the shIpowners who were tryIng 
to c lainl either the benefit of the I' , 'd' , , exc USlve Juns IctIon clause by reason of the HImalaya 
clauseinthetinlecharter'sb'll fl d' 39, " , loa lng, or to Invoke the pnnclple of baIlment on terms, 
The shipowners were seeking not to rely on exemptions or limitation clauses which would 
solely be for their benefit, but on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterer's bill 
which is for the benefit of both party,40 
The Privy Council in The Mahkutai had to consider to what extent a bailment on 
terms should be regarded as analogous to its decision to The Pioneer Container as regards 
jurisdiction clauses, This issue had already come before the Court of Appeal in The Forum 
Crafismon,·H where they had refused to allow the shipowners to rely on the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in the charterer's bill of lading on the ground of bailment on terms, The 
issue in The Pioneer Container was whether the shipowners could, as sub- bailees, invoke 
the terms of the sub- bailment against the cargo owner, the head bailor, including the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, In contrast, the issue in the present case was whether the 
shipowners, as sub- contractors, were entitled to rely on a term of the head contract, a case 
of bailment on terms, The Privy Council, distinguished, The Mahkutai from The Pioneer 
Container, on the ground that the latter dealt the sub- bailee's ability to rely on the terms of 
the sub- bailment against the bailor. In contrast, The Mahkutai was concerned with the 
availability of the exclusive jurisdiction clause to the shipowner by reason of the Himalaya 
clause which depends on 
38 At first instance, Sears 1., held that despite the fact that the shipowners were not parties to the biII oflading 
contract, they were entitled to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause either as a contractual term by virtue 
of the Himalaya clause, or as one of the terms on which the goods were bailed to them, ~owever, the Court 
of Appeal accepted the cargo owner's appeal against Sears 1's orde~ and held that the shIpowne~s were not 
parties to the bill of lading contract and also that there was no baIlment on terms .such as t~ mclude the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause. Both of the parties were granted lea:e to appeal to ~he PrIvy Cou~cIl. 
39 The availability of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, to the shIpowners, by VIrtue of the HImalaya clause 
see infra sub- title 6. 3. 
40 See supra fn. 37 at 6. 
41 [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 291 at 295. 
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the scope of the agreement between the head contractor and the sub-
contractor, entered into b~ the intermediate contractor as agent for the 
sub- contractor, under whIch the benefit of a term in the head contract 
nlay be made available by the head contractor to the sub- contractor.42 
The Privy Council considered the application of the principle of bailment on terms 
which depends on whether the shipowners could establish that they received the goods into 
their possession, as bailees, upon the terms set out in the bill of lading. The Privy Council 
held that the shipowners were not bailees on the terms of the bill of lading and one 
objection to the bailment on terms argument was that the exclusive jurisdiction clause was 
not a part of the Himalaya clause. 
it is impossible to hold that, by receiving the goods into their possession 
pursuant to the bill of lading, the shipowners' obligations as bailees were 
effectively subject to the exclusive jurisdiction clause as a term upon 
which they implicitly received the goods into their possession.43 
The involvement of the master in the issue of the charterer's bill of lading should arguably 
have been used as an indication of the shipowners' consent to the bailment's being on the 
terms of the bill of lading including the exclusive jurisdiction clause, so as to come within 
the above dicta of the Privy Council in The Mahkutai. However, the Privy Council 
dismissed both the shipowners' arguments and concluded that the shipowners were not 
entitled to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Their appeal against the order of the 
Court of Appeal refusing of a stay of the cargo owner's claim in Hong Kong must 
therefore fail. 
However, there is an argument that the decision of The Mahkutai will undermine 
the doctrine of bailment on terms,44 since The Pioneer Container also contained a 
Himalaya clause and an exclusive jurisdiction clause, but the jurisdiction clause was 
accepted as a term in the sub- bailment, but not in bailment. Different results in these 
42 See supra fn. 37 at 15. ..' . 
43 Ibid. Surely the shipowners were bailees on the biII of ladmg tenns whIch had to be read m the lIght of the 
Himalaya clause in the biII of lading? . . . " 
44 See MacMillan, c., "Elder, Dempster Sails on: PrIVIty of Contract BaIlment on Tenns [1995] LMCLQ 1 
at 5. 
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situations should not be acceptabl th d . . 
e on e groun s of commercial convenIence referred to , 
in The Pioneer Container by the Privy Council 45 Th C th d h ld 11 
. erelore, ese groun s s ou equa y 
apply in The Afahklltai, regardless of the fact that the clause was to be found in a different 
contract, the head contract, rather than in the sub- contract, as in The Pioneer Container. 46 
Furthermore, the Privy Council's objection to the bailment on terms argument was 
that the exclusiye jurisdiction clause was not a clause within the Himalaya clause. There is 
a distinction between the Himalaya clause and the bailment on terms, according to The 
Pioneer Container,47since the people who require the protection of the Himalaya clause are 
di tTerent to those who can claim the benefit of the bailment on terms. Therefore, the 
prOk'ction under the Himalaya clause derives from the contract, while the protection under 
the bailment on terms derives from the voluntary taking of the possession of the goods, by 
the bailee, with the acknowledgement of they belong to someone else. Moreover, contract 
and bailment impose different obligations and terms, which are sometimes the same, but 
sometimes not. The bailee's ability to claim the benefit of the terms of the bailment should 
derive from the fact that the bailment imposes certain duties on the bailee, and not as a 
result of a contractual basis. To consider whether the exclusive jurisdiction clause forms a 
term of the bailment, it is important to know the basis on which the shipowners were trying 
to establish their claim, either in contract or as a bailment on terms. The shipowners did not 
rely upon a contractual basis, but, rather, they based their claim upon the doctrine of 
bailment on terms (on the ground of the Privy Council's assumption that the shipowners 
were sub- contractors). Therefore, the relationship between the shipowners and the cargo 
45 For the reasons of commercial convenience see The Pioneer Container, supra fn. 31 and the corresponding 
text. 
46 See MacMillan, C., supra fn. 44 at 5. 
47 See supra fn. 10 at 603. 
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owners was based upon bailment, and according to decision of the House of Lords in Elder 
Dempster4'8. the terms ofth' If' . IS re a Ion are contaIned III the charterer's bill oflading.49 
The Privy Council's conclllsI'on I'n Tn .,. I hk . h h' . d" I 
' 1, e lVla utaz, t at t e Juns IctlOn cause was 
not within the Hinlalaya clause and so could not be a term of the bailment would also 
, 
exc lude limitation of liability and exception clauses from the terms of a bailment on terms 
which would undermine the House of Lords decision in Elder Dempster. Also, what is the 
situation where there is no Himalaya clause? The Privy Council identified the difficulty of 
determining when an Elder Dempster bailment on terms arose. 
in the circumstances ..... the shippers may be taken to have impliedly 
agreed that the goods were received by the shipowners, as bailees, 
subject to the exceptions and limitations contained in the known and 
contemplated form of bill of lading50 
Lord Sumner, in Elder Dempster, has, arguably, not confined himself only with terms 
\\'hich were either exceptions or limitations in order to be a term on bailment, but he spoke 
about obligations "which include the exceptions and limitations of liability stipulated" 
Therefore, the types of which term come within the scope of bailment on terms may be 
larger than those that come within the scope of the Himalaya clause.51 
Moreover, it is arguable that the shipowners in Mahkutai should have succeeded in 
their argument, as a result of the absence of any kind of conclusion by the Privy Council on 
the issue of whether the shipowners actually qualified as "sub- contractors" within the 
meaning of the Himalaya clause, cl. 4 of the bill of lading. If the shipowners were not in 
48 [1924] A.C 522. 
49 See MacMillan, C, supra fn. 44 at 5- 6. The Privy Council, in fact, made no decision on this issue and 
therefore, it can be argued that, it should have done for their finding that a bailment on terms only works if 
the shipowner could rely on the Himalaya clause. Furthermore, the Privy Council made no decision on the 
shipowners' ability to rely on the bailment on terms doctrine. 
50 See supra fn. 37 at 9. . . . 
51 See MacMillan, C, supra fn. 44 at 6- 7. This is supported by Lord Go~f o~ Chieveley, In .The PlOn.eer 
Container, commenting on Lord Sumner's dictum " .... the shipowner'.s obhg~tIOns wer~ effectI~ely subject 
to the terms upon which the shipowners implicitly received the goods In~O theIr posseSSIOn .. : S~e supra 
fn. 10 at 600. Therefore, a jurisdiction clause can be included in the bailment on terms doctrIne, SInce the 
Privy Council in The Makhutai excluded this term as a part of the Himalaya clause rather than from the 
bailment on terms doctrine. 
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fact · sub- contractors' the Privy Council's decision on the terms of the bailment can no 
longer be justified by reference to cl 4 Th h' " , 
" e s Ipowners argument IS also congruous WIth 
the underlying commercial reality . I . 52 . 
, as prevIOus y mentIoned, because both the shIpowners 
and the charterers were Indonesian and their common understanding was that litigation 
would take place in Indonesia. Furthermore, as against the claimant, the inclusion of the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause as a term on bailment can more readily be justified as it 
derives fron1 the principal contract rather than the sub- contract as in The Pioneer , 
COlltainer. 
Finally. it should be noted that the relationship between the shipowner and the 
shipper when a charterer's bill is issued could alternatively be viewed as a sub- bailment 
on tenns. This view was propounded, obiter, by Lord Hobhouse in The Starsin, and avoids 
the problem of both charterer and shipowner constituting the head bailee.53 On this 
analysis. the shipowner might arguably be able to rely on jurisdiction! arbitration clause in 
the time charter. 
6. 3. THIRD PARTY RELIANCE ON THE TERMS OF THE HEAD CONTRACT 
(THE 'HIMALAYA' AND 'CIRCULAR INDEMNITY' CLAUSES) 
The sub- bailee can rely on the terms of the sub- bailment, in certain circumstances, as a 
defence to an action brought by the owner of the goods. But, can he invoke the terms of the 
head contract as a defence toward the principal bailor? The sub- bailee may prefer to rely 
on the provision of the main contract for different reasons. One is when the court cannot 
infer any consent by the owner of the goods to the terms of the sub- bailment. Another is 
when, the terms of the head contract offer wider protection to the sub- bailee than the terms 
of the sub- contract. This question is also critical to a third party, such as a stevedore, who 
52 See supra fn. 10 at 605. 
53 [2003] W.L.R. 711 at para. 133, ([2003] UKHL 12). 
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is not a bailee and cannot therefore, rely on the doctrine of sub- bailment on terms. 
In Elder. Demnster & Co v P t Z h . & 54 
r / " a erson, oc oms Co, the cargo was damaged as 
a result of bad stowage on board the defendant's vessel. The defendant was sued in 
negligence by the cargo owner and the former sought to rely on the stowage exception in 
the bill of lading to which he was not a party, as it was a time charterer's bill of lading. The 
House of Lords agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeal that the shipowner could 
invoke the stowage exception against the claim brought by the cargo owner. In the words 
of SClutton, L 1., in the Court of Appeal 
the real answer to the claim is in my view that the shipowner is not in 
possession as a bailee, but as the agent of a person, the charterer, with 
whom the owner of the goods has made a contract defining his liability, 
and that the owner as servant or agent of the charterer can claim the same 
protection as the charterer. 55 
The Court of Appeal allowed the shipowner to invoke the terms of the bill of lading 
contract on the agency doctrine and not on the bailment on terms doctrine. 56 However, the 
result of the above case has not been followed in subsequent cases. Therefore, in Midland 
Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd,57 the House of Lord applied the doctrine of privity of 
contract and found that the defendants were not parties to the bill of lading contract and so, 
they could not rely on its terms as a defence. The defendants were not bailees because they 
were engaged as an independent contractor to discharge the cargo without any intention 
that they should acquire legal possession of the goods. 
The key issue is the possession of the goods, which is not, usually, transferred to 
the stevedores. Therefore, the position would be different where the defendants, as 
stevedores, were engaged to discharge the goods and also to store them until the time of 
54 [1924] A.C. 522. 
55 Ibid. at 564. 
56 The New South Wales Court of Appeal, in Gadsden .v. Australian Commission, [1977] N.S.W.L.R. 575, 
an Australian case, supported the view that the sub- bailee would not be allowed to use the terms of the 
contract between the principal bailor and the principal bailee. 
57 [1962] A.C. 446. 
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collection by the consignee. On those facts, there would be an intention that the stevedores 
should acquire legal possession of the goods and therefore, as sub-bailees, they would owe 
a duty of care towards the cargo owner. The defendant could in this case invoke only the 
telTI1S of the sub- bailment in any claim brought by the cargo owner. The Privy Council in 
Gilchrist rratt . v. York Products 58 recognised the creation of a sub- bailment of the goods 
when the independent contractor owed the duty of taking care of the owner's goods and 
took legal possession of them. 
The House of Lords strictly applied the rule of privity of contract doctrine in 
l\fidland Silicones and prevented the stevedores, engaged as independent contractors, from 
inyoking the limitation of liability clause in the contract carriage. But Lord Reid had 
suggested that agency relationship might be introduced as a solution to such problems. In 
his view 
first, the bill of lading makes it clear that the stevedores is intended to be 
protected by the provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the bill 
of lading makes it clear that the carrier in addition to contracting for 
those provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as agent for the 
stevedores that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) 
the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later 
ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any 
difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were 
overcome. 59 
The suggestion of Lord Reid was accepted by the Privy Council in The 
Eurymedon.60 A drilling machine had shipped under bill of lading which incorporated the 
Hague Rules and included an express Himalaya clause. Later, the stevedores were sued in 
negligence for damage caused to the drilling machine during discharging operation. 
Stevedores sought to invoke the Hague Rules, on the ground of the Himalaya clause, which 
barred any action brought more than 12 months after the damage occurred. The Privy 
Council concluded that the defendant was entitled to rely upon those rules, because the 
58 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1262. 
59 See supra fn. 57 at 474. 
60 [1975] A.C. 154. 
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contractual carrier, in concluding th . 
e carnage contract, had been acting as agent for the 
steYedore.61 Also in New Y; k St 62 Th· . 
, or ar, e Pnvy CouncIl confirmed the efficacy of a 
Hinlalaya clause as to confer upon the stevedores the benefit of defences and immunities 
contained in the bill of lading, including a one-year time bar. Lord Wilberforce stressed 
It may in?eed be said. that the significance of Satterthwaite's case lay not 
so m~ch III the establIshment of any new legal principle, as in the finding 
that .In the normal situation involving the employment of stevedores by 
earners, accepted principles enable and require the stevedore to enjoy the 
benefit of contractual provisions in the bill of lading.63 
Howeyer, The Privy Council recognised, in the above cases, the effectiveness of the 
Hinlalaya clause, which provides protection against claims in tort by consignees. 
Furthermore, the Privy Council held that the clause was still capable of protecting the 
ste\'edores in respect of loss or damage that occurred outside the 'tackle to tackle' period 
of the carrier's responsibility under the Hague Rules. 
The Privy Council held, in The Mahkutai,64 according to The Eurymedon65 and The 
.I.Velt' York Star,66 that the shipowners could not rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause by 
reason of the Himalaya clause. This is because the principle, in the latter cases, was applied 
to stevedores who were seeking to rely on "exemptions and limitation" and "defences and 
immunities" in the bill of lading. But, an exclusive jurisdiction clause is different, since it 
does not benefit only one party but it is "a clause which creates mutual rights and 
obligations".67 The Privy Council held, as a matter of construction, that the jurisdiction 
clause could not fall within the wording of the particular Himalaya clause. The Privy 
Council also supported this conclusion by examining the purpose behind Himalaya clause 
61 Ibid. at 165. The bill of lading included an express clause which provided that any servant, agent or 
independent contractor employed by the carrier should be en~itIed to the pr?tection of ever~ exemption 
available to the carrier and that, in respect of this clause, the carrIer was contractmg not only on hIS behalfbut 
also as agent or trustee on behalf of the parties named. 
62 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 138. 
63 Ibid. at 143. 
64 [1996] 3 W.L.R. l. 
65 See supra fn. 60. 
66 See supra fn. 62. 
67 See supra fn. 37 at 13. 
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which would prevent the cargo owner from suing those person who had performance the 
service in order to avoid the contractual defences available to the carrier. Reliance on an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause did not further this purpose. Additionally, the benefit of an 
exc lusive jurisdiction clause would not extend to sub- contractors, because such sub-
contractors are frequently present in countries other than the carriers' countries. Therefore, 
The Privy Council concluded that, the benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause, in the 
present case, would only occur, by coincidence, where the shipowners as sub- contractors 
and the carriers were present in the same jurisdiction.68 Therefore, the protection of such 
clauses can be extended to third parties only by means of a 'Himalaya' clause, redrafted so 
as to avoid the linguistic problems highlighted in The Mahkutai. Re- drafting the Himalaya 
clause might arguably extend the benefit of an exclusive jurisdiction clause to such third 
parties as to provide a clear reference in the Himalaya clause that the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause should also be available to such third parties as well as to the contracting party. 69 
But, the question of whether such an extension of the exclusive jurisdiction clause would 
be acceptable before the court might be doubtful on the basis of the Privy's Council 
decision in The Makhutai. 
Recently, the Court of Appeal in The Starsin70 has considered the meaning of sub-
contractor 'independent contractor' in the Himalaya clause. Rix L.J., agreed with Colman 
J., at the first instance, who defined 'independent contractor' as "a third party with whom 
a party to the contract enters into a contract under which the third party contracts to 
perform some or all of the obligations which that party had undertaken to perform under 
the head contract, in other words, a sub- contractor". 71 Therefore, the shipowners of a 
68 See supra fn. 37 at 12- 14. . . 
69 For support for this view see Gaskell, N., Bills of Lading: Law and Co~t:acts, (et aT), 1st. EdItIOn, LPP 
2000, at para. 12. 31 and para. 12.38 and Carver on Bills of Lading, 1st. EdItIOn, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
2001, at para. 7- 078. . 
70 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437 at para. 113, ([2001] EWCA Clv 56). 
71 Ibid. at para. 112. 
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chartered vessel would be considered as independent contractors within the Himalaya 
clause. Then Rix LJ., added that "Unlike the members of the Court of Appeal of Hong 
Kong, [in The Afahkutai] I do not find the wider construction artificial. .. Once it had been 
decided that they were charterer's bills and that the shippers had contracted with the 
charterers as carriers it was (and is) open to the Court to treat shipowners as sub-
contractors for the carriage of the cargo and independent contractors on behalf of the 
cha11erers".72 This finding was upheld by the House ofLords.73 
The period of responsibility under the Hague and the Hague- Visby Rules, by virtue 
of arts. I (e) and II, is between loading and discharge 'tackle to tackle'. Therefore, the 
Himalaya clause would not provide any protection to the carrier's sub- contractors in 
relation to operations outside the 'tackle to tackle' period. It seems. therefore, the 
Himalaya clause should contain a term extending the period of responsibility so as to 
include periods before loading and after discharge. Such term would provide the carrier' 
sub- contractors with the necessary protection against any liability which occurred outside 
the 'tackle to tackle' period under the Hague and Hague- Visby rules. 
This constitutes a vital restraining element on the use of the 'Himalaya' clause, for 
the contract it creates is parasitic on the carriage contract itself. The consequence of this 
can be seen in two cases. First, in Raymond Burke Motors Ltd. v. The Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Co., 74 where a consignment of motor cycles was taken to the defendants' terminal 
facility. While the consignment was in the container park, it was damaged by the chemical 
escaped following an incident occurring during the discharge of cargo from another vessel. 
The defendants sought to rely on the terms of the bill of lading, which would have been 
issued had the consignment been loaded, the bill containing a 'Himalaya' clause. Leggatt 
J., held that they could not rely on the bill's terms as the damage was occurred before 
72 Ibid. 
73 See supra fn. 53. 
74 [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 155. 
303 
loading began and therefore before the carrier's period of responsibility began under the 
~tackle to tackle' lule. The finding would be the same even though the carrier had acted as 
the shipper's freight forwarder. This is because the damage occurred while the carrier was 
acting as a freight forwarder rather than as a carrier. This problem can be avoided by 
expanding the carrier's period of responsibility from 'tackle to tackle' to 'port to port'. 
However, in the absence of such an expansion, the Himalaya clause will not protect the 
temlinal operator if the cargo is damaged between its being received into its custody and 
the start of loading. Nonetheless, the terminal operator can avoid this problem by issuing a 
receipt to the shipper incorporating the terms on which it wishes to rely. This will 
constitute a bailment or sub- bailment on terms, or, possibly, a separate contract, as found 
by the Court of Appeal in The Rigo!etto.75 By issuing a receipt, the terminal operator 
would be protected by the Himalaya clause on the terms of its own receipt rather than on 
the terms of the bill containing the 'Himalaya' clause. Although Lord Goff of Chieveley in 
The Pioneer Container contemplated that a sub- carrier might be entitled to elect to rely on 
either the terms of the 'Himalaya' clause in the head bailment or its own terms in the sub-
bailment, the right of election does not apply where the shipper deals directly with a sub-
contractor, such as the terminal operator. Therefore, the Court of Appeal in The Rigo!etto76 
held that the defendant, by issuing its own receipt, had elected to rely on its own terms 
rather than those contained in the bill of lading containing the 'Himalaya' clause. 
Secondly, the 'Himalaya' clause in The Starsin went further than extending the 
exceptions and limitations of the Hague Rules to the sub- contractor and purported to grant 
the sub- contractor a complete exemption from liability. As a result of the House of Lords' 
finding that the bills were charterers' bills, it became necessary to decide whether the 
75 [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 532. 
76 Ibid. at para. 49. 
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shipowners were liable in negligence77 and, if so, whether they could take the benefit of 
this complete exemption. Their Lordships held that the 'Himalaya' clause should be 
constnled in accordance with the other terms of the bill, in particular the one which gave a 
paramount inlportance to the Hague Rules. This entailed an examination of whether the 
complete exenlption clause was nullified by art. III (8). This required consideration of 
whether 'the carrier' referred to in that clause included a party who performed the actual 
carriage of goods. Their Lordships, by a 4- 1 majority, found that it did and therefore, the 
shipowners could not rely on the complete exemption in favour of sub- contractors. Had 
the sub- contractor been a terminal operator, such finding may will have been different as 
such a party would not have been involved in the actual carriage of goods. Such distinction 
of treatment would be difficult to justify in the light of the services which are covered by 
the Hague Rules as to include loading, stowing and discharge as well as the carriage itself. 
Therefore, a party who loads or stows the cargo is as much a 'carrier' under art. III (8) as 
one who actually carries the goods in that both parties are performing the incidents of a 
'contract of carriage' as defined by the Rules and neither has actually contracted to 
perform those services. 
The 'Direct Approach' 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel,78 have adopted a 
new method to meet the problem of the doctrine of privity of contract. The plaintiff sued 
the employees of warehouseman in negligence for damaging a transformer, and the latter 
tried to rely on the limitation of liability clause contained in the contract between the 
plaintiff and the warehouseman. The court sought to create a new exception to the privity 
rule and to allow the employees to invoke the limitation clause. The justification of the 
new exception was outlined by Iacobucci, 1., 
77 The House of Lords found that the shipowners were liable in negligence in respect of one the claimants. 
78 [1992] 97 D.L.R. 261. (4th). 
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~hen an enlployer and a customer inter a contract for services and 
Include a clause limiting the liability of the employer for damages arising 
fronl what will normally be conduct contemplated by contracting parties 
to be ~er~ormed by th~ employer's employees, and in fact so performed, 
there IS SImply no vahd reason for denying the benefit of the clause to 
employees who perform the contractual obligations.79 
The operation of this exception depends on two requirements, one of them, the expressed 
or implied intention of the parties to extend the benefits of these clauses to the employees 
seeking to rely on it. On the other hand, the damages must occur during the performance of 
the service contained in the contract and the employees must also have been acting in the 
course of their employment. In the above case the court had relied on the implied intention 
and concluded from the circumstances of the case and the absence of clear indication in the 
contract to the contrary, the term "warehouseman" must be interpreted as warehousemen.8o 
Howe\,er, it is arguable that, the exception in the above case is to protect the employees 
\\'hich can be justified as a method of giving effect to the true intention of the parties which 
may be implied or express. Meanwhile, this exception would not be useful to independent 
contractors or sub- contractors, unless the principal contractor is contracting as an agent as 
well as a principal, as with the Himalaya clause. 
The Circular Indemnity Clause 
The circular indemnity clause is another method for providing the carrier's sub- contractor 
with the necessary protection against a claim by the cargo owner. The clause amounts to an 
undertaking by the bill of lading holder that it will not sue the carrier's sub- contractors and 
that it will indemnify the carrier in the event that it breaches the undertaking. A cargo 
owner suing the carrier's sub- contractor would constitute a breach of such a clause and 
would allow the carrier to sue the cargo owner directly for such breach. The carrier may 
apply for a stay of the cargo owner's action against his sub- contractor, provided the carrier 
can show that the cargo owner's breach of the circular indemnity clause prejudiced its 
79 Ibid, at 361. 
80 Ibid. at 369. 
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interest, as in Nippon Yusen Kaisha . v. International Import and Export Co. Ltd., (The Elbe 
Sl 
Alanl),' However the carrier ca' k hI' 
, n mvo e suc a cause after the cargo owner's claIm has 
been made against the carrier's sub- contractor by way of express indemnity, The 
disadvantage with the circular indemnity clause is that the third party's protection is 
depending upon the carrier activating its right under the clause, Even if the carrier applies 
to stay the proceedings brought against the third part, there is no guarantee that the court 
\"ill actually order a stay, 
6. 4. THE PROBLEM OF PARALLEL ACTIONS IN NEGLIGENCE AND 
BAILMENT 
The utility of the doctrine of sub- bailment on terms at confining claims within the ambit of 
the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules depends on the claim being made in bailment. What if 
the claimant elects to base its claim exclusively on the general duty of care in negligence? 
Donaldson 1., in Johnson Matthey & Co, Ltd. v. Constantine Terminals Ltd. ,82 considered 
the problem of parallel actions in negligence and bailment and stated that "If Constantine 
Terminals had themselves damaged the cargo, quite different considerations would have 
been involved. The plaintiffs could have set out to prove negligent conduct without any 
reference to bailment. Whether, in those circumstances, Constantine Terminals could have 
relied on the contract of sub- bailment to which the plaintiffs were strangers or on the 
contract of head bailment to which they were strangers, seems to me to be a problem of 
d I h . . " 83 some nicety to be tackle on y w en It anses . 
81 [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 606. The Court might refuse to gr~nt .such ~ st~y as in The Chevalier Raze, [1983] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 438, where the carrier failed to show such prejudice to Its mterest. 
82 [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 215 at 220. ., 
83 Similar dicta to Donaldson's J., was expressed by Bingham L.J., m The Captazn Gregos (No 2), [1990] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 395 at 406, and by Staughton L.J., in The Gudermes, [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 311 at 328. 
307 
Lord Steyn, in The Nicholas H,84 held that a classification society owned no duty of 
care towards the cargo owners where their goods were carried on board a vessel which it 
had surveyed and stated that "The law of torts applies generally and it is not simply 
supplementary to the law of contract. A remedy in tort is not confined to situations where 
no remedy in contract is available". Then, he proceeded to state that "The liability in tort 
was independent of any liability in contract .... In two situations, however, liability in tort 
depends on contract. First, where a plaintiff consents to the terms in the defendant's 
contract with a third party on the basis of which the defendant undertakes the task in 
question or the plaintiff authorise the third party to agree with the defendant that the 
defendant's undertaking of that task should be subject to those terms. The defendant may 
rely on the terms of the contract when sued by the plaintiff in tort. Secondly, the terms of 
the plaintiff s contract with a third party may contemplate that the defendant will undertake 
a task and the plaintiff will not hold the defendant liable for the consequences of any 
negligence".85 
According to these dicta, it seems that it is open to the claimants to sue third parties 
in tort rather than in bailment so as to avoid the doctrine of sub- bailment on terms. 
However, in The Nicholas H, by a 3- 2 majority, the House of Lords found that policy 
grounds dictated that no duty of care should be imposed on the classification society, even 
though the case involved negligence occasioning physical loss which would appear to fall 
clearly within the general duty of care in Donoghue . v. Stevenson.86 There were two 
grounds to justify this departure from the general rules. First, the public nature of 
classification societies. Secondly, the fact that the imposition of a duty of care would 
undennine the unifonnity of international conventions on liability, such as the Hague 
Rules, and on limitation of liability. The second, but not the first, reason would apply with 
84 [1996] A.C. 211 at 214. 
85 Ibid. at 215. 
86 [1932] A.C. 562. 
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equal cogency to an attempt to avoid the doctrine of sub- bailment on terms by pleading 
the claim exclusively in general negligence.87 
Lord Hobhouse in The Starsin88 held that "The sub- bailment creates a specific 
bailor! bailee relationship between the sub- bailee and the goods owner. It is not the same 
as the 'neighbour! foresight' relationship exemplified by Donoghue. v. Stevenson and the 
duties created are not the same". The Court of Appeal in East West Corporation .v. Dkbs 
19 ~ 1 held that it was unnecessary to consider whether or not the shipowner could have 
been found liable in negligence had there been no parallel liability in bailment. 89 Mance 
LJ., observed "In these circumstance, it is unnecessary to examine the authorities and 
arguments deployed for and against the proposition that, if the appellants had no other 
potential responsibility towards the respondents, they must at least be regarded as owing 
the respondents an ordinary duty of care. The Aliakmon rejected such a proposition in a 
case where the buyer at risk was attempting to hold the carriers responsible in negligence, 
\vithout having any proprietary or possessory basis for so doing. The House of Lords was 
unable to understand how any purely tortious duty of care could be treated as modified so 
to equate with the intricate blend of responsibilities and liabilities constituted by the Hague 
Rules, which governed the shipowners' bill of lading liability (p. 818). Similar 
consideration would have presented a formidable impediment to the recognition of any 
purely tortious duty, if I had not concluded that the appellants owed duties towards the 
respondents in or paralleling those owed in bailment, notwithstanding the delivery to 
Chilean banks of bills of lading. On the basis, well- recognised duties exist in law and the 
doctrine of bailment on terms is potentially available as a controlling mechanism. So it is 
87 Similar reasoning lies behind the decision in Norwich City Council. v. Harvey, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828. 
88 See supra fn. 53 at para. 136. 
89 See supra fn. 3 at para. 50. 
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unnecessary for nle to consider further whether the impediment would have been 
insuperable, it simply does not arise".9o 
6.5. CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) 1999 ACT 
The terms of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 1999 Act are not applicable to carriage 
contracts by sea, by virtue of s. 6 (5- 7). However, third parties, such as stevedores, fall 
within the exception contained in s. 6 (5) (b) which provides except that "a third party may 
in reliance on that section avail himself of an exclusion or limitation of liability in such a 
contract". Stevedores' protection would depend on their falling within the class of persons, 
by yirtue of s. 1 (3) which refers to a party being "expressly identified in the contract by 
name, as a member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not to be in 
existence when the contract is entered into".91 Therefore, the efficacy of Himalaya clauses 
has finally been recognised by legislative reform which provides a simpler and more 
certain mechanism for reaching the same result reached in The Eurymedon and other 
similar cases. An arbitration clause is also available to such a third party by virtue of s. 8 of 
the 1999 Act. In contrast, jurisdiction and choice of law clauses are not available to such a 
third party and so the 1999 Act has followed the decision of the Privy Council in The 
Mahkutai. For this reason, the 'Himalaya' clause may still be attractive. With suitable re-
drafting, it may be possible to use such a clause to extend the benefit of jurisdiction and 
choice of law clauses to sub- contractors; a possibility not open under the 1999 Act. 
:~ ~~: would cover a clause in favour of any sub- contractor, including a shipowner when a charterer's bill is 
issued. 
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6. 6. NON- CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS UNDER US LAW 
6. 6. 1. STEVEDORES', TERMINAL OPERATORS' AND 
LIABILITIES TO CARGO OWNER 
INLAND CARRIERS' 
"[M]ulimodal transportation has created complex, overlapping legal relationships. The 
precise scope of these parties' obligations often depends not only on the provisions of the 
contract of carriage, but also on the terms of the subordinate contractual arrangements for 
performance of the various phases of the through transportation and handling".92 Because 
the seryices performed by stevedores and terminal operators are frequently performed 
between the ship and the shore, there is no consistent national approach as whether these 
seryices are maritime or non- maritime services, in particular when the relationships 
between these persons and shippers and consignees, are in dispute. Considering these 
services as non- maritime services would allow courts to apply state laws rather than 
federal law which would affect the uniformity of federal maritime law.93 
Accordingly, stevedores may be liable directly to shippers and consIgnees for 
negligence94 or in bailment under state law. It was held in Philipp Bros. Metal Corp. v. s.s. 
Rio 19uazu,95 that Pittston, the stevedore, became a common- law bailee after delivery to 
Philipp Brothers had been completed at the time Philipp Brothers caused the cargo to be 
92 Denniston, Thomas R., and Others "Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: Terminal Operators and 
Multimodal: Liabilities of Multimodal Operators and Parties Other than Carriers and Shippers" (1989) 64 
Tul. L. Rev. 517 at 519 and, also, see Palmer, Richard W., Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: Terminal 
Operations and Multimodalism: Terminal Operations and Multimodal Carriage: History and Prognosis" 
(1989) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 281. 
93 See, in general, Lambert, L., "Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: Damages in Maritime cases: Article: 
Damages Arising from Breach of Contract, Loss of Revenue, and 'Indirect' damages" (1997) 72 Tul. L. Rev. 
759; Schoenbaum, Thomas 1., Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3d Edition, West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 2001, 
8- 8 at pp. 527- 530, Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claim, 4th Edition, chapter 36, The full text of this edition is 
available on the net; http://tetley.mcgill.ca/maritime/ch36.htm and Dock, James B., "Admiralty Law Institute: 
Symposium on Carriage of Goods by Water: Liabilities of Stevedores, Terminal Operators, and Other 
Handlers in Relation to Cargo" (1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 572. 
94 Stevedores are liable for the loss or the damage to the cargo caused by their negligence. See Robert C. 
Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 79 S. CT. 766 at 773, 1959 AMC 879; Demsey & 
Associatees, Inc. v. s.s. Sea Star, 461 F. 2d 1009, 1016, 1972 AMC 1440 (2d Cir. 1972) and Leather's Best, 
Inc., v. s.s. Mormaclynx, 451 F. 2d 800 at 808, 1971 AMC 2383 (2d Cir. 1971). 
95 658 F. 2d 30 at 32, 1981 AMC 2864 (2D Cir. 1981). 
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counted and weighed. Leaving the goods, after delivery to Philipp Brothers, created a new 
bailor- bailee relationship between Philipp Brothers and Pittston. As a bailee, Pittston, was 
acting neither on the carrier's behalf to fulfill its obligations under carriage contract, since 
those obligations had been discharged after delivery to Philipp Brothers, nor at the carrier's 
direction. Philipp Brothers' acts, rather than the carrier's, were what created the bailment 
relationship. Therefore, the court held that "Since Pittston's [a stevedore'S] liability is 
premised on its position as a bailee, any time limit or limitation of liability contained in the 
bill of lading or COGSA are inapplicable". Thus, damages in full may be assessed without 
regard to any limit of liability contained in the bill of lading or under COGSA.96 
COGSA's application, by virtue of s. 1301 (e) is limited to "the period from the 
time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship", 
commonly known as the "tackle to tackle" period. Services provided by stevedores and 
terminal operators are normally performed outside the "tackle to tackle" period. 
Accordingly, the Harter Act governs the responsibility of stevedores and terminal 
operators. The Harter Act, by virtue of s. 190, applies to any period before loading and to 
any period between discharge of the cargo from the ship and its proper delivery. COGSA, 
by virtue of s. 1311, while partially superseding the Harter Act, expressly preserves its 
application outside the "tackle to tackle" period. Nonetheless, COGSA, by virtue of s. 
1307, allows the parties to the carriage contract to enter in a special agreement relating to 
the period "prior to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship on which 
the goods are carried by sea". Therefore, the parties to the carriage contract can elect to 
extend the application of COGSA during this period. However, any special agreement 
between the parties is governed by the Harter Act, which makes void any provision in the 
bill relieving the carrier from the responsibilities set forth in the Act. 
96 Ibid. 
312 
Tenninal operators are generally independent contractors to the carrier and have the 
status of bailees under state laws of bailment. Therefore, as bailees, they are liable for 
negligence or the lack of due care that results in the loss of or the damage to the cargo. In 
Colgate Palmolive Co. v. SS Dart Canada,97 the plaintiff delivered a total of 22 drums of 
speannint oil to the defendant terminal operator (Global) in Jersey City, New Jersey. The 
defendant (Global) contracted with a third party (Dart) to store the goods until it loaded 
them on board the vessel. Sixteen of the drums were never loaded on board and were never 
located. Global issued a dock receipt covering all the goods and which incorporated all the 
terms of the bill of lading issued by the third party (Dart). One of the issues before the 
court was whether the defendant (Global) could rely on the package limitation of COG SA. 
The court held that "Parties may contractually extend COGSA's application beyond its 
normal parameters. When they do so, however, COGSA does not apply of its own force, 
but merely as a contractual term. In this case, state law, the law of New Jersey, governs 
and invalidates the contractual limitation of liability upon which Global relies".98 The court 
relied on its decision in Leather's Best, Inc., v. SS Mormaclynx,99 and held that" an action 
against a terminal for negligent loss of cargo is not within federal maritime jurisdiction, but 
is a state claim governed by state law. Since state law governs, provisions of COGSA 
incorporated by contract can be valid only insofar as they do not conflict with applicable 
tat I ,,100 S e aw . 
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Wemhoener Press en v. Ceres Marine 
Terminals, Inc.,101 have not followed the Second Circuit's decision in Colgate Palmolive 
Co. v. SS Dart Canada. It held that "[T]he contractual incorporation of COGSA into 
97 724 F. 2d 313 at 314 (2d Cir. 1983). . . . .. 
98 Ibid. at 315. The court disagreed with the District Court's deCISIOn that the state law IS totally unavaIlIng. 
99 See supra fn. 94 at 808. 
100 See supra fn. 97 at 315- 316. 
101 5 F. 3d 734, 1993 AMC 2842 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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foreign bills of lading should be construed according to federal law". 102 It then added that 
"So long as the bill of lading is still governed by COOSA or the Harter Act, which includes 
the period of time after discharge of the goods but prior to delivery, the rights and 
obligations of third party beneficiaries under a Himalaya clause should be determined with 
reference to the bill of lading, not state law, even if state law is inconsistent".103 Most 
courts apparently have assumed, without deciding the point, that contractual extensions of 
COOSA are to be construed according to the terms of the bill of lading and without 
reference to state law. The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit in Barretto Peat, Inc. v. 
Luis Ayala Colon Successors Inc., 104 held that the defendant stevedores were acting within 
the scope of the carrier's contractual functions and duties and were entitled to the benefit 
provided by the Himalaya clause, including the COOSA one- year statute of limitations. 
1-10reover, it stated that "In conclusion, given the applicability of COOSA, [the plaintiff] 
cannot circumvent COOSA's operation by couching its complaint in terms of conversion 
or breach of contract". 105 The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in Gebr. BeUmer KG. v. 
106 d l' h k 1" . Terminal Services Houston, Inc., allowed the steve ores to c aIm t e pac age ImItatIOn 
of COOSA under the Himalaya clause according to the terms of the bill of lading and 
without reference to state law. The damage to goods here occurred outside the "tackle to 
tackle" period. The shipper's cargo consisted of four containers, which were loaded upon a 
tractor and chassis. The stevedore's employee was driving the load of four containers to a 
particular staging area designated by the shipper's agent where the cargo would cease to be 
in the carrier's possession. While en route the cargo fell off the trailer and was damaged 
beyond repair. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Assicurazioni Generali v. 
102 Ibid. at 740. 
103 Ibid. 
104 896 F. 2d 656 at 660 (lst Cir. 1990). 
105 Ibid. at 661. 
106 711 F. 2d 622 at 624- 625, 1986 AMC 607 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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D ' 4 . 107· . • mICO, In a SUIt brought by an . . h . . Insurer agaInst t e carner and ItS agent, a stevedore, 
for negligent damage to cargo held, without even considering state law, that it was well 
settled that parties to a bill of lading may contractually extend limitation of liability 
benefits to non- carriers a d t f h . n agen sot e carner and that the parties had in fact , , 
successfully done so. 
Therefore, carriers have attempted to circumvent this problem by extending the 
application of COGSA 1936 to these parties, in particular the package and the one- year 
linlitations and the list of defences provided by the provisions of COGSA, through their 
bills of lading by the inclusion of three types of clauses: Himalaya clause, a period of 
responsibility clause and a clause paramount. 
The requirements for a valid Himalaya clause has been established by the Supreme 
Court in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 108 as follows, "There is, thus, 
nothing in the language, the legislative history or environment of the Act that expressly or 
impliedly indicates any intention of Congress to regulate stevedores or other agents of a 
carrier, or to limit the amount of their liability for damages caused by their negligence". 
However, the Supreme Court held that stevedore was liable on the ground that "No statute 
has limited its liability, and it was not a party to nor a beneficiary of the contract of 
carriage between the shipper and the carrier, hence its liability was not limited by that 
contract". 109 Therefore, stevedores or other third parties can avail themselves of the benefit 
of the provisions of COGSA if the language of the Himalaya clause expresses clearly that 
is to be the understanding of the contracting parties and so the Supreme Court held that 
107 766 F. 2d 485 at 490,1986 AMC 1051 (lIth Cir. 1985). 
108 See supra fn. 94 at 301- 302. 
109 Ibid. at 308. 
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"Similarly contracts purportin t '. . g 0 grant Immumty from, or lImitation of liability must be 
strictly constnled and limited to indented beneficiaries". I 10 
The language requirement does not, however, mean that the beneficiary parties 
should be enumerated in the Himalaya clause contained in the bill of lading. Thus, it was 
held in Certain Undent'riters at Lloyds v. Barber Blue Sea Line, III that "It is sufficient that 
the temlS express a clear intent to extend benefits to a well- defined class of readily 
identifiable persons". Moreover, the court emphasised in Institute of London Underwriters 
v. Sea- Land Service, Inc., 112 that the use of a more inclusive term [independent contractor] 
evidenced the parties' intention to extend the coverage of COGSA to stevedores through 
the Himalaya clause and held that "If it were the case that the several types of agents and 
independent contractors listed in the parenthetical phrase were to be excluded from the 
extension of COGSA coverage, the Himalaya Clause would be rendered extraordinarily 
empty, as it would exclude from coverage all 'agents' and 'independent contractors"'. 
However. the courts are divided on the adequacy of a general phrase, such as 'all persons 
rendering services in connection with the performance of this contract'. The Court of 
Appeals for the second Circuit in Ruppy v. Int' I Terminal Operating Co., 113 concluded that 
the phrase "all persons rendering services in connection with contract" in the Himalaya 
Clause was overbroad and ineffective to cover the terminal operator. I 14 Nonetheless, The 
Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Wemhoener Press en v. Ceres Marine Terminals, 
110 Ibid. at 305. See Jagenberg, Inc. v. Georgia Ports Authority, 882 F. Supp. 1065, 1995 AMC 2333 
(S.D.Ga. 1995), where the court held that the Himalaya claus~ was too ~mbiguous. to be given effect. 
111 675 F. 2d 266 at 270 (lIth Cir. 1982). See, also, Tazsho Manne and FIre Ins., Co. v. The Vessel 
Gladiolus, 762 F. 2d 1364, 1987 AMC 2047 (9th Cir. 1985); Ram Metals & Building In~ustries, Ltd. v. Zim 
Israel Nav. Co., Lltd., 732 F. Supp. 106, 1989 AMC 2215 (S.D.Fla. 1989) and Watkms .v. MIV London 
Senator, 112 F. Supp. 2d 511 at 517, 2000 AMC 2740 (E.D. Va. 2000). . . .. . 
112 881 F. 2d 761 at 767, 1989 AMC 2516 (9th Cir. 1989) and see, also, ACCzal Specza/z Term USA, Inc. v. 
MIV Berane, 181 F. Supp. 2d 458 at 464,2002 AMC 528 (D. Md. 2002). 
113 479 F. 2d 674 at 676 (2d Cir. 1973). . 
114 See also James N. Kirby v. Noifolk Southern Railway, 300 F. 3d 1300 at 1308, 2?02 AMC 2113 (lIth Clr. 
2002). In general see Zawitoski, "Limitation of Liability for Stevedores and term mal Operators Under the 
Carrier's Bill of Lading and COGSA" [1986] 161. Mar. L. & Com. 337 at 345. 
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11 -
Inc.. ) have upheld such general ph Th 
rases. e courts are also divided on the adequacy of 
the term 'bailee'. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Assicurazioni Generali 
\'. D' Amico 116 held that such t ffi . 
, erm was su IClently clear to protect stevedores and terminal 
operators. Other courts held that identical terms was insufficient to protect stevedores and 
inland carrier.117 
American courts are divided on the issue of whether or not a Himalaya clause 
would only protect a third party who is in privity with the mean contractor, such as the 
ocean carrier. On the one hand, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Certain 
Un dent Titers at Lloyds v. Barber Blue Sea Line,118 held that "when a bill refers to a class 
of persons such as agents and independent contractors, it is clear that the contract includes 
all those persons engaged by the carrier to perform the functions and duties of the carrier 
with the scope the carriage contract. No further degree of clarity is necessary".119 The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Taisho Marine & Fire Ins., Co. v. The Vessel 
"GLADIOLUS",120 endorsed such dicta and held that whether an entity is the intended 
beneficiary of a Himalaya clause is determined by the contractual relationship between 
such entity and the carrier, and the nature of the services performed by such entity 
compared with the carrier's responsibilities under the carriage contract. 121 The Court of 
115 See supra fn. 101 at 742- 743. See also Thiti Lert Watana Co. v. Minagrates Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1077 
at 1080,2001 AMC 80 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
116 See supra fn. 107 at 489- 490. . 
117 See De Laval Turbine, Inc. v. West India Indus., 502 F. 2d 259 at 264- 270, 1974 AMC 1156, (3rd. Or. 
1974). 
118 See supra th. 111 at 270. See, also, Assicurazioni Generali v. D' Amico, supra fn. 107 at 487- 488 and 
Ram Metals & Building Industries, Ltd. v. Zim Israel Nav. Co., Lltd., s~p:a th. 1 ~ 1. . . 
119 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit endorsed the prIVIty reqUIreme~t dIcta latter In Hale 
Container Line, Inc. v. Houston Sea Packing Co., 137 F. 3d 1455 at 1466 (11~h Or. ~9~8) and he~d ~hat 
"H t [th defendant] was neither an agent nor independent contractor of Project LOgIStICS [the plaIntIff]. 
ous on e . ~.. fr P' 
..... Houston not directly employed by Project Logistics, did .n~t receIve payment lor Its serVIces om ro~ect 
Logistics, had no contractual relationship with Project LOgIStICS, an~ was not, rendered an agent by Project 
Logistics as Project Logistics did not consent to have Houston act on ItS behalf. 
120 See supra th. 111 at 1367- 1368. . . . . . .. . 
121 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit endorsed the PrIVIty. reqUIrement dIcta latter In Man Sezkl 
USA, Inc. v. MIV Alligator Triumph, 990 F. 2d 444 at 450- 451 (9th Or. 1993). 
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Appeal for the Second Circuit in Toyomenka, Inc. v. SS Tosaharu Maru,122 held that the 
Himalaya clause was not applic bl t . d 
a e 0 an III ependent contractor since he was engaged by 
the stevedore rather than the ocean carrier. 
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in James N Kirby 
v. Norfolk Southern Railway,123 held that where the term is descriptive, such as 
"stevedore", "terminal operator", unlike the non- descriptive term as in Certain 
Undenvriters "agent", "servant" or "independent contractor", privity of contract is not 
required. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Akiyama Corp. of America v. M V. 
Hanjin i\farseilles 124 disregarded the privity requirement and instead focused on comparing 
benveen "the nature of the services performed [by the defendant who seeks to invoke the 
cause] compared to the carrier's responsibility under the carriage contract". However, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in James N Kirby v. Norfolk Southern 
RailH'a)',125 held that "Indeed, the result, though not the language, of Akiyama conforms 
this rule [where the term is descriptive, such as "stevedore", "terminal operator", the 
requirement of privity of contract is not required]". Nonetheless, it is well settled that a 
Himalaya clause is valid if COGSA is incorporated either by a clause paramount or by 
reference into a bill of lading, 126 and the benefits of such a clause is extended to stevedores, 
tenninal operators, and other agents and independent contractors of the carrier. 127 
In respect of the period of responsibility clause, the bill of lading should contain a 
clause that extends the application of COGSA to periods prior to loading and subsequent to 
122 523 F. 2d 518,1975 AMC 1820 (2d Cir. 1975). 
123 See supra fn. 114 at 1309 fn. 11. . ' . . ... . 
124 162 F. 3d 571 at 574 (9th Cir. 1998). In earlIer deCISIOn the Court of Appeals for th~ ~mth C~rcUIt m ~on 
Seiki USA, Inc. v. MIV Alligator Triumph, supra fn. 121 at 450- 451, endorsed the pnvIty reqUIrement dIcta 
which implicitly contradicts Akiyama dicta. 
125 See supra fn. 114 at 1309 fn. 11. .. 
126 In Hiram Walker & Sons v. Kirk Line, 30 F. 3d 1370, 1995 AM~ 879 (l1th 0r..199.4), the termmal 
/ t d as gI'ven the benefit of a Himalaya clause despIte madvertently Issumg a premature operator s eve ore w 
delivery receipt. AMC 929 (5 h C' 1981)' A' .. 
127 See Brown & Root, Inc. v. MIVPeisander, 648 F. 2d 415,1982. .t Ir. ,SSICUraZlOnl 
I · D 'A . fn 107' Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Manne Termznals, Inc., supra fn. 101. Genera I v. mIco, supra. , 
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discharge of the cargo from the I Th' . 
vesse . IS IS because such period is limited to "tackle to 
tackle" under COGSA and ther fI h b 
' e ore, tea sence of such a clause will prevent the carrier 
and third parties from claiming the benefits of COGSA's provisions outside the "tackle to 
tackle". The effect of the period of responsibility clause is to apply COGSA's benefits as 
temlS of the contract rather than as matters of law. Thus, the Harter Act's provisions, 
which generally cover the periods prior to loading and subsequent to discharge, will prevail 
oyer such a clause that exculpates the carrier or third parties from liability for negligence. 
This is because the application the Harter Act's provisions outside the "tackle to tackle" 
period will be as a matter of law rather than as contractual terms. 
As regard the paramount clause, a clause paramount is a clause that designates 
COGSA as the controlling law with respect of the rights and liabilities of all the parties to 
the carriage contract, such as the bill of lading. Such a clause is mandatory in foreign trade, 
because s. 13 of COGSA requires the clause paramount to be included in the bill of lading. 
THROUGH BILL OF LADING128 
A through bill of lading is "one by which an ocean carrier agrees to transport goods to their 
final destination".129 The question of whether a particular bill of lading is a through bill of 
lading is a question of fact and so, in Marine Office of America Corp. v. NYK Lines,130 it 
was held that "Whether a particular contract is indeed a through bill of lading is a question 
of fact, to be determined by examining various factors such as the final destination 
indicated on the document, the conduct of the shipper and carriers, and where the 
connecting carriers were compensated by the payment made to the initial carrier or by 
128 The use of ''Through Bill of Lading" phrase, here, means that this bill covers a mulltimodal transportation; 
combined transport bill oflading. While, if the on- carriage involves another :essel or vessel.s: the bill covers 
a through transport, through bill of lading. See Schoenbaum, Thomas J., AdmIralty and Mantime Law, supra 
fn. 93 at pp. 522. " . 
129 Donovan, Charles S., & Haley, Jill M., "Who Done It and Who s Gonna ~ay?: Rights of ShIppers an~ 
Consignees Against Non- Ocean Carriers Performing Part of a Contract of CarrIage (1998) 7 D.C.L. 1. Int I 
& Prac. 415 at 415. . d' k' . . 
130 638 F. Supp. 393 at 399, 1987 AMC 652 (N.D.Ill 1985). These factors were CIte III To LO Manne & FIre 
Ins. Co., ltd. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 717 F. Supp. 1307 at 1309, 1989 AMC 2672 (N.D.III 
1989). 
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separate consideration" Other [, t . 
. ac ors were found In Toshiba Int'/ Corp. v. MIV Sea- Land 
Express,131 such as the issuance of d . b'll . 
a omestlc I s of ladIng by the connecting carrier and 
identifying which party had d th . 
rna e e transportatIOn arrangement with the connecting 
carriers. Under such a bill some th h h . . one 0 er t an t e ocean carner performs a portIOn of the 
contracted carriage such as land '1 . Th . or ral carrIer. e cargo owner may proceed dIrectly 
against the non- ocean carrier for loss of or damage to the cargo. However, inland carriers 
haye frequently sought to take the benefits afforded by COGSA and, therefore, ocean 
carriers have tried to include into their bills several clauses- Himalaya, Period of 
responsibility, and Paramount clauses- which would affect the inland carrier's liability to 
the cargo owner. 
However, the effectiveness of the inclusion of such clauses- Himalaya, Period of 
Responsibility, and Paramount clauses- into through bills of lading as so to allow inland 
carriers to take the benefits afforded by COGSA is not without risks, if such bills are ill-
drafted. The issue before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mannesman Demag 
Corp. v. MIV Concert Express 132 was whether the Harter Act was compulsorily applicable 
to the inland portion of carriage pursuant to a through bill of lading. 133 The court held that 
the carrier's duty of care under COGSA would be limited to the period from the time the 
goods are loaded on board the vessel until the time when they released from the vessel's 
tackle at the discharge port. Nonetheless, the Harter Act would be applicable to any period 
after the discharge of the goods from the vessel and their proper delivery. 134 
131 48 1 F. Supp. 123 at 129 (S.D.N.Y 1994). 
132 225 F. 2d 587 2000 AMC 2935 (5th Cir. 2000). See, in general, Parker, Bradley S., "Mannesman Demag 
Corp. v. MN C~ncert Express: A Denial of Maritime Protections to Overland Transportation Companies" 
(2001) 25 Mar. Law. 547. . . " 
133 Clause 3 (1) of the ocean carrier's through bill of ladIng provI.des tha~ If and to the extent tha~ t~e 
provisions of the Harter Act ......... would otherwis~ ?~ compul~only apphcab.le to regulate the CarrIer s 
responsibility for the goods ... the Carrier's reSpOnSI?I~I~y shall Instead be. subject to COO~~, but where 
COOSA is found not to be applicable such responsIbIhty shall be determIned by the prOVISIOns of 3 (2) 
?3~1~~~. court in concluding this cited Tapeo Nigeria Ltd. v. MIV Westwind, 702 F. 2d 1252 at 1255 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
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The Court defined "prope d l' " . 
r e Ivery as dIscharge of the cargo "upon a fit and 
custonlary wharf,,135 and al 't' 1 d 
, so 1 mc u es the general maritime law requirement that a 
carrier "unload the cargo onto a d k ". . . 
oc , segregate It by bIll of ladIng and count, put It III a 
place of rest on the pier so th t 't . 'bl' . 
a 1 IS accessl e to the consIgnee, and afford the consIgnee a 
reasonable opportunity to co d t' " 136 . 
me an ge It. However, such reqUIrements of proper 
deliYery are modified "by custom, regulations, [and] law of the port of destination".137 
Accordingly, the court held that the critical question is "Whether delivery was to persons 
charged by law and the usage of the port with the duty to receive cargo and distribute it to 
the consignee".138 COGSA also refers to "delivery", which commences the running of a 
one- year limitations period. Therefore, the court adopted its interpretation to this phrase in 
Servicios- Expoarma CA. v. Industrial Maritime Carriers Inc. /39 and stated that "when 
such delivery occurs varies according to the custom and laws of a port but that "delivery" 
is not equivalent to receipt by the consignee". 140 
The court in interpreting the Harter Act phrase "proper delivery" with respect to 
inland portion of a through bill of lading, reviewed the decisions of two district courtS. 141 
In Jagenberg, Inc. v. Georgia Ports Auth., 142 it noted the complication raised by a through 
bill in relation to the interpretation of the phrase "proper delivery" and stated that "The 
contract was intermodal, meaning that [Atlantic] contracted with J agenberg to transport the 
goods over sea from The Netherlands, and then over land to ... Macon, Georgia ... Macon 
was the place at which a consignee or its 'agent'.... first encountered the cargo. 
Consequently, the Court must either extend the reach of the Harter Act- a maritime law- to 
135 See Tapco Nigeria Ltd. v. MIV Westwind, ibid., and Metropolian Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. MIV Royal 
Rainbow, 12 F. 3d 58 at 61,1994 AMC 1435 (5th Cir. 1994). . 
136 See Tapco Nigeria Ltd. v. MIV Westwind, ibid., and Metropolwn Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. MIV Royal 
Rainbow, ibid. 
137 See Tapco Nigeria Ltd. v. MIV Westwind, ibid. 
138 See supra fn. 132 at 592. 
139 135 F. 3d 984 at 993,1998 AMC 1453 (5th Cir. 1998). 
140 See supra fn. 132 at 592. . .. . 
141 This is because of the absence of any circUlt OpInIOn In that respect. 
142 See supra fn. 110. 
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the point of delivery in Macon, GeorgI'a, 
or it must find some principled manner of 
deciding when a proper delive d b 
ry occurre eforehand, despite the fact that, technically, no 
agent of Jagenberg had a rea bl' , 
sona e opportumty to take the goods Into 'proper care and 
custody' before they reached M " 143 Th ' , 
aeon , e court then held that Inland transportatIOn 
under a through bill occurs after proper delivery under the Harter Act. The Court based its 
conclusion on the maritime nature of the Harter Act "The Harter Act is at core a maritime 
la\\': the Court is unwilling to rule that simply because private parties enter an intermodal 
agreement federal maritime legislation is thus extended far beyond its congressionally 
intended bounds, The Harter Act is designed solely to regulate the liability of seagoing 
carriers, That said, the Court finds that the Harter Act does reach to the point at which 
goods are loaded onto the vehicles of an inland trucker, whether hired by the shipper or the 
carrier", 144 However, the court held that proper delivery under the Harter Act precedes that 
inland transport and added that "The Court finds that it advisable to keep sea carriers to the 
standards imposed by the Harter Act until goods are in the hands of land carriers and 
actually leaving the maritime arena, With COGSA covering carrier's legal responsibilities 
through discharge, Harter fills a potential gap between discharge and inland transit in those 
situations where the goods, though on the dock, are still within the control and 
'b'l' f h ' ,,145 responsl I tty 0 t e sea carner, 
The conclusion in Jagenberg, Inc" was adopted by the court in Colgate Palmolive 
Co, v. MIV Atlantic Conveyor,146 where it held that "Proper delivery occurs when the cargo 
is ready for inland transport" and so the Harter Act does not cover inland transportation, 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mannesman Demag Corrp. v. MIV Concert 
143 Ibid. at 1077. 
144 Ibid. at 1077- 78. . . 
145 Ibid. at 1079. However, the court found that the damage occ~rred at port before loadmg onto mland-
bound trucks, and thus, the proper delivery had not yet occurred. Ibzd. at 1077. 
146 1996 AMC 1478, U.S. LEXIS 19247, at [14] (S.D.N.Y Dec. 31,1996). 
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Ex 147 d' h 
. press agree WIt these decisions and added "We do not preclude parties from 
contractually lin1iting liability d' h . . . 
urmg t e entIre tIme In which the carrier has custody or 
control oyer the cargo We me 1 h Id h h' .. . . 
. re y 0 t at were partIes contractually tIe such lImItatIOn 
to the extent that the Harter Act is c 1'1 l' bl ... ompu son y app Ica e, the lImItatIOn does not apply to 
inland transportation in through bills of lading. A contrary result extends the compulsory 
applicability of the Harter Act to transportation that Congress almost certainly did not 
intend to include within that [A]ct". 
The ill- drafting of the through bills of lading, in particular clause 3 (1)148 the 
Period of Responsibility clause, in Mannesman Demag Corrp. v. MIV Concert Express and 
Jagenberg. Inc., and of similar clauses in Colgate Palmolive Co. v. MIV Atlantic Conveyor, 
and Jagenberg, Inc. v. Georgia Ports Auth., was the reason why the benefits afforded by 
COGS~.\ could not be to inland carriers. This can be avoided by better wording of the terms 
of through bills of lading as in Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., ltd. v. Hyundai Merchant 
jf arine Co., Ltd., 149 where the through bill of lading provided, inter alia, that "when the 
goods are in the custody of the inland carrier it shall be entitled to all the ... limitations of 
and exoneration from liability ... granted to the carrier".150 The court, then held that "Here, 
however, the terms of the [through] bill of lading explicitly limit the liability of all carriers 
to S 500. Thus, regardless of in whose shoes Hyundai stands--whether as inland or ocean 
carrier-- Mitsubishi is entitled to no more than $ 500. Put another way, Hyundai's failure to 
notify the inland carrier did not injure the plaintiff [Mitsubishi]".151 
American courts have accepted that a bill of lading may extend its benefits to third 
parties through the Himalaya Clause, if the bill's language clearly expresses the intent to 
147 See supra fn. 132 at 595. . . 
148 Cl 3 (1) which provides that "If and to the extent that the proVISIons of the Harter Act ......... would 
ause . , . '1' .c. h d h C . , 
otherwise be compulsorily applicable to regulate the Carner s responsIb~ Ity lor t e goo s ...... t.e arrIer s 
responsibility shall instead be subject to C~~SA, but where C~GSA IS found not to be applIcable such 
responsibility shall be determined by the prOVISIOns of 3 (2) below . 
149 See supra fn. 130. 
150 Ibid. at 1309. 
151 Ibid. at 1310. 
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do so. The criteria referred to, previously,152 to decide whether the wording of the 
Hinlalaya clause covered stev d . 
e ores or termInal operators as third parties, would, also, be 
used in respect of an inland carrier. 
The court in TaisllO Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. v. The Vessel 
"GL -lDIOLUS,,153 " '" " 
. stated that Whether an entIty IS an Intended beneficIary of a HImalaya 
Clause depends upon the contractual relation between the party seeking protection and the 
ocean carrier, as well as the nature of the services performed compared to the carrier's 
responsibilities under the carriage contract". Accordingly, the court, in respect of the 
inland truckers, held that "The undisputed facts show that ABF [inland truckers] was hired 
by Foster- Wheeler [the consignee], was performing a non- maritime function after the 
carrier's obligations under its carriage contract had ended, and was rendering services 
under the terms and conditions of its own bill of lading". 154 Therefore, the inland truckers 
were independent contractors of the consignee rather than agents, servants or independent 
contractors of the ocean carrier. 
The court in Taisho Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Maersk Line,155 using 
the Ninth Circuit's factors in Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. v. The Vessel 
"GLADIOLUS" concluded that the inland carrier was engaged directly by the ocean carrier 
and the through bill of lading was intended to cover the shipment of the cargo from Tokyo 
to the container yard in Chicago. Therefore the inland portion of transport was within the 
scope of the ocean carrier's contractual obligation under the through bill of lading. The 
court supported its conclusion by reference to the non- issuance of a separate bill of lading 
152 See supra fns. 118- 127. .... 
153 See supra fn. III at 1367. This case, however, dId not Involve WIth a though carnage of goods by sea and 
so was not cover by a through bill oflading. 
154 Ibid. at 1367- 1368. . . . 
155 796 F. Supp. 336, 1993 AMC 704 (N.D.Ill 1992), This case, however, Involve,d WIth a though carnage of 
goods by sea and so was cover by a through bill of lading issued by the ocean carner. 
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by the inland carrier to cover its portion of the transport. 156 Finally, the court held that "As 
an agent engaged by [the ocean carrier] to perform services within the direct scope of that 
responsibility [inland cam·er] m t C' b . . . 
, us perlorce e vIewed as an Intended beneficIary of [the 
ocean carrier's] Himalaya Clause". 157 Therefore, the court in Canon US.A Inc. v. Norfolk 
Southern Railway Co.,158 refused to allow the terminal operator to have the package 
limitation on the ground that it was engaged by an intermediate rail contractor and so it 
was not a sub- contractor of the ocean carrier. Also, the court in Tokio Marine & Fire Ins., 
Co. ". Nippon Yusen Kaisha Lines,159 held that the Himalaya clause which covers every 
"agent and subcontractor" of the carrier, only extends to parties with a direct contractual 
relationship with the carrier. 
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Caterpillar Overseas S.A. v. Marine Transport 
Inc., 160 held, in comparison with stevedore services, that the inland portion of transport was 
not non- maritime operating and added that "This is a far different situation than that of the 
stevedore whose services are rendered in the terminal facilities while engaged in actually 
loading directly the cargo on the ship. Stevedoring is essentially a maritime trade. 
Transporting cargo down a group of public highways for a stretch of miles, on the 
contrary, is not a normal maritime operation".161 The court in Tiasho Marine and Fire 
Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Maersk Line,162 concluded that Caterpillar Overseas S.A. case does 
not dictate a different conclusion on the ground that the inland carrier was performing part 
of the ocean carrier's contractual obligation which he had been permitted to sub- contract 
156 Ibid. at 340. 
157 Ibid. 
158 936 F. Supp. 968 at 270,1997 AMC 1510. 
159 466 F. Supp. 212,1979 AMC 2577 (W.D.Wash. 1979). 
160 900 F. 2d 714, 1991 AMC 75 (4th Cir. 1990). 
161 Ibid. at 726. 
162 See supra fn. 155. 
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then to sub- contractor Mo th . I . 
. reover, e In and carner was claiming the benefit of the bill of 
lading's provision that extended limited liability beyond COGSA.163 
Recently. the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in James N Kirby v. 
Yorfolk Southern Railway,164 discussed the effect of the Himalaya Clause as to extend the 
benefits of COGSA to an inland carrier. It held, on the ground of the wording of the 
Himalaya Clause in the bill of lading issued by freight forwarder, ICC, that the Himalaya 
clause did not identify Norfolk Southern, the defendant, as a sub- sub- contractor of the 
carrier and so as a member of "well- defined class of readily identifiable persons" entitled 
to claim the benefits of the clause. One could argue, therefore, that the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit in James N Kirby v. Norfolk Southern Railway, based its decision 
of the requirement of privity and ignored to some extent the requirement that the inland 
carrier was performing the ICC's contractual responsibilities under the carriage contract. 
Accordingly, to allow the inland carrier to have the benefits furnished by COGSA's 
provisions the Himalaya Clause should either identify the inland carrier in the class 
description as "inland carrier", in line with clause in Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., ltd. v. 
Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., or in line with the clause in Uncle Ben's v. Hapag-
Lloyd AktiengesesellschaJt,165 which provides that it is "for the benefit of the servants, 
employees and agents of the carrier as well as of such independent contractors (including 
their servants, employees and agents) whose services the carrier from time to time may 
engage". 
As result, one could argue that American courts are divided in respect of the 
interpretation of the Himalaya Clause. For instance, on one hand, the phrase "sub-
contractor" in the Himalaya Clause was held to encompass an inland carrier in Taisho 
Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Maersk Line. On the other hand, the phrase "sub-
163 Ibid. 341. 
164 See supra fn. 114 at 1310- 1311 fn. 11. 
165 855 F. 2d 215 at 218 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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contractors" was held not to encompass an inland carner in Lucky- Go Ids tar Intern. 
(America) Inc. v. SIS California Mercury,166 where the court held that the parties would use 
the phrase "inland carriers" I'n t d" b " . . 
s ea su - contractors If they really Intended to extend the 
benefit of the Himalaya Clause to inland carriers. Accordingly, the court in Tokio Marine 
& Fire Ins. Co., ltd. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., extended the benefit of the 
Himalaya Clause to the participating land carrier on the ground of para. 27 which appeared 
to qualify the Hinlalaya Clause and provided that "when the goods are in the custody of the 
Inland Carrier it shall be entitle to all the '" limitations of and exoneration from liability ... 
granted to the carrier". 167 Moreover, the phrase "independent contractor" would encompass 
stevedores and tenninal operators but not a non- maritime carrier as in Caterpillar 
Overseas S.A. v. Marine Transport Inc. Furthennore, courts would apply state law rather 
than the provisions of the bill of lading as in Colgate Palmolive Co. v. SIS Dart Canada, 168 
where the court applied the state law and invalidated any COGSA provisions which 
conflicted with the state law. Other courts have applied both state law and the provisions of 
the bills of lading, as in Taisho Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Maersk Line. 169 
Nonetheless, one could argue that an inland carrier might be able to claim the 
benefits furnished by COGSA' s provisions under the Himalaya Clause of the ocean 
carrier's bill of lading. This is because the inland carrier might not have issued its own bill 
of lading, but might, instead, have acted under the ocean carrier's bill as in James N Kirby 
v. Norfolk Southern Railway. The tenns of the freight forwarder's bill of lading would 
nonnally put the shipper of the goods on notice that the freight forwarder would have to 
employ other entities to transport the goods to their final destination. For instance, the 
terms of ICC's bill expressly states that ICC was undertaking "to perfonn ... the entire 
166 750 F. Supp. 141 at 145 (S.D.N.Y 1990). 
167 See supra fn. 130 at 1309. 
168 724 F. 2d 313 at 315- 316 (2d Cir. 1983). 
169 See supra fn. 155 at 342- 343. 
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transport," or '"in [its] own nam t h 
e 0 procure t e performance the entire transport" which 
n1ight be considered as an imp}' d th . . Ie au onty to sub- ball the goods to another entity to 
transport them to the final destination. Accordingly, the ocean carrier would be the sub-
bailee of the goods and so the land carrier would be able to claim the benefits of the 
Himalaya Clause contained in the ocean carrier's bill of lading rather than the freight 
forwarder's bill. In contrast, if the inland carrier issues its own bill of lading, the tenns of 
the sub- bailment will be the terms of the inland carrier's bill of lading. 
6. 6.2. FORUM SELECTION AND CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES 
Forum selection and choice of law clauses are prima facie valid and enforceable. The 
S C · C/ 170 upreme ourt In M V Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., held that the court must enforce 
the parties' contractual choice of forum unless the plaintiff can "clearly show that 
enforcement would be umeasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such 
reasons as fraud or overreaching".171 When these clauses are contained in a bill of lading 
governed by COGSA, they violate COGSA and are unenforceable if the substantive law to 
be applied lessens the carrier's liability below what COGSA guarantees. This is because 
COGSA applies ex proprio vigore to all bills of lading for shipments of goods to or from a 
United States port in foreign trade and so enforcing these clauses would be considered as 
lessening the carrier's liability under s. 1303 (8). 
On the one hand, under English law, third party beneficiaries would not be able 
claim the benefit of the exclusive jurisdiction clause by reason of the Himalaya clause 
contained in the bill of lading, as in The Mahkutai: 72 Because an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause does not benefit only one party but it is "a clause which creates mutual rights and 
170 407 U. S. 1, at 15,92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972). 
171 The court in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v MIV Sky Reefer, 515 U. S. 528 at 533, ~ 15 S: Ct.. 2322 
(1995), extended the rationale of MIS Bremen to international forum selection clause contamed m bIlls of 
lading. 
172 See supra fn. 37. 
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bI" . " 173 
o 19ahons. Even, re- drafting the Himalaya clause as to extend the benefit of an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause to such third parties might be doubtful in the light of the 
Pri\"y's Council decision in The Mahkutai. 
On the other hand, an American court in Acciai Speciali Terni USA, Inc. v. MIV 
B 174 'd 
crane. consl ered the issue of whether a third party, a discharging stevedore, can claim 
the benefit of the choice of forum clause by virtue of the Himalaya Clause contained in the 
bill of lading. In general, the Himalaya Clause extends "every right, exemption from 
liability, defence and immunity" that the carrier's enjoy under the bill of lading to the 
carrier's agents, servants and independent contractors while acting in the course of or in 
connection within the scope of their employment. It was not disputed that the defendant 
\\"as an agent of the carrier, acting in the course of its employment when the cargo was 
allegedly damaged. The issue before the court in Acciai Speciali Terni USA, Inc. v. MIV 
Berane, came before another district court in LPR, SRL v. Challenger Overseas, LLC,175 
where it was held that "The Himalaya Clause applies to defences and the usual 
understanding of a forum selection clause is that it is a defence to an action, and such a 
clause is normally raised as a defence". It, then, added that "Indeed, it would be odd for an 
action against a carrier to be brought in one jurisdiction and another action, arising out of 
the very same dispute, to be brought against the carrier's local agent in an entirely different 
. . d' . ,,176 Juns lctIon . 
Based on the former decision, the court in Acciai Speciali Terni USA, Inc. v. MIV 
Berane,l77 held that the parties could not have envisioned that the carrier and its agent 
would be sued in different jurisdiction when the loss of or the damage of the cargo arose 
out of the same shipment. Moreover, the court in Acciai Speciali Terni USA, Inc. v. MIV 
173 Ibid. at l3. 
174 See supra th. 112. 
175 2000 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 9746 at [14] ,2000 AMC 2887 (S.D.N.Y July 7,2000) 
176 Ibid. at [15]. 
177 See supra fn. 112 at 464. 
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Berane,178 held that "The bills f I d· . . 
o a Ing eVInce no mtent by the parties to confer immunity 
from all jurisdiction on the intended beneficiaries of the Himalaya Clauses" and therefore, 
the court granted the discharging stev d d' . I d' . . . e ore a con ItIona Ismlssal "submISSIOn to 
jurisdiction in the appropriate court() d't . f . '" s an I s waIver 0 any tIme lImItatIOn defences 
otherwise applicable there".179 The court based its decision on CBJ, Inc. v. MIV "Hanjin 
Hong K "t I 180 h· h . . . 
ong , ea., w IC Imposed sImIlar conditions on dismissal of claims against a 
"Himalaya" beneficiary relying on a forum selection clause. As a result, under American 
law. third party beneficiaries, such as stevedores, would be able to claim the benefit of the 
choice of forum clause by reason of the Himalaya clause contained in the bill of lading. 
6. 6. 3. THE PROPOSED BILL TO AMEND COGSA 1936 
If the Congress enacts the Proposed Bill Amendments to COGSA much of the discussion 
here would become moot. This is because the amended act would automatically extend the 
benefits as well as the responsibilities available under COGSA to almost everyone 
performing any of the carrier's functions under the carriage contract without the use of the 
Himalaya clause. 181 The Proposed Bill adopts the statutory Himalaya clause whereby the 
Rules will be extended, by virtue of the broad definition of the "performing carrier", to 
include the ocean carrier, stevedore, terminal operator, freight forwarder, etc. 
Under the Proposed Bill, an independent contractor, whether he is an ocean carrier, 
a stevedore, a terminal operator or a freight forwarder, will be able to invoke the Rules 
against the cargo owner's claim. The broadness of the period of responsibility under the 
Proposed Bill would intensify the ability of these people to have the benefit of the 
Proposed Bill during transhipment, loading operation, discharge operation and any other 
178 Ibid. at 465. 
179 See Kanematsu USA, Inc. v. MIV Pretty Prosperity, 2000 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 10000 at [2- 3] (E.D. La. July 
2 2000) where the court. also, gave similar conditional dismissal. 
Hio 2000 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 20288, at [6] (D.N. Jer. Sept. 22,2000). 
181 See Benedict on Admiralty, Volume 2A at para. 169 [F]. 
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I, 
operation which is supplementary operation to the carnage 
contract. Therefore, the 
enactnlent of the Proposed bill will be considered as an advantage over COGSA 1971 
which only solves the problem of the carrier's servants or agents but not the problem of his 
independent contractors who need to recourse to another mechanism such as implied 
contract or the doctrine of bailment on terms, under English law. 
6. 7. NON· CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS 
6. 7. 1. NON· CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS UNDER THE HAGUE AND HAGUE. 
VISBY RULES 
It has been noted that, the Hague Rules did not have any provision in respect of non-
contractual c1aims
182 
but the draftsmen of the Hague- Visby Rules realised the importance 
of such a provision and thus, the Rules provide a new provision which resolved the 
problem of suing the carrier, or his servants or agents in tort. Therefore, by virtue of art. IV 
bis (1) of the Hague- Visby Rules, the defences and limits of liability, in these Rules, 
would be available to the carrier in respect of loss or damage to the goods in any action 
whether it be founded in contract or in tort. By virtue of art. IV bis (2) of the Rules, the 
defences and limits of liability which are available to the carrier would also be available to 
the carrier's servant or agent, who not being an independent contractor, whether the action 
is founded in contract or in tort. But the ability of the carrier's servants or agents is 
conditional and therefore, the carrier's servants or agents, by virtue of art. IV bis (4), 
182 However, under English law the cargo owner who has a contractual relationship with :~e carrier ,would not 
be able to sue the carrier in tort and so, the cargo owner could not circumvent the prOVISIOns of hIS con?"a~t 
with the carrier including the Hague Rules, Therefore, cargo owners tried to a:oid that by sui~g the carrI,er s 
servants or agents in tort. Carriers then responded by inserting a clause, the HImalaya clause, In the carnage 
contract to extend the benefit of the Rules to a third party, 
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,,"ould lose the benefit of art IV b' (2)' 
. IS III case of an act or omission done with intent to 
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result. 183 
The next question which would be considered is the meaning of the terms 
"servants" or "'agents" in art. IV bis (2) of the Hague- Visby Rules. It has been noted that 
art. IV bis (2) of the Rules reversed the principle in the Adler. v. Dickson,184 where the 
passenger. as a plaintiff, sued the carrier's servants, the master and the boatswain, who 
were responsible for the state of gangway. The carrier was exempted from all liability 
according to the ticket's conditions. The Court of Appeal held that the carrier's servants 
were not protected by those exemption clauses since they were not parties to the contract 
of carriage. There is no problem in respect of the construction of the term "servant" but the 
construction of the term "agent" might cause a problem because of the qualifYing words 
"not being independent contractor". It is hard as a matter of English law to conceive of any 
agent, capable of being held liable in respect of carriage of goods by sea, who is not an 
independent contractor. 185 Therefore, it is important to decide the line which should be 
drawn to distinguish between an agent who is protected by art. IV bis (2) and an agent 
who would be considered as an independent contractor and so not protected by the Rules. 
On the one hand, the master could be considered as an agent to the carrier when he is 
performing certain function, such as signing the bill of lading and the ship's manager could 
183 The circumstances in which the carrier's servants or agents would lose the protection of art. IV bis (2) are 
similar to those in art. IV 5 ( e), but the carrier would only lose the protection of the package limitation and 
not the other defences, such as the time- bar in art. III (6), while the carrier's servants or agents would lose 
the protection of the package limitation including the other defences which would be available to the carrier 
in similar circumstances, such as the time- bar in art. III (6) since art IV bis (2) the only article which enables 
them to such defences. However, this issue was raised in The Captain Gregos (No 2), [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
310 at 316, but without decision. For opposite point view see Boyd, S. C, (et af), Scrutton on Charter parties 
and Bills of Lading, 20th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1996, at p. 456. 
184 [1955] 1 Q.B. 158. 
185 However, the French text of the 1968 Protocol provides no light regarding the intention of the draftsmen 
or the construction of the term "agents" in art. IV bis (2) of the Rules. In the sub- committee on Bill of 
Lading Clauses there was an idea that distinction should be drawn between the carrier's servants and agents 
on one hand and an independent contractors on the other hand, but the minority of the sub- committee 
considered that the former group should be protected for social reasons while the latter should not protected 
since those reason do not apply to them. The majority of the sub- committee tried to provide an independent 
contractor with the same protection but however, it seems that the minority proposal prevailed. 
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also be considered as well as an t t h . 
agen 0 t e carner. On the other hand, stevedores and 
ternlinal operators would be considered as independent contractors and so would not be 
protected by art. IV bis (2) of the Rules. 
In respect of the period of time in which the protection would be available to the 
seryants or agents in art. IV bis (2) of the Rules should be, according to arts. I (e) and II, 
between loading and discharge. But, would the carrier's servants or agents be protected by 
yirtue of art. IV bis (2) where they are handling goods in a quay or in a warehouse at the 
port of loading or discharge? Thus, it is important to extend the period of responsibility to 
include periods more than the "tackle to tackle" period in order to provide the carrier's 
servants or agents with the protection of art. IV bis (2). But, would those who are protected 
in art. IV bis (2) be protected for liability occurring outside the period of responsibility 
"tackle to tackle" since the protection under this article would only be effective where the 
Rules have the "force of law"? It is arguable that there would be no protection for the 
carrier's servants or agents for liability occurring outside the particular period of 
responsibility, unless there is a clause, such as Himalaya clause, in the bill of lading 
contract which would extend that period to include period before loading and after 
discharge in order to allow them the protection of art. IV bis (2) which would only be 
granted by that clause. Furthermore, the protection of art. IV bis (2) would only have a 
contractual effect in respect of the period outside the "tackle to tackle" period of 
responsibility. Moreover, the protection of art. IV bis (2) would be available to the servants 
or agents only where they are acting in the course of their employment. This requirement is 
not an expressed one but it should be implied. 
An independent contractor, such as a stevedore, would not be protected by art. IV 
bis (2) of the Rules and so the decision of the Court of Appeal in Midland Silicones. v. 
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S IS(l cruttOIlS. would be preserved There~ore . d d 
. 1 1 , an In epen ent contractor, such as a 
stevedore or a temlinal operator, would only be protected by the terms of the bill of lading 
including the Hague Rules where the conditions which entitled the stevedores in The , 
Eurrm )dOIl 187 t th t t' . b . 
. t , 0 e pro ec Ion gIven y the bIll of lading are satisfied. These conditions 
are: a clear intention that the protection would be extended to an independent contractor, 
the carrier is acting as an agent to the independent contractor as well as principal for his 
own, a proof that the carrier has authority to act on behalf of the independent contractor. 
Ho\vever. later ratification would be enough for this purpose. Finally, there should be 
consideration from the independent contractor side for the protection to be extended. 
However, it is arguable that the period of responsibility should be extended to include 
period before loading and after loading in order to allow the independent contractor the 
benefit of the Hague Rules granted by the Himalaya clause since the period of 
responsibility under the Rules, by virtue of arts. I (e) and II, is restricted to the "tackle to 
tackle" period. Therefore, the independent contractor would be protected against any 
liability which occurred outside the period under the Rules. 
However, an independent contractor, such as a stevedore, may now be protected by 
s. 6 (5) (b) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 1999 Act. Therefore, the efficacy of 
Himalaya clause is finally recognised by legislative reform which provides a simpler and 
more certain mechanism for reaching the same result reached by The Eurymedon and other 
similar cases. But a clause for expanding the period of responsibility to include operations 
outside the "tackle to tackle" period is till needed in order to provide satisfactory result and 
to satisfy the enactment of the 1999 Act. 
186 [1962] A.C. 446. 
187 New Zealand Shipping .v. Satterthwaite & Co. ( The Eurymedon), [1975] A.C. 154. 
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6. 7.2. NON· CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS UNDER THE HAMBURG RULES 
The draftsnlen of the Hamburg RId I 
u es use a most the same language as the Hague- Visby 
Rules in respect of the protect' fth " 
IOn 0 e carner s servants and agents. But, as the same time 
the Hamburg Rules escaped the criticisms which appeared in art. IV bis (2) of the Hague-
Visby Rules. The absence of the words" such servant or agent not being an independent 
contractor" in art. 7 (1) of the Hamburg Rules might allow an independent contractor, such 
as stevedore, the benefit of the protection art. 7 (2).188 
Moreover, stevedore's liability, as an independent contractor, which occurred 
before loading and after discharge would be covered by art. 7 (2) of the Hamburg Rule, 
since the period of responsibility, by virtue of art. 4, would cover the whole period as long 
as the carrier has control over the goods and so this period is wider than the one under the 
Hague Rules. Even if the stevedore, as an independent contractor, is not protected under 
art. 7 (2), there would be no need, as is the case with the Hague Rules, to draft the clause 
so as to extend the period of responsibility to include periods before loading and after 
discharge in order to provide him with protection which would be granted by the Himalaya 
clause. 
The protection granted to the carrier's servants or agents is not exclusive but it is 
conditional. Thus, they would have no such protection unless they were acting in the scope 
of their employment. But, could this condition restrict the ability of the an independent 
contractor to rely upon art. 7 (2) of the Hamburg Rules, since an independent contractor is 
obliged to produce a result but without restriction to the way of performing or producing 
that result? However, this condition could be interpreted in a positive way by the courts 
which would lead to a satisfactory result. Thus, an independent contractor, such as a 
188 See Force, R., "A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by .Sea Act- Present text and Propose.d 
Changes- and the Hamburg Rules" in Honka, H., (et aT) New Carrz~ge of Good~. by Sea- The Nor~lc 
Approach Including Comparisons with Some Other Jurisdictions, InstItute of Mantlme and CommercIal 
Law: Abo Akademi University 1997, at p. 397. 
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stevedore, would be acting out f th . 
o e scope of hIS employment if he did some thing not 
related to his work as a stev d d d . . 
e ore an so epnve hIm of the benefit of that protection. 189 
However, the carrier's servants and agents are protected under the Hamburg Rules 
by virtue of art. 7 (2) which·d . .. 
, prOVI es no specIfic exclusIOn of Independent contractors. 
Article 7 (2) of the Hamburg Rules is similar to art. 28 (2) of CMR and under English law 
the terms "servants and agents" excludes independent contractors. Therefore, the 
enactment of the Rules will have the same effect as to exclude independent contractors, 
since the comments on this article notes that there is no specific exclusion of independent 
contractors form art. 7 (2) because to do so was regarded as superfluous and even 
an1biguous. However, this type of independent contractor, under English law, is protected 
by virtue of s. 6 (5) of the 1999 Act. 
6. 8. NON· CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS UNDER THE DRAFT INSTRUMENT 
The protection of sub- contractors under International Conventions for sea carriage has 
been unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, The Hague- Visby Rules offers protection 
only to 'servants and agents' of the carrier while the Hamburg Rules extend such 
protection to sub- carriers, the' actual carrier' at the price of imposing their liability regime 
on them. Therefore, other independent contractors remain unprotected. Secondly, the 
period of responsibility covered by such Conventions, the Hague- Visby Rules apply 
'tackle to tackle' while the Hamburg Rules apply 'port to port'. The Draft Instrument, as 
will be shown, goes beyond both Conventions in its concept of the 'performing party'. Not 
only is such a party is entitled to the carrier's exceptions and limitations under the Draft 
Instrument, it is also subjected to the same liability regime to the extent it physically 
189 For more detail see Mankabady, S., "Comments on the Hamburg Rules" in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Mankabady, SeEd) Leyden! Bosten:,,~. w. Sijthoff [1978] at p. 64- -:1 and 
Gronfors, K., "Non- contractual claims under The Hamburg Rules In The Humbug Rules on the carnage of 
goods by sea (Samir Mankabady (Ed,), Leyden and Boston: A. W. Sijthoff [1978] at p. 187. 
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performs the contractual services for which the carrier is responsible. The Draft Instrument 
prinlarily focuses on 'door to door' transport which makes it more straightforward for 
caniage incorporate its provision, than would be the case with the Hamburg Rules. 190 
However, a 'Himalaya' clause would still be needed to cover a 'performing party' who 
was neither a servant or an agent of the carrier, nor an 'actual carrier', as only such parties 
are protected by the Hamburg Rules. Further difficulty would arise with 'door to door' 
transport, an option for which art. 4 (2) (1) of the Draft instrument provides. These 
difficulties nlean that the Draft instrument could not work well with either the Hague-
Visby Rules or the Hamburg Rules. It could only work well if, as its drafters intend, it 
constitutes an exclusive and self- contained code. The provisions of article 6, relating to the 
'performing party', will now be examined in more detail. 
Under art. 6 (3) (1) (a) a performing party is "entitled to the carrier's rights and 
immunities provided by this instrument (i) during the period in which it has custody of the 
goods; and (ii) at any other time to the extent it is participating in the performance of any 
of the activities contemplated by the contract of carriage" Sub- paragraph (b) provides that 
it remains entitled to those immunities even if the carrier has agreed to assume 
responsibilities other than those imposed on it by the Draft Instrument. Article 6 (3) (3) 
goes on to provide that "If an action is brought against any person, other than the carrier, 
mentioned in article 6. 3. 2. 191 that person is entitled to the benefit of the defences and 
limitations of liability available to the carrier under this instrument if it proves that it acted 
within the scope of its contract, employment or agency". This covers a wider range of 
persons than performing parties, including parties who merely undertake to perform any of 
190 A complicating factor, however, is that the Hamburg Rules contain no equivalent to art. V of the Hague-
Visby Rules, , 1 d' fi' 'b 
191 This refers not only to a performing party but to "any other person, me u ,m~ a per 0n:nI,n,gyarty s su -
d t ho perfiorms or undertakes to perform any of the carner s responSIbIlItIes under the contractors an agen s, w , , ' , 
contract of carriage, to the extent that the person acts, either directly or mduectly, at the carrIer s request or 
under the carrier's supervision or control", 
337 
the carrier's responsibilities. However, art. 6 (3) (2) only confers the benefit of 'defences 
and liluitations of liability' on such persons, unlike art. 6 (3) (1) (a) which entitles the 
performing party to the carrier's 'rights' as well as its 'immunities' under the Draft 
Instrument. It is uncertain whether a 'performing party' acquires the right to rely on 
jurisdiction and choice of law clauses under these provisions because such a 'right' does 
not seem to derive from the Draft Instrument itself but rather from the terms of the contract 
of carriage. 
It should be noted that the protection offered to a 'performing party' under the 
Draft instrument is tied to the carrier's period of responsibility. This is because a 
'performing party' is defined in art. 1 (17) as one who 'physically performs any of the 
carrier's responsibilities under a contract of carriage'. Therefore, the problem in Raymond 
Burke J.\/otors Ltd., still exists under the Draft Instrument if the time at which the carrier 
has 'received' the goods under art. 4 (1) (1) is defined under art. 4 (1) (2) in accordance 
with the 'tackle to tackle' rule. A term to this effect in the carriage contract would be 
perfectly valid under art. 4 (1) (2) and in such a situation the terminal operator would have 
to protect itself either by contracting on the basis that contract of carriage would be such 
that the carrier would accept that it had received the goods at the same time as the terminal 
operator, with the terminal operator indemnifying the carrier for any liability arising 
between receipt and the start of loading. 
This problem would not arise under the 1991 UN Convention on the Liability of 
Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade which is not yet in force. This 
covers the provision of 'transport- related services,l92 by an 'operator of a transport 
terminal' who, under art. 3, is responsible for the goods "from the time he has taken them 
192 These include "storage, warehousing, loading, unloading, stowage, tr.imming, dunnaging and lashin.g". 
A d · I a non- bailee stevedore would fall within the ConventIon. They would be performmg ccor mg y, . I' f h' h h h 
'transport- related services with respect to the goods in an area under hIS contro or m respect 0 w IC e as 
a right of access or use' in art. I (a). 
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in charge unti 1 the time he has handled them over to or has placed them at the disposal of 
the person entitled to take delivery of them". This period is based on services provided by 
the temlinal operator and is not tied to the carrier's period of responsibility. Under art. 5 
liability of the operator is on the basis of presumed fault with a two- tier limitation figure 
under art. 6. The Convention also contains a two- year time bar, another important 
difference from the Draft Instrument. For this reason the UNCITRAL Working Group has 
noted the need to take into account the provisions of the Convention when drafting the 
provisions relating to a 'performing party' . 
Article 6 (10) deals with non- contractual claims, as follows "The defences and 
limits of liability provided for in this instrument and the responsibilities imposed by this 
instrument apply in any action against the carrier or a performing party for loss of, for 
damage to, or in connection with the goods covered by a contract of carriage, whether the 
action is founded in contract, in tort, or otherwise". However, art. 6 (10) omits the persons 
mentioned in art. 6 (3) (2) (a) (ii) as 'any other person, including a performing party's sub-
contractors and agents' and so the cargo owner might choose to sue such other person in 
tort which might strip them of the benefit of the defences and the limitations of liability 
available under art. 6 (3) (3). As a result, it is arguable that art. 6 (10) should be re- drafted 
as to include 'any other person, including a performing party's sub- contractors and agents' 
as well as the performing party. Alternatively, the reference to 'an action' in art. 6 (3) (3) 
could be replaced by the wording used in art. 6 (10), namely 'any action .... whether the 
action is founded in contract, in tort, or otherwise' . 
6. 9. CONCLUSION 
There is a set of defendants, as a result of the exclusion of independent contractors from 
the ambit of COGSA 1971, who do not have contractual relationships with the cargo 
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owner and who seek to rely on d fI d. 
e ences create by theIr contracts. Also, there is a set of 
litigants who, as a result of being outside the ambl·t of the COGSA 
1992, are trying to 
enforce the rights and the obligations of the bill of lading. How satisfactorily have the 
English courts dealt with these two sets of participants in the process of the carriage of 
goods by sea? 
Four avenues are open to the courts in addressing this problem; implied contract, 
the 1999 Act, negligence and bailment. The implied contract theory is unlikely to be of 
much use as a result of the restrictions imposed by the courts. As regards the 1999 Act, 
clauses that attempt to confer rights of action under s. 1 (3) are likely to be ineffective by 
reason of s. 6 (5). As regards negligence, litigants without a contractual cause of action 
should not be encouraged to sue a third party involved in the performance of the carriage 
contract in tort which would allow them to escape the defences and limitations, such as the 
Hague- Visby Rules. 193 Moreover, suing in tort would not be available to litigants without 
ownership or constructive possession at the time where the loss of or damage to the goods 
occurred. The Starsin and The Aliakmon highlight the problems posed to claimants by this 
rules. A potential solution can be found in bailment and the doctrines of bailment and the 
sub- bailment on terms for the following reasons. Firstly, as an effective formula to 
frustrate the cargo owner's aim to escape the limitation of the carriage contract by suing a 
third party involved in the performance of the carriage contract, in tort. 194 Secondly, as an 
effective formula to enable cargo owner, as being outside the ambit of COGSA 1992, to 
have the rights and the obligations of the bill of lading contract, such as the cargo owner in 
possession of an electronic bill of lading which is not included by the 1992 Act since it is 
193 The cargo owner would be able to recover damages in full by suing in tort, but he woul~ not be ~ble to 
recover pure economic loss. In contrast, this loss can, arguably, be rec~vere~ u~der the docn:me of baIlment 
and the assessment of this loss is preferable to be on a contractual baSIS. ThIS IS because baIlment and sub-
bailment have a contractual flavour. .. ,.. 
194 As where the cargo owner is in posseSSIOn of eIther a charterer s bIll ?f ladmg who want sue the 
shipowner or the initial carrier's bill of lading who wants to sue the sub- carrIer for the loss or damage to 
goods after transhipment. 
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neither in a written fonn nor is sign d 195 Th· dl . 
e . Ir y, baIlment enables a successor in title , 
who could not sue in tort to su th d 
' e e wrong oer, although the requirement of attorment 
nlight be considered as an obstacle. Finally, jurisdiction and choice of law clauses, which 
cannot be relied on by means of the statutory Himalaya clauses, can be relied on under the 
doctrine of sub- bailment on tenns. 
The above reasons could be considered as the policy behind the application of the 
doctrine of bailment and sub- bailment on terms. However, this policy would not be 
secured without legislative or judicial blockage to the cargo owner's right to sue 
exc1usiyely in negligence to avoid being bound by the terms of the bailment or sub-
bailment. Nevertheless, the bailment and the sub- bailment on terms doctrines contain 
problems which might reduce their productivity. First, the requirement of attornment by 
the bailee or his bailee to the successor in title of the original shipper which Lord Brandon, 
in The Aliakmon, considered to be the basis of establishing a bailment relationship between 
the shipowners and the buyer. Therefore, taking delivery against the bill of lading would 
not constitute an attornment, since it can not be seen as an express undertaking by the 
bailee to hold the goods on behalf of the successor in title. Moreover, the establishment of 
an attornment would be hard in the case of a chain of sub- bailees, since the cargo owner 
would not be able to prove that the loss or damage to the goods occurred while they were 
in the attorning bailee's custody. However, it has been suggested that, delivery of the 
goods without presentation of the bill or delivery the goods against documents which are 
not included by the 1992 Act so as to trigger the application of s. 1 (2) of the 1992 Act 
might be considered by the courts as an attornment so minimising this problem. Secondly, 
there can be no attornment in the event of non- delivery and, no claim in bailment by a 
successor in title. Thirdly, it may be difficult to infer an express, an implied or an 
195 0 . ·on of other documents such as a freight forwarder's bill oflading, because of r a cargo owner In possessl . .. 
h . t fth l·fi tl·on of these types of documents as documents of tItle and being Included by t e uncertain y 0 e qua I lca 
the provisions of the 1992 Act. 
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ostensible authority on the cargo owner's side 196 Th P' C " . 
. e nvy ouncd, III The PIOneer 
Container, provides no answer to these cases, which might leave a place for the application 
to the dictum of Donaldson 1. in Johnson Matthey & C Ltd C . 'T' . l 
' , o. . v. onstantzne 1 ermzna s 
Ltd. This is because of the imbalance between the existence of the bailee's and sub-
bailee's duty which is based on a factual determination, whereas the bailee's and sub-
bailee's ability to rely on the defences is based on a consensual determination. 
Sub- bailment on terms would not introduce any kind of help to non- bailees, such 
as stevedores, who have no contractual relationship with the cargo owner, as an 
independent contractor, and no intention to acquire from him legal possession of the goods. 
In contrast, the same doctrine would be useful for a person, such as a warehouseman, who 
would be qualified as a sub- bailee of the goods and he could invoke the terms of his 
contract with the principal bailee against the principal bailor where the requirements of the 
sub- bailment are fulfilled. However, an independent contractor, such as a stevedore, is 
protected by virtue of s. 6 (5) (b) of the 1999 Act where the requirements of s. 1 (3) are 
satisfied. However, jurisdiction and choice of law clauses are not available to such an 
independent contractor under the 1999 Act. It remains to be seen whether these clauses can 
be effectively redrafted to avoid the decision of the Privy Council in Mahkutai. 197 
A bailment relationship, under US law, arises when goods are delivered by one 
party to another for a specific purpose, and the other party accepts the goods with the 
express or implied promise that the goods will be returned after the purpose of delivery has 
been fulfilled. 198 The courts have established that the carrier will be considered as a bailee, 
under federal bailment law, where COGSA is inapplicable to a particular party or under 
196 However, there is an argument which provides that, the bailor's consent is not nee?ed fO.r the inclusion of 
the terms of bailment and sub- bailment where they are reasonable and exp~cted I~ their ,context on the 
ground of the agency principle. See Glass, D. A., " Bailment on terms and circular mdemmty- Spectra. v. 
Hayesoak" [1997] LMCLQ. 478. . ' 
197 See Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: Law Com. No. 242 (l9~6). For m~re 
details about the Proposed Bill see Girvin, S. A., "The Law Commission's Draft Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Bill and the carriage of goods by sea" [1996] LMCLQ. 541. 
198 See Benedict on Admiralty, Volume 8 at para. 19.07 [A]. 
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particular circunlstances. Although no formal contr t' . d . 
ac IS reqUIre to create a baIlment 
relationship, lawful possession and a duty to account for thing as the property of another, is 
necessary. The federal bailment law, therefore, will be applicable to a shipowner in two 
situations. First, a shipowner under a charterer's bill of lading might be sued as a bailee for 
the loss or the damage to the goods during transit. Secondly, a shipowner might also be sue 
as a bailee for the loss or the damage to the goods during the period before loading or after 
discharge. On the one hand, the courts, in some cases, did not explore the doctrine of sub-
bailment on terms as a ground for the cargo owner to sue the shipowner, under a 
charterer's bilL but rather granted the shipowner cOGSA protections through the use of a 
Himalaya clause. On the other hand, the courts, in other cases, did not apply the doctrine of 
sub- bailment on terms as a ground for applying the shipowner's tariff, but rather 
established a bailment between the cargo owner the shipowner on the terms of the 
charterer's bill. 
The courts also granted the status of bailees to non- carriers such as terminal 
operators that provide stevedoring services as well as storage services. Nonetheless, the 
courts are divided as regard the law applicable to the period outside the 'tackle to tackle' 
period of COG SA. Some courts have applied the state bailment law rather than the federal 
bailment law, while some courts have applied the federal law rather than the state law. 
Applying the state law entail the risk of preventing non- carriers, as bailees, of having the 
benefits of COGSA when they conflict with the applicable state law. Therefore, carriers 
have attempted to circumvent this problem by extending the application of cOGSA to 
these parties through the use of the Himalaya clause. The Himalaya clause, however, 
would not be needed by the enactment of the Proposed Bill Amendments to cOGSA under 
US law. 
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Thus, the solution to the probl f" f 
em 0 pnvlty 0 contract doctrine, in respect of actual 
carriers really needs to be accomplished by legislative reform rather than by judicial 
creativity.199 Article 6 (3) (1), 6 (3) (3) and 6 (3) (10) of the Draft Instrument provide a 
nlore comprehensive solution to the problem of non- contractual suits against sub-
contractors than that provided by the Hamburg Rules, which only protect the sub-
carrier.
200 
The actual carrier, by virtue of both art. 10 and art. 11, is protected in the same 
way as the contracting carner under the Hamburg Rules as well as under the Draft 
Instrument, by virtue of art. 6 (3) (3). However, by virtue of art. 1 (17) of under the Draft 
Instrument, unlike the Hamburg Rules, a distinction has been drawn between sub-
contractors who actually perform and those who undertake to procure performance of any 
of the sub- contracted obligations. Therefore, the need to the doctrine of bailment on terms 
or the implied contract doctrine will be reduced, if not abolished, in that respect under both 
the Hamburg Rules, by virtue of art. 10 (2), and the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 6 
(10). However, an independent contractor such as stevedore would not protected under the 
Hamburg Rules, since such an independent contractor is not included by the definition of 
carrier's servants or agents, by virtue of art. 7 (2), despite the omission of the words "such 
servant or agent not being an independent contractor". In contrast, such an independent 
contractor would be protected under the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 1 (17), even 
though an independent contractor who is performing one of the carrier's obligations other 
than those specified in that article, such as a security company guarding a container yard, is 
not included. Therefore, the Himalaya clause protection is still needed for such 
independent contractors who are not included by the provisions of both of the Hamburg 
Rules and the Draft Instrument. The prolongation of the period of responsibility under both 
199 Whereby Lord Goff of Chieveley, in The Pioneer Container, referred to the speech of Viscount Simonds 
in Midland Siliconed Ltd. v. Scrutton Ltd., [1962] A.c. 446 at 467- 468. .. . 
200 The provisions of the CMI Outline Draft, in respect, are similar to those contamed m the US Proposed Bl11 
which relate to the 'performing carrier'. 
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of the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument, unlike the Hague and Hague- Visby Rules, 
would provide an independent contractor with the protection which would be granted by 
the Himalaya clause. However, the period of responsibility under the Draft Instrument, by 
yirtue of art. 4 (l) (l), is wider than that of the Hague and the Hague- Visby Rules 'tackle 




COGSA 1992 has solved the bl f pro em 0 privity associated with cases such as The 
A lialanoll , The Aramis and The Delfini by increasing the range of cases in which a 
contractual right to sue the carrier is transferred to the holder of the bills of lading and to 
the person to delivery is to be made under sea waybills and ship's delivery orders. COGSA 
1992, therefore, encourages contracting parties who are not English to provide for their 
contracts to be governed by English Law, so preventing the loss of shipping and insurance 
business, litigation and arbitration to the City of London and the national economy. 
The interpretation and the construction of bills of lading as a whole, including the 
carrier's identity and the demise clauses, by the English courts, has led to conflicting 
results which provide unpredictable guidance for determining the carrier's identity under 
English law. Therefore, the success of the cargo owner will depend of the accuracy of his 
initial choice of defendant which is hardly an encouraging prospective. Moreover, the 
claimants' will still face problems when damage or loss occurs after transhipment and the 
head bill contains a cesser of liability clause. This highlights the wider problem of how 
cargo claimants can obtain rights of suit where they fall outside COGSA 1992. The basic 
privity problem still exists in relation to some shipping documents in particular electronic 
bills, combined transport bills and bills issued by nvocc' s. Then, there is the problem of 
preventing non- contractual claims from going outside the scope of COGSA 1971. 
Four avenues are open to the English courts in addressing these problem; implied 
contracts, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, negligence and baliment. The 
implied contract doctrine is unlikely to be of much use as a result of the restrictions 
imposed by the English courts in cases such as The Aramis and The Gudermes. As regards 
the 1999 Act, clauses that attempt to confer rights of action under s. 1 (3) are likely to be 
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ineffective by reason of s 6 (5- 7) S" . 
. . Ulng III neglIgence should not be encouraged since it 
would allow litigants to escape the defences and limitations in COGSA 1971. Moreover, 
suing in negligence will not always be available in the lights of the problems highlighted 
by The Alialanoll and The Starsin. Suing in bailment and sub- bailment on terms may not 
always be available because of the requirement of attornment by the bailee to the successor 
in title, the absence of attornment in the case of non- delivery and the difficulty of inferring 
an express, an implied or an ostensible authority on the cargo owner side. There is also 
some confusion and uncertainty as to the circumstances in which a third party may rely on 
a jurisdiction or choice of law clause in either the head contract or the sub- contract. I will 
conclude by testing eleven specific problems against the prospective both of existing law 
as well as that of the proposals for reform set out in the Hamburg Rules and the Draft 
Instrument. As will become apparent, most of the problems under the existing law would 
be resolved with the implementation of the Draft Instrument. 
1- Claimant has an unendorsed order bill- Transferred but not endorsed bill of lading 
Such a claimant would not be a 'lawful holder' by virtue s. 5 (2) (b) of the 1992 Act since 
he is not "a person with possession of the bill as a result of the completion, by delivery of 
the bill, of any endorsement of the bill" and so he would not be able to sue under s. 2 (1) of 
the Act. Such a claimant would also not be liable under s. 3 (1) of the 1992 Act since the 
contractual rights of suit never have been vested in him as a 'lawful holder' of the bill. 
Suing in negligence depends on the claimant's having ownership or constructive 
possession at the time when the loss or damage to the goods occurred. The House of Lords 
in The Aliakmon held that the shipowner's duty of care would only exist towards the owner 
of the goods at the time of the breach of duty occurred, and this was confirmed by in the 
House of Lords in The Starsin. The Starsin highlighted the problem that progressive 
damage would not create a new cause of action in the hands of a new cargo- owner since 
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such cause would be complet d b fi h . 
e e ore t e acquIrement of title to the cargo. In the light of 
these difficulties, suing in negligence will not always be available to such a claimant. 
Suing in bailment, instead, depends on the establishment of attornment by the 
bailee to the successor in title. Taking delivery of the goods against the bill would not 
constitute an attornment, since it cannot be seen as an express undertaking by the bailee to 
hold the goods on behalf of the successor in title. Moreover, there can be no attornment in 
the event of non- delivery and, therefore, no claim in bailment by the successor in title, 
en~n though the shipper can still sue as in The Pioneer Container. However, if an 
attornment can be established, the successor in title would be able to sue for pre-
attornment loss or damage without having to show that it had become successor in title at 
the time of the loss or damage. Moreover, an attornment would not have the effect of 
transferring liabilities, such as for shipment of dangerous cargo, of the head bailor to the 
successor in title. To allow a successor in title to be liable for the head bailor's breach of 
the duty not to ship dangerous cargo would, in effect, be to impose a strict liability as that 
party would have had no means of ascertain the condition of the goods. It is, therefore, 
unlikely the courts would find such a party to be liable as sub- bailee to the shipowner. 
Taking delivery of the goods against a letter of guarantee which provides that such a 
claimant is the lawful person to take delivery might constitute an attornment by the bailee 
and so to allow him sue in bailment. 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 1999 Act would not be applicable to the 
case of transferred but not endorsed bill of lading or, for that matter, to any other cases 
covered by bill of lading, sea waybill and ship's delivery order since s. 6 (5) of 1999 Act 
excludes carriage of goods by sea covered by such documents. However, the 
implementation of the implied contract doctrine, in such situation, depends on taking 
delivery of the goods against a letter of guarantee which provides either he is the lawful 
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person to take delivery or that th b'II f 1 d' . 
e loa Ing would be presented as soon as possIble, 
since presentation of the bill of lading will considered as an offer to contract on the terms 
of the bill of lading and it is an essential to the implementation of the implied contract. 
Therefore, it is arguable that taking delivery against such letters would support the 
argument that the shipowner was not merely intending to perform his pre- existing 
contractual obligation against the original shipper. Moreover, the co- operation between 
the involved parties by taking off the goods with minimum cost and maximum speed might 
be taken as a sign of an intention to contract with each other due to the importance of 
having defined rights against each other. Giving delivery of the goods to such holder might 
be considered as consideration on the basis that the shipowner has performed his contract 
\"ith the shipper and so of being discharge of liabilities under that contract. Granting the 
carrier the benefits of the contractual defences embodied into such document might also be 
considered as consideration. 
Under US law, by virtue ofCh. 801, the transferee's title to the goods and his cause 
of action depends on the criterion that whether or not the bill of lading has been duly 
negotiated. Therefore, such a claimant, by virtue of Ch. 801 05 (a) (2), would not have a 
cause of action since the bill in such case has not been duly negotiated to him. 
Under the Draft Instrument, such a claimant would not be a holder, by virtue of art. 
1 (12), since the bill of lading has not been duly endorsed to him, and therefore, he would 
not be able to sue under art. 13 (2). Nonetheless, if there has been an assignment of rights 
under art. 13 (1) (iii), such a claimant would be able to sue under art. 13 (3), provided that 
he could prove both that he suffered such loss or damage and that the holder did not suffer 
such loss or damage. 
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l- Claimant has lost possession of the bill 
The three definitions of a 'lawful holder' in s. 5 (2) of the 1992 Act all refer to a 'person 
with possession of the bill'. Such a claimant would not be divested of contractual rights of 
suit under s. 2 (5) and, therefore, he should still be able to sue under s. 2 (1 )of the Act, 
provided that he could prove both that he once had the bill and that there has been no 
divestment under s. 2 (5). To require proof of continued physical possession of the bill in 
such a situation would mean that neither such a claimant nor any other person would have 
title to sue under s. 2 (1). This is clearly undesirable and it is likely, therefore, that the 
courts would take the view that such claimant in such circumstances would still be able to 
sue under the 1992 Act. This view can be supported by the language of s. 2 (1) which 
refers to a person who 'becomes' a 'lawful holder' rather than a person who 'is' a 'lawful 
holder'. If such a claimant is able to sue under s. 2 (1) of the Act, in these circumstances, 
he would be liable to the carrier under s. 3 (1), provided that the requirements of that 
section were satisfied. 
Under the US law this problem does not exist since, under Ch. 801 05, the title to 
the goods and the cause of action depend on one criterion which is whether the bill has 
been duly negotiated. 
Under the Draft Instrument, such a claimant would not be a holder, by virtue of art. 
1 (12) (a), since he is not in possession of the bill of lading and, therefore, he would not be 
able to sue under art. 13 (2). Nonetheless, such a claimant would be able to sue under art. 
13 (3), since he is one of the persons referred to in that article as 'without being the 
holder', provided that he could prove both that he suffered such loss or damage and that 
the holder did not suffer such loss or damage. 
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3- Claimant has lIot yet received the bill 
According to Rix J's obiter dicta in Th G' . 
. ,e lOvanna, such a claImant would have possession 
of the bill of lading, by virtue of s. 5 (2) (b) of the 1992 Act, once it has been indorsed and 
handed to couriers for despatch to such a claimant and so he would be able to sue under s. 
2 (1) of the Act. The critical issue before such a claimant is to whom the bill of lading was 
delivered and, therefore, if it was delivered to his agent, the exact moment at which the 
claimant acquired the contractual rights of suit would be once the bill has been indorsed 
and delivered to agent, since the concept of possession is a flexible one so as to allow the 
agent to have actual possession and his principal to have constructive possession. Once 
such a claimant established that he has acquired the contractual rights to sue under s. 2 (1) 
he would become liable under s. 3 (1) of the Act, provided that the requirements of that 
section were satisfied. If such a claimant cannot sue the carrier under s. 2 (1) of the 1992 
Act, he may be able sue under the implied contract doctrine, provided that the requirement 
of the intention and the consideration are satisfied. Therefore, it is arguable that taking 
delivery against a letter, which provides that the bill of lading would be presented as soon 
as possible, would support the argument that the shipowner was not merely intending to 
perform his pre- existing contractual obligation against the original shipper. Such a 
claimant can sue in negligence or in bailment, if the requirements of such claims are 
satisfied as has already been discussed in the case of a claimant who holds an unendorsed 
order bill. 
Under US law, this problem does not exist since, under Ch. 801 OS, the title to the 
goods and the cause of action depend on one criterion which is whether the bill has been 
duly negotiated rather than being the holder in possession of the bill. 
Under the Draft Instrument, the position of such a claimant would the same as a 
claimant who has lost possession of the bill and, therefore, he would be able to sue under 
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art. 13 (3), since he is one of the persons referred to in that article as 'without being the 
holder', provided that he could prove both that he suffered such loss or damage and that 
the holder did not suffer such loss or damage. 
-/- Claimant suffers loss but is not the holder a/the bill 
By virtue of s. 2 (5) of 1992 Act, the shipper's rights, as an original party, are extinguished 
where the rights of suit are transferred to the holder of the bill by virtue of s. 2 (l) of 1992 
Act. The shipper might need to sue the carrier for his own loss in cases such as where he , 
has sold the goods at his risk but parted with the property. Although, the holder of the bill, 
by yirtue of s. 2 (4) of 1992 Act, can recover substantial damages from the carrier for the 
benefit of the person who had suffered the loss such as the shipper, the holder might not be 
able to recover substantial damages for the shipper's benefit, in the above case, since the 
latter might not qualify as a person with an interest or right to the goods according to s. 2 
( -+) (a) of 1992 Act. However, the shipper as an original party can still sue for the benefit of 
a third party who had suffered loss according to the rule of Dunlop . v. Lambert as an 
exception to the common law rules, provided that his original contract is not contained in 
or evidenced by the charter- party. The shipper's ability to recover substantial damages 
was restricted by the decision in The Albazero. But, a separate exception was recognised in 
The Sanix Ace whereby the shipper may recover substantial damages in contract or tort 
provided that he still the owner of the goods at the time of breach, notwithstanding that risk 
has passed to a third party. The shipper's rights of suit under the bill of lading are 
extinguished by virtue of s. 2 (5) of the 1992 Act. 
The holder of the bill can sue the carrier for the benefit of the shipper or the third 
party who has suffered loss as a result of the carrier's breach of the carriage contract under 
s. 2 (4) of the 1992 Act. Recovery of damages for the shipper under s 2 (4) depends on 
how the English courts interpret the words 'interest or right' in these situations. 
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Consequently there is a risk th t 2 (4) . 
, a s. would not be avaIlable to the buyer where the risk 
of loss has passed on shipment b t th h 
,u e property as not passed yet or for the shipper who 
haye sold the goods at his risk and parted with the property or where he wished to claim 
against the carrier for losses for breach of the contract such as delay in loading on the 
ground that neither the shipper nor the buyer is "a person with any interest or right in or in 
relation to goods to which the document relates". Section 2 (4) of the 1992 Act allows the 
holder to sue the carrier for the benefit of the person who had suffered loss as a result of 
the carrier's breach of the carriage contract without providing a machinery for such person 
to compel the holder to exercise those rights. Moreover, the shipper might be the only 
person with a cause of action, but without a right to recover substantial damages for the 
person who had suffered loss in cases such as where the bill had never been transferred so 
as to give the latter a cause of action according to s. 2 (l) of 1992 Act. 
On the one hand, under US law, there is no provision in respect of the shipper's 
rights when the bill of lading is negotiated to a third party, by virtue of Ch. 801. The 
shipper can still sue, under US law, if he is able to produce evidence that the bill has not 
been negotiated so as to give the cause of action to a third party. Therefore, the shipper will 
be able to recover substantial damages for his own loss as well as for the loss suffered by a 
third party without a cause of action. On the other hand, under US law there is also no 
corresponding section to s. 2 (4) of the 1992 Act in Ch. 801. Nonetheless, the ability of the 
holder to recover substantial damages for the loss suffered by a third party without a cause 
of action, under US law can, arguably, be compared with the position of the transferee of a 
non- negotiable bill and, therefore, a holder would be able to recover substantial damages 
for his own loss as well as for the loss suffered by such a claimant by virtue of being only 
the holder of the bill. 
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Under the Draft Instrument l' h 
, a calmant w 0 suffers loss, a shipper or a consignee 
and their assigns, without being the holder of the bill would be able to sue the carrier under 
art. 13 (.3), provided that he could prove both that he suffered such loss or damage and that 
the holder did not suffer such loss or damage. As a result, the co- operation of the holder of 
the bill is not needed under art. 13 (3) of the CMI Outline Draft, unlike s. 2 (4) of the 1992 
Act as well as without the restrictions imposed by the words 'interest or right' . 
5- Electronic bill of lading 
The application of the 1992 Act to electronic bill of lading is, by virtue of s. 1 (5), 
conditional on regulations made by the Secretary of State. No such regulations have yet 
been made. Moreover, s. 7 of the Electronic Communication Act 2000 cannot solve the 
problem of title to sue for bills of lading in that it cannot allow electronic bills to be treated 
as 'bills of lading' for the purpose of the 1992 Act, even if it enables them to achieve 
recognition as documents of title. The provisions of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
1999 Act are not applicable to a carriage contract embodied into an electronic bill, by 
yirtue of s. 6 (6), on the ground that the provisions of the 1992 Act include this bill. 
Nevertheless, if both the requirement of consideration and the rigid application of 
that requirement by English courts undermined the application of the novation of the 
carriage contract adopted by the Bolero system, the doctrine of implied contract might well 
provide a possible solution to the problems of privity. Under the doctrine of implied 
contract, a contract would be implied from the conduct of both the consignee and the 
carrier. The involvement of the 'Title Registry' of the Bolero system as the carrier's agent 
in the electronic equivalent of endorsement does seem to place the Bolero situation closer 
to the facts of The Captain Gregos (No.2) than to those of The Aramis. This is because in 
The Captain Gregos (No.2), BP neither paid the freight or undertook to pay it, nor was 
there evidence that BP knew that the freight was outstanding. Also, BP neither presented 
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the bills of lading to the ship t k . 
owners 0 ta e dehvery nor undertook to do so latter. These 
facts would arguably support th f . 
e present 0 a contractual mtention and therefore the 
delivery of the goods to the transferee of the Bolero bill of lading by the carrier would not 
be considered as a performance of a pre- existing obligation. Suing the shipowner in 
negligence would mean that the transferee would face the problems highlighted by both 
The Alailunoll and The Stars ill , which have already been discussed. 
The involvement of the shipowner in the process of transmitting the private codes, 
directly or indirectly through its 'Title Registry', under the Bolero system, to enable the 
transferee to take delivery of the goods might well constitute an acknowledgement by the 
shipowner to the transferee's possessory title to the goods represented by the electronic 
bill. Such acknowledgement by the shipowner might be considered as an attornment by the 
shipowner, as a bailee, to the transferee and so giving the transferee rights of suit in 
bailment. Moreover, there can be no attornment in the event of non- delivery and, 
therefore, no claim in bailment by the successor in title, even though the shipper can still 
sue as in The Pioneer Container. Moreover, an attornment would not have the effect of 
transferring liabilities, such as for shipment of dangerous cargo, of the head bailor to the 
successor in title. Therefore, suit by the shipowner would only workable if the implied 
contract or the novation is adopted as in the Bolero system. This is because the problem of 
maintaining liability of the original shipper under the Bolero system, by virtue of novation, 
might be challenged under the English law and so the English courts might well decide to 
invalidate any maintaining of the original shipper's liabilities such as in respect of 
dangerous cargo. 
Under the Hamburg Rules, the bill of lading can be signed electronically and it 
would still be governed by the Rules. Therefore, the Bolero bill of lading might well be 
governed by the Rules on the ground that it is no more than a document 'other than a bill 
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of lading' issued by the carrier h' h 'd . 
, w IC eVI ence the conclUSIOn of a carriage contract and 
the taking over of the goods b th . . 
y e carrIer, by vIrtue of art. 18, and signed electronically in 
accordance with art. 14 of the Rules. 
Under US I h b'll' aw, suc a 1 IS not covered by the provisions of Ch. 801 nor by the 
provisions of COGSA 1936. The enactment of article 7 of UCC would convert such a bill 
to a document of title so as to be covered only by the provisions of COGSA 1936, but not 
Ch. 801 as it is not a negotiable bill. 
Under the Draft Instrument, electronic bill of lading is treated in the same way as 
an orthodox bill of lading and so both of art. 12 (2) (1 & 2) and art. 13 would be 
applicable to an electronic bill. 
6- Combined transport documents 
The combined transport document might be not included by the provisions of 1992 Act on 
the basis that it does not contain or evidence a carriage contact exclusively by sea. 
However, the 1992 Act, by virtue of s. 1 (1) (a), states that this Act applies to "any bill of 
lading" and s. 5 (1) (a) defines the carriage contract as "the contract contained in or 
evidenced by that bill". One could, accordingly, argue that the combined effect of these 
sections is to make the Act applicable to any bill as long as the carriage contract is 
contained in or evidenced by such bill regardless of whether such carriage contract covers 
a carriage wholly or partly by sea. Nonetheless, the restriction, mentioned above, might be 
applicable to sea waybills and ship's delivery orders, since the definitions of these 
documents are connected to carriage contract by sea. The Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) 1999 Act is not applicable to such document. On the one hand, such documents 
would not be within the exception of s. 6 (5) ( a) of the 1999 Act since it would not cover a 
carriage contract wholly by sea. On the other hand, such document would might be within 
the exception of s. 6 (5) (b) since a carriage contract covers party by sea and another mode 
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f . 
o transport mIght be governed by international convention which have the force of law 
under other legislation which could be applicable to the whole of the multimodal transport 
operation such as the conventions on road and rail carriage. 
Therefore, if both of the 1999 Act and the 1992 Act are not applicable to a 
conlbined transport document, the implied contract doctrine would be viable method to 
regulate the relationship between the involved parties under such documents. Nonetheless, 
the utility of the doctrine of implied contract was reduced by the decisions of the Court of 
Appeal in The Aramis as well as in The Gudermes. This is because the existence of a 
contractual intention has a significant role in relation to the implementation of implied 
contract doctrine. Moreover, in the light of the difficulties imposed by The Aliakmon and 
The Starsin, suing in negligence will not always be available to a successor in title, such a 
claimant. Suing in bailment, instead, depends on the establishment of attornment by the 
bailee to the successor in title. Taking delivery of the goods against this document would 
not constitute an attornment, since it cannot be seen as an express undertaking by the bailee 
to hold the goods on behalf of the successor in title. 
The implied contract doctrine would still be needed as a means of imposing 
liabilities on the transferee of such document, even if the 1999 Act is applicable to the 
combined transport documents. This is because the 1999 Act can only confer rights on a 
third parties but not liabilities. Moreover, an attornment would not have the effect of 
transferring liabilities, such as for shipment of dangerous cargo, of the head bailor to the 
successor in title. 
Under the US law, qualifying the combined transport document as a true bill of 
lading so as to be included by the provisions of Ch. 801 might be problematic. However, 
such document is included by the provisions of the Proposed Bill whereby the carriage is 
performed by the contracting carrier or by a performing carrier who is performing the 
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ocean part of the carriage contract Th:6 h . 
. ere ore, t e combmed effect of the provisions of both 
the Proposed Bill and Ch. 801 might allow the application of these provisions to such 
docunlent under US law. 
The definition of the carriage contract, by virtue of art. 1 (6) of the Hamburg Rules, 
would include the carriage of goods partly be sea 'only in so far as it relates to carriage by 
sea'. Therefore, the Hamburg Rules would not cover the whole carriage which is covered 
by a combined bill of lading. 
The conlbined transport document would probably considered as a negotiable 
transport document under the Draft Instrument. This is because the definition the carriage 
contract under art. 1 (5) as to include carriage of goods partly by sea from one place to 
another. Moreover, there is no reference to any particular form of document under art. 13 
but rather to 'contract of carriage' as defined in art. 1 (5). 
7- Charterer's bill of lading 
A claimant suing the shipowner under charterer's bill of lading in bailment would require 
the courts to hold that there had been an attornment to the successor in title. Delivery of the 
goods would not constitute an attornment under a shipowner's bill, there is no reason why 
it should not do so under charterer's bill of lading, even though in the case of non- delivery 
there would be no attornment and so no bailment. Suing the shipowner under a charterer's 
bill in accordance to the implied contract doctrine might arguably be difficult. This because 
it is difficult to say that the shipowner have any lien to give up when delivering cargo 
carried under such bill. Moreover, Hain Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Tale & Lyle Ltd. shows a 
judicial unwillingness to imply quantum meruit freight when the shipowner still has an 
express right to recover freight under a charter- party. Nonetheless, suing the shipowner 
under charterer's bill in negligence requires the claimant to show that the breach comes 
after the acquisition of ownership or possession. Moreover, an action in negligence will not 
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always be available to the claimant in the light of the difficulties highlighted by The 
Aliakmoll and The Starsin. 
Can the shipowner, when sued non- contractually, rely on the terms of such bill? 
The bailment on terms, unlike sub- bailment on terms, will not be subject to the 
jurisdiction and choice of law clauses under such bill as in The Forum Craftsman and The 
Alakhlltai. The other possibility is that the shipowner will be able to rely on the terms of 
the charterer's bill on the basis of the Himalaya clause whose its effectiveness has been 
recently proven in The Starsin. The reason in The Makhutai will still apply so as the 
shipowner will not be able to rely on both jurisdiction and choice of law clause. Although, 
a third party such as the shipowner under the charterer's bill of lading will be able to rely 
on a Himalaya clause, by virtue of s. 1 (1) (a) and s. 1 (6) of the 1999 Act, as to avail 
himself of the exclusion and limitation of liability clauses into the bill of lading, the 
shipowner will not be able to rely on either jurisdiction or choice of law clause. 
The next question is whether the shipowner, when charterers' bills have been 
issued, could sue the cargo owner for the loss or the damage caused to their vessel. What is 
uncertain, though, is whether an attornment has the effect of transferring liabilities of the 
head bailor, such as liability for the shipment of dangerous cargo, as well as its rights of 
suit. To allow a successor in title to be liable for the bailor's breach of such duty would, in 
effect, be to impose a strict liability as that party would have had no means of ascertaining 
the condition of the cargo. It is, therefore, unlikely that the courts would find such a party 
to be liable as sub- bailor to the shipowners. In any event, the cargo owner would not be 
liable to the shipowners for the loss or the damage caused by dangerous cargo, even if an 
implied contract was implied by the court between the shipowners and the cargo owner as 
in The Athanasia Comninos. 
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Moreover, the shipowner under a charterer's bill of lading will not be able to have 
rights of suit as against the cargo owner by virtue of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999. This is because the 1999 Act is not applicable to a contract of carriage of goods 
contained in or evidenced by a bill of lading, by virtue of s. 6 (5) (a). Moreover, the 1999 
Act will not assist the shipowner who wished to assert positive rights under the charterer's 
bill of lading and, therefore, it will not impose any liabilities on third parties, even if it is 
applicable to such cases, but would only operate as to confer the benefits of carriage 
contract to such person. A Himalaya clause would only operate to give the shipowner a 
right to sue the cargo owner for dangerous cargo, if it was worded in a different way from 
the usual clause and, if the courts were prepared to extent what is already a very artificial 
doctrine to this new situation. 
Under US law, the shipowner will have the benefit the defences and the limitations 
of liability provided for in the Proposed Bill, by virtue of ss. 3 and 4 and the Enaction 
Clause. 
Under both the Hamburg Rules and the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 10 and 
art. 11 and art. 8 (2) (4) and art. 6 (10) respectively, the shipowner will have the benefit of 
the defences and the limitations of liability provided for in these Instrument. The 
shipowner, as a 'performing party' is entitled to the carrier's rights under art. 6 (3) (1) (a). 
But he will not be able to sue the cargo owner for the shipment of dangerous cargo under 
art. 7 (1), if the phrase 'carrier' is only confined and referred the carrier so as excluding the 
performing party. 
8- NVOCC bill of lading 
This bill is essentially the same as the charterer's bill and, therefore, it should be treated as 
in the same way under the 1992 Act. However, such bill, if not treated as a true bill, falls 
within the sea waybill sections of the 1992 Act. Nonetheless, such bill will not be treated 
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as a sea waybill if it was issued in a negotiable fonn. As a result of such uncertainty, the 
freight forwarder might be considered as a bailee on the ground of having contractual 
control over the goods, even if he has no physical custody of them as in Spectra 
International PIc. v. Hayesoak Ltd. The need of attornment could create a problem to the 
successor in title in the case of a chain of sub- bailees. However, this problem, arguably, 
might be resolved by considering the delivery of the goods against those bills to the 
successor in title as attornment that would be upon the head bailee's instruction, which 
\,"ould also be bound to the sub- bailee. Suing in negligence, under such bill, is subject to 
the problems already discussed in connection with the claimant who holds an unendorsed 
'order' bill. A contract can be implied between the successor in title and the NVOCC on 
the basis that taking delivery was against the ocean bill issued by the shipowner as agent to 
the NVOCC. 
Under the Hamburg Rules, art. 1 (1) defines the carrier as "any person by whom or 
in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a shipper" 
which should include a non- sea carrier such as NVOCC. Article 1 (7) of the Hamburg 
Rules defines the bill as "a document which evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the 
taking over or loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to 
deliver the goods against the surrender of the document...". This wording is probably broad 
enough to cover bill of lading whose status is still doubtful under the 1992 Act, such as 
freight forwarder bills. 
The definition of the carrier under the Draft Instrument, by virtue of art. 1 (1) as "a 
person that enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper" is such that it can include a 
non sea carrier such as NVOCC. By virtue of art. 13 (2), a party who falls outside the four 
categories in art. 13 (1) will still be able to sue on the carriage contract. To do so they must 
be the holder of a 'negotiable transport instrument'. A 'holder' is defined in art. 1 (12) in 
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similar terms as adopted by s. 5 (2) (b) and (c) of the 1992 Act. A 'negotiable transport 
document' is defined in art 1 (14) , 
. as a transport document that indicate, by wording such 
as "to order" " f bl " . 
or nego la e or other appropnate wording recognised as having the same 
effect by the law governing the document, that the goods have been consigned to the order 
of the shipper, to the order of the consignee, or to bearer, and is not explicitly stated as 
being "non- negotiable" or "not negotiable".' This wording is probably broad enough to 
cover a bill of lading whose status is still doubtful under the 1992 Act, such as a freight 
forwarder bill. 
9- Transhipment with a cesser a/liability clause 
Assuming the loss occurs on the second voyage, the claimant will not be able to sue the 
first carrier in bailment since the bailment of the goods ends on the transhipment of the 
goods to the second carrier. Also, the claimant will not be able to sue the first carrier in 
accordance to the implied contract doctrine since the delivery of the goods made by the 
second carrier. Suing in negligence will not be also available because of the absence of any 
breach of the duty to take care of the goods. 
Suing the second carrier in negligence, the claimant must show that the breach of 
the duty to take care of the goods occurs after the acquisition of ownership or possession. 
An action in negligence will not always be available to the claimant in the light of the 
difficulties highlighted by The Aliakman and The Starsin. Suing the second carrier in 
accordance to the implied contract doctrine might arguably be difficult. The is because it 
difficult to say that the shipowner have any lien to give up when delivering cargo carried. 
Also, the requirement of contractual intention would be hard to satisfy, since the conduct 
of the involved parties by taking delivery might not be consistent with a new contract to be 
implied and inconsistent with no such contract to be implied. The claimant will be able to 
sue the second carrier in bailment on terms of the sub- bailment provided the courts to hold 
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that there had been an attornment to the successor in title. Delivering the goods to the 
ho lder of the first carrier's bilI of lading might be viewed as an attornment to the holder of 
that bill so as to found a claim in bailment in respect of the post- transhipment events, 
provided that the sub- carrier is aware that the goods belong not to the first carrier. The 
second carrier will not have the benefit of jurisdiction and choice of law clauses as a result 
of the Privy Council in The Pioneer Container. The 1999 Act will not give rights of suit to 
the claimant under the second bill since such documents still fall within the 1992 Act. The 
answer to the question whether the shipowner can sue the cargo owner for the loss or the 
damage caused to their vessel, will be the same as when the shipowner is suing the cargo 
o\\ner under a charterer's bill. 
Under the Hamburg Rules, the claimant will be able to sue the second carrier as an 
'actual carrier' under art. 11. Nonetheless, the claimant will still be able to sue the first 
carrier if a claim against the second carrier cannot be instituted in a competent court under 
art. 21 (1 or 2), by virtue art. 11 (1). 
Under the Draft Instrument, the first shipowner will still be liable to the cargo 
owner as the contracting carrier, unless there is an 'express' agreement to cesser of liability 
under art. 4 (3) (1). In any event, the second carrier will be liable to the cargo owner as a 
performing party and will have the benefit of defences and limitations of liability under the 
Instrument. 
10- Claimant sues sub- contractor of contractual carrier 
The claimant will be able to sue the sub- contractor of the contractual carrier in accordance 
with the doctrine of sub- bailment on terms, provided that the consent requirement is 
satisfied as in The Pioneer Container and provided the sub- contractor is a sub- bailee. The 
sub- bailee's duties may be modified or negated by reference to the terms of the sub-
bailment in their contract with the bailee so as jurisdiction and choice of law clauses in 
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their contract would be available to the sub- bailee as against the claimant. Nonetheless, 
the claimant nlay still be able to base its claim exclusively on the general duty of care in 
negligence. One of the justifications of the departure from the general rules of Donoghue 
. \ '. Stevenson by the House of Lords in The Nicholas H was that the fact that the imposition 
of a duty of care would undermine the uniformity of international conventions on liability, 
such as the Hague rules, and on limitation of liability. Therefore, such a justification 
should be considered as the policy reason for denying the existence of a general duty of 
c are in circumstances where there is a duty of care in bailment. 
Another method to avoid the problem of parallel actions in negligence and bailment 
would be through the Himalaya clause. A Himalaya clause would only provide such sub-
contractor with the benefit of the exceptions and limitations terms and so jurisdiction and 
choice of law would not be available as in The Makhutai. The protection of such clauses 
can be extended to sub- contractors only by means of redrafting the 'Himalaya' so as to 
avoid the linguistic problems highlighted in The Makhutai. The Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) 1999 Act is not applicable to carriage contracts by sea, by virtue of s. 6 (5- 7) but 
its provisions can be used to provide a sub- contractor, such as a stevedore (who will not 
have a legal possession and therefore not a bailee) with the benefit of 'exceptions' and 
'limitations' in the contract of carriage. Redrafting the 'Himalaya' clause is still needed, 
though, to avoid the problems highlighted in The Makhutai and extent the benefit of 
jurisdiction and choice of law clauses to sub- contractors. 
Under the Hamburg Rules, the sub- contractor will have the benefit of the Rules as 
the 'actual' carrier under both art. 10 and art. 11. However, independent contractors such 
as stevedores will still need the protection of the 'Himalaya' clause since such sub-
contractors will not be protected under the Rules by virtue of art. 7 (2). 
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Under the Draft Instrument, a sub- contractor who is included within the definition 
of the 'performing party' art 1 (17) '11 h h b . ,. ,WI ave t e enefit of the carner's rights and 
imnlunities provided by this Instrument under art. 6 (3) (1) (a). Sub- contractors will still 
need Himalaya clauses to rely on jurisdiction and choice of law clauses since such clauses 
are not covered by the Draft Instrument but rather by virtue of a Himalaya clause. If the 
sub- contractor is not covered by the definition of the 'performing party, under art. 1 (17), 
they will still be able to have the carrier's defences and limitations of liability provided 
under the Instrument, by virtue of art. 6 (3) (3). This is because such sub- contractors can 
be classified as 'any other person' under art. 6 (3) (2) (a) (ii). 
11- Claimant is an endorsee of a bill for goods which are never shipped 
The claimant in this case will not have a cause of action against the carrier under s. 2 (1) of 
the 1992 Act, by virtue of s. 4. This is because a third party will be able to rely on s. 4 of 
the Act if he could prove that the document which he holds is a bill of lading. At common 
law, if no goods are shipped at all there is no bill of lading and so what purports to be a bill 
is in fact a mere 'nullity'. 
Under the Draft Instrument, the reference is not to a 'bill of lading' but rather to a 
'contract of carriage' under s. 13. However, in Heskell .v. Continental Express Ltd., the 
court held that the issuance of a bill of lading would not constitute a carriage contract, 
unless the goods were received by the shipowner or his agent for shipment. Therefore, the 
result under the Draft Instrument would be the same as under the 1992 Act. 
Under the Draft Instrument, the cargo owner would be able to sue both the carrier 
and the performing party which would prevent non- contractual claim to go outside the 
scope of this instrument. The Draft Instrument will be applicable to the corresponding 
transactions such as electronic bi1ls of lading and to combined transport bills and 
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NVOCC's bills. The shipper and the cargo owner will be able to sue for their loss without 




1 ) Baughen, S., Shipping Law, 2nd Edition, Cavendish Press 2001. 
2) Bools, Michael D., The Bill of Lading- A Document of Title to Goods- An Anglo-
American Comparison, 1 st Edition, London & Hong Kong: L.L.P. 1997. 
3) Boyd, Stewart C., Burrows, Andrew S., and Foxton, David., (et al) Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1996. 
4) Chitty on Contracts, 28th Edition, Vol. One, General Principles, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 1999. 
5) Colinvaux, R., Carver's Carriage by Sea, 13th Edition, London: Stevens & Sons 
1982. 
6) Cooke, J., Kimball, J.D., Young, T., Martowski, D., Taylor, A., and Lambert, L., (et al) 
Voyage Charterers, London: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., 1993. 
7) D' Arcy, L., Murray, C., Cleave, B., and Others, (et al), Schmitthoff's Export Trade: 
Law and Practice of International Trade, 10th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2000 
8) Debattista, C., Sale of Goods Carried by Sea, London: Butterworths 1990. 
9) De Wit, Ralph., Multimodal Transport- Carrier Liability and Documentation, London, 
New York, Hamburg & Hong Kong: Lloyd's of London Press LTD 1995. 
10) Gaskell, N., Asariotis, R., and Baatz, Y., (et aI), Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, 
1 st Edition, L.L.P. 2000. 
11) Goode, R.M., Proprietary and Insolvency in Sales Transactions, 2nd Edition, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 1989. 
12) Guest, A.G., Ellinger, E.P., Harris, D.R., Lomnicka, Eva., Miller, C.J., Morse, Morse, 
C.G.J., Reynolds, F.M.B., Sealy, L.S., and Sir Treitel, G., (et aI), Benjamin's Sale of 
Goods, 6th Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2002. 
367 
13) Ivamy, Hardly E R., Payne and Ivamy's Carriage a/Goods by Sea, 13th Edition, 
London & Edinburgh: Butterworths 1989. 
1-1-) Palmer, N., Bailment, 2nd Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1991. 
15) Palmer, N., & McKendrick, E., (et al) Interests in Goods, 2nd Edition, London & 
Hong Kong: L.L.P. 1998. 
16) Proctor, C., The Legal Role a/the Bill a/Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal 
Transport Document, Pretoria- Interlegal 1997. 
1 7) Sanson, N., "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992- The Practice and Legal 
Implications" Conference Documentation- IBC Legal Studies and Services Limited 
Maritime Law Division 1993, SAS Portman Hotel, London WI. 1. 
18) Schoenbaum, Thomas J., Admiralty and Maritime Law, 2nd Edition, Hornbook 
Series- West Group 1998. 
19) Todd, P., Cases and Materials on International Trade Law, 1st Edition, London: Sweet 
& Maxwell 2003. 
20) Todd, P., Modern Bills a/Lading, 2nd Edition, London: Blackwell Law 1993. 
21) Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claim, 3rd Edition, Montreal: International Shipping 
Publications- BLAIS 1988. 
22) Sir Treite1, G., & Reynolds, F.M.B., Carver on Bills 0/ Lading, 1st Edition, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell 2001 
23) Wilford, M., Coghlin, T., and Kimball, J., Time Charters, 4th. Edition, LLP- London, 
New York, Hamburg and Hong Kong: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., 1995. 
24) Wilson, John F., Carriage a/Goods by Sea, 4th Edition, Longman! Pearson 2001. 
Articles 
1) Bassindale, 1., "Title to Sue- The Penultimate Chapter" [1991] 1 OGLTR. 25. 
2) Bassindale, J., "Ownership, Risk and Title to Sue in Oil Trading Contracts" [1988/89] 
368 
70GLTR. 171. 
3) Buaghen, S., "Bailment's Continuing Role in Cargo Claims" [1999] LMCLQ 393 . 
.+) Baughen, S, "Article III rule 8. A Killer Provision" [2002] STLI 14. 
5) Baughen, S., "The Gudermes- What Future for Brandt .v. Liverpool Contract" [1994] 
6) Baughen, S., "Contract and Co- operation- The Gudermes" [1991] LMCLQ 459. 
7) Baughen, S., & Campbell, N., "Apportionment of Risk and the Carriage of Dangerous 
Cargo" [2001] IML 1. 
8) Baughen, S., "Does a 'Freight Prepaid' Bill of Lading Mean What it Says?" [1999] 
Shipping & Transport Lawyer 12. 
9) Baughen, S., "The Gudermes- What future for Brandt .v. Liverpool?" [1994] M.L.R. 
62. 
10) Beatson, J., & Cooper, J.J., "Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage of Goods by Sea" 
[1991 LMCLQ 196. 
11) Bell, A., "Sub- Bailment on Terms: A New Land Mark- The Pioneer Container" 
[1995] LMCLQ 177. 
12) Berlingieri, F., "The Hague- Visby Rules and Actions in Tort" [1991] 107 L.Q.R. 18. 
13) Bond, R., "The Future of Electronic Commerce in International Trade" [1999] ITLQ 
15. 
14) Bradgate, R., & White, F., "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" 56 [1993] 
M.L.R.188. 
15) Burden, K., "EDI and Bills of Lading" [1992] 8 C.L.S.R. 269. 
16) B. J. D., "Ownership of Bulk Cargoes- The Gosforth" [1986] Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commerce Law 4. 
17) Caplehorn, R., "Bolero.net- Provides New Legal Framework for Electronic Trade" 
[1999] S & T.L.I. 12. 
369 
18) Caplehom, R., "Bolero.net- The Global Electronic commerce Solution for International 
Trade" [199] 14 BJIB & FL 421. 
19) Carver, TG, "On Some Defects in the Bills of Lading Act 1855" [1890] 6 L. Q .R. 289. 
20) Chuah, J., "The Bolero Project- the International Chamber of Commerce's Electronic 
Bill of Lading Project" [2000] Student Law Review 56. 
21) Clarke, M., "A Black Letter Lawyer Looks at Bolero" [1999] ITLQ 69. 
22) Clarke, M., "The Consignee's Right of Action Against the Carrier of Goods by Sea, 
The Captain Gregos (No.2)" [1991] LMCLQ. 5. 
23) Cooper, J.1., "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" 3 [1990] Current Law Statutes 
Annotated 1992. 50- 01. 
2-+) Davenport, BJ., "Problems in the Bills of Lading Act" 105 [1989] L.Q.R .. 174. 
25) Davenport, B.1., "Limits on the Hague Rules" [1989] 105 L.Q.R. 521. lB.L. 62. 
26) Debattista, C., "The Bill of Lading As the Contract of Carriage- A Reassessment of 
Leduc .v. Ward" 45 [1982] M.L.R 652. 
27) Del Busto, C., (et al), Documentary Credits- UCP 500 & 400 Compared- An Article 
-by Article Detailed Analysis of the New UCP 500 
Compared with the UCP 400, International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
28) De Val, P., "More points on the Brandt .v. Liverpool contract- The Aramis" 3 [1987] 
LMCLQ.255. 
29) Devonshire, P., "Sub- Bailment on Terms and the Efficacy of Contractual Defences 
Against A Non- Contractual Bailor" [1996] lB.L. 330. 
30) Diamond, A., "The Hague- Visby Rules" [1978] LMCLQ. 225. 
31) Emerson, V., "The Concept of Negotiability and the Electronic Bill of Lading- An 
Overview" [2001] 3 J.E.C.L. & P. 10. 
370 
32) Faber. D., "The Problems Arising from Multimodal Transport" [1996] LMCLQ 503. 
33) Faber, D., "Electronic Bills of Lading" [1996] LMCLQ 232. 
34) Force, R., ""A Comparison of the US Carriage of Goods by Sea- Present Text and 
Proposed Changes- and the Hamburg Rules" in New Carriage of Goods by 
Sea- The Nordic Approach Including Comparisons with some other 
Jurisdictions, (Honka, H., (et al))Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, 
Abo Akademi University, 1997. 
35) Girvin, S. A., "The Commission's Draft Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill 
and the Carriage of Goods by Sea" [1997] LMCLQ. 541. 
36) Girvin, S.D., "Shipper's Liability for the Carriage of Dangerous Cargoes by Sea" 
[1996] LMCLQ 487. 
37) Glass, D. A., "Bailment on Terms and Circular Indemnity- Spectra. v. Hayesoak" 
[1997] LMCLQ 478. 
38) Gronfors, K., "Non- Contractual Claims under the Hamburg Rules" in The Hamburg 
Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Mankabady, S., (et a1), 
Leyden! Boston: A.W. Sijthoff 1978, 187.) 
39) Hetherington, S., "Freight Forwarders and House Bills of Lading- The Cape 
Comorin"[1992] LMCLQ 32. 
40) Hetherington, S., "Freight Forwarders' Liability- The Oceania Trader" [1993] 
L.M.C.L.Q.313. 
41) Howard, T., "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" 24 J. Mari. Law & Com. 
[1993] 181. 
42) H G & Hl·ggS A "An Overview of the Implication of the Carriage of Goods umpreys,., ,., 
by Sea Act 1992" [1993] lB.L .. 61. 
43) Lai, M., "Delivery of Cargo without Production of the Original Bill of Lading" 9 
371 
[2003] 3 JIML 284. 
44) Livermore, J., & Euarjai, K., "Electronic Bills of Lading and Functional 
Equivalence" [1998] 2 J.I.L.T., <http://elj.warwickac.ukljilt. 
45) Sir Lloyd, A., "The Bill of Lading: Do We Really Need it?" [1989] LMCLQ 47. 
46) MacMillan, C., "Elder, Dempster Sails on: Privity of Contract Bailment on Terms-
The Mahkutai" [1997] LMCLQ 1. 
47) Mallon, P., and Tomlinson, A., "Bolero: Electronic 'Bills of lading' and Electronic 
Contracts of Sale" [1998] I.T.L.Q. 257. 
4S) Mankabady, S., "Comments on the Hamburg Rules" in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea ( Mankabady, S., (et al), Leyden! Boston: 
A.W. Sijthoff 1978,27. 
49) Martin- Clark, D., "Where are you leading us, Ranger", Shipping & Transport Law 
[2002] 1. 
50) Martin- Clark, D., "Straight, but not Straightforward" [2003] 3 Shipping & T.L. 1. 
51) McMeel, G., "The Redundancy of Bailment" [2003] L.M.C.L.Q. 169. 
52) Mildon, D., & Scorley, D., "Liabilities of the Transferees of Bills of Lading" [1999] 
HOSL 94. 
53) Nicoll, C. C., "BOLERO Makes the Bill of Lading Obsolete" [1999] Int. M.L. 148. 
54) Nilson, A., "Bolero- An Innovative Legal Concept" [1995] 6 Comps. & Law 17. 
55) Palmer, N., "Sub- Bailment on Terms" [1988] LMCLQ. 466. 
56) Reynolds, B., "Further Thoughts on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (UK)" 25 
J. Mari. Law & Com. [1994] 143. 
57) Reynolds, F.M.B. "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 Put to the Test" [1999] 
LMCLQ 161. 
58) Reynolds, F.M.B., "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" [1993] LMCLQ 436. 
372 
59) Reynolds, F.M.B., "The significance of Tort in Claims in respect of Carriage by Sea" 
[1986] L.M.C.L.Q. 97. 
60) Richardson, 1., "At the Cutting Edge" [1999] S & T.L.I. 14. 
61) Rose, F.D., "Liability for Dangerous Goods- The Giannis" [1998] LMCLQ 480. 
62) Rose. F., "Transhipment and the Hague- Visby Rules- Mayhew Foods Ltd v 0 
. . verseas 
Containers Ltd." [1984] LMCLQ 202. 
63) Sing, K., "Jurisdiction Clauses in Bills of Lading- The Cargo Claimant's 
Perspective- The Pioneer Container" [1995] LMCLQ 183. 
64) Sing, K., "Of Straight and Switch Bills of Lading" [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 416. 
65) Sukhninder, P., "The Shipment of Dangerous Goods and Strict Liability" [1998] 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 1. 
66) Swadling, W. J., "Sub- Bailment on Terms- The Pioneer Container" [1993] LMCLQ. 
9. 
67) Thomas, W.H., "Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995" 3 [1995] Current Law 
Statutes 28- 1. 
68) Treitel, G.H., "Passing of property under c.i.f. contracts and the Bills of Lading Act 
1855 The Delfini" [1990] LMCLQ. 1. 
69) Todd, P., "Oil Cargoes and the Bills of Lading Act" [1990] 7 OGLTR. 214. 
70) Todd, P., "Dematerialisation of Shipping Documents" [1994] nBL 410. 
71) Todd, P., "Brandt .v. Liverpool Doctrine- No Freight or other Charges Paid by 
Receiver (The Aramis)" [1988/89] 2 OGLTR 19. 
72) Treitel, G. H., "Bills of Lading: Liabilities of Transferee- The Berge Sisar" [2001] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 345. 
73) Treitel, G.H., "Bills of lading and implied contracts" [1989] LMCLQ. 162. 
74) Treitel, G.H., "Bills of lading and third parties" [1986] LMCLQ 294. 
373 
75) Tricks, S., "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992" [1991]12 OGLTR. 385.13) 55) 
76) Uiph, 1., "The Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995' CO' 
. 0- wnershlp and the Regue 
Seller" [1996] LMCLQ 93. 
77) Urbach, A., "The bill of lading: Who Owns the Cargo You Have Just Bought?" 
[1983/84] 12 OGLTR 267. 
78) White, F., & Bradgate, R., "The Survival of The Brandt .v. Liverpool Contract, The 
Gudermes" [1993] LMCLQ. 483 
79) White, F., & Bradgate, R., "The Survival of the Brandt. v. Liverpool contract, The 
Gudermes" [1993] LMCLQ 483. 
80) Wilson, 1. F., The Starsin- Spot the Contractual Carrier" [2001] STLI4. 
81) Wilson, J.F., "A Flexible Contract of Carriage - the Third Party Dimension?" [1996] 
LMCLQ 187. 
82) Wiseman, R.M., "The Delfini and its Consequences for CIF Transactions" [1988/89] 
8 OGLTR. 220. 
Documents 
1) The English and Scottish Law Commissions Rights of Suit in Respect of Carriage by 
Sea (1991) English Law Com. No. 196 and Scottish Law Com No. 130 
2) UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III 
(Transport Law) Ninth session U.N. Doc. AlCN.9/WG.IIIIWP.21, (15- 26 April 2002), 
The full text of the document is available on the net; http://www.uncitra1.org/en-index.htm. 
3) The comments on text of UNCITRAL Transport Law- Preliminary Draft Instrument on 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
Working Group III (Transport Law) Ninth seSSIOn U.N. Doc. 
374 
A/CN.9/WG.IIIIWP.21/Add.l, (15- 26 April 2002). The full text of the document is 
available on the net; http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. 
-+) Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the Work of its ninth session, United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Thirty- fifth session U.N. Doc. 
AlCN.9/510, (New York, 17- 28 June 2002). The full text of the document is available on 
the net; http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. 
5) Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions, Advise from 
The Law Commission, December 2001. The full text of the document is available on the 
net; http://www.lawcom.gov.library. Report on 
6) The Rulebook of the Bolero System see Bolero Association at 
http:!\Y\\'\y.boleroassociation.orglrulebookl, or http://www.boleroassociation.org/dow-
docs.htm. 
7) The Report Prepared by Allen & Overy and Richards Butler, London, for Bolero 
International Limited, operators of the Bolero System titled "International Legal feasibility 
Report"~ 2nd Edition, November 1997 (updated August and December 1999). The full text 
of this document is available on the net; at http://www.bolero.net/decisionllegal/legal.php3 
or http://www.bolero.netlcontentlsearchllibrary. 
375 
